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Executive Summary  
 
This thesis analyzes how effectively international climate finance has reduced greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions in developing and emerging countries in the last 20 years. Furthermore, it identifies variables 
that influence the effectiveness of different channels. Two types of finance are studied in this context: 
(1) payments for carbon credits under the Clean Development Mechanism, a market-based approach 
under the Kyoto Protocol, and (2) grants from the Global Environment Facility (GEF), the official 
public finance channel under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. 
 
In a first step, the study addresses the provision of resources, which is a precondition for effectiveness of 
international climate finance. It analyzes how different interpretation of “new and additional” finance, a 
common term in international decision texts, influences the level of climate finance. Understanding “new 
and additional” as “above current climate finance” would enhance the level of climate finance but it may 
lead to diversion of development assistance and is, therefore, not acceptable for developing countries. 
Two alternative interpretations of “new and additional” may better enable an increase in climate finance 
without diverting development assistance: “above pre-defined projection of development assistance and 
climate finance” or “from new sources”. Climate negotiators may consider these definitions as promising 
compromises between the current positions of industrialized countries (no definition) and developing 
countries (above 0.7% of GNI flowing to development assistance).  
 
In a second step, the study analyzes whether CDM and GEF have been as effective as they report in 
reducing GHG emissions via renewable energies. Using random effects, fixed effects and generalized 
methods of moment models, we estimate the determinants of renewable energy diffusion in more than 
120 countries and conclude that both CDM and GEF tend to overestimate their influence on the 
diffusion of renewable energy power generation. Only on biomass power the CDM has the same or even 
a higher influence than officially declared, while results for geothermal and hydro power are not fully 
clear. These macro-level results are consistent with predictions derived from principal-agent theory as 
well as with past project-level evidence of support for business-as-usual projects by the CDM and the 
low quality of GHG assessments within GEF procedures. 
 
In a third step, we analyze whether GEF and CDM influence the adoption of renewable energy policies, 
as the latter are key drivers of GHG emissions reductions via renewable energies. Using event-history 
models, we estimate that GEF and CDM have some (albeit limited) influence on adoption of “soft” 
policies, such as targets and framework policies, while no significant influence on costly policies, such as 
feed-in tariffs and other financial incentives can be observed in the short term. This lack of influence on 
financial incentives can be explained by the focus of GEF on capacity building and the potential fear of 
some developing countries that CDM may not support policy-financed projects. In this regard, the 
decision of CDM regulators to not punish countries for climate-friendly policies seems to have at least 
avoided a negative impact of CDM on renewable energy policy adoption. 
 
In a final fourth step, the relationship between private finance and cost-effectiveness of international 
climate finance in reducing GHG is examined. While policy makers call for mobilizing as much private 
finance as possible in order to reach the goal to mobilize USD 100 billion per 2020, the empirical analysis 
of more than 300 CDM and GEF projects shows that this is not the most cost-effective strategy. While 
the analysis supports the finding of others that the private sector is more cost-effective than the public 
sector, it also finds that private finance intensity is far from perfectly correlated with cost-effectiveness. 
This is both because some cost-effective projects have very low private finance intensities (e.g. non-CO2 
reduction projects), and because the public sector is a major investor in climate-friendly technologies 
(e.g. in China). This means that selecting projects according to mobilization of private finance can only 
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improve cost-effectiveness in a situation where policy makers would otherwise not select the most cost-
effective projects due to limited knowledge. 
 
The results imply that international climate finance has to be reformed. Market-based mechanisms may 
have to move in the long-term from project-based payments (as under the CDM) to uniform carbon 
pricing (e.g. emission trading systems or country-wide carbon taxes), while public climate finance has to 
more consistently measure GHG reductions and provide clearer incentives for national climate policies, 
e.g. by prioritizing countries with ambitious low-carbon development plans. Finally, policy makers 
should be careful when focusing climate finance on mobilization of private finance as such a strategy 
may leave out some of the most cost-effective mitigation options. 
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1 Introduction  
 
Anthropogenic greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions are now widely seen as responsible for observed 
climate change, including the average warming of the surface (Solomon et al., 2007).  Politicians have 
agreed in 2009 that global warming should not surpass 2 degrees above pre-industrial levels to prevent 
dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system (UNFCCC, 2009b). However, current 
actions taken on a national and global level are seen as not sufficient to keep global warming below 2 
degrees (Rogelj et al., 2010), particularly because energy consumption and GHG emissions in developing 
countries are projected to rapidly raise (Hagem and Holtsmark, 2009; IEA, 2009a, 2010a).   
 
An effective international climate regime is vital for achieving the politically set goals (Yamin and 
Depledge, 2004; Gupta et al., 2007)1, given that a safe climate is a global public good (Kaul, 2003) and, 
therefore, nations cannot be expected to take action unilaterally. A key ingredient of effective 
international environmental regimes is financial support for developing countries (Biermann et al., 2012), 
in case of climate change both to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and to adapt to climate change. This 
financial support is often referred to as “climate finance” in the literature (Stewart et al., 2009; Buchner 
et al., 2011b; Haites, 2011; Michaelowa, 2012).  
 
As there is no agreed definition of international climate finance (Buchner et al., 2011a), we define it here 
as “international financial payments, directly or indirectly mobilized by industrialized country governments that cover costs 
of climate change mitigation and/or adaptation in developing and emerging countries”. This definition does not only 
include public finance channels, such as the Global Environment Facility (GEF), but also payments via 
market-based mechanisms, such as the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM).2 We use the term 
“developing and emerging countries” here as financial support in international climate policy has also 
been flowing to rapidly growing countries like China, Mexico, Russia and Thailand, to which the term 
“developing country” hardly applies any more. “Developing and emerging countries” are defined here as 
all countries without financial commitments under the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC).   
 
Not only mitigation actions but also the level of international climate finance is seen as substantially 
below the needs for keeping global warming below 2 degrees (World Bank, 2009; Roberts et al., 2010b; 
Olbrisch et al., 2011). Therefore, industrialized countries have committed themselves to increase the 
current level of climate finance from roughly USD 10-20 billion in 2010 to USD 100 billion in 2020 
(UNFCCC 2009). Spending this finance effectively will be important to narrow the gap between 
business-as-usual GHG emissions and the 2-degree-path. For effective use, the lessons learned from the 
last 20 years of international climate finance may be important. Therefore, this study addresses the 
following main question: how effectively has international climate finance reduced GHG in developing and emerging 
countries in the last 20 years, and which factors have determined effectiveness?  
 
Climate finance institutions are confident about their effectiveness: “1 billion tonnes of CO2 mitigated since 
2004” is a highlight of the recent CDM report (UNFCCC, 2012), while the GEF reports that its energy 
efficiency investments “are expected to reduce carbon dioxide emissions by 1.3 billion tonnes by 2020” (GEF, 
2009b: 1), while its promotion of renewable energy shall result “in an estimated direct avoidance of 290 million 
tonnes CO2 (GEF, 2011c: 1).” Can researchers trust these numbers? Existing studies cast doubt on the 
                                                     
1 While scholars agree that international coordination and agreements are key for climate policy, they disagree on whether the 
international regime should be regulated with a top-down approach (internationally agreed targets and timetables determining 
domestic actions) or a bottom-up approach (harmonizing and coordination of national actions), see Aldy and Stavins (2007).  
2 This definition differs from the one by Buchner et al. (2011b), who also include private investments that are not mobilized by 
governmental intervention, and the one by Michaelowa (2011b), who only includes public but no market-based sources in 
“climate finance”. 
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reliability of these claims (see e.g. Eberhard et al., 2004; Michaelowa and Purohit, 2007; Mee et al., 2008; 
Schneider, 2009b), so a more thorough evaluation of effectiveness in reducing GHG seems to be 
warranted. 
 
Studying past effectiveness of international climate finance does not start from scratch given the growing 
literature on the provision (e.g. Dellink et al., 2009; Harmeling et al., 2009; UN, 2010; Michaelowa and 
Michaelowa, 2011b), the governance (e.g. Ballesteros et al., 2010; Müller et al., 2010), and the spending 
and evaluation of climate finance (e.g. Mee et al., 2008; Alexeew et al., 2010; Donner et al., 2011). 
Therefore, this study focuses on four specific gaps in the literature.  
 
The first gap refers to the provision of international climate finance, as one of the factors influencing 
effectiveness. While determinants of individual nations’ contributions have been studied, both for public 
finance (Michaelowa and Michaelowa, 2011b) and carbon credits (Zhang, 2001; Jotzo and Michaelowa, 
2002; Pinske, 2006; Flues, 2012), the relevance of international decision texts in the climate regime has 
only rarely been studied (e.g. Michaelowa and Michaelowa, 2011b). Specifically, no study has analyzed 
the term “new and additional” finance, which has been included in all major climate agreements 
(UNFCCC, 1992, 1997, 2001, 2009b) as developing countries requested that aid flows should not be 
redirected (Benedick, 1991; Bodansky, 2001; Chasek et al., 2010). The question is whether specific 
definitions of the term “new and additional” can help to increase the level of climate finance without 
leading to redirection of development assistance flows. This seems a particularly important question, as 
development assistance flows are still used to meet climate finance pledges, as criticized by NGOs and 
the media (Vidal and Adam, 2009; Oxfam Australia, 2012; Clarke, 2013). Additionally, industrialized 
countries have counted already planned or pledged climate finance as “new and additional” (Doyle, 
2010; Oxfam, 2012). Therefore, a clear definition of the term seems to be warranted, and our first sub-
question is: How would the term “new and additional” have to be defined to enable an actual increase of climate finance 
without redirection of development aid (Research question 1)? 
 
The second gap refers to economic studies on cost-effective spending of climate finance. Generally the 
use of carbon price is seen as the most effective and cost-effective way to reduce GHG emissions (e.g. 
Pearce, 1991; Baranzini et al., 2000; Nordhaus, 2006; Stern, 2007), as the carbon market price should 
theoretically incentivize market participants to undertake the most cost-effective mitigation measures. 
Therefore, the CDM as a market-based mechanism is often considered as more cost-effective than 
public finance channels where incentives to lower costs are missing (e.g. Heller and Shukla, 2003). 
However, several micro-level studies have questioned the cost-effectiveness of the CDM as many 
projects – specifically renewable energies – may also have taken place without CDM support 
(Michaelowa and Purohit, 2007; Wara and Victor, 2008; Schneider, 2009a). These micro-level studies 
have left two questions open: first, whether the case-study results – that the CDM has in many cases not 
been effective in driving renewable energies – also apply on the macro level, which is ultimately of 
interest for the effectiveness of the climate regime, and second, whether public finance may have been 
more effective in the case of renewable energies, as it can also address information and regulatory 
barriers. Therefore, our second sub-question is: How effective has the CDM been in reducing GHG emissions via 
renewable energy diffusion, and how effective has public finance been in comparison (Research question 2)? 
 
The third gap can be found in the literature on the effectiveness of international environmental regimes. 
This tradition stresses that effectiveness of international environmental regimes is, among other factors, 
closely determined by the implementation via national policies (see e.g. Haas, 1989; Keohane et al., 1993; 
Underdal, 1998). While national policies of developing countries are widely seen as important for 
reaching the 2 degrees target (Frankel, 2007; Michaelowa, 2007c; Den Elzen and Höhne, 2008), studies 
on the adoption of climate-friendly energy policies have focused on industrialized countries (Jacobsson 
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and Lauber, 2006; Vachon and Menz, 2006; Huang et al., 2007; Matisoff, 2008). The few studies on RE 
policy adoption in developing countries have not examined the role of international climate finance (e.g. 
Benecke, 2009). However, international climate finance may be an relevant determinant of policy 
adoption: public finance actively aims at inducing renewable energy (RE) policies (GEF, 2011c), while 
market mechanisms can both form an incentive or disincentive for policies (Winkler, 2004; He and 
Morse, 2010). Thus, our third sub-question is: Has international climate finance induced developing countries to 
undertake renewable energy policies (Research question 3)? 
 
The fourth and last gaps relates to the role of private finance. While scholars agree that the private sector 
will be needed for a large part of investments in low-carbon technologies (Lile et al., 1998; Zhang and 
Maruyama, 2001; Schmidt et al., 2008; Brinkman, 2009; Bowen, 2011; Olbrisch et al., 2011) and that the 
private sector is often more cost-effective in implementation (Dunkerley, 1995; Estache, 2001; Mueller, 
2003; Pattillo, 2006; Hodge and Greve, 2007), no study has analyzed whether focusing climate finance 
on mobilizing private finance enhances effectiveness. Given potential trade-offs between the goals of 
climate policy makers (mitigation) and private investors (maximizing profits), mobilizing as much private 
investments as possible may actually reduce effectiveness of climate finance.  This literature gap is 
particularly relevant as policy makers (EU, 2011; G20, 2011) repeatedly call for increasing the 
mobilization of private finance for climate change, which is in their self-interest as they have to reach the 
UNFCCC goal of mobilizing USD 100 billion of public and private finance per 2020. Therefore, the 
fourth sub-question is: How does a focus on mobilizing private finance influence the cost-effectiveness and effectiveness of 
climate finance (Research question 4)? 
 
While the four research questions are, at first sight, independent from each other, there are important 
links: For instant, the provision of new climate-related resources (research question 1) is a prerequisite 
for effective promotion of renewable energies with public climate funding, examined by the second and 
third research question. Furthermore, the effectiveness in climate finance in promoting renewable 
energies (research question 2) may depend on the ability to promote related public policies (research 
question 3) and the mobilization of private investments (research question 4). 
 
This study is structured as follows. The second chapter summarizes the history of and the key literature 
on international climate policy and climate finance to provide the relevant framework for the following 
analysis. Then, the literature on effectiveness of international climate finance is reviewed, explaining in 
more detail, why the four sub-questions are of particular relevance for climate finance effectiveness but 
have not yet been addressed. Also the strategies for answering the research questions are summarized: 
mainly, quantitative econometric models are used, but also qualitative data from the literature and semi-
structured interviews (chapter 3). This is followed by four chapters addressing the four research 
questions; each of these chapters has a short introduction, method and data section, and discusses the 
results (chapters 4-7). A final chapter reviews the main findings and draws conclusions both for research 
and for policy-making. 
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2 International climate policy and finance: an overview 
 
This chapter describes the historical evolution of international climate policy and finance, which is 
essential to understand the political shaping of existing climate finance mechanisms and their 
effectiveness. At the same time, for both climate policy and climate finance the most important research 
is summarized, in order to embed this study in the wider academic literature. 
 
 
2.1 International climate policy  
 
2.1.1 History  
 
While there had already been first scientific evidence of rising GHG emissions and global warming in the 
1960s and 1970s, it did not come on the international agenda before the mid to late 1980s. A 1985 
scientific conference organized by the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) and the United 
Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP) in Villach concluded that global warming is highly 
probable and that governments should consider an international convention on climate change 
(Bodansky, 2001)3. In the coming years, many notable institutions, including NASA, recognized that 
global warming was happening, and the topic received substantial media and political attention. In 1988 
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) was founded by WMO and UNEP, with the 
role of summarizing the scientific evidence on climate change (Chasek et al., 2005). The 1990 first 
assessment report (Houghton et al., 1990) concluded that it is “certain” that human-induced greenhouse 
gas emissions enhance the natural greenhouse effect. The IPCC also concluded that man-made climate 
change will imply sea-level-rise and potentially substantial changes in ecosystems. A coalition of like-
minded scientists, NGOs and European governments sharing a scientific consensus on climate change 
began pushing for an international protocol obliging governments to limit greenhouse gas emissions4. 
Official negotiations under the United Nations (UN) General Assembly began in 1991 and resulted in 
the Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). The UNFCCC, signed at the UN 
conference on environment and development in Rio de Janeiro 1992, set the ultimate objective in Article 
2 to “stabilize greenhouse gas emissions in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous 
anthropogenic interference with the climate system” (UNFCCC, 1992). The UNFCCC did not include 
any clear commitment on emission targets and timetables as the United States (US) acted as veto power 
(Chasek et al., 2005). 
 
The 1992 UNFCCC also spurred an early divide between industrialized and developing countries by 
establishing specific commitments for Annex-1 countries (industrialized countries and the former 
Eastern Bloc) in “taking the lead” in GHG emission reductions and advanced reporting (Article 4.2). 
Additionally, Annex-2 countries – industrialized countries excluding the former Eastern Bloc – took on 
the commitment to provide “new and additional” financial resources that cover costs of reporting 
obligations as well as mitigation and adaptation activities by developing countries (Article 4.3). The 
UNFCCC also included several principles that reflect the interests of developing countries, such as 
“common but differentiated responsibilities and capabilities”, the “specific needs and special 
circumstances of developing country Parties” and the “right to sustainable development (Article 3). The 
division between Annex-1 and non-Annex-1 reflected the economic development and GHG emissions 
                                                     
3 The relevance of the Villach conference for international climate policy to get on the political agenda is, however, contested 
(Franz, 1997). 
4 This coalition of like-minded scientists and policy makers is often called an “epistemic community” by political scientists 
(Gough and Shackley, 2001). Actually, Peter Haas, who shaped the term “epistemic community” (Haas, 1989), restricts the term 
to scientists that transmit scientific evidence to politicians (Haas, 2004). 
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per capita at the time of the convention but it also led to path-dependence (Castro et al., 2011a), as 
countries began to think and negotiate along this division, and no relevant developing country was added 
to Annex-1 in the last 20 years. The convention text specifically takes into account the interests of the 
large and growing developing countries Brazil, China and India, who were concerned about their right 
for economic development and wanted to avoid restrictions on their sovereignty, while the Small Island 
States did not reach their desired targets and timetables, and oil-producing countries could not block the 
adoption of the convention (Bodansky, 2001). 
 
The UNFCCC entered into force after ratification of more than 50 states in 1994, and the first 
Conference of the Parties (COP) to the UNFCCC in Berlin 1995 created the Ad Hoc Group on the 
Berlin Mandate to negotiate a binding agreenment on actions to be taken after the year 2000 (Bodansky, 
2001; Chasek et al., 2005), with a focus on strengthening industrialized countries’ commitments, while 
additional commitments for developing countries were excluded (UNFCCC, 1995). The IPCC’s second 
assessment report in 1996 strengthened the view that climate change mitigation was needed (Bodansky, 
2001), influencing the negotiations under the Ad Hoc Group that resulted in the Kyoto Protocol 1997 
that entailed binding targets for all Annex-1 countries to limit emissions of six greenhouse gases in the 
period 2008-2012, on average 5.2% below the 1990 level. The Protocol also contained three flexibility 
mechanisms to reduce costs of meeting these targets, including two mechanisms between industrialized 
countries (Joint Implementation and Emission Trading) and one mechanism for reducing emissions in 
developing countries (Clean Development Mechanism, CDM). The Kyoto Protocol is seen as a 
compromise between the US-led positions on low ambition and flexibility and the EU’s and developing 
countries’ position on high ambition and a focus on domestic actions (Oberthür and Ott, 1999; 
Bodansky, 2001). 
 
The first years after Kyoto were filled by cumbersome negotiations on the accounting of emissions from 
land-use, land-use change and forestry (LULUCF), compliance procedures and the flexibility 
mechanisms, particularly the CDM. Several Annex-1 countries including the US, Australia, Canada and 
Russia threatened not to ratify the Protocol if their positions on liberal use of carbon sinks and the 
flexible mechanisms were not taken into account, clearly slowing down the negotiations (Chasek et al., 
2005). Additionally, the chances for US ratification were considered low as the US Senate, whose 
approval was needed for ratification, already stated before Kyoto that it would not agree to any protocol 
unless it contained comparable commitments for developing countries. In 2001, the new US president 
George Bush made clear that his country would not ratify Kyoto. Nevertheless, the negotiations moved 
forward with the Marrakesh Accords at the 7th COP that clarified important details on the 
implementation, including the CDM. The Kyoto Protocol was seen as “ratifiable” at this time (Den 
Elzen and De Moor, 2002), and quickly the 55 needed nations ratified Kyoto until May 2002 (UNFCCC, 
2012). However, it only entered into force in 2005, when Russia and thereby countries representing more 
than 55 per cent of Annex-1 GHG emissions had ratified (Henry and Sundstrom, 2007). 
 
The period between 2005 and 2009 was characterized by substantial expectations that a more ambitious 
post-2012 climate regime might evolve. These expectations were nurtured by at least three factors. First, 
the publication of the Stern review for the British Government (Stern, 2007) changed fundamentally the 
way many economists and particularly politicians had been thinking about the economics of global 
warming: the Stern report argued that costs of climate change would be way higher than the costs of 
reducing GHG emissions and, therefore, substantial political action was required immediately. Before the 
Stern report, the standard economic view had been that uncertain costs of climate change and the high 
costs of mitigation only warranted very limited action (see e.g. Nordhaus, 1994). Second, the fourth 
assessment report of the IPCC in 2007 showed that the scientific community was even more certain that 
temperatures were increasing, mainly linked to man-made GHG emissions (Solomon et al., 2007) and 
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that climate change would imply changing precipitation patterns, sea-level rise, melting of arctic ice, 
changes in ecosystems and substantial decrease of agricultural yields in some developing countries (Parry 
et al., 2007). The IPCC also received the 2007 Peace Nobel prize, together with Al Gore, which further 
increased media and public attention to climate change. Third, the negotiations themselves took a turn: 
at the 13th COP in 2007, Australia announced to ratify Kyoto and the Bali Action Plan (UNFCCC, 
2008b) was adopted, establishing an Ad-Hoc Working Group for negotiating an agreed outcome on 
post-2012 climate policy until the end of 2009. In 2008, the EU endorsed an ambitious climate package 
and the rather climate-sensitive Democratic Party won the US elections. Thereby, the expectations of an 
ambitious climate treaty to be adopted in Copenhagen 2009 increased, although the world economy was 
in a recession.  
 
The 15th COP in Copenhagen 2009, the largest climate summit ever, was plagued by sub-optimal political 
and administrative management, and could not meet the public expectations, as the US and larger 
emerging countries were not willing to commit to internationally agreed GHG targets. The conference 
only resulted in the “Copenhagen Accord” (UNFCCC, 2009b), a loose political agreement that was in 
the end not even formally adopted by the COP due to opposition by few developing countries, such as 
Tuvalu and Venezuela (Bodansky, 2010). While the Copenhagen Accord was considered a 
disappointment by researchers and most environmental NGOs who concluded that pledged emission 
reductions were way below the ones needed to limit global warming below 2 degrees (Rajamani, 2010; 
Rogelj et al., 2010), the perception was more positive in the US where e.g. Bodansky (2010) argued that 
the accord also included major achievements, such as the long-term 2 degree warming target, the 
pledging of substantial financial resources and some first moves to break down the “fire wall” between 
Annex-1 and non-Annex-1 countries, as major developing countries for the first time had pledged 
emission reduction actions under an international instrument, and had agreed to report more frequently 
on emissions and mitigation actions, while the latter were now either subject to international verification 
(financially supported actions) or to “international consultation and analysis” (domestic actions). 
 
In the end, the Copenhagen outcome may have been below expectations but it set the cornerstones for 
the negotiations in the two coming years. In 2010, all elements of the Copenhagen Accord were included 
in the Cancun Agreements, and were formally adopted by the COP (UNFCCC, 2010). In 2011, the 17th 
COP in Durban, shortly disturbed by the withdrawal of Canada from the Kyoto Protocol, further 
clarified the Cancun agreements, e.g. by setting up the new Green Climate Fund and establishing a new 
market-based mechanism. Furthermore, the Ad hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform was 
established under which countries will negotiate “a protocol, a legal instrument or another decision with 
legal force” that shall be adopted by 2015 and should come into force not later than by 2020 (UNFCCC, 
2011a). The Durban wording can be considered a small step towards a more ambitious climate regime, as 
the legal wording is more ambitious than in Bali, and as the new agreement should also include 
comparable commitments by developing countries. At the 18th COP in Doha, most European countries 
and Australia, together responsible for only 15% of global GHG emissions, committed to reduce their 
emissions by 18% below 1990 levels under a second commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol 
(2013-2020). Canada, Japan, New Zealand and Russia did not take on any new commitments. The carry-
over of surplus emission allowances from the first to the second commitment period was limited to 2.5% 
of assigned allowances, to ensure that “hot air” allowances from Russia and other Eastern European 
countries are not endangering the environmental integrity of the Protocol. Furthermore, the Ad-Hoc 
Working Group on post-2012 climate policy was determined without any major new commitments on 
mitigation and finance. In the end, further work on increasing mitigation and finance ambition has been 
left to the Ad hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform that continues that will try to negotiate a 
new climate agreement until 2015. 
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2.1.2 Literature  
 
How do political scientists and economists explain the slow but steady evolvement of international 
climate policy? The slow progress can be explained by theories on public goods. The avoidance of 
dangerous climate change is considered a global public good (see e.g. Kaul, 2003; Nordhaus, 2006), 
meaning that the consumption of this good is non-rivalrous (Samuelson, 1954), that no human can be 
excluded (Buchanan, 1965) and that this applies to all humans worldwide. The challenge with global 
public goods is that individual countries have low interests in providing the good on their own, as 
benefits accrue to all nations but costs are covered by the providing nation. Game theorist interpret 
climate change as a classical prisoners-dilemma game, where individual nations would be jointly best off 
when collaborating but they are individually always better off when not collaborating (Barrett, 2003). A 
different interpretation is that “atmospheric space for emitting greenhouse gases” can be considered a 
common pool resource (Ostrom et al., 1999). Hardin (1968) was the first to describe that such 
“commons” tend to be overused. Ostrom (1990) explains how institutions, such as decision-making 
procedures, monitoring, sanction and conflict resolution rules, have limited the overuse of common pool 
resources at the local and regional level. However, creating these institutions at the international level is 
far more difficult (Ostrom et al., 1999). Even among global public goods (or common resources), climate 
change is particularly challenging. Compared to the protection of the ozone layer hardly any cheap 
abatement technologies are available in case of climate change, no hegemonic power (such as the US or 
China) has interests in solving the problem, and the number of collaborating nations needed to create a 
net-benefit situation is particularly high (Barrett, 2003). Given that the governments of the most 
powerful nations have no interest in acting, neo-realist scholars in international relations (e.g. Waltz, 
1979), can easily explain absence of any international progress on climate change, as they are assuming 
international anarchy and nations as uniform actors, so each country is assumed to have a unified 
position in international relations. However, how to explain that international agreements on climate 
change have nevertheless evolved and negotiations are continuing? 
 
The gradual evolution of the climate regime is best explained by theories of liberal institutionalism (e.g. 
Krasner, 1983; Keohane, 1984), who assume that, even when international relations are generally 
anarchic, countries may have some interests in cooperation and are not uniform actors, as they are 
influenced by domestic politics. The interplay of domestic politics, including interest groups, and 
international negotiations have been studied theoretically (Putnam, 1988) and also empirically: in the 
climate change case where both a business and a environmental lobby exists (Michaelowa, 1998; 
Gullberg, 2008), and countries do not just follow their economic interests (Sprinz and Vaahtoranta, 
1994). An additional theoretical contribution of liberal institutionalism is that it assumes that even weak 
institutions, such as the UNFCCC, will create norms and rules that can induce countries to cooperate. 
International climate change politics can be conceptualized as a regime, following Krasner’s (1982a) 
definition of an international regime as “implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making 
procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international relations”. Yamin 
and Depledge (2004) and Depledge (2005) have described the very complex international climate regime 
that has evolved, including UNFCCC principles, procedures (e.g. the decision-making by unanimity) and 
expectations (e.g. the objective of stabilizing the GHG concentration in the atmosphere). The existence 
of this regime may explain why negotiations continue even when key countries have no interests in 
progress and find themselves in an economic crisis. 
 
Some of the ‘classic’ theorists on cooperative action have recently urged to move the academic and 
political focus on climate policy away from the negotiations under the UNFCCC. Ostrom (2009) has 
called for polycentric governance of climate change, involving all geographical levels, while Keohane and 
Victor (2011) have found that climate change politics actually consists of a “complex of regimes” rather 
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than a single international regime. Some other political scientists (Biermann et al., 2012) have argued that 
institutions at the international level for coping with environmental governance are deficient (e.g. there is 
no unified UN environment organization, no majority voting) and not enough financial resources for 
developing countries are available. Such financial resources are the topic within international climate 
policy that is specifically studied in the following.  
 
 
2.2 International climate finance  
 
In many of the climate negotiation summits mentioned above (e.g. Rio 1992, Kyoto 1997, Marrakesh 
2001, Bali 2007 and Copenhagen 2009), climate finance – the financial resources for mitigation and 
adaptation in developing countries – have played a major role. In this chapter, we will further clarify the 
historic evolvement of international climate finance, the current situation (finance levels, sectors, GHG 
mitigation) and an overview of the literature. 
 
 
2.2.1 History  
 
Figure 1 depicts the history of international climate finance, both for public finance and market-based 
mechanisms. While this chapter focuses on the period 1992-2011, as shown in Figure 1, the 
understanding of climate finance also requires some background on earlier developments. 
 
Already in the 1970s and 1980s, environmental issues were seen by developing countries as a threat for 
their development aspirations, as environmental protection was considered as additional financial burden 
that may slow-down the economic development path (Chasek et al., 2010).  Developing countries also 
saw the North as primarily responsible for global environmental damage and, therefore, wanted the 
North to pay for any effort to abate global environmental pollution. Furthermore, developing countries 
feared that environmental concerns would be a new way for the North to dominate the South, e.g. by 
imposing environmental conditionality on aid flows. As consequence, developing countries asked the 
North to provide financial resources covering the costs of environmental treaty obligations of the South, 
as precondition for joining these treaties. Furthermore, the funding was also required to be “new and 
additional” to existing aid flows to avoid environmental conditionality and redirection of funding for 
development assistance (Chasek et al., 2010). The relevance of additional financial assistance was also 
nurtured by increasing environmental concerns, including climate change, in the 1980s (Fairman, 1996). 
 
Financial assistance in the 1992 climate convention was, however, not only shaped by this long-term 
Southern perspective on global environmental politics but also by the concrete design of the ozone 
regime where financial assistance was essential for inducing developing countries to reduce ozone-
depleting substances (Benedick, 1991; Luken and Grof, 2006). After the Montreal Protocol for the 
protection of the ozone layer was adopted in 1987, developing countries threatened not to ratify, if they 
were not compensated with resources “additional” to development assistance. This threat was relevant, 
as the projected rise of CFCs in developing countries could have offset any efforts achieved by 
developing countries. The South asked for coverage of all costs and channeling of resources through a 
new UN fund, while the US proposed to use existing funds under the World Bank (WB). The WB itself 
suggested the planned Global Environment Facility (GEF) as funding institution (Benedick, 1991). The 
compromises in the 1990 London Revisions to the Montreal Protocol were, first, to cover not all but 
only the “incremental” costs; second, to make sure that the most cost-effective technologies were used 
and, third, to establish a new “Multilateral Fund” under UNEP but use the World Bank as most 
important implementing agency. Furthermore, the term “additional” was kept but not clearly defined. 
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The US wanted to set not precedent for the much larger costs of climate change so the wording 
“without prejudice to any future arrangements that may be developed with respect to other 
environmental issues” was included in the London Amendments to the Montreal Protocol 1990 
(Benedick, 1991). 
 
During the negotiations of the 1992 FCCC, the same crunch issues on financial assistance as in case of 
the ozone regime emerged (Bodansky, 2001): First, the South wanted all costs of its obligations to be 
covered by the North. Second, developing countries requested a new fund to be established as in the 
ozone regime, while industrialized preferred the GEF, who was established in 1990 by the World Bank 
and just underwent a pilot phase involving various implementing entities, such as the UN Development 
Programme (UNDP) and UNEP. Third, developing countries demanded that financial resources should 
be “new and additional” to existing development assistance pledges.  
 
The final UNFCCC (1992) text on finance was a compromise of Northern and Southern positions 
(Bodansky, 2001). First, industrialized countries committed themselves to provide financial resources 
covering the full incremental costs of developing country mitigation commitments5 but only the costs as 
agreed between developing countries and operational entities of the financial mechanism (Article 4.3). 
This wording has been interpreted as being the same as in the Ozone case where industrialized countries 
pay all incremental costs of developing countries (Biermann, 1997) but developing countries mitigation 
commitments have been kept very vague in the UNFCCC (Article 4.1.), so the financial  mechanism’s 
operational entity received substantial power in shaping the agreement on incremental costs. Second, the 
GEF was made operational entity of the financial mechanism but only on an interim basis and it was 
asked to be restructured (Article 21). As concession to industrialized countries, financial resources could 
also be provided as concessional loans and through other bilateral, regional and other multilateral 
channels (Article 11). Finally, the term “new and additional” was included but no further definition given 
(Article 4.3). The term left open whether an increase of development assistance with climate co-benefits 
– as already provided in the 1980s (Roberts et al., 2009; Michaelowa and Michaelowa, 2011b) – would 
count as “new and additional”. As concession to developing countries, a further article (4.7) clarified that 
the implementation of developing country commitments will depend on the effective provision of 
financial and technological support. 
 
                                                     
5 These commitments included mitigation and adaptation programs, national GHG inventories, technology cooperation, research, 
and information exchange, all of which were very loosely defined (see Article 4.1. of the UNFCCC, 1992). 
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Figure 1: History of international climate finance 
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After the Rio conference, where GEF also became interim financial mechanism of the biodiversity 
convention6, GEF was restructured, receiving a very complex structure that balanced the interests of 
international organizations (World Bank, UNDP, UNEP), developed and developing countries and the 
civil society (Fairman, 1996). Administratively, the GEF secretariat remained part of the World Bank, 
which also acts as trustee of GEF funds, but the GEF received an independent governance structure 
with a council where developing countries had more voting power than in the World Bank but less than 
under UN institutions. With this set-up, the World Bank and industrialized countries retained some of 
the power asymmetry compared to other implementing agencies and developing countries (Streck, 2001). 
The politically shaped setup of the GEF also led to a complex approval process that is often perceived as 
cumbersome and lengthy (Werksman, 1998; Streck, 2001; Birner and Martinot, 2005). In 1995, the first 
COP of the UNFCCC decided to continue using GEF as interim operational entity of the financial 
mechanism (Bodansky, 2001), gave initial guidance to the GEF (see Figure 1) and in 1996, a 
Memorandum of Understanding between the COP and the GEF council was adopted clarifying the 
respective roles (UNFCCC, 1996)7. The resulting structure, where the COP gives guidance to the GEF, 
but the GEF council is formally responsible for decisions, and is dependent on quasi-voluntary 
contributions by industrialized countries8, resulted in continuing frustration by developing countries who 
argue that the GEF does not fully take into account the COP guidance, is underfunded and slow 
(Werksman, 1998). These points of criticism have stayed alive in developing countries’ positions on GEF 
for a long time, as reflected by the following G77 statement: “The GEF lacks adequate resources and 
requires the simplification of its procedures (G77, 2007: 2).”  
 
From 1995 on, a strand of more market-oriented resources began to emerge in the climate regime (see 
lower part in Figure 1). The first COP in Berlin decided to establish a pilot on “Activities Implemented 
Jointly” (AIJ), where countries could implement activities in other countries, including in the South. This 
AIJ program was based on concerns of countries like Norway and Japan, for which domestic GHG 
emissions reductions were costly. As concession to developing countries who opposed non-domestic 
implementation of UNFCCC commitments, it was not allowed to credit emission reductions under AIJ 
activities (Bodansky, 2001). During the negotiations of the Kyoto Protocol in 1997, the US wanted to 
include an AIJ-type mechanism for meeting reduction obligations abroad, which was strongly opposed 
by developing countries and initially the EU. On their side, developing countries pushed for additional 
financial resources, disappointed by decreasing development flows after Rio (Chasek et al., 2010) and the 
low GEF climate change funding (Werksman, 1998)9. Under this public finance perspective, Brazil 
proposed a Clean Development Fund, sourced by fees for non-compliance with emission targets. In the 
final negotiation round, the Clean Development Fund was transformed to the “Clean Development 
Mechanism” and the fees were replaced by the possibility to avoid non-compliance by achieving 
reductions in the South, essentially what the US wanted (Cole, 2012). Finally, in exchange for deleting a 
sentence on “voluntary commitments” by the South and the earmarking of CDM fees for adaptation 
funding, developing countries gave up their opposition against the flexibility mechanisms, and the CDM 
emerged as the “Kyoto surprise” (Werksman, 1998; Oberthür and Ott, 1999). The two main purposes of 
the CDM reflect the respective interests of developing and developed countries when setting up the 
                                                     
6 Later, GEF also became the financial mechanism of the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants (2001) and of 
the Desertification Convention (2003), while also supporting economies in transition to meet their obligations under the Montreal 
Protocol (GEF, 2012). 
7 In 1998 the GEF became permanent operational entity of the financial mechanism but the latter was to be reviewed every 4 
years (Oberthür and Ott, 1999). 
8 The fact that there is no strict financial obligations for  providing finance to GEF, gives contributors a stronger role than the 
actual voting shares in the GEF council suggests, e.g. one of the key contributors threatened to withdraw GEF funding if no 
result-based allocation formula was had been adopted (according to one interviewee, see Annex 10.1). In contrast, recipients may 
fear that they lose funding if they veto decisions in the GEF council. 
9 In the three years before the Kyoto conference USD 400 million were approved, see GEF (1997). 
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CDM: the first goal is to assist developing countries in achieving sustainable development and contribute 
to emission reductions10, while the second goal is to help developed countries in achieving their Kyoto 
targets in a cost-effective manner through emission credits from projects in developing countries. 
 
The Marrakesh Accords at the 7th COP in 2001 (UNFCCC, 2001) strengthened both the institutions for 
market-based resources and public finance (see Figure 1). On the market-based side, details on the CDM 
were clarified, which included the functions of the CDM Executive Board (EB) as the main supervising 
body, who received the tasks to approve new baseline and monitoring methodologies, register projects, 
issue “Certified Emission Reductions” and accredit operational entities, which were tasked to validate 
project design documents and certify monitored emission reductions. Furthermore, host countries of 
CDM projects were tasked to designate a national authority that has to approve CDM projects prior to 
validation. Furthermore, important terms such as “baseline”, “leakage” and the “crediting period” were 
defined. On the public finance side, GEF was urged to provide more funding for capacity building, and 
industrialized countries committed to provide funding via an increased GEF replenishment, bilateral and 
multilateral sources and via two new funds, the Special Climate Change Fund (SCCF) for adaptation, 
technology transfer and diversification of fossil-fuel-dependent economies, and the Least Developed 
Countries Fund (LDCF), supporting mainly adaptation. GEF was entrusted to operate both the SCCF 
and the LDCF. The COP also welcomed that the European Union, Canada, Iceland, New Zealand, 
Norway and Switzerland had declared their preparedness to jointly contribute USD 410 million by 2005, 
the first time concrete financial volumes were pledged under the climate regime. This funding was meant 
to come from GEF, SCCF, LDCF, the Adaptation Fund and further bilateral and multilateral sources, 
and was said to be beyond the level of 2001. Later, it proved to be impossible to verify whether the 
pledge was met as the 2001 funding level was simply not known (Pallemaerts and Armstrong, 2009), 
which led to calls for better monitoring, reporting and verification of financial flows (e.g. Müller, 2009). 
 
The CDM quickly emerged after the Marrakesh Accords. The CDM EB began to meet on a regular 
basis, set up supportive panels and working groups, approved the first baseline and monitoring 
methodologies in 2003, accredited first operational entities 2004 (UNFCCC, 2004) and a hydro power 
station in Honduras became the first registered project in January 2005 (URC, 2011). The Kyoto entry-
into-force in 2005 led to a “gold rush” in the international carbon market. All industrialized countries 
that ratified the Kyoto Protocol – except the former Eastern bloc countries who had excess emission 
allowances – planned to use CDM credits to fulfill their emission targets. Mainly promoted by the 
establishment of the EU emission trading system (EU ETS) that allowed for using CDM credits, the 
CDM quickly became an important pillar of the climate regime with thousands of projects registered and 
billions of dollars for CDM credit purchases contracted (URC, 2011; Michaelowa and Buen, 2012).  
  
For public finance, the next important step was the 13th COP in Bali 2007 (UNFCCC, 2008a), where the 
governance of the Adaptation Fund (AF) was decided, and where finance played a crucial role under the 
Bali Action Plan. In case of the AF, the newly created AF Board, in which developing countries had 
majority of seats, became the operating entity of the AF under authority of the COP, while the GEF was 
invited to provide secretary services and the World Bank became the trustee. This solution was a 
compromise between the interests of developing countries who were disappointed about GEF 
governance and wanted a COP-led fund, while industrialized countries preferred GEF as operational 
entity. As concession to developing countries, they were allowed to directly submit proposals to the AF, 
and did not have use multilateral agencies (e.g. World Bank, UNDP, UNEP) as intermediaries, as in case 
of the GEF. Under the Bali Action Plan (UNFCCC, 2008b), finance was at the edge of a last minute 
decision: industrialized countries achieved that a future outcome would include “nationally appropriate 
mitigation actions” (NAMAs) by developing countries, who should be “measurable, reportable and 
                                                     
10 The official wording is “contributing to the ultimate objective of the Convention” (UNFCCC, 1997: Article 12.2).  
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verifiable” (MRV). However, developing countries insisted that NAMAs are to be supported by finance, 
technology and capacity building, and that MRV also applies to support. MRV of both actions for 
developing countries and financial support was considered a major step forward in the climate regime 
(Winkler, 2008). 
 
In the years between 2007 and 2009, bilateral and multilateral agencies began to set up a range of funds 
and initiatives for mitigation and adaptation actions in developing countries, e.g. the German 
International Climate Initiative or Australia’s International Forest Carbon Initiative (HBS/ODI, 2011). 
The most relevant development was the setup of the USD-6-billion Climate Investment Funds (CIFs), 
which were administered by the World Bank. The CIFs were composed of different funds for clean 
technologies, renewable energies in low-development countries, adaptation and forestry, while regional 
development banks were used as implementing agencies. The CIFs were considered as an attempt by 
developing countries to have more decision power and undermine the new governance experiment 
under the AF (Müller and Winkler, 2008). The CIF initiators were aware of the political salience so the 
governance framework of the Clean Technology Fund, the largest CIF, made clear that it will not 
“prejudice the on-going UNFCCC deliberations” and that the fund should conclude its operations once 
new financial architecture is effective (CIF, 2008). Furthermore, the CIFs’ governance structure 
resembled the GEF one (apart from the CIFs’ independence from the UNFCCC), with balanced 
representation of industrialized and developing countries in the trust fund committees, consensus 
decisions and windows for civil sector participation (Ballesteros et al., 2010). Several experts (Müller and 
Winkler, 2008; Ballesteros et al., 2010) agreed that the strategy of the CIFs to support national climate 
policy frameworks was a positive move in the direction of the alignment and ownership principles of the 
Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. By the end of 2011, the CIFs have received more than USD 4 
billion, and approved more than USD 2 billion of funding  (CIF, 2011a), while their future is still unclear. 
 
The Copenhagen Accord 2009 (UNFCCC, 2009b), although not formally adopted by the COP, had a 
substantial outcome from a climate finance perspective (see bold text in Figure 1), mainly in four ways. 
First, delivery of all financial resources were said to be measured, reported and verified, meaning that 
MRV did not only apply to NAMA support as under the Bali Action Plan. Second, industrialized 
countries committed to USD 30 billion of “new and additional” resources for the period 2010-2012, the 
so-called fast-start finance. Third, there was a further commitment to mobilize USD 100 billion of 
financial resources per year in 2020, usually called “long-term finance”. The funding was said to come 
from a variety of sources, including private ones, and a high-level panel was established to identify 
promising sources. Finally, a new Green Climate Fund (GCF) was set up as additional operational entity 
of the financial mechanism. Interestingly, the CDM and new market mechanisms were not mentioned 
once in the Copenhagen Accord, although the definition of the USD 100 billion let open whether market 
mechanisms are included or not (Roberts et al., 2010b). 
  
The finance decisions of the Copenhagen Accord were all included in the Cancun Agreements 2010 
(UNFCCC, 2010) and, therefore, formally adopted by the COP. The Cancun Agreements also further 
specified MRV of support and established a new Standing Committee that should support the COP in 
improving coherence and coordination in the delivery of climate change financing, rationalization of the 
financial mechanism, finance mobilization and MRV of support. As well, the cornerstones for the new 
GCF were set, by deciding on equal representation of developed and developing countries on the GCF 
board, inviting the World Bank to be interim trustee and establishing a committee designing the fund. 
On the sources of long-term finance no progress was made, although the UN High Level Panel’s report 
concluded that reaching the USD 100 billion is challenging but feasible, when considering different 
sources, ranging from traditional budget sources, development bank finance, carbon taxes, and 
international transport levies to auctioning of carbon credits (UN, 2010). 
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At 16th COP in Durban 2011, both negotiations on public finance and market-based mechanisms slightly 
progressed (see Figure 1). In case of market-based mechanisms, the COP – after more than three years 
of discussions – finally decided to establish a new market-based mechanism (UNFCCC, 2011a), which 
was pushed by the EU and other industrialized countries to link the international carbon market to own 
contributions of developing countries, and to move from the project level (as in the CDM) to a sectoral 
or even national level (see e.g. Sterk and Wittneben, 2006; Schmidt et al., 2008; Schneider, 2009a for 
related proposals). However, it remained unclear from where demand for new market mechanisms 
should come from, as no major demand was expected to emerge from the 2nd commitment period under 
the Kyoto Protocol, which was also agreed upon in Durban (UNFCCC, 2011b). With regards to public 
finance, the GCF was launched by adoption of a governing instrument, which included some innovative 
features such as direct access, result-based payments and a private sector facility. Furthermore, a work 
program on long-term finance was established, as parties could not agree on any details regarding the 
USD 100 billion goal. Finally, the standing committee was tasked to conduct a biennial overview of the 
climate finance flows. Such an overview may have become vital as the 20-year history led to scattered 
international climate finance, nowadays flowing via GEF funds, the AF, CIFs, a variety of bilateral and 
multilateral channels, and in the future also via the GCF. In Doha 2012, the work program on long-term 
finance was extended but no formal decisions on the amount of finance in the years 2013-2015 was 
reached, even when few EU countries announced increased contributions. 
 
 
2.2.2 Level of funding, sectors and reported GHG emission reductions 
  
The just described history of international climate finance has led to a complex landscape, involving both 
public finance and market-based payments. In the following, a short overview is given, on the level of 
funding, the sectoral focus and the reported GHG emissions reductions. We only refer to finance for 
climate change mitigation and neglect adaptation finance in the following, as this thesis focuses on the 
effectiveness in reducing GHG emissions. 
 
Level of public funding 
 
While new Green Climate Fund may become more important in the future, the GEF is still the only 
operational entity of the UNFCCC’s financial mechanism that has disbursed climate change mitigation 
funding (see Figure 2); in the period 1992-2008 more than USD 2.5 billion have been committed for 
climate change mitigation (GEF, 2009a) and further 1.35 billion USD have been pledged for the period 
2010-2014 (GEF, 2010a).  
 
Even if the GEF has been operating the UNFCCC’s financial mechanism in the last 20 year, most public 
climate finance for developing countries have flown through other channels (see Figure 2). According to 
the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)’s climate change Rio marker 
coding more than USD 16 billion of Official Development Assistance (ODA) have been committed to 
projects with climate change mitigation as principal or significant objective in 2010 (OECD, 2011a). This 
is a sharp increase compared to 2009 and previous years, probably a result of the “climate year” 2007 
(IPCC 4th Assessment Report, Peace Nobel Prize, Bali Action Plan), the setup of the CIFs in 2008 and 
the USD 30 billion fast-start finance commitments for the period 2010-2012.  
 
It has to be noted that the surge of reported funding after 2007 (see Figure 2) may not only relate to 
factual increases in climate funding but also to low data quality in earlier years and increased pressure 
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over time to report climate change action (Roberts et al., 2009; Michaelowa and Michaelowa, 2011a)11. 
Projects marked as having “climate change” as objective may not have necessarily been undertaken 
because of climate change reasons. Michaelowa and Michaelowa (2011b) found that the share of RE and 
energy efficiency projects in overall ODA is mainly connected to the oil price and hardly to major 
climate change agreements, such as the UNFCCC or the Kyoto Protocol. 
 
The reported numbers of climate ODA as shown in Figure 2 do not include funding from the 
Multilateral Fund for the Implementation of the Montreal Protocol (MLF), whose programs – although 
aiming at reducing ozone-depleting substances – have substantial climate change mitigation benefits 
(Luken and Grof, 2006). The OECD (2011a) has included 100% of the Multilateral Fund in ”multilateral 
aid to climate change”, but the MLF’s future contribution to climate change is uncertain, as developing 
countries may use low-cost but climate-unfriendly HFCs in their plans to phase out HCFCs under the 
Montreal Protocol (Shende, 2010).  
 
 
Figure 2: International public and market-based climate change mitigation finance (reported commitments) 
 
Sources: OECD (2011b) for GEF and other international public climate finance (climate-coded ODA and multilateral loans). The numbers are 
the climate-related flows as reported by public institutions. While an increase of public climate-related finance may have happened after 2007, 
part of the increase may be due to politically motivated changes in reporting (see main text). For other official flows, data on climate change 
coding is not yet available for 2010 (see column with dashed line at the right). Source for CDM forward credits is Linacre et al. (2011). 
 
 
 
Level of market-based funding 
 
When the Kyoto Protocol came into force in 2005 and the EU ETS started its operations, the contracts 
for CDM credit purchases rapidly increased to several USD billion a year (see Figure 3). The value of 
                                                     
11 The OECD removed numbers for the climate change Rio markers prior to 2007 from their website, officially because data for 
the years 1998-2006 were obtained on a trial basis and reporting became only mandatory with 2007 flows (OECD, 2012c) but the 
removal of the data may also be related to the coding errors found in the data (Michaelowa and Michaelowa, 2011a). 
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such contracts even surmounted total ODA with climate change objectives in both 2006 and 2007. From 
2008 on, both CDM contracts and the carbon market price crashed due to the economic crisis and 
uncertainty on post-2012 climate policy. As the planned US cap-and-trade system was not approved by 
the US senate and the Copenhagen climate summit in 2009 did not result in binding emission limitations 
for post-2012, the interest in signing new CDM contracts declined even more in 2010. 
 
Despite the decline in CDM contracts in recent years, the actual CDM finance flowing North-South is 
still increasing. This is because most CDM contracts foresee payment upon delivery of credits, and new 
CDM credits have reached an all-time high in 2011, with credits representing 320 million tonnes of CO2 
issued by the CDM EB (URC, 2011). The corresponding value of the 2011 credits is approximately USD 
3.2 billion, when assuming an average price of 10 USD per credit. This credit price of 10 USD is 
approximately the average primary credit prices reported for the years 2004-2009 by GIZ (2011) and the 
World Bank carbon market reports (Lecocq and Capoor, 2005; Capoor and Ambrosi, 2006, 2007, 2008, 
2009, 2010). Some of the credits, particularly from unilateral CDM projects with no industrialized 
country partner (Michaelowa, 2007b), may have directly been sold on the spot market, where it would 
have fetched prices above USD 10 before mid-2011, and lower ones since then. 
 
 
Figure 3: Climate change mitigation finance under UNFCCC mechanisms between 1994 and 2011 
 
 
Sources: OECD (2011b) for GEF until 2010; GEF (2010a) for GEF 2011 figure; URC (2011) for issued credits, while assuming 10 USD as 
credit value; Linacre et al.(2011), Kossoy and Guigon (2012) for CDM forward contracts. 
 
 
 
Among UNFCCC-related mechanisms, the CDM as a market-based instrument has clearly become more 
important than the GEF as a public finance instrument (see Figure 3). In terms of funding 
commitments, the value of CDM forward contracts has overtaken GEF commitments already in 2004, 
while in terms of disbursements, CDM funding (value of issued credits) surpassed GEF funding in 2006. 
The supremacy of market mechanisms under the UNFCCC may, however, vanish in the next few years, 
as major funding commitments are foreseen for the Green Climate Fund as second operational entity of 
the UNFCCC’s financial mechanism, while no substantial new demand for credits under the CDM and 
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the new market-based mechanism are in sight, as the economic downturn has drastically reduced the 
demand for carbon credits, and no industrialized country currently seems to be willing to step-up its 
2020 mitigation target. 
 
 
Funding per project type 
 
Figure 4 displays the level of funding per project type according to official project documents. In case of 
CDM, the funding has been calculated by multiplying the amount of issued credits with 10 USD (same 
credit price assumed for all project types) 
 
Figure 4: Funding per project type (2008-2010, average) 
 
Sources: GEF Data from Stadelmann (2009), which is based on numbers in the official GEF documents (GEF, 2011a). The transaction costs 
(agency fees, GEF secretariat) are not included here; CDM funding is calculated as issued credits in tCO2 (URC, 2011) multiplied by an estimated 
credit price of 10 USD per tonne of CO2, which is based on primary credit prices reported by GIZ (2011) and the World Bank carbon market 
reports (Lecocq and Capoor, 2005; Capoor and Ambrosi, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010); the average of the years 2004-2009 is taken; MLF 
numbers from UNEP (2012); ODA numbers from OECD (2011b), excludes GEF and MLF 
 
 
 
CDM has focused on industrial gases – GHG other than CO2 and methane in the industrial sector (75% 
of issued credits until 2010) –, while renewable energies (15%), energy efficiency (5%), methane-reducing 
projects (5%) have been other relevant sectors. In the future, renewable energies will even have a higher 
share of issued CDM credits as they represent 68% of registered projects and 35% of expected credits 
until 2012 (URC, 2011). Finally, no credits for forestry projects have been issued until the end of 2010.  
 
GEF funding has focused on renewable energies and energy efficiency in the buildings, industry and 
energy sector (each 30-40% of funding), while 7% has been spent on energy efficiency in the transport 
sector. Only around 1% of funding has been used to reduce methane emissions in the waste and 
agriculture sectors, and also reduction of industrial gases and funding for afforestation and reduced 
deforestation has been negligible. However, new GEF funding for forestry is foreseen for the period 
2010-2014 (GEF, 2010a).  
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The MLF has uniquely focused on industrial gases, consistent with its main aim to support developing 
countries in phasing out ozone-depleting substances. 
 
ODA (other than GEF) funding with reported climate benefits has also focused on transport (21%), 
renewable energy (16%), energy efficiency and fuel switching (9%), while forestry (11%) is also a major 
sector. Given that many of these have been project types in ODA for a long-time, it is questionable 
whether these projects are indeed undertaken for climate purposes. Around 44% of climate-marked 
ODA cannot be attributed to a mitigation-related project type, either because it is cross-sectoral finance 
or because it is actually climate change adaptation finance that has been miscoded (see Michaelowa and 
Michaelowa, 2011a). 
 
GHG emissions reductions overall and per project type  
 
The GEF and CDM are the only two institutions that publish information about GHG emissions 
reductions of each of their projects. In case of GEF, GHG emissions reductions are reported as 
projections in the project documents, while in case of the CDM, GHG reductions are even verified and 
certified. Reported effectiveness in tonnes of CO2-equivalents (tCO2-eq) per year has been similar for 
CDM and GEF until 2010 (see Figure 5). From 2011 on, the overall GHG emissions reductions 
reported by the CDM should be higher than GEF, as CDM credit issuances are rising, while GEF 
funding has remained constant over time (see Figure 3).  
 
In case of public funding that is not channeled through the GEF, no information on GHG emissions 
reductions is available, as other ODA projects do not regularly report on this. Only for the MLF, GHG 
emissions reductions have been estimated. Although the MLF has no specific climate change aims, it 
may have reduced around 70-115 million tCO2-eq per year (UNEP, 2012), which is similar to the annual 
GHG emissions reductions of GEF and the CDM between 2008 and 2010. However, the GHG 
emissions reductions of the MLF will be comparatively lower in the future, both because the GHG 
emissions reductions via CDM are rising, and because of the threat that developing countries may use 
climate-unfriendly HFCs in their plans to phase out HCFCs under the Montreal Protocol (Shende, 
2010)12. 
 
On a sectoral basis, GEF has clearly reduced more GHG in energy efficiency (including the transport 
sector), while the CDM did better in reducing industrial GHG and methane emissions. The respective 
sectoral advantages may be overestimated, however, as GHG emissions reductions via GEF energy 
efficiency projects are not thoroughly verified (Mee et al., 2008; Stadelmann, 2009) and reductions of 
industrial GHG in the CDM have probably been overestimated as some installations may have artificially 
inflated their production of HCFC-22 to claim higher reductions of HFC-23 (CDM Watch, 2010; 
Schneider, 2011). Nevertheless, it is very likely that the GEF has reduced less industrial GHG – it has 
simply not been a political strategy – and that the CDM has been less successful in promoting energy 
efficiency, as it cannot address the information asymmetries and barriers in this sector (Koeppel and 
Ürge-Vorsatz, 2007), and CDM transaction costs are too high for small projects (Hinostroza et al., 2007; 
Karakosta and Askounis, 2010).  
 
The most interesting project type from a comparative point of view is renewable energy (RE): while 
GEF and CDM report to have reduced a similar amount of GHG emissions via renewable energies per 
year until 2010 (see Figure 5) the CDM’s reported GHG emissions reductions via RE have overtaken the 
ones of GEF in 2011, when CDM credits representing 74 million tonnes of CO2 have been issued for 
RE projects (URC, 2011). However, several studies have found that CDM’s GHG emission reductions 
                                                     
12 Therefore, the MLF programs now encourage countries to use low-carbon replacement gases (Multilateral Fund, 2012) 
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via renewable energies are substantially overestimated (Michaelowa and Purohit, 2007; Schneider, 2007; 
Haya, 2009), so it remains unclear whether GEF and CDM have reduced more GHG emissions via RE 
projects. Given that reported GHG emissions reductions may not be congruent with actual GHG 
emissions reductions, this thesis will avoid using official data on GHG emissions reductions for 
analyzing effectiveness; the only exception is chapter 7 where project-level GHG data is used. 
 
 
Figure 5: Reported GHG emissions reductions by mechanism and project type (2008-2010, average) 
Sources: GEF Data from Stadelmann (2009), which is based on numbers in the official GEF documents (GEF, 2011a). Only directly measurable 
reductions (“direct reductions”) are included. The GEF itself also estimates indirect reductions through e.g. capacity building; CDM Effectiveness 
in reducing GHG emissions is based on data for issued credits from URC (2011). In the effectiveness numbers, we neglect that the CDM as offset 
mechanism is meant to help industrialized countries complying with their targets, so some of the GHG emissions reductions may actually replace 
reductions in industrialized countries; MLF numbers from UNEP (2012). The lower estimate of effectiveness only includes projects reducing 
production of ozone-depleting substances, while the higher also includes projects reducing consumption. 
 
 
 
2.2.3 Academic literature on climate finance  
 
Finance for climate change mitigation has been studied from very different angles (see Tatrallyay and 
Stadelmann, 2012), e.g. with regards to its sources (Harmeling et al., 2009; UN, 2010; Springmann, 2013), 
the amounts required for fair burden sharing (Dellink et al., 2009), its governance architecture 
(Biermann, 1997; Ballesteros et al., 2010; Müller et al., 2010), the systems for reporting financial flows 
(Porter et al., 2008; Tirpak et al., 2010; Michaelowa and Michaelowa, 2011a), its contribution to 
sustainable development (Olsen, 2007; Sutter and Parreno, 2007; Alexeew et al., 2010; Zerriffi and 
Wilson, 2010), its geographical distribution (Hultman et al., 2009; Castro and Michaelowa, 2010), its 
contribution to technology transfer (Haites et al., 2006; Schneider et al., 2008; Seres et al., 2009), private 
companies’ perceptions of the CDM (Hultman et al., 2012) and how climate finance should be evaluated 
(Mee et al., 2008; Donner et al., 2011). To date the most frequently examined issue is the effectiveness of 
climate finance in reducing GHG emissions (see e.g. Michaelowa et al., 2003; Hepburn, 2009; Schneider, 
2009b; Schneider et al., 2010; Zerriffi and Wilson, 2010; Grubb et al., 2011).  
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2.3 Summary on international climate policy and finance 
 
This chapter has shown that international climate finance has been a key pillar of international climate 
policy since its beginnings. Already before Rio 1992, developing countries substantially pushed for 
including “new and additional” financial support in the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC).  
 
The 1990s were dominated by discussions on the shaping of the Global Environment Facility (GEF) as 
operational entity of the UNFCCC’s financial mechanism, while actual public climate finance flows to 
developing countries were mainly occurring through other channels. In the 2000s, the CDM as market-
based mechanism under the Kyoto Protocol emerged, and even overtook public finance as main 
international climate finance flow in the years 2006 and 2007. In the years since 2008, new CDM 
contracts substantially decreased due to the economic downturn and the lack of ambitious post-2012 
emission targets. In the same time, reported public climate finance saw a substantial increase, related to 
promises made at the Copenhagen summit in 2009 but also to increased pressure to report climate 
finance. 
 
While an overview of US dollars spent for international climate finance is easily possible, this is more 
difficult in the case of GHG reductions. Only the CDM reports detailed and verified GHG data, while 
among public finance channels, just GEF and the Multilateral Fund (MLF) under the Montreal Protocol 
provide some GHG estimates. According to this scarce data, GEF and MLF have been similarly 
effective than CDM in reducing GHG emissions in the years 2008-2010, while CDM has been much 
more effective from 2011 on. In sectoral terms, the CDM and the MLF have reduced industrial GHG 
(e.g. HFC) emissions very effectively, while the GEF mainly excelled in promoting energy efficiency. In 
case of renewable energies (RE), CDM and GEF have been similar effective according to official reports 
but data is hardly reliable. Given this similar effectiveness, the lack of reliable data and the substantial 
role of RE in low-carbon transformation pathways, a closer examination of CDM and GEF effectiveness 
in promoting RE seems to be warranted.  
 
The academic literature has examined several issues related to international climate finance, particularly 
the question whether it contributes to sustainable development. However, the effectiveness in reducing 
GHG remains the core question. As this will also be the focus of this study, the literature on climate 
finance effectiveness is considered in detail in the next chapter, in order to identify the most important 
research gaps. 
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3 Effectiveness of climate finance: definition, literature and research gaps  
 
In this chapter, the literature on the effectiveness of international climate finance is reviewed and 
research gaps are identified. As background, the term “effectiveness” and its measurement is more 
precisely defined, followed by official data on different effectiveness measures.  Then the common 
determinants of climate finance effectiveness, as reported in the literature, are reviewed. The main 
determinants serve as starting point for a more profound literature review that results in the 
identification of four research gaps and sub-research questions. 
 
 
3.1 Definition, measurement and official data on effectiveness  
 
3.1.1 Definition of effectiveness 
 
Gupta et al. (2007: 751) have defined environmental effectiveness as “the extent to which a policy meets 
its intended environmental objective or realizes positive environmental outcomes”. In case of climate 
change mitigation policy, the intended environmental outcome is the stabilization of greenhouse gas 
concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that prevents dangerous anthropogenic interference with the 
climate system (UNFCCC, 1992). Given the substantial gap between current (emission reduction and 
finance) pledges and a climate policy limiting global warming below 2 degrees (World Bank, 2009; 
Roberts et al., 2010b; Rogelj et al., 2010; Olbrisch et al., 2011), any GHG emission reduction achieved by 
international climate finance can be seen as contributing to environmental effectiveness. Therefore, we 
define effectiveness of international climate change mitigation finance as the ultimately desired environmental effect of climate 
policy, which is the reduction of GHG emissions, measured in tonnes of CO2-equivalent. All reductions of GHG 
emissions other than CO2 are transformed to CO2-equivalents using 100-year Global Warming Potentials 
(GWP), see Solomon et al. (2007).  
 
Our definition of effectiveness has two important implications. First, our definition of effectiveness 
focuses on the ultimate policy outcome – the actual effects of a policy in terms of environmental goal 
achievement – and not the policy output – the types and amount of policies and institutional 
arrangements adopted (for this distinction, see e.g. Hollifield, 1986; Holzinger and Knill, 2005; Bättig and 
Bernauer, 2009). Under this definition of effectiveness, we are not interested in policy outputs, such as 
enhanced capacity or regulatory changes (see Eberhard et al., 2004 for the case of the GEF), unless they 
improve the ultimate policy outcome, GHG emissions reductions.   
 
Second, we only focus on the primary goal of climate change mitigation policy, the reduction of GHG 
emissions, while neglecting other environmental, social and economic benefits (see Barker et al., 2007). 
This focus is purely analytical and is not necessarily congruent with the political intentions: apart from 
reducing GHG emissions the CDM also has the goal to support sustainable development according to 
the Kyoto Protocol (Olsen, 2007; Sutter and Parreno, 2007), and developing countries have repeatedly 
tried to re-focus public climate finance, including GEF finding, on development benefits (Fairman, 1996; 
Najam, 2005). The focus on GHG emissions reductions as desired effect of climate change mitigation 
finance will, therefore, limit the interpretation of the research findings: the results will only refer to 
effectiveness in reducing GHG emissions but not to other potential goals of climate finance, such as 
sustainable development benefits or political interests of industrialized countries (e.g. technology exports, 
improving bilateral relations). Therefore, some projects or programs may be judged ineffective by this 
study, as they are not reducing CO2, while they are actually judged as effective by the program managers 
or contributors, as development or other benefits are realized. To give a simple example, a project 
reducing industrial gases like HFC may be very effective in reducing GHG emissions, so it will be judged 
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effective by this study, while projects with low GHG reductions but high development benefits, such as 
small-scale RE plants (see Sutter and Parreno, 2007), will be judged as rather ineffective by this study.  
 
 
3.1.2 Output and output-input measures of effectiveness 
 
Effectiveness itself is a pure output measure (GHG emissions reductions), but we may also be interested 
in how much effect or output (GHG emission reductions) is achieved per input unit (see Table 1). There 
are two output-input measures, which are of interest: effectiveness per unit of climate finance and cost-
effectiveness – both measured in tCO2eq per USD.  Effectiveness per unit of climate finance is simply 
the amount of GHG emissions reduced per unit of public finance or carbon market payments. Cost-
effectiveness is a different measure, as it looks at the effectiveness in relation to economic costs of 
climate change mitigation.  
 
In case of public climate finance, such as in case of GEF, the two output-input measures can be the 
same, as the amount of climate finance is supposed to be equal to the economic costs of climate change 
mitigation. In case of carbon markets, the amount of climate finance is different to the economic costs, 
as climate finance is dependent on the carbon market price, while the costs depend on the specific 
mitigation measure, so effectiveness per unit of climate finance and cost-effectiveness are not the same. 
While this study focuses on effectiveness in reducing GHG emissions overall, we will also consider cost-
effectiveness and effectiveness per unit of climate finance, in cases where projects or programs are 
compared (chapters 5 and 7). 
 
 
Table 1: Output and output-input measurement of effectiveness 
Measure Type Definition (in this study) Unit 
Effectiveness Output GHG emissions reductions achieved  tCO2eq 
Effectiveness per unit of climate finance Output/Input GHG emissions reductions per unit of 
climate finance 
tCO2eq/USD
Cost- Effectiveness Output/Input GHG emissions reductions per unit of 
economic costs 
tCO2eq/USD
 
 
 
3.1.3  Reported effectiveness 
 
Figure 4 has already provided data on the pure output measure of effectiveness, the reduction of GHG 
emissions. According to this figure, CDM, GEF and the MLF have been similarly effective per year in 
the period 2008-2010, while data on effectiveness of other ODA flows is missing. In 2011, CDM became 
clearly the most effective channel, when credits equivalent to 320 MtCO2eq were issued (URC, 2012).  
 
Table 2 now adds the output-input measures: claimed effectiveness per unit of climate finance and 
reported cost-effectiveness. We focus on CDM and GEF here, as they are the only climate finance 
institutions that provide enough information for estimating output-input measures of effectiveness. 
 
Table 2 shows that in terms of reported effectiveness per unit of climate finance, GEF reports to be at 
least five times more effective than our estimations for CDM effectiveness per unit of climate finance. 
The main explanation is that public climate finance pays just the costs of climate change mitigation 
projects, while CDM funding is dependent on a market price that is often higher than the costs of 
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emission reductions (Müller 2007). It has to be noted that the CDM figures for “effectiveness per USD 
of funding”, are actually not CDM numbers but estimations based on effectiveness claimed by the CDM 
(each credit represents 1 tCO2eq) and a market price assumption (10 USD per credit, see footnote in 
Figure 4 for details on the calculation). We assume here the same CDM credit price for all projects but in 
fact, some project types like wind energy may receive higher market prices (Wu and Sheng, 2008). 
Therefore, the 0.1 tCO2eq/USD figure is just a proxy for effectiveness per unit of climate finance, and 
may actually differ per type of project, so numbers are set in parentheses. 
 
In terms of cost-effectiveness, so GHG emissions reductions per economic costs, numbers were 
calculated using information in several GEF and CDM project documents. Using this project document 
data, CDM projects are on average slightly more cost-effective than GEF projects. 
 
 
Table 2: Estimated climate finance (in 2009 USD) and reported effectiveness by mechanism and project type (2008-2010) 
  
Climate finance flows 
(in 2009 USD million)
Reported 
effectiveness
Reported 
effectiveness 
per unit of 
climate finance 
 Cost-
effectiveness 
estimated by 
author 
Years 
considered 
  USD M per year %
M tCO2-eq
per year
tCO2eq
per USD
tCO2eq 
per USD 
CDM1 Total 1312 100% 131 [~0.1] 0.65 2008-2010
 Industrial gases 978 75% 98 [~0.1] 2.22 2008-2010
 Methane 71 5% 7 [~0.1] 0.47 2008-2010
 Renewable energy 189 14% 19 [~0.1] 0.15 2008-2010
 Energy efficiency 53 4% 5 [~0.1] 3.23 2008-2010
 Transport 0 0% 0 [~0.1] n/a 2008-2010
 Forestry 0 0% 0 [~0.1] n/a 2008-2010
 Other 22 2% 2 [~0.1] n/a 2008-2010
     
GEF2 Total 164 100% 98 0.60 0.60 2008-2010
 Industrial gases 0 0% 0 1.18 1.18 2008-2010
 Methane  1 1% 1 0.39 0.39 2008-2010
 Renewable energy 62 38% 15 0.25 0.25 2008-2010
 Energy efficiency 48 29% 77 1.61 1.61 2008-2010
 Transport 11 7% 2 0.19 0.19 2008-2010
 Forestry 0 0% 0 n/a n/a 2008-2010
 Other (transport) 41 25% 3 0.07 0.07 2008-2010
1 Effectiveness equals issued credits in tCO2eq per year (URC 2011). Cost-effectiveness is calculated as the inverse of median abatement costs per 
project type, as calculated by Castro (2010). Effectiveness per USD of funding is the inverse of the expected primary CDM credit price. This 
primary credit price is estimated to be 10 USD per tonne of CO2, based on primary credit prices reported by GIZ (2011) and the World Bank 
carbon market reports (Lecocq and Capoor, 2005; Capoor and Ambrosi, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010); the average of the years 2004-2009 is 
taken. (In fact, this credit price may differ per type of project). In the effectiveness numbers, we neglect that the CDM as offset mechanism is 
meant to help industrialized countries complying with their targets, so some of the GHG emissions reductions may actually replace reductions in 
industrialized countries. CDM funding is calculated as issued credits multiplied by an estimated credit price of 10 USD per tonne of CO2. 
2 Data from Stadelmann (2009) based on numbers in the official GEF documents (GEF, 2011a). Only directly measurable reductions (“direct 
reductions”) are included. The GEF itself also estimates indirect reductions through e.g. capacity building. The transaction costs (agency fees, 
GEF secretariat) are not included here. 
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3.2 Potential determinants of effectiveness according to the literature 
 
Figure 6 shows the different components of the effectiveness of environmental regimes according to 
Underdal (2002), applied to the case of international climate finance. Our measure for effectiveness, the 
reduction of GHG emissions, can be considered the outcome of the regime, as it constitutes the desired 
“change in behaviour”. For simplicity, the figure omits the ultimate impact of a regime, the biophysical 
change (Underdal, 2002), which is the change in GHG concentrations in the atmosphere in our case. 
Furthermore, we add the input level, which is a common element of causal chains (see Earl et al., 2001). 
 
Figure 6 also helps to depict potential determinants of effectiveness. First, effectiveness in reducing 
GHG emissions may depend on financial inputs (see Keohane, 1996 for environmental aid in general), 
such as public finance or carbon credit purchases. Second, effectiveness of climate finance will also 
depend on the intermediate outputs of climate finance. Outputs of international agreements are 
established norms, principles, and rules (Underdal, 2002), so e.g. the “institutional arrangements” 
governing the transfer of financial resources (Keohane, 1996), such as CDM and GEF. As these 
institutions do not reduce emissions themselves but via specific tools, CDM and GEF are considered as 
primary output of climate finance and we add secondary outputs to the causal chain. Such secondary 
outputs are e.g. the coverage of mitigation costs for low-carbon technologies, which is often seen as key 
for climate change mitigation by economists (e.g. Criqui et al., 1999; Klepper and Peterson, 2006; Kuik et 
al., 2009; Olbrisch et al., 2011), the creation of institutions like national policies as emphasized by 
political scientists (see e.g. Haas, 1989; Keohane et al., 1993; Underdal, 1998), the creation of capacity 
and knowledge, as studied by political scientists (Krasner, 1982b; Haas, 1992; Haas et al., 1993; Mitchell, 
1998; Stokke et al., 1999; Breitmeier et al., 2011) and science and technology studies (Lundvall, 1992; 
Malerba, 2002; Hekkert et al., 2007), and finally the mobilization of private finance, which is a growing 
concern of politicians and funding agencies (EU, 2011; G20, 2011) and often considered as pre-
requirement for successful climate policy (Gentry and Esty, 1997; Lile et al., 1998; Zhang and Maruyama, 
2001; Bowen, 2011).  
 
 
Figure 6: Financial input and intermediary outputs as determinants of effectiveness of climate finance 
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In the following, the literature is reviewed for the identified determinants of climate finance 
effectiveness: finance availability, cost coverage for low-carbon measures, the creation of institutions, the 
provision of capacity and knowledge, and the mobilization of private finance. In each part, a literature 
gap and a research question is identified. 
 
 
3.3 Literature gaps  
 
3.3.1  Provision of climate finance  
 
Provision of climate finance will both depend on carbon credit purchases and public finance. The 
demand for carbon credits from developing countries has been studied thoroughly. Purchases under the 
Kyoto Protocol depend on the difference between emission paths and GHG emission targets of 
industrialized countries, and the extent to which these countries are closing the difference with carbon 
credits from developing countries (Anger et al., 2007). Regarding the emission-target difference, Bhatti et 
al. (2010) find that EU members, richer countries, the ones with high GHG emissions, and high 
projected growth rate have committed to the strictest Kyoto targets. In contrast, former East-Bloc 
countries received more allowances than projected emissions (so called “hot-air”), which was projected 
to reduce the demand for CDM credits (Jotzo and Michaelowa, 2002). Until now, “hot-air” allowances 
have only been bought by Japan and EU countries for the non-ETS sector, while Russia has not yet sold 
any allowances (Aldrich and Koerner, 2012). Further limitations for CDM demand were the non-
ratification of the Kyoto Protocol by the USA and the possibility to account for carbon sinks (Jotzo and 
Michaelowa, 2002). Apart from the Kyoto targets, the commitments of individual countries have also 
been studied for the burden sharing within the EU (Oberthür and Ott, 1999; Michaelowa and Betz, 
2001) and the Copenhagen pledges (Brechet et al., 2010). Regarding the flexibility to use credits from 
developing countries for compliance, the EU’s attempt to limit CDM imports internationally may have 
been linked to low domestic abatement costs compared to the US and Japan (Zhang, 2001). While CDM 
imports were not restricted globally, the EU decided to use CDM credits for no more than 50% of their 
emission reduction obligations under the Kyoto Protocol. Flues (2012) studied the allocation of CDM 
import quota within the EU, and found that both environmental and business interests are influential. 
Apart from governmental decisions, CDM purchases also depend on business strategies to use carbon 
credits (see Pinske, 2006; Pinske and Kolk, 2007).  
 
Less is known on the side of public climate finance. As studies on public climate finance provision are 
rare, the literature on provision of ODA may be enlightening. Support for ODA provision has been 
found to be more likely if leftist and not conservative parties are in power (Imbeau, 1989; Therien and 
Noel, 2000; Milner and Tingley, 2010; Tingley, 2010), if donor governments or parliamentarians have 
specific economic interest (Imbeau, 1989; Milner and Tingley, 2010), if pro-ODA interest groups are 
strong (Milner and Tingley, 2010) and if donors perceive that recipients need assistance (Imbeau, 1989). 
In case of environmental ODA, Roberts et al. (2009) observe an increased share of green aid in the 
1990s, probably related to NGO protests in the 1980s. Hicks et al. (2008) argue that the change towards 
a higher share of environmental aid was triggered by governmental change (Germany, USA), lobbying of 
NGOs and other interest groups (Germany, UK, and Japan), commercial and security interests (USA) 
and international pressure (UK, USA, Japan). In a cross-country comparison they found that “dirty” aid 
is low in countries with high wealth and strong environmental lobby groups, while these determinants do 
not significantly increase “green” (environmental) aid. Therefore, the determinants of ODA, including 
environmental projects, are quite well known. 
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In contrast, the provision of climate-related public finance has only been examined by three studies, one 
on adaptation finance (Michaelowa and Michaelowa, 2012) and two on mitigation finance (Michaelowa 
and Michaelowa, 2011b; Halimanjaya and Papyrakis, 2012). These studies find rather different patterns 
than for ODA: the oil price (Michaelowa and Michaelowa, 2011b) and environmental expenditures in 
general (Halimanjaya and Papyrakis, 2012)13 have driven finance with mitigation benefits, while the 
perceived need of assistance (natural catastrophes) has driven adaptation aid. According to Michaelowa 
and Michaelowa (2011b; 2012), international climate agreements had some influence. In case of 
mitigation, finance increased after the Rio conference and decreased after Kyoto, while in case of 
adaptation, finance increased after Kyoto.  
 
Most of the just mentioned studies use econometric approaches to analyze the determinants of ODA 
and climate finance provision. Such studies have the advantage that hypotheses can quantitatively be 
tested. However, these studies also rely on the availability of quantitative data, which are missing when 
we are interested in the impact of specific wordings in international decision texts. In such cases, a 
qualitative analysis of the concrete decision texts and their meaning seems to be warranted. For example, 
by looking at concrete UN climate decision texts, we may explain the econometric finding of 
Michaelowa and Michaelowa (2011b; 2012) that mitigation funding increased in the 1990s and adaptation 
funding increased in the 2000s: the UNFCCC in 1992 clearly focused on mitigation (see e.g. Ciplet et al., 
2013, Khan & Roberts, forthcoming) and asked for the provision of “new and additional” financial 
resources, so an increase in mitigation but not adaptation finance seems to be coherent with the decision. 
Similar insights can be found when analyzing the decision within the Kyoto Protocol:  no new public 
finance pledges for mitigation were specified but  the CDM was created, partly a response to the finance 
demands from developing countries (see chapter 2.2.1), which led to substantial non-public finance to 
developing countries, and the impression that public mitigation finance was less needed. Therefore, the 
decrease of public mitigation finance after Kyoto seems at least partly explainable by qualitative analysis 
of UN decision texts. Finally, the negotiations on the implementation of Kyoto resulted in two new 
funds that mainly supported adaptation (UNFCCC, 2001), so an increase of adaptation funding in the 
2000s seems consistent with UNFCCC decision texts. Finally, the Copenhagen decision text in 2009 
included wording on additional funding and a “balance” between mitigation and adaptation, which led to 
substantial climate rise in climate finance (see Figure 2) and the provision of 50% funding allocation to 
adaptation by some countries (Stadelmann et al. 2012)14. 
 
Such qualitative analysis on decision texts may also help to explain the meaning of the term “new and 
additional” finance, which is repeatedly occurring in UN decision text, and which may have an influence 
on the level of finance provided. While the term “new and additional” was originally introduced by 
developing countries to avoid re-redirection of development aid resources (Benedick, 1991; Bodansky, 
2001; Chasek et al., 2010), the term was never clearly defined. In the Marrakesh declarations, “new and 
additional” seems not only to refer to funds beyond development assistance but also beyond existing 
public climate finance, so it could mean that climate finance has to be increased. In the Copenhagen 
Accord, there was again no clear definition of “new and additional” and several interpretations have been 
proposed both by developing and developed countries (Brown et al., 2010; UNFCCC, 2011c). The only 
general agreement seems to be that “new and additional” refers to an increase beyond a certain level, 
which can be called the “baseline” level of finance. One of the main tensions in the definition for “new 
and additional” is that the “baseline” may both refer to a specific level of development aid or climate 
                                                     
13 The results of Halimanjaya and Papyrakis (2012) remain dubious as, according to their models, high GDP per capita and left 
governments tend to decrease the provision of public climate finance, which is opposite to theoretical expectations. These non-
convincing results may be related to the analysis of officially reported climate finance. Therefore, their findings may rather relate 
to reported and not necessarily to provided climate finance.  
14 Overall the share of adaptation was below the 50%, so not all countries understood the word balance as half-half allocation to 
mitigation and adaptation (Stadelmann et al. 2012). 
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finance. Given the goal of developing countries to avoid redirection of aid flows and the political need to 
increase climate finance to limit global warming to 2-degrees, the first research gap and question is; 
 
How would the term “new and additional” have to be defined to enable an actual increase of climate finance without 
redirection of development aid? (Research question 1) 
 
 
3.3.2 Covering costs of low-carbon measures 
 
From an economic perspective on climate policy, the most important strategy for climate finance for 
having an effect on GHG emissions is to give a financial incentive to reduce GHG emissions. Most 
economists (e.g. Pearce, 1991; Baranzini et al., 2000; Nordhaus, 2006; Stern, 2007) agree that the most 
effective and efficient policy to enable low-carbon measures is to set a price on GHG emissions, e.g. via 
carbon taxes or an ETS. A price on pollution should be effective, as it provides a direct economic 
incentive, and it should be cost-effective, as only measures with mitigation costs below the market price 
are undertaken, which has been both theoretically discussed (Baumol and Oates, 1971, 1988) and 
empirically observed (Stavins, 2003). The more GHG emissions are covered by a uniform carbon price, 
the lower the costs of reaching a specific GHG reduction goal. This has been analyzed both for different 
GHG gases (Bernard et al., 2006) and for emissions from several countries (Criqui et al., 1999; Zhang, 
2001). 
 
The view that a uniform carbon price for a wide geographic area should reduce costs of climate policy is 
one of the key logics behind the CDM: the extension of the carbon market to developing countries 
should reduce compliance costs for industrialized countries (Criqui et al., 1999; Zhang, 2001). If the 
carbon price is fully transmitted by the CDM to all individuals in developing countries, then the lowest-
cost mitigation options should be undertaken, and the CDM should clearly be more cost-effective than 
public finance channels such as the GEF, under which political considerations are important and hardly 
any incentive to choose the least cost solutions exist (Heller and Shukla, 2003). So at first sight, it seems 
obvious that under the CDM less financial means are needed to reduce one unit of GHG emissions than 
under public finance channels such as the GEF. 
 
However, there are the least five reasons why it is not clear whether the CDM can generate more GHG 
emissions reductions per dollar of funding than public finance. Four of these five reasons are related to 
the question whether the assumption of a perfect market with no political interference and no 
transaction cost hold under the CDM, while the fifth reason is the occurrence of rents. 
 
The first reason of a non-perfect CDM market is the occurrence of administrative transaction costs 
(Michaelowa et al., 2003; Michaelowa and Jotzo, 2005). Projects have to follow a complicated process to 
receive CDM credits, including host country approval, validation of project documents, registration, 
monitoring of GHG emission reductions, verification and issuance of credits by the CDM EB. These 
verification costs are particularly high compared to carbon taxes and emission trading, as not only the 
actual level of GHG emissions has to be verified, but also the counterfactual level of “baseline” 
emissions, so the business-as-usual (BAU) emissions without CDM intervention. Further costs occur for 
finding credit buyers, contract negotiation and enforcements. If all these administrative transaction costs 
are summed up, small-scale projects are not attractive any more under the CDM, while larger projects 
can easily cover these costs (Michaelowa et al., 2003; Michaelowa and Jotzo, 2005). While important 
steps have been undertaken to reduce administrative costs of small-scale projects, e.g. simplified 
methodologies and rules, bundling of projects and Programmes of Activities (PoAs), substantial 
transaction costs remain. Still, administrative transaction costs for an average CDM project, as estimated 
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by Michaelowa et al. (2003), are not higher than in case of the GEF, where implementing agencies charge 
a 10% administrative fee (GEF, 2011b). 
 
The second reason for a non-perfect market is the political design of the CDM (see chapter 2.2.1) that 
has led to the exclusion of some mitigation opportunities from the market. First of all, some mitigation 
projects are excluded by definition, e.g. the certification of reduced deforestation (Santilli et al., 2005) or 
nuclear power plants (see decision 16/CP.7, UNFCCC, 2001). However, public climate finance excludes 
even more project types, such as industrial gases, so CDM should still be comparatively cost-effective. 
More importantly, CDM credits are not issued to projects representing policies (UNFCCC, 2005c), so 
regulatory policies (including carbon taxes and ETS) are excluded. This is a potential advantage of public 
finance (e.g. GEF) that also supports the setup of policies.  
 
The third reason why the CDM may not form a perfect market is missing information at the level of 
investors. It has widely been studied that many mitigation projects, particularly in the energy efficiency 
field, would be profitable but they are not undertaken because companies or households miss 
information on these opportunities (Jaffe and Stavins, 1994; Painuly, 2001; Sorrell et al., 2004). In case of 
asymmetric information (e.g. between landlords and tenants) or a wide spread information problem (e.g. 
cost-saving light bulbs) a market failure may exist, and government interventions, e.g. via information 
campaigns, standards or economic incentives may be warranted (Jaffe and Stavins, 1994). In such cases, 
public finance may be more cost-effective and effective than a project-based market mechanism as it can 
support public policies, such as energy efficiency standards, and finance “soft” measures such as 
information campaigns. It has to be noted that there are doubts on whether “soft” measures are always 
efficient (see e.g. Pearce, 1991; Stavins, 2003). 
 
The fourth reason for a non-perfect CDM market – may be the most important one – is the problem of 
asymmetric information between the project investors and the persons approving the crediting. If 
projects are business-as-usual (BAU), i.e. they would have been implemented even without CDM 
support, then CDM approval is not warranted from an effectiveness point of view. However, the CDM 
EB and verifiers may not be able to detect the relevant information so these projects still receive CDM 
approval. Approval of such “business-as-usual” (by some called non-additional”15) projects has been 
detected in several case studies (Michaelowa and Purohit, 2007; Haya, 2009; Schneider, 2009b). Some 
studies have even concluded that a whole range of CDM projects, including most RE projects, may have 
happened without the CDM (Schneider, 2007; Haya, 2009). Approval of BAU projects would 
substantially reduce effectiveness and cost-effectiveness of the CDM16, given that renewable energies 
form the majority of registered projects. While the CDM has substantially strengthened the project 
assessment in the last years, rejecting several projects and making it very difficult for projects to be 
approved without showing a financial investment barrier17 (Michaelowa, 2009), there may still be 
“business-as-usual” projects registered, particularly as small-scale energy projects do not have to prove 
additionality anymore (UNFCCC, 2011f). Clearly, there is a trade-off for the regulators: introducing 
                                                     
15 The term “additional” is interpreted differently in the literature. According to the official CDM definition, a CDM project is 
additional if “anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases by sources are reduced below those that would have occurred in the 
absence of the registered CDM project activity (3/CMP.1, Annex, paragraph 43).” This could simply mean that the project must 
reduce emissions but it is more often understood that a CDM project should not be financially viable without CDM support 
(Greiner and Michaelowa, 2003) or that it should not have happened without CDM support (Schneider, 2009b).  
16 If BAU projects are financially attractive (e.g. in case of energy efficiency), then they are very cost-effective projects on their own, as 
they do not cost anything. However, supporting these financially attractive BAU projects with climate finance (e.g. CDM credit 
payments) is not cost-effective, as the effect in terms of GHG reductions is zero, while transaction costs for raising and spending 
climate finance occur. 
17 A financial investment barrier can be shown by either proving that the project’s Internal Rate of Return (IRR) is lower than the 
returns required on the market (benchmark IRR) or by showing that high-carbon investment alternatives have better returns.  
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stricter rules may reduce the number of “bad” projects being approved (less false positives) but it may 
also lead to “good” projects being rejected (more false negatives), see Trexler et al. (2006). Furthermore, 
in-depth assessment of projects will also increase the administrative transaction costs.  
 
The fifth and last reason, why the CDM may be less effective per USD of funding is not related to 
economic costs but related to rents that accrue to the sellers of CDM credits: while buyers pay the 
market price for CDM credits, the actual cost of emission reductions is in many cases much lower. This 
leads to substantial rents (or “producer surpluses”) for credit sellers (Müller, 2007). Such producer rents 
do not increase economic costs as they are simply representing economic value transferred from buyers 
to sellers. However, from a climate policy perspective, rents may still represent an ineffective use of 
climate finance. Some scholars (Fein et al., 2010; McNish, 2010) have argued that a climate fund that 
avoids rents by paying only the incremental costs of projects, such as the GEF or the MLF (Biermann, 
1997) may be more effective per USD of funding. As counter-argument, Hepburn (2009) argues that 
rents attract investors and may enhance long-term effectiveness. Empirically, it has not been studied 
whether the advantages of the CDM compared to public funding (dynamic incentives for reductions, 
openness to different project types) has outweighed the rent-losses in terms of effectiveness per USD of 
funding. However, there are clearly cases like HFC-reducing projects where enormous rents have led to 
reduced effectiveness, as the rents proved to be a perverse incentive to artificially inflate production in 
order to claim more CDM credits (Schneider, 2011). 
 
All of these five theoretical factors why the CDM may not reduce GHG emissions for the lowest 
amount of funding – administrative costs, political design, missing information, promotion of business-
as-usual projects due to asymmetric information, and rents to credit sellers – have  been empirically 
examined: substantial transaction costs occur for both GEF and CDM (Michaelowa et al., 2003; 
Michaelowa and Jotzo, 2005), the forestry sector was largely excluded from both CDM and GEF during 
their political design, and the CDM has also not fully addressed the energy efficiency potential due to 
administrative costs and missing information (Grubb et al., 2011; Castro, 2012; Tatrallyay and 
Stadelmann, 2012). Promotion of business-as-usual projects has been assessed by several case studies 
(Michaelowa and Purohit, 2007; Schneider, 2007; Haya, 2009; Schneider, 2009b), and the existence of 
substantial rents have been detected particularly in case of industrial gases (Müller, 2007; Stadelmann et 
al., 2011a).  
 
Even when all theoretical factors have been empirically analyzed, there is an important research gap in 
relation to the promotion of BAU projects due to asymmetric information: it has neither been examined 
with independent nor with macro level data. First, empirical studies have relied on data from CDM 
project documents, which are written by project developers, and will, therefore, not fully reveal how 
substantially the promotion of BAU projects affects effectiveness of the CDM. Apart from this problem 
of non-independent data, existing research (Michaelowa and Purohit, 2007; Schneider, 2007; Haya, 2009; 
Schneider, 2009b) is restricted to the analysis of project effectiveness (micro level), while no study is known that 
has assessed how the support for business-as-usual projects affects the aggregate effectiveness (macro level)18 of 
the CDM and, whether public finance has performed better in this regard.  
 
Such a macro level analysis using independent data seems to be particularly relevant for the case of RE 
projects because of at least 4 reasons: First, RE is a key project type for both CDM and GEF, both with 
regards to funding and effectiveness (see Table 2). Second, many CDM renewable energy project have 
been found to be business-as-usual (Michaelowa and Purohit, 2007; Schneider, 2007; Haya, 2009).  
Third, RE technologies are seen as key technologies in low-carbon transformation paths (Krey and 
Clarke, 2011). Finally, analyzing the effectiveness of the CDM in reducing CO2 via renewable energies 
                                                     
18 See Keohane (1996) for the distinction between project and aggregate effectiveness in case of environmental aid. 
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from a macro level may not only enhance the understanding of business-as-usual projects but also 
contribute to close a gap in another strand of literature: while many studies have analyzed the 
determinants of RE diffusion in industrialized countries (e.g. Carley, 2009; Marques et al., 2010; Marques 
et al., 2011; Popp et al., 2011), only two have looked at the determinants in developing countries 
(Sadorsky, 2009; Brunnschweiler, 2010), and both of them have neglected international climate finance as 
potential driver. Therefore, the second research gap and question is; 
 
How effective has the CDM been in reducing GHG emissions via renewable energy diffusion, and how effective has public 
finance been in comparison? (Research question 2) 
 
 
3.3.3 Creation of institutions and capacity  
 
Many social scientists – particularly in the area of international relations and “science and technology 
studies” – have stressed the role of institutions and the capacity of actors in effective international 
responses to environmental problems. Institutions “are rules of the game in a society or, more formally, 
are humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction (North, 1990: 3).” Organizations can be 
seen as special institutions with clear boundaries, sovereignty rules and chains of command (Hodgson, 
2006).  
 
Institutions are relevant for international climate finance in at least two ways: climate finance is governed 
by transfer institutions, and it creates institutions, such as national policies itself. First of all, climate 
finance is governed by international institutions, such as the GEF and CDM. Such “financial transfer 
institutions” are “sets of rules […] established to govern a flow of funds from richer to poorer countries 
to achieve specific environmental purposes (Keohane, 1996: 5)”. These institutional arrangements will 
substantially determine the effectiveness of financial transfers (Keohane, 1996): e.g. the distributional 
struggles during the set-up has clearly undermined the effectiveness of GEF (Fairman, 1996), while 
institutional costs can also be observed for the AIJ and CDM (Heller, 1999; Michaelowa and Jotzo, 
2005).  
 
Secondly, and important for effective spending, climate finance transfers may create or support national 
institutions for climate change mitigation. Among these newly created institutions, national policies are 
particularly relevant for the effectiveness of international environmental regimes (see e.g. Haas, 1989; 
Keohane et al., 1993; Underdal, 1998). Such national policies, including emission targets in developing 
countries, are considered to be crucial in the climate regime for achieving the 2 degree limit (Frankel, 
2007; Michaelowa, 2007c; Den Elzen and Höhne, 2008). Scholars have not only discussed the set-up of 
climate-specific policies but also, as a potentially effective strategy, the integration of climate change 
activities in national development policies (Winkler et al., 2007; Winkler et al., 2008). Developing 
countries have made clear that their recently pledged mitigation policies and measures are conditional on 
financial support (UNFCCC, 2008b, 2009b). Therefore, it seems warranted to analyze the impact of 
climate finance on national policies as key institutions in the climate regime. 
 
Figure 7 shows three channels through which climate finance may induce developing countries to enact 
national climate policies as key institutions for climate change mitigation. The first two, capacity and 
concern, are important determinants for the effectiveness of environmental regimes (Haas et al., 1993)19. 
                                                     
19 Haas et al. (1993) mention the “contractual environment”, e.g. the negotiation arenas, as further determinant for the 
effectiveness of environmental regimes but we leave this away here, as – in this chapter – we analyze the use of funding once 
international negotiations have already decided on the provision of climate finance. 
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The third channel – coverage of policy costs – is actually part of “building capacity” in the concept of Haas et 
al. (1993) but we are keeping it analytically separate here to clearly distinguish between financial capacity 
(ability to cover costs) and other capacity (e.g. human and institutional). In the following, we will discuss 
the theory and existing literature on these three channels. 
 
 
Figure 7: Channels for international climate finance to induce national policies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The first channel for climate policy to induce national policies is the creation of capacity via the provision 
of knowledge and technical support. With capacity, we do not mean financial capacity here but the 
technical, legal and administrative capacity to negotiate, elaborate and implement regulations. Such 
capacity can be provided via transfer of expertise and knowledge within an environmental regime (Haas 
et al., 1993). Capacity and knowledge may also be relevant for businesses to advance innovative 
technologies (Lundvall, 1992; Jacobsson and Johnson, 2000; Malerba, 2002; Hekkert and Negro, 2009) 
but we focus here on the capacity of governments, which are seen as key by scholars (Haas et al., 1993; 
Keohane, 1996; Underdal, 2002). While capacity and knowledge both influence agenda setting and 
development of rules and norms at the international level (Haas, 1989; Keohane et al., 1993), they are 
also key on a national level, e.g. for implementation, or monitoring and verification of compliance 
(Mitchell, 1998), and for design and implementation of national measures (Haas et al., 1993; Underdal, 
2002). Climate finance may improve such national capacity via provision of knowledge and also 
assistance to elaborate policy programs. Such capacity building is not undertaken by the CDM, the CDM 
is even partly dependent on capacity building by public finance20. In contrast, capacity building for 
developing countries, including support for policy design, is a core strategy of the GEF (Lindholt, 2005; 
GEF, 2011c). However, there is a debate on whether such capacity building efforts are effective 
(Keohane, 1996) and to our knowledge no independent study has ever analyzed the effectiveness of 
GEF’s capacity building for policy design.  
 
A second channel for inducing national policies is to increase governmental concern for environmental 
issues (Keohane, 1996), which is not a strategy of the CDM, while the GEF has raised some awareness 
via training at the national and sub-national level, e.g. in China (Heggelund et al., 2005). Again, the real 
impact of this awareness-raising on national policies has never been studied. 
                                                     
20 Some ODA funding was needed for building host country capacity in least developed countries to facilitate the access to CDM 
funds (Michaelowa, 2003; Okubo and Michaelowa, 2010). 
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As third channel to induce national policies, climate finance may cover costs of implementing public 
policies, as recently proposed in the context of feed-in tariffs (Edkins et al., 2009; Deutsche Bank Group, 
2010). Such cost coverage is not the core of GEF programs that finance at best the implementation of 
some pilot installations. Also in case of CDM, cost coverage of policy implementation is officially not 
foreseen as policies are not credited under single CDM projects (UNFCCC, 2005c). Nevertheless, CDM 
credit payments may reduce the cost of public policies. If e.g. all renewable energies receive CDM 
credits, then the governmental subsidies to make renewable energies financially viable can be lowered, 
and governments may be more willing to adopt policies. However, this potential incentive for policy 
adoption has only existed since 2005, when the CDM EB made clear that climate-friendly policies 
adopted after 2001 will not lead to fewer credits (UNFCCC, 2005a). Before this decision, there were 
fears that the CDM provides a disincentive for national policy adoption as projects enabled by national 
policies by may be judged “non-additional” (Winkler, 2004). Despite the EB decision of not punishing 
climate-friendly policies, the application of the rule was not fully clear. In 2009, the EB rejected several 
wind power plants, arguing that the reduction of the feed-in tariff by Chinese regulators has to be 
understood as climate-unfriendly policy that has to be punished, while most carbon market players and 
Chinese regulators still saw the (reduced) feed-in tariff as climate-friendly policy. This case showed that 
the current CDM rules cannot rule out perverse incentives (He and Morse, 2010). Therefore, the CDM 
may theoretically both have a positive or negative impact on policy adoption, and empirically the 
situation is not clear.  
 
Given the research gap on whether GEF’s capacity building and awareness raising or CDM’s cost-
coverage have an impact on national policy adoption, an empirical study seems to be warranted. For 
several reasons, one of the most interesting sectors in this regard could be the one of renewable energies. 
First, GEF actively aims at supporting the set-up of RE policies (GEF, 2011c). Secondly, the potential 
for perverse incentives of the CDM on national policy adoption has so far mainly been discussed with 
regards to renewable energies (Winkler, 2004; He and Morse, 2010). Thirdly, such a study could also 
contribute to the literature on the drivers for RE policy adoption that has entirely focused on 
industrialized countries (Michaelowa, 2004; Jacobsson and Lauber, 2006; Vachon and Menz, 2006; 
Huang et al., 2007; Matisoff, 2008; Laird and Stefes, 2009; Uba, 2010). Therefore, the third research gap 
and question is: 
 
Has international climate finance induced developing countries to undertake renewable energy policies? (Research question 3) 
 
 
3.3.4 Private finance 
 
Another away to make climate finance effective, apart from covering costs of low-carbon technologies, 
building capacity and creating institutions, may be to mobilize private finance. This way has been recently 
hailed by public institutions (EU, 2011; G20, 2011) development agencies (Assmann et al., 2011; IFC, 
2011) and even some NGOs (Brown and Jacobs, 2011)21. Some of these non-academic institutions call 
for (Assmann et al., 2011) or explore ways (Brown and Jacobs, 2011) on how to increase the ratio 
between mobilized private investments and mobilizing public finance.  
 
In the academic literature, the mobilization of private investments has not been studied itself but there is 
some related literature. First of all, many scholars conclude that the private sector will be needed for a 
large part of investments in low-carbon technologies given the high private share of the overall 
                                                     
21 The calls clearly focus on the mobilization of private investments, not the mobilization of private donations for GHG 
emissions reductions (Assmann et al., 2011; Brown and Jacobs, 2011), so we will only refer to private investments in the 
following. 
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investment capital (Lile et al., 1998; Zhang and Maruyama, 2001; Schmidt et al., 2008; Brinkman, 2009; 
Bowen, 2011; Olbrisch et al., 2011). Furthermore, several studies – outside the climate context – have 
found that the private sector is often more efficient in implementation (Dunkerley, 1995; Estache, 2001; 
Mueller, 2003; Pattillo, 2006; Hodge and Greve, 2007). Therefore, the academic literature would suggest 
that private investments will be needed for low-carbon transformation and the private sector should be 
included in the implementation.  
 
These two findings in the academic literature – need for private investments and efficiency of the private 
sector in implementation – do not necessarily imply that mobilizing private finance will increase the 
effectiveness of international climate finance. One general caveat is that climate finance, such as GEF 
and CDM, already mobilize private investments and include the private sector in implementation 
(Clémençon, 2006; Zhang, 2006; Ellis et al., 2007), so mobilizing private finance would require an 
additional focus on mobilization of private investments. Therefore, the question is whether an additional 
focus on private finance can increase effectiveness and/or cost-effectiveness.  
 
In case of the CDM, an additional focus on mobilization of private investments is clearly questionable 
from an cost-effectiveness point of view: currently, the CDM already promotes the projects reducing 
GHG emissions most cost-effectively, given that the CDM only rewards GHG emissions reductions (by 
issuing credits per tonne of CO2 reduced) but not any other benefits22, so private actors will only invest 
in projects that reduce GHG emissions for costs lower than the carbon price. If instead, CDM would 
not reward GHG emissions reductions itself but private investments in low-carbon technologies, this 
may not lead to the selection of the least-costly projects because of several reasons. First, a substantial 
part of CDM projects involves public investments23, so these projects would essentially be excluded. 
Second, the main goal of private investors (maximizing profits) is not congruent with the political goal of 
reducing GHG emissions because investors take into account non-carbon returns such as electricity 
payments (Greiner and Michaelowa, 2003; Matsuhashi et al., 2004; Schneider, 2009b) when deciding in 
which GHG-reducing project types to invest. 
 
A trade-off between (cost-)effectiveness in reducing GHG emissions and mobilizing private finance 
should also exist in case of GEF projects. While at first sight a strategic GEF focus on the private sector 
seems to be warranted, given that GEF has often been criticized for not including the private sector 
enough (Streck, 2001; Lindholt, 2005; Clémençon, 2006), the mobilization of the private sector may also 
be achieved by a strategy of selecting the projects that are most cost-effective in reducing GHG 
emissions. This is because such a strategy would require to overcome the most important barriers for 
private sector access, e.g. the simplification of the complex GEF project approval process (Streck, 2001) 
and the abolishment of the formula allocating fixed funding amounts to each country (GEF, 2010c).  
 
Summing up, there are theoretical arguments that a focus on private finance mobilization may not be the 
most cost-effective and effective strategy for climate finance. As this has never analyzed empirically, our 
fourth sub-question is:  
 
How does a focus on mobilizing private finance influence the cost-effectiveness and effectiveness of climate finance? (Research 
question 4) 
 
 
                                                     
22 Actually, this focus on GHG reductions has been criticized by some scholars, who argue that, currently, projects with 
substantial development benefits are not enough promoted (Sutter and Parreno, 2007; Alexeew et al., 2010). 
23 In a sample of 227 CDM projects selected by Castro (2010), 39% of projects involved some public investments, according to 
our analysis. 
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3.4 Overview of research questions  
 
Figure 8 provides an on overview on how the four research questions are integrated in our framework of 
climate finance effectiveness. The first research question (RQ1) addresses the question on how the 
financial input may be enhanced by specific decisions on the term “new and additional”, without leading 
to a redirection of aid flows. RQ2 addresses the question whether financial inputs covering costs of low-
carbon measures via a carbon price (CDM strategy), or rather the financial payments providing capacity 
and knowledge (GEF strategy) have been more effective in reducing GHG emissions via renewable 
energies. Then, RQ3 asks whether the CDM strategy (covering costs) or the GEF strategy (providing 
capacity) have led to adoption of national RE policies, which are seen as key institutions in supporting 
low-carbon development. As national RE policies are an indirect way of promoting RE and reducing 
GHG emissions), RQ3 on policy adoption complements RQ2 that looks at the direct effectiveness in 
reducing GHG emissions via promoting RE. Finally, RQ4 examine whether a focus on mobilization of 
private finance can enhance cost-effectiveness of climate finance.  
 
 
Figure 8: Research questions, as embedded in the framework of climate finance effectiveness 
 
 Input Output 1      Output 2      Outcome 
  (Primary)    (Secondary) (= Effectiveness) 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.5 Strategies to answer research questions 
 
For each research question, a different empirical strategy (methods and data) will be applied in the 
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“new and additional” are examined with regards to the political support they have and the potential 
implications on effectiveness. This analysis relies on a review of the literature, negotiation documents 
and other secondary text sources. 
 
Chapter 5 analyzes research question 2: How effective is the CDM in reducing GHG emissions via renewable energy 
diffusion and how effective has public finance been in comparison? This research question will be addressed by, first, 
theoretically discussing the reasons why CDM and GEF may have an impact and why it may be 
overestimated, and second, by quantitatively estimating the impact of CDM and GEF on RE diffusion, 
using panel data models controlling for other determinants of RE diffusion. The dataset is based on 
direct or transformed secondary sources, and covers more than 20 years and 120 countries. Models for 
five different RE technologies are estimated. 
 
Chapter 6 analyzes research question 3: Has international climate finance induced developing countries to undertake 
renewable energy policies? This research question will be addressed by, first, theoretically discussing the 
different variables influencing policy adoption, and, second, estimating the determinants of RE policy 
adoption in developing countries, using an event-history model on four different RE policies. The policy 
data set is self-compiled from various secondary sources and covers the last 10 years and more than 160 
countries. Climate finance is only one potential determinant of RE policy adoption, so we also test for 
the influence of other determinants, both domestic and international ones. 
 
Finally, Chapter 7 analyzes research question 4: How does a focus on mobilizing private finance influence the cost-
effectiveness and effectiveness of climate finance? This question is addressed by both a theoretical analysis how 
private finance and GHG emissions reductions interact, followed by a two-step empirical analysis. The 
first step of the analysis measures how much cost-effectiveness in reducing GHG emissions and private 
finance intensity have correlated in case of more than 300 CDM and GEF projects (representative 
sample), while in a second step, a regression analysis tests whether the impact of private finance on cost-
effectiveness changes if other determinants of cost-effectiveness are taken into account. The paper also 
discusses the different implications of mobilizing private finance on effectiveness and cost-effectiveness. 
 
In all chapters, information from 21 semi-structured interviews with experts from national governments, 
international organizations, development banks and the private sector (see list in Annex 10.1) are used to 
back up or challenge some of the results from the core analysis. 
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4 New and additional to what? Options for baselines to assess "new and additional" 
climate finance24 
 
 
Abstract 
 
All major climate policy agreements – the UN Framework Convention, the Kyoto Protocol, and recently 
the Cancun Agreements – have stated that climate finance for developing countries will be ”new and 
additional”. However, the term “new and additional” has never been properly defined. Agreeing a system 
to measure a baseline from which “new and additional” funding will be calculated will be central to 
building trust and realizing any post-Kyoto agreement. We explore eight different options for a baseline, 
and assess each according to several criteria: novelty to existing pledges, additionality to development 
assistance, environmental effectiveness, distributional consequences, and institutional and political 
feasibility. Only two baseline options do well on these criteria and will therefore imply both an increase 
of climate finance without redirecting aid flows: "new sources only" and "above pre-defined business as 
usual level of development assistance".  
 
 
Keywords: climate finance, Copenhagen Accord, development assistance, additionality, UNFCCC 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
24 This chapter was published 2011 in ‘Climate and Development’ 3(3), pages 175-92, with co-authors J. Timmons Roberts & 
Axel Michaelowa. The version presented here contains few changes and updates.  
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4.1 Introduction   
 
Since the original Stockholm Earth Summit in 1972, developing nations have feared that attention to 
protect the natural environment would sideline their ardent quest for meeting basic development needs 
like health, education and economic growth (Hicks et al., 2008, paragraph 46). Therefore, from the very 
beginning of international environmental statecraft, gaining these nations’ cooperation in efforts to 
address global environmental issues required promises for funding beyond development assistance (DA). 
We use the term “development assistance” (DA) here instead of the usual term “Official Development 
Assistance” (ODA), as ODA as registered by the OECD includes climate change mitigation and 
adaptation funding, while our term “development assistance” (DA) excludes climate change mitigation and 
adaptation funding in order to conceptually clearly separate development assistance from climate 
finance25. 
 
Early phrasings described “The Earth Increment”, making clear that this funding would not come from 
other promises, such as the 1970 Monterrey pledge of most wealthy countries to send 0.7 percent of 
their GNI to assist poor countries overcome their poverty. The phrase “new and additional” financial 
resources was used at the Rio 1992 drafting of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC, 1992), and the language has appeared in every major climate agreement since, including the 
Kyoto Protocol (1997), the Marrakesh Accords (UNFCCC, 2001), the 2009 Copenhagen Accord 
(UNFCCC, 2009b) and the Cancun Agreements (UNFCCC, 2010).   
 
The Copenhagen Accord promises USD 30 billion in “new and additional“ fast-start finance” over 2010-
2012, “scaling up” to USD 100 billion a year of public and private climate finance by 2020. These 
promises, integrated in the recent Cancun Agreements, are very ambitious given the level of existing 
flows: USD 159 billion of ODA disbursements in 2009, of which about 6 billion are marked as climate-
related, see OECD (2011b). The promises were also fundamental to the reaching of any agreement given 
the even higher estimates for climate finance needs, e.g. USD 150-300 billion annually by 2030 as 
estimated by the World Bank (2009). Both wealthy and poor nations agree on the need for such funds: 
developing countries need funding to grow their economies without becoming locked in to fossil fuel 
dependence and its high carbon footprint. The most vulnerable developing countries also need 
substantial funds to prepare for, cope with, and recover from the growing number and intensity of 
climate-related disasters and incremental changes in local climate.   
 
However as has happened many times before, the terms “new and additional” were never clearly defined, 
neither in Copenhagen nor in Cancun. “New and additional” to what year as a baseline and to which 
funds – only those addressing climate change or also development assistance?  Given the failure of most 
industrialized nations to meet their previous pledges of foreign aid, from the 1970 0.7% of GNI pledge 
to the Gleneagles 2005 promises26, developing countries question what the term “new and additional 
climate finance” means in practice. To establish clarity and potentially restore some trust in the integrity 
of Northern nation commitments, an agreement on the interpretation of “new and additional” is needed.  
 
One can argue that the phrase “new and additional” has been less relevant for global environmental 
treaties in the past, as official financial payments for developing countries have not reached more than 
USD 0.15 billion annually per environmental treaty and thus the potential for diversion of large amounts 
                                                     
25 The reason for using a different term than ODA is that ODA actually includes public climate finance but most people are not 
aware of this and just use “ODA” as a synonym for development assistance (excluding climate finance). Our term “development 
assistance” (DA)” is similar to the term “ODA classic” used by Huhtala et al. (2010). 
26 At the G8 summit in Gleneagles 2005 the European G8 members pledged to increase their ODA to 0.7% of their GNI by 
2012-2015, while also the US, Canada and Japan made pledges for substantial increase of their ODA (G8, 2005). 
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of development assistance did not exist. This has significantly changed with Copenhagen where 
industrialized countries pledged USD 10 billion and more per year. This raises serious questions about 
both compliance with these substantial pledges and their additionality to development assistance.  
 
When defining “new and additional” climate finance, two major challenges arise. First, countries have 
very different understandings of the term “new and additional” (Brown et al., 2010; Stadelmann et al., 
2010; WRI, 2010). This is also reflected in the different “baselines” industrialized countries use for 
justifying that their fast-start pledges are “new and additional” (see Table 3). Such a “baseline” can be 
defined as the level against which a commitment or action is measured. In the context of “new and 
additional” climate finance, the baseline is the level of finance, above which finance is considered “new 
and additional”.  
 
Table 3: Baselines for “new and additional” used by industrialized countries for fast-start funding 
1 Source: WRI (2010) and Faststartfinance.org (2011) for: Australia, Canada, Finland, Iceland, Switzerland, United Kingdom. For Sweden and 
Norway, the “0.7% ODA/GNI” baseline is not explicitly mentioned but is clear given current ODA contributions. 
 
 
The second issue is that the assessment of “additionality” is methodologically challenging, as both 
realized by the Commission of Sustainable Development (Yamin and Depledge, 2004, p. 277) and 
scholars (Dutschke and Michaelowa, 2006). 
 
In this article we address both of these challenges: the question how to reconcile the varying baseline 
definitions of different parties, and second how to define a baseline that does not face substantial 
Country Baseline definition1  
Australia Existing aid budgets / no diversion 
Austria Not specified 
Belgium Current ODA, pre-COP15 commitment 
Canada Pre COP15 commitments 
Denmark Above 0.7% ODA/GNI 
EU Commission Above planned programs 
Finland Above 2009 climate finance 
France Not specified 
Germany Not specified 
Hungary Not specified 
Iceland Not specified 
Ireland Not specified 
Italy Not specified 
Japan Not specified 
Luxembourg Above 0.7% ODA/GNI 
Malta Not specified 
Netherlands Above 0.7% ODA/GNI 
New Zealand Not specified 
Norway Above 0.7% ODA/GNI 
Portugal Not specified 
Slovenia Not specified 
Spain Pre COP15 commitments 
Sweden Above 0.7% ODA/GNI 
Switzerland Existing ODA budgets 
United Kingdom Past ODA, max. 10% of climate ODA  
United States Not specified 
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methodological challenges, such as uncertainty of data. The article is structured as follows: First, the 
criteria for assessing baselines are discussed. Second, a series of options for baselines are analyzed and 
assessed using five criteria (novelty to existing pledges, additionality to development assistance, 
effectiveness, distributional consequences, and institutional feasibility). We also examine the practical 
implications of these baseline proposals, and estimate political resistance and support for each of them.  
 
 
4.2 Criteria for a baseline  
 
The criteria used here are derived from the climate negotiation texts and the academic literature. The two 
obvious criteria for setting a baseline are common understandings of the terms “new and additional”, 
such as “novelty to existing pledges” (Müller et al., 2010) and “additionality to development assistance” 
(Asuka, 2000; Dutschke and Michaelowa, 2006). Furthermore, baselines can be assessed according to the 
four criteria for climate policies set out by the 4th Assessment Report of the IPCC (Gupta et al., 2007): 
environmental effectiveness, cost-effectiveness, distributional considerations and institutional feasibility. 
These four criteria represent research interests of five disciplines: the one of environmental sciences 
(environmental effectiveness), economics (cost-effectiveness), philosophy/sociology (equity) and 
political science (institutional feasibility). The four criteria also incorporate the principles of the 
UNFCCC (1992): environmental effectiveness incorporates the precautionary principle spelled out in the 
phrase “preventing dangerous climate change”; equity incorporates the “common but differentiated 
responsibilities and capabilities” principle, as well as the specific needs and circumstances of developing 
countries; cost-effectiveness can be seen behind the principles that the UNFCCC should promote and 
not hinder sustainable development and an open international economic system. While institutional 
feasibility is not representing any UNFCCC principle, it is clear that baselines, which fulfill all other 
criteria, need also political acceptability and institutions to ever be implemented. The importance and 
definition of each of these criteria is explained in the following. 
 
 
4.2.1 Criterion 1: Additionality to development assistance 
 
The discussion about development assistance baselines began essentially with the pledge of “new and 
additional” resources in Rio 1992. The Commission on Sustainable Development unsuccessfully tried to 
establish an indicator for “new and additional” financial resources in 1995 (Yamin and Depledge, 2004, 
p. 277). The question was further taken up in the discussion on “diversion” of development assistance in 
the context of CDM projects from 2000 onwards (Asuka, 2000; Dutschke and Michaelowa, 2006). 
Apparently, the lessons from this debate did not inform the discussion about climate finance that has 
taken off since 2007. Here “additionality” is an often used term but its meaning has never been clearly 
defined. Some understand “additional” as “additional to existing aid flows”, while most developing 
countries and NGOs understand it as additional to existing developed country promises to provide 0.7% 
of their GNI as ODA (Dutschke and Michaelowa, 2006; Oxfam, 2009; Müller et al., 2010). We use a 
middle-ground definition: climate finance is additional if it leads to an increase both compared to present and projected 
future development assistance (DA), while DA does not include the climate finance part of ODA (see 
footnote 25). Climate finance may be counted as ODA but the development assistance (DA) part of 
ODA is not allowed to be reduced below BAU projections. This is a theoretically clear definition but 
international institutions as well as recipients may find it difficult to assess the BAU levels of DA. 
Donors may have some incentives to not reveal the real BAU level of DA, similar to the distortion of 
investment parameters by project owners in the context of CDM projects.  
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4.2.2 Criterion 2: Novelty to existing flows and pledges 
 
According to Müller et al. (2010) “new” mainly refers “to funds which are separate from those that have 
already been promised, for climate change or as overseas development assistance”. However, “novelty” 
is also increasingly understood as new funding sources such as a tax on financial market transactions, 
auctioning of emission allowances or levies on air and maritime transport (Müller et al., 2010). The idea 
behind defining novelty as “new sources” is that industrialized countries’ government budgets, especially 
the part dedicated for developing countries, are always subject to domestic pressures (Fischer and 
Easterley, 1990; Bulír and Hamann, 2008; Doornbosch and Knight, 2008). Therefore, governmental 
funds for climate finance can always be funds that had already been pledged in the past, or promised as 
development assistance; and funds are only then really “new” if they stem from new sources other than 
government pledges. While the “new sources” definition clearly has its merits we define “new climate 
funds here as funds that have not yet been promised for supporting developing countries’ climate or development actions, 
following the most common understanding according to Müller et al. (2010). 
 
 
4.2.3 Criterion 3: Environmental effectiveness  
 
The IPCC (Gupta et al., 2007) lists environmental effectiveness as the first criterion to evaluate 
environmental policies. Environmental effectiveness is understood here as the level of climate change 
mitigation and adaptation achieved27. Assuming that an increase in funds leads to an increase in 
mitigation and/or adaptation28, a baseline is environmentally effective if it increases funds useable for 
climate mitigation and adaptation compared to business as usual. On one hand, we can assume that the 
more stringent a baseline is regarding novelty to existing climate funds, the more climate funds will be 
paid. However, once the sum of the baseline and the new climate funds reaches the maximum level of 
climate finance donors are willing to pay in order to meet international standards (see also Figure 12), a 
further strengthening of the baseline will not increase funding or even lead to decrease29. On the other 
hand, decreasing the stringency for additionality to existing development funds may also enhance climate 
funds as lenient development baselines make diversion to climate funds more probable.  
 
A criterion linked to environmental effectiveness is “cost-effectiveness”. We exclude this criterion in the 
following, as the influence of the baseline on cost-effectiveness is difficult to judge, for two reasons: 
First, the way a baseline is set does not influence how the funds are spent. Second, a baseline leveraging 
more funds can have different impacts: scale and learning effects linked to the size of the programs may 
increase cost-effectiveness, while the exhaustion of cheap options can decrease it.  
 
 
  
                                                     
27 Strictly speaking, only mitigation has an “environmental” impact by reducing climate change, while adaptation has mainly direct 
economic benefits. However, as most climate finance is used for mitigation, we can easily assume that climate finance enhances 
environmental effectiveness.  
28 This is a weak assumption in our view: If international mechanisms are stringent enough, climate funds will be spent on 
climate-related activities. Assuming minimal knowledge on mitigation and adaptation, environmental benefits per unit may 
decrease with increased finance but will stay positive. In few cases, climate funding may actually decrease environmental 
effectiveness, e.g. in case of maladaptation or if funds are allocated to energy efficient coal power plants, which would have been 
built anyway. However, it is highly probable that such negative effects will not outweigh the positive effects of climate finance. 
29 We assume here that industrialized countries indeed react to the internationally agreed level of the funds but only until a specific 
level. This assumption would e.g. hold for the 0.7% of industrialized countries’ GNI being pledged as goal for development 
assistance: while this goal is often used to motivate donors to increase their funds, the level of 0.7% of GNI seems to be above 
the level that industrialized countries are – at maximum – willing to contribute. Therefore, moving the target beyond the 0.7% of 
GNI should not lead to additional funds. 
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4.2.4 Criterion 4: Distributional considerations 
 
As any economic policy measure, climate policy measures will have distributional impacts. For this 
reason, commonly used terms in the climate policy context are “equity” and "fairness” (Ringius et al., 
2002). Distributional considerations have focused on the phrase “fair burden sharing” (see e.g. Müller et 
al., 2009). In our study we consider distributional questions by assessing the impact of different baselines 
on burden sharing between developed and developing countries. We assume that current climate policy 
pledges (mitigation and finance) of developed countries are way below their fair share of the burden, 
when considering various burden sharing studies30 (Pan, 2003; Den Elzen et al., 2005; Bernard et al., 
2006; Baer et al., 2007; Marklund and Samakovlis, 2007; Den Elzen and Höhne, 2008; Chakravarty et al., 
2009). A baseline, therefore, adequately addresses equity the more it shifts the burden away from developing nations that 
are least responsible for the problem and least capable to adapt. 
 
 
4.2.5 Criterion 5: Institutional feasibility  
 
The last IPCC criterion for environmental policy is institutional feasibility, or broadly speaking the 
question of whether the theoretical ideas can be implemented, given the existing institutions and political 
considerations, internationally as well as nationally. We divide institutional feasibility into three sub-
criteria: a proposed method’s political acceptability, its transparency, and whether it interferes with other 
international regimes.  
 
Criterion 5a: Political acceptability (North-South) 
 
Not even the most objective definition of a baseline will be feasible if it is not accepted by the major 
Parties to the UNFCCC. Political acceptability is an important precondition for participation, a key 
criterion for success of an environmental regime (see e.g. Wettestad, 1999). Participation is a widespread 
concern for the climate regime after the US did not ratify Kyoto (Barrett and Stavins, 2003); thus the 
impact of future non-participation has been studied as well (Keppo and Rao, 2007; van Vuuren et al., 
2009). As the world’s CO2 emissions are about evenly split between developed and developing countries 
(PBL, 2009; Olivier and Peters, 2010), while the share of developing countries’ emissions will further rise 
in the future (van Vuuren et al., 2009), the acceptability for both Northern as well as Southern countries 
has to be assured. Under a universal international climate treaty, horse trading of climate finance and 
mitigation targets would be possible, which would allow one to bring baseline stringency in as one 
parameter of negotiations. However, the lack of progress in international climate negotiations makes the 
fragmentation of the regime more and more likely and thus reduces horse trading options. Furthermore, 
the room for concessions is narrow at the moment, as the North is dealing with the consequences of a 
major economic crisis and the South is harboring mistrust due to disappointments on finance pledges31. 
Therefore, political acceptability of baseline stringency as part of the climate finance negotiations is a 
major criterion; a baseline will be politically feasible if it is expected to be acceptable to the major Parties to the UN 
framework convention. 
 
  
                                                     
30 Also advanced developing countries such as China, South Korea or Mexico may have to contribute. However, the bulk of 
climate finance will have to come from industrialized countries. 
31 For a recent critique of India and South Africa that industrialized countries do not deliver promised climate finance, see Jebaraj 
(2011).  
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Criterion 5b: Transparency: clarity of definition and availability of data 
 
The importance of transparency for environmental regimes is acknowledged by academic scholars, 
governments and NGOs (Mitchell, 1998). Transparency helps for achieving and assessing compliance 
and effectiveness, which has been studied both for security and environmental regimes (Mitchell, 1998; 
Roberts and Parks, 2007). Transparency is important in many ways for the climate regime: e.g. related to 
greenhouse gas inventories or the negotiation process32. Regarding transparency of finance, financial 
contributions have haphazardly been included in national communications, but transparency only came 
to the forefront when the notion of “nationally appropriate mitigation actions [...] supported and enabled 
by technology, financing and capacity-building, in a measurable, reportable and verifiable manner” was 
included in the Bali Action Plan (UNFCCC, 2008b). By this wording, not only the actions of developing 
but also the financial support of developed countries was to be measured and verified. While the Parties 
are still negotiating the way this has to be done, scholars have already identified the need for more 
transparency: the new climate funds set up in the last few years lack transparency (Stewart et al., 2009) 
and more transparent guidelines for finance reporting are needed under the UNFCCC (Roberts et al., 
2010b; Tirpak et al., 2010). Such guidelines seem especially important as the current way of labeling 
ODA as climate-related (labeling by donors using the OECD’s Rio Markers) has been inconsistent and 
politically-driven in the past (see Michaelowa and Michaelowa, 2011a). 
 
The transparency of a baseline is given if international organizations or parties can easily assess whether 
the baseline for climate finance has been complied with. This assessment is possible if two conditions are 
met: first, the definition of a baseline must be clear to avoid renegotiation and redefinition. Second, the 
data for measurement and verification must be accessible and assessable. Therefore, we will assess the 
transparency of baseline definitions by both analyzing the clarity of the definition and the availability of data. 
 
Criterion 5c: Consistency with other regimes 
 
Rules within the climate change regime may not be consistent with well-established rules of other 
regimes. This has especially been studied for the case of border carbon adjustment and the trade regime 
(see e.g. Charnovitz, 2003; Brewer, 2004; Biermann and Brohm, 2005): e.g. taxes on embodied carbon in 
imported goods, which can be seen as contributing to the precautionary principle within the climate 
regime, are not clearly consistent with WTO principles on free trade. In the case of climate finance, we 
may have some interference with the rules for accounting development assistance. The wording of “new 
and additional” in the climate regime may imply a separation of development and climate funds (Huhtala 
et al., 2010). However, the OECD has established rules that all financial transfers with a certain level of 
concessionality qualify as Official Development Assistance (ODA). Therefore, a decision to not count 
climate funds as ODA would heavily interfere with the established OECD rule, which is backed by 
major donor preferences33. Beside the definition of ODA, a baseline definition may also include 
assumptions on the pledged level of ODA, which is a large intervention into the development assistance 
regime as well, given that donors are used to having sovereignty on ODA commitments. In contrast, 
honing the definition of climate finance is less interfering into the development regime, as the existing 
Rio Markers for both mitigation and adaptation (OECD, 2009) are quite new, not defined in detail, and 
the definition is sometimes poorly understood by donor staff. Therefore, we define the consistency with other 
regimes as the level of consistency of climate regime rules with well-established rules in the development assistance regime. 
Major interferences would be a change of the ODA definition or fixing the level of ODA commitments. 
                                                     
32 See e.g. the Cancun summit: the success was partly related to the transparent procedures, applauded by many parties (IISD, 
2010a).  
33 A senior Northern government official reported that his country advocated the change of the ODA definition in order to 
separate climate funding. The attempt, however, had no chances. 
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4.3 Options for a baseline   
 
In this section we describe eight baseline options and assess how well they perform on the criteria just 
listed. Seven of the analyzed baseline options are the ones mentioned in the literature and the 
negotiations: 0.7% of GNI, no baseline, new channels, no ODA counts, current climate finance, current 
development assistance and new sources. Furthermore, we propose a new, potentially promising 
definition: projection of development assistance and climate finance.   
 
 
4.3.1 Option 1: 0.7% of GNI 
 
Many developing countries prefer that the ticker for new and additional funding start only after countries 
have contributed 0.7% of their Gross National Income (GNI) to ODA (Ballesteros and Moncel, 2010). 
The target that developed countries provide 0.7% of their GNI as ODA has first been mentioned in the 
Report of the Commission on International Development (Pearson, 1969), without any clear explanation 
on how this has been calculated (Clemens and Moss, 2005). The 0.7% target has been several time 
restated, e.g. at the ”Earth Summit” in Rio de Janeiro 1992 and importantly in the final declaration of the 
UN’s International Conference on Financing for Development in Monterrey 2002, attended by many 
heads of state (Clemens and Moss, 2005)34. Until now, the 0.7% has been reached by only a very small 
number of countries, and the highest overall ratio of ODA to GNI has been achieved before the target 
was even set (see Figure 9). The 0.7% GNI threshold is also a favorite of European countries like 
Norway and the Netherlands that already meet this ODA standard.  
 
Although this threshold seems transparent and takes into account past pledges by developed countries, it 
is not viable for two reasons. First, many developed countries will in the next few years neither accept 
nor reach this threshold – especially the United States, with less than 0.2% of its GNI going to ODA. In 
case of countries that are far away from the 0.7% level, the wording “new and additional” will not put 
any pressure on them to spend on climate finance, as anyway, none of their funding is seen as additional. 
Second, countries like Sweden and Denmark, which today exceed the 0.7% mark, may just divert existing 
ODA commitments and call them new and additional climate finance. The non-feasibility of this baseline 
also applies to CDM additionality (Dutschke and Michaelowa, 2006). 
 
  
                                                     
34 Industrialized countries actually for a long time never promised to reach the 0.7% target but only to make efforts to attain it 
(Clemens and Moss, 2005). This changed when the EU pledged that the old member states reach this level by 2015 (EU, 2005). 
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Figure 9: Historic ratio of ODA to GNI (dashed line) and historic level of ODA (straight line) 
 
 
 
 
Sources: OECD (2010a) for ODA and WB (2010) for GNI 
 
 
 
4.3.2 Option 2: No agreed baseline 
 
Most industrialized countries favor having no agreed baseline, so that each contributor defines its own 
baseline. This option is clearly not acceptable for developing countries, and “additionality to 
development assistance” is not given. Furthermore, the definitions will be arbitrary, comparing funding 
across nations becomes very difficult, transparency is hardly given, and diversion of development 
assistance is likely. This option is the current state of affairs at this writing, as each donor has its own or 
even no definition of the baseline (WRI, 2011) 
 
 
4.3.3 Option 3: New UN channels only 
 
A simple option for avoiding this situation with unclear baselines is to count only funding disbursed 
through new UN channels, such as the Adaptation Fund or the planned Green Climate Fund, as wished 
by many developing countries. Although technically clear, the “new channels only” approach reduces 
flexibility for contributors and makes it less acceptable to them to use the term “new and additional” or 
leaves them less willing to disburse climate funds. Some existing channels may be better suited for 
effective use of certain types of flows or certain efforts to address climate change. This approach could 
have absurd consequences if old commitments are simply redirected into new funds.  
 
 
4.3.4 Option 4: No ODA counts 
 
Another straightforward option would allow using the best channels and mechanisms, but would not 
count ODA money as climate finance, to clearly separate between development and climate funds. This 
option is favored by many developing countries, who want climate finance to be above ODA 
(Ballesteros and Moncel, 2010). This approach forces contributors to decide whether the main goal of 
funding is development or climate related. Double-counting could be avoided and transparency 
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enhanced. Additional administrative costs of separately accounting climate funds from ODA are minimal 
if built on existing accounting systems, e.g. the only change to the existing OECD system would be that 
funds marked with the climate change Rio Marker would not be counted as ODA but reported as 
“climate finance”. However, the quality of the Rio Markers needs to be improved, see Michaelowa and 
Michaelowa (2011a). We may expect an improvement of the Rio markers, if climate-marked funds are 
not counted as ODA anymore, as development ministries will have an interest that development projects 
are not marked as climate projects. 
 
Despite the advantages of this approach, it is rejected by most industrialized countries, as they prefer to 
use climate funds to reach their ODA targets (see footnote 33). Developing countries also argue that 
climate finance should be “mainstreamed” into existing development assistance but this is a non-
consistent argument as mainstreaming in itself is not constrained by separate accounting of development 
and climate funds35.  However, a further argument against this baseline approach is that it would be 
inconsistent with the well-established rule in the development assistance regime that all concessional 
flows can be counted as ODA. 
 
A softened version of the “no ODA counts” option is the idea of former British Prime Minister Gordon 
Brown to limit the climate finance that can be accounted as ODA to 10% of overall ODA contribution. 
All climate finance beyond this 10% needs to come from other sources to be seen as “new and 
additional” (Brown et al., 2010). We do not treat this as a separate option here, as the 10% seems to be 
an artificial number that made sense for the UK Prime Minister at a given time, as the climate share of 
his aid budget was not yet close to the 10%. We never heard that this number has been repeated by any 
other nation. 
 
 
4.3.5 Option 5: Current climate finance 
 
A baseline acceptable to contributors (and according to Brown et al. (2010) supported by Germany) may 
be “current climate finance”: the existing climate funds and those pledged before Copenhagen would 
define the fixed baseline. This could be the final year before Copenhagen (2008 or 2009), or a five-year 
average such as 2005-2009. This interpretation of “new and additional” has some precedent in the 
climate negotiations, as the Marrakesh Accords (UNFCCC, 2002: 43) included the wording “funding that 
is new and additional to contributions, which are allocated to the climate change focal area of the Global 
Environment Facility and to multilateral and bilateral funding”. On the downside, with this model the 
diversion of development-oriented aid is possible, and information on current climate finance is scarce. 
In three analyzes, we have attempted to quantify current levels of climate finance (Roberts et al., 2008; 
Roberts et al., 2010a; Michaelowa and Michaelowa, 2011a). Many definitional problems arise, showing 
starkly conflicting numbers between OECD “Rio Marker” totals and those of our independent 
categorizations at the project level. Therefore, the criterion of transparency is currently not given, both in 
terms of clarity of definition and availability of data. However with clear definitions and sufficient 
resources, such a baseline could be constructed for major contributor nations in the future. 
  
                                                     
35 Separate accounting just means that in case of a larger development program, in which climate change concerns are 
mainstreamed, donors have to decide which part of the funding is seen as development-related and which part is counted as 
climate finance. This accounting exercise by itself should not have an impact on the project design. 
Effectiveness of international climate finance    Chapter 4: Definition of “new and additional” 
 
 
57 
4.3.6 Option 6: Current development assistance and climate finance  
 
An additional option is the idea to see current development assistance and climate finance as baseline, 
which is close to the wording in the Marrakesh Accords (UNFCCC, 2001) of “funding that is new and 
additional to […] multilateral and bilateral funding”. Under this definition, all contributions above 
current development assistance and climate finance (= above current ODA36) may count as climate 
finance. Two contributor countries, Australia and Switzerland, use a similar definition to this when 
saying that their fast start pledge is part of an increase in ODA (WRI, 2010). This essentially means that 
all climate finance can be called “new and additional” as long as ODA is increasing. However, this 
definition has some fundamental flaws: ODA has been increasing over time and is expected to increase 
even more in the future as most countries attempt to get closer to their 0.7% of GNI target or their 
Gleneagles 2005 promises. Australia and Switzerland both fit this pattern: their ODA has increased in 
the last few years, they have not yet met the 0.7% target, and it can be projected that their ODA will 
increase in the future (see Figure 10). This baseline will, therefore, not fulfill the criterion of 
“additionality to development assistance” and will not be acceptable for developing countries. 
 
 
Figure 10: Possible projections of development assistance (straight line projections) 
 
 
Source: OECD (2010a) and WB (2010) for years 1996-2009, straight line projections for the years 2010-2013, based on the data from the years 
1996-2009 (not controlling for economic development) 
 
 
  
                                                     
36 As all public climate finance to developing countries is counted as ODA, the sum of DA and public climate finance is ODA. 
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4.3.7 Option 7a: Updated projections of development assistance and climate finance  
 
Instead of current development assistance and climate finance levels, updated projections of 
development assistance and climate finance could be used as a baseline, which is a new option we 
propose (although Huhtala et al. (2010) mean a similar baseline when proposing “benchmarking”). In 
this case, BAU funding levels would be re-assessed every year or two, taking into account current 
economic growth in industrialized countries and development assistance commitments. For example, 
country X plans to increase ODA to USD x billion per 2020 if its economy is steadily growing. However, 
an economic crisis just before 2015 makes the reaching of this target impossible. Therefore, the country 
will lower its projected baseline for 2020 and the international community may allow the country to 
lower its baseline for 2015. This option may be acceptable to contributors, as it could allow future 
spending on climate finance to fall during economic downturns. Of course, obligations would also 
increase in strong growth years. Although this method is theoretically close to the perfect assessment of 
“new and additional”, it might fail at creating trust between parties, as developed countries may be 
suspected of gaming the baseline, and because baselines are renegotiated every few years. Therefore, we 
judge this baseline to not fulfill the criteria of “clarity of definition” and “political acceptability in the 
South”. 
 
 
4.3.8 Option 7b: Pre-defined projection of development assistance and climate finance 
 
A variant baseline using pre-defined projections of development assistance would avoid this permanent 
re-negotiation by defining the projected BAU level of development assistance and climate finance in 
advance, according to a realistic growth path. The pre-definition task would create a debate on which 
growth path is most realistic—very recent years or a longer-term trend37. Industrialized countries may be 
concerned about agreeing to specific levels of development assistance and climate finance without 
knowing their future GNI growth and related tax income. It is relatively straightforward, however, to use 
a formula that takes into account real GNI growth in later years38 (see Figure 11 for illustration). The 
GNI dependence of the funds would be a downside for developing countries, but by avoiding re-
negotiation of the formula they would benefit from better predictability.  
 
We do not see any major drawbacks beside some interference with the development assistance regime, as 
a projection of ODA is defined. This interference is, however, not very severe, since projections do not 
change official definitions like ODA.  
                                                     
37 For example in Figure 10 Switzerland shows a steeper increase over the final three years than over the trend – Australia’s ODA 
was flat and then dropped in 2009, but a longer-term trend since 1996 gives it the steepest slope of the two. 
38 This pre-definition with later adjustment is similar to the case of the Clean Development Mechanism where the baseline is 
estimated before the project is registered but it is adjusted ex-post according to some predefined formula (e.g. the production 
level or the units installed). 
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Figure 11: Projected development assistance and climate finance, adjusted to GNI (notional example) 
 
 
Source: Own graph, assuming ODA is projected to rise (simplified assumption of gradual increase; in reality development assistance will 
fluctuate due to economic cycles) 
 
 
 
4.3.9 Option 8: New sources only 
 
A final baseline definition, also proposed by Huhtala et al. (2010) for defining “new” is ”new sources 
only”, which is actually an alternative definition to “novelty” we rejected earlier. It combines all issues: 
novelty, additionality and acceptability. This baseline would count new sources only, meaning that only 
assistance from novel funding sources—such as international air transport levies, currency trading levies 
or auctioning of emission allowances—would be seen as new and additional. Such funds are new by 
definition, and they are likely to be additional to development assistance, as it is improbable that new 
funding sources – particularly the ones related to pricing carbon emissions – would be used for 
development assistance without a climate policy regime39. The obvious drawbacks are that it inflexibly 
bars the use of effective current funding streams, and would somewhat arbitrarily define which sources 
are new. Although we believe that this baseline could be acceptable for contributors, they have ruled it 
out for 2010-2012 “fast-start” financing, which will draw on existing sources such as the general budget. 
Therefore, the ”new sources only” option is probably one for longer-term (post-2012) climate finance, 
especially the ramping up of climate finance for the 2020 promise of USD 100 billion a year, for which 
the UN Secretary-General’s High-level Advisory Group on Climate Change Financing is suggesting 
especially new sources such as carbon taxes, auctioning of emission allowances or levies on international 
transport (UN, 2010). 
 
 
  
                                                     
39 The risk of “diverting” development funds is most likely in cases of sources that are not related to climate change, e.g. in case 
of a new financial transaction tax. 
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Summary of options 
 
When assessing the different baseline options with the criteria discussed (Table 4) most options do not 
fulfill at least one criterion. Only the baseline options “above a pre-defined projection of development 
assistance and climate finance” and “new sources only” can guarantee some level of additionality, 
novelty, and acceptability by parties, as well as transparency and consistency with other regimes.  
 
The option “pre-defined projection of development assistance and climate finance” does not perform 
very well on any particular criterion, but it also lacks any major drawbacks. The main challenge is to 
predefine projections of ODA. Such projections would not mean a change of existing regime rules but to 
introduce a new rule, which will have to be agreed at the head of state level. The second option with no 
negative rating on any criterion is “new sources only,” which we consider very promising given that there 
is international agreement that new sources are needed. Both the Copenhagen Accord and the Cancun 
Agreements specify that alternative sources of finance are to be included. Therefore, the “new sources” 
baseline option may have political support but it is hardly feasible in a strict sense: totally refraining from 
using traditional aid budgets will decrease flexibility on the donor side and may, therefore, limit both 
acceptability in the North and lower the overall climate funds (and, therefore, environmental 
effectiveness). Furthermore, many developing countries wish that most funding is coming from public 
sources (see e.g. IISD, 2010b), whereas “new sources” also include private funds. Therefore, a less strict 
baseline, e.g. the use of “at least 50% new sources” or the combination of the two feasible options 
(“above pre-defined projection of DA or from new sources”) may be more promising.  
 
 
  
  
 
Table 4: Assessment of baseline options  
Criterion 1) Additional 
to develop’t 
assistance 
2) New to exis-
ting flows and 
pledges 
3)Environ-
mental 
Effectiveness 
4) Distribu-
tional consid-
erations 
5a) Political 
acceptability 
(North) 
5a) Political 
acceptability 
(South) 
5b) Transpa-
rency: Clarity 
of definition 
5b) Transpar-
ency: Availa-
bility of data 
5c) Consisten-
cy with other 
regimes 
Means of assessment 
 
No DA 
decrease 
No double 
counting 
Funds for 
mitigation & 
adaptation 
Shift of burden 
away from 
South 
Public 
statements 
Public 
statements 
Clarity % available Consistency  
with rules of 
the DA regime 
Baseline Option          
1) 0.7% GNI 
 
+ + - + - + + + - 
2) No agreed  
baseline 
- (-) (+) (-) + - -  + 
3) New UN channels 
only 
  -  -  + + + 
4) No ODA counts +  (-) + - + + + - 
5) Current climate 
finance 
- + +   - - - + 
6) Current DA  
& climate finance  
-  (+)  + -    
7a) Updated projection 
of DA & climate finance 
+   +  - -  (-) 
7b) Pre-defined pro-
jection of DA& CF 
+   +   +  (-) 
8) New sources only  + (-) + (-) (-) + + + 
+ Criterion given, (+) rather given, (-) not clearly given, – clearly not given; blank cells means no clear rating. DA = development assistance, CF = climate finance 
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4.4 Discussion: challenge to raise climate finance without redirecting aid flows 
 
The assessment of the different baseline option has shown that hardly any of the baselines meets all 
criteria (additionality to aid flows, novelty, environmental effectiveness, political acceptability, and 
transparency).  
 
The challenging situation can illustrated with Figure 12 that shows the relationship between the baseline 
stringency (x-axis) and the level of funding (y-axis); depending on the baseline stringency,  a different 
amount of finance is seen as ODA and existing climate finance (white area below the bold line) and 
“new and additional” climate finance (grey-shaded area above the line). We assume here that both the 
current and projected development assistance and climate finance levels do not exhaust the maximum 
budget that a country is willing to spend on development assistance and climate finance together. Clearly, 
the assumption of a budget constraint budget is a proxy that only holds if several parameters, e.g. 
composition of the government, voters preferences are kept stable40.  
 
Figure 12 illustrates that only limited baseline options can lead to an increase of climate finance without 
implying a diversion of DA or re-counting of already planned climate finance. If the baseline stringency 
for “new and additional” is below the projected level of finance, then industrialized countries can 
increase climate finance at the expense of DA (or re-label “old” finance as “new”) as far as the baseline 
permits, as long as minimum level of DA finance wished by the electorate is guaranteed41. If the baseline 
is more stringent than the projected level of DA and climate finance, industrialized countries can increase 
development assistance spending beyond the projected level until the entire budget is spent, in order to 
be able to generate “new and additional climate finance.” If the baseline stringency goes beyond the 
budget constraint, then the country can – by definition – not spend anything on “additional” climate 
finance, and – as long as the government is mainly interested in meeting international obligations – 
development assistance and climate finance abruptly decreases to the projected level.  
 
Therefore, only baselines between the projected level of DA/climate finance and the budget constraint 
lead to an increase of climate finance (criterion of “environmental effectiveness”) without diverting 
development assistance (criterion of “additionality” and “novelty”) or re-counting of already pledged 
climate finance (criterion of “novelty”). Baselines that meet these criteria are the projected BAU level of 
finance and “new sources”, as the later essentially weakens the budget constraint. 
 
Figure 12 also depicts the criterion of political feasibility. The budget constraint is essentially the limit of 
political feasibility in the North, while the projected level of funding equals the minimum baseline level 
the South is willing to politically accept. 
 
  
                                                     
40 There are, however, at least two historic arguments that governments cannot raise assistance to developing countries beyond a 
specific level, given the preferences of the electorate. First, aid budgets have been heavily determined by external influences such 
as the global economic situation and unique historic events such as the end of the Cold War (see e.g. Round and Odedokun, 2004; 
Mold et al., 2009). Second, the 0.7% GNI goal for ODA flows has only been met by few countries despite international and 
national pressure; some countries have not even come close to it. 
41 This minimum level will hardly be much below the current level of DA funding; only if the government faces a strict obligation 
to meet climate finance pledges, it may reduce – as compromise – some of its development assistance. 
Effectiveness of international climate finance    Chapter 4: Definition of “new and additional” 
 
 
63 
Figure 12: Impact of climate finance baseline in case of budget constraint 
 
 
 
4.5 Conclusions  
 
The current state of no transparency on novelty and additionality of climate finance pledges will 
perpetuate mistrust in the climate regime. Many options for a baseline for a definition what “new and 
additional” means have been put forward but the parties to the UNFCCC have not yet agreed on any. 
From the climate negotiation texts and the academic literature we derive that a meaningful and successful 
baseline must at least fulfill the following criteria: novelty, additionality, equity, acceptability, transparency 
and consistency with other regimes. We conclude that only two of the assessed baseline options are not 
violating any criterion excessively: “Above pre-defined projection of development assistance and climate 
finance” and “new sources only”. It is, therefore, warranted that parties consider those two baseline 
options instead of restating their old extreme positions of either no baseline or a threshold of 0.7% of 
GNI going to ODA. 
 
Procedurally, the discussion on a baseline should be included either in the Ad-hoc Working Group on 
Long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention, or as subtask for the new Standing Committee on 
Climate Finance. If a global agreement on a single baseline definition is not possible, a second-best 
solution would be to oblige each contributor to transparently declare its own baseline definition, while 
providing guidance on needed data for each baseline option. Both a common as well as individual 
baselines could be part of the “enhanced common reporting methodologies for finance and tracking of 
climate-related support”, for which modalities and guidelines should be developed according to the 
Cancun Agreements (UNFCCC, 2010, paragraph 46). 
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Both industrialized and developing countries can do their part to reach a compromise: while 
industrialized countries could agree on elaboration of an internationally defined baseline or at least attach 
a baseline to each of their pledges, developing countries may acknowledge that it was almost impossible 
for industrialized countries to contribute USD 10 billion of “new and additional” funding in 2010, as the 
2010 budgets have mostly been determined before Copenhagen. More scrutiny may be applied to the 
figures for 2011 and 2012.  Meanwhile, the “scaling up” period from 2013 (when fast-start finance is 
past) and 2020 (when USD 100 billion/year is pledged) requires a sharp increase of about USD 10 
billion/year: deciding a baseline is critical for financing action during this period. 
 
In the end, defining a baseline for “new and additional” is just one of many important pieces in the larger 
jigsaw of climate finance. The new Green Climate Fund board will have to design the detailed 
governance structures and modalities for access for the Fund. However, this new fund will only be part 
of the various bilateral, multilateral, private and even South-South flows that have to do with financing 
climate change mitigation and adaptation. For realizing the full potential of climate finance, parties to the 
UNFCCC have to decide on a definition of “climate finance” and on rules and institutions on how to 
track it. In parallel, new and acceptable financing sources have to be identified. The new Standing 
Committee on Climate Finance could deliver important preparatory work for decisions on definitions 
(both climate finance and “baselines”), tracking modalities and new sources.  
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5 International climate finance as driver of renewable energy diffusion – comparing 
official claims with macro level evidence 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Renewable energies (RE) in developing countries are financed by two main mechanisms under the UN 
Climate Convention:  public funds are flowing through the Global Environment Facility (GEF) while 
mostly private funds are invested through the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). GEF and CDM 
report substantial effectiveness of their funding in promoting RE but micro level studies have questioned 
these claims. This paper uses a macro perspective to analyze whether GEF and CDM indeed 
overestimate their impact on renewable energy diffusion. For this purpose, Fixed Effects, Random 
Effects and Generalized Methods of Moments models are used to identify the determinants of grid-
based renewable energy diffusion, using a dataset covering 20 years and more than 120 developing 
countries. The models estimate that CDM and GEF’s effect is substantially lower than officially reported 
when controlling for economic development, national policies, dependence on foreign oil and resource 
endowment. The only exception is the case of biomass power where CDM is, according to the models, 
more effective than officially reported. The results are consistent with evidence from case study research 
and suggest that reforms of both CDM and GEF are needed. 
 
Keywords: Renewable Energies, Developing Countries, Clean Development Mechanism, Global Environment Facility, 
Effectiveness 
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5.1 Introduction 
 
This study analyzes international climate finance as driver for renewable energies in developing countries. 
Renewable energies are seen as important technologies for transformation to sustainable and low-carbon 
energy systems (see e.g. Pacala and Socolow, 2004; Edenhofer et al., 2011; Krey and Clarke, 2011). 
 
Given their importance for climate change and sustainability, there is a wide range of comparative studies 
analyzing the determinants of renewable energy (RE) diffusion (Carley, 2009; Marques et al., 2010; 
Marques et al., 2011; Popp et al., 2011). Most of these studies have focused on industrialized countries 
and neglected developing countries, which are particularly important in scenarios of future diffusion 
(Krey and Clarke, 2011). For developing countries we mainly find case studies and qualitative analysis 
(e.g. Martinot et al., 2002; Goldemberg et al., 2004; Reddy and Painuly, 2004; Yu et al., 2009). The only 
known comparative analysis of RE diffusion in developing countries are the ones of Brunnschweiler 
(2010), who identifies the financial market as important determinant, and Sadorsky (2009), who analyzes 
the impact of income per capita for 16 emerging economies.   
 
All of these quantitative studies have neglected the role of international climate finance, which we define 
here as “international financial payments, directly or indirectly mobilized by industrialized countries 
governments that cover costs of climate change mitigation and/or adaptation in developing countries”. 
Such international climate finance substantially supports the deployment of renewable energies in 
developing countries both via public channels (Zerriffi and Wilson, 2010; Dixon et al., 2011) and the 
carbon market (Lewis, 2010; Schneider et al., 2010).  
 
Existing studies on the impact of international climate finance on RE deployment are based on micro-
level case studies (Schneider, 2009b; Lewis, 2010; Zerriffi and Wilson, 2010) and have not taken into 
account important macro level drivers such as technology potential (Marques et al., 2011), financial 
markets and resources (Sadorsky, 2009; Brunnschweiler, 2010), energy demand (Carley, 2009), knowledge 
(Popp et al., 2011) and climate and energy policies (Lewis and Wiser, 2007; Carley, 2009). 
 
This study tries to fill this research gap by analyzing the influence of international climate finance on 
macro level diffusion of renewable energies in developing countries. We focus on the impact of the 
Global Environment Facility (GEF) as public funding institution and the Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM) as market-based mechanism, as these are the main financing channels for RE linked 
to the United Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). 
 
The paper starts off by describing the role of CDM and GEF as international climate finance channels, 
comparing their size to international development funding promoting RE. Then we explore theoretical 
reasons why the CDM and GEF may be successful in promoting renewable energies but why their 
impact may be overestimated by official numbers. We also explore reasons whether CDM or GEF can 
be expected to be more effective per unit of funding. After this the empirical strategy and data is 
presented, followed by the results for five different types of renewable energies and a discussion of the 
results. 
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5.2 International climate finance channels promoting renewable energies 
 
5.2.1   The Global Environment Facility (GEF) and other public institutions 
 
Under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the wealthiest countries (Annex 
II) have the obligation to pay for any climate change mitigation related measures that are agreed between 
developing countries and operating entities of the UNFCCC’s financial mechanism (UNFCCC 1992). 
Similar to other environmental conventions (biodiversity, desertification), the Global Environment 
Facility (GEF) was chosen to be the operational entity of the UNFCCC’s financial mechanism, and in 
the last 20 years around 1.3 billion USD have been committed to support renewable energies, which is 
the main climate change funding area besides energy efficiency (Stadelmann, 2009). Table 5 shows that 
among all RE technologies, mostly biomass, solar and wind power have been promoted, while less than 
50% of funding committed in the period 1992-2009 had been disbursed by the end of 2008. 
 
 
Table 5: Share of grid-based renewable energy among all GEF projects (at the end of 2009) 
Approved projects 
(until June 2009) 
Committed funding  
(until 2009) 
Disbursed funding  
(until end of 2008) 
Number %  Number  %  USD  million  %  
Biomass power 30 8% 141 4% 85 8% 
Geothermal power 8 2% 68 2% 49 4% 
Hydro power 28 7% 68 2% 31 3% 
Solar power 26 7% 253 8% 130 12% 
Tidal power 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 
Wind power 30 8% 164 5% 55 5% 
All Renewable Power 94 24% 856 27% 356 33% 
All GEF projects 393 100% 3140 100% 1090 100% 
Source: database of Stadelmann (2009), based on GEF (2010d); in 2007 constant USD. 
 
 
 
While the GEF has been the official entity of the UNFCCC’s financial mechanism, most international 
grants to support renewable energies in developing countries have been provided by other public 
institutions in the last 10 years (see Figure 13). According to OECD (2011b) data around USD 0.5-2.0 
billion of Official Development Assistance (ODA) has been committed to RE projects per year between 
1999 and 2009. In this period, the GEF has been the second most important grant contributor among 
multilateral institutions, after the World Bank’s International Development Association (IDA), and the 
fifth most important international grant contributor overall, after the IDA, Japan, Germany and Spain. 
While GEF’s role has been substantial in the first years after the millennium, its role has diminished in 
the last few years while other ODA for renewable energies has substantially increased, probably 
connected to the rising oil price (Michaelowa and Michaelowa, 2011b), and potentially the funding 
pledges at the 2009 UN conference in Copenhagen. In addition, international public flows that do not 
meet the criteria for ODA, mainly non-concessional loans by multilateral development banks (MDBs), 
have supported renewable energies in the past 10 years, on average with USD 0.6 billion per year 
(OECD, 2012c). 
 
Although the GEF only provides only a small part of international grants for renewable energies (see 
Figure 13) we will focus on GEF as an example for a public climate finance channel. There are several 
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reasons for this; first, GEF is the only operational entity of the UNFCCC’ financial mechanism that has 
disbursed funds for climate change mitigation42. Second, the GEF provides project-level documents 
containing CO2 reduction estimates, which is different to other public funding institutions, so we can 
compare official claims for RE promotion with our results. Third, the GEF disburses funding specifically 
directed at climate change mitigation, while other public funds and agencies have already supported 
renewable energies in the 1980s and is debatable whether funding in the last 20 years is due to climate 
change reasons (Michaelowa and Michaelowa, 2011b). Only in the last few years, a series of non-GEF 
public funds dedicated to climate change have been created, both on bilateral and multilateral terms (see 
HBS/ODI, 2011 for a comprehensive overview). The best-funded ones are the World Bank’s Climate 
Investment Funds (CIFs), for which donors pledged more than USD 6 billion, both in grants and loans. 
However, it is too early to evaluate the performance of these funds given that most of them have only 
disbursed funding in the last 1-2 years. 
 
 
Figure 13: ODA for RE in developing countries (commitments) compared to CDM contracts 
 
Source: OECD (2012b) for Official Development Assistance supporting renewable energies, Stadelmann (2009) for GEF, and Linacre et al. 
(2011) for CDM forward contract. 
 
 
 
5.2.2  Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) as market mechanism 
 
The Clean Development Mechanism has emerged as major international funding channel for RE 
investments in developing countries in the last ten years. The CDM is a flexible mechanism under the 
Kyoto Protocol (UNFCCC, 1997) that allows developed countries to partly achieve their greenhouse gas 
emission targets by purchasing emission reduction credits from projects in developing countries. RE has 
become the most important technology area for the CDM with around 65% of all registered projects and 
35% of all emission reduction credits expected until the end of 2012. Until the end of 2011, more than 
                                                     
42 In 2010, the Green Climate Fund was designated as second operational entity but the Green Climate Fund has not disbursed 
any funding until the beginning of 2013. 
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130 million emission reduction credits from RE projects have been issued, mostly to biomass, hydro and 
wind power projects (see Table 6). The corresponding financial payments can be estimated at 0.4 billion 
in 2010, assuming an average credit price of 10 USD43. While these payments are lower than the level of 
public grants, the actual commitment for CDM credit payments, measured by the value of signed 
contracts for future payments for CDM credits (Linacre et al., 2011; URC, 2011)44, have exceeded public 
grant commitments in the period 2006-2008 (see Figure 13). While the level of CDM forward contracts 
substantially lowered in the last three years due to the economic crisis and uncertainty on post-2012 
climate policy (Linacre et al., 2011), credit payments will still grow due to on-going contracts and 
advanced implementation of registered projects.  
 
Apart from the CDM, voluntary carbon credits also provide financial incentives for renewable energies in 
developing countries, close to USD 100 million in 2011 (Peters-Stanley and Hamilton, 2012). Given the 
scarce data on the voluntary market, we focus here on the CDM. 
 
 
Table 6: Share of renewable energy among all CDM projects (at the end of 2011) 
Registered projects
 
Expected credits
until end of 2012
Issued credits
until end of 2011
Number  % million % million  % 
Biomass energy 392 11% 168 6% 21 3%
Geothermal 12 <1% 13 <1% 2 <1%
Hydro power 1084 30% 438 16% 68 8%
Solar energy 50 1% 6 <1% <1 <1%
Tidal power 1 <1% 1 0% 0 0%
Wind power 817 23% 333 12% 54 7%
All Renewables 2356 65% 959 35% 145 18%
All CDM projects 3620 100% 2733 100% 816 100%
Source: URC (2011) 
 
 
 
5.3 Theoretical considerations on the effectiveness of CDM and GEF  
 
In the following, theoretical explanations are given for why and to which extent international climate 
finance may influence RE diffusion. First, the different causal mechanisms of CDM’s and GEF’s impact 
on RE diffusion are explained, which are also relevant for the timing of their impact. Then, reasons are 
given why the effectiveness stated in official project documents may be overestimated and why this 
overestimation may be more relevant for one or the other of the two mechanisms. From all these steps, 
we derive hypotheses, which are subsequently tested in the empirical analysis. 
 
 
  
                                                     
43 This price is based on primary credit prices reported by GIZ (2011) and the World Bank carbon market reports (Lecocq and 
Capoor, 2005; Capoor and Ambrosi, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010); the average of the years 2004-2009 is taken, as primary prices 
should have been fixed before delivery in 2010. Euros were converted into USD using historical exchange rates from Oanda 
(2011). 
44 This value was estimated multiplying the USD 6-7 billion of forward contracts in this period (Linacre et al., 2011) with the share 
of credits from renewable energy projects in the CDM pipeline (around 35%), see URC (2011). 
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5.3.1 Causal mechanisms to address barriers of renewable energy diffusion 
 
Among the key barriers of RE diffusion in the literature (Painuly, 2001; Reddy and Painuly, 2004; 
Brunnschweiler, 2010; Edenhofer et al., 2011) there are four that are addressed by international climate 
finance: higher costs of renewable energies, lack of awareness and information, regulatory barriers and 
imperfect financial markets.  
 
The first barrier are higher costs of some RE technologies (Painuly, 2001; Reddy and Painuly, 2004; 
Edenhofer et al., 2011). Direct financial incentives provided by international climate finance can 
overcome this barrier, e.g. CDM credit payments can in some cases (landfill gas, specific wind and 
biomass power plants) cover all additional costs of renewable energies (Schneider et al., 2010). In 
contrast, the GEF seldom provides direct financial incentives; it rather assists countries in designing 
national policies that encompass financial incentives. 
 
A second barrier for RE adoption is lack of awareness and information of investors and consumers 
(Reddy and Painuly, 2004; Edenhofer et al., 2011). Strategies for overcoming this barrier are e.g. 
education and outreach programs, which are seen as vital for success of RE deployment programs 
(Martinot, 1998; Bolinger et al., 2001). The CDM itself does not aim at directly providing information 
but it has an indirect capacity building effect via learning by-using and technology transfer (Haites et al., 
2006; Schneider et al., 2008; Seres et al., 2009). In contrast, the GEF (2011c) is actively aiming at 
dissemination information on RE technologies, both to producers and consumers. 
 
Third, RE diffusion is also hindered by regulatory barriers, such as no guaranteed access to the electricity 
grid, missing clarity of the regulatory framework (Painuly, 2001; Reddy and Painuly, 2004; Edenhofer et 
al., 2011) and non-reflection of externality costs in public policies (Owen, 2006). Regulatory changes or 
specific policies can alleviate these barriers. For example, the introduction of feed-in tariffs has led to 
rapid diffusion of renewable energies by guaranteeing grid access and regulating the tariff per unit of 
renewable electricity produced (Mitchell et al., 2006; Mendonça, 2007). While CDM does not aim at 
regulatory change, and has even been seen as barrier for policy adoption by some authors (He and 
Morse, 2010), GEF is actively initiating regulatory frameworks and policy strategies for renewable 
energies (GEF, 2011c).   
 
Fourth, investment in renewable energies also rely on the availability of a well-functioning financial 
market (Brunnschweiler, 2010), which is linked to low macroeconomic investment risk, such as political 
and economic stability. CDM has not aimed at alleviating this barrier, and host country investment risks 
are even seen as major barrier for the CDM investment itself (Oleschak and Springer, 2007). In contrast, 
the GEF has tried to improve availability of capital for RE projects by setting up investment funds and 
strengthening financial intermediaries (GEF, 2011c).  
 
Table 7 provides an overview of the causal mechanisms employed: while the CDM provides financial 
payments to cover additional costs of RE technologies, GEF is providing capacity building, advice for 
regulatory changes and access to capital.  
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Table 7: Causal mechanisms for explaining effectiveness of CDM and GEF 
Causal mechanism Expected timing of 
causal mechanism 
CDM GEF 
Financial payments to cover additional costs of 
renewable energy technologies 
Immediate Used Partly used 
Capacity building to overcome information barriers of 
investors and consumers 
Lagged  Used 
Advice for setting up renewable energy promotion 
policies and alleviate regulatory barriers 
Lagged  Used 
Access to capital for overcoming imperfect financial 
markets and macroeconomic investment risks 
Immediate  Partly used 
Expected timing of causal influence  Rather immediate Rather lagged 
 
 
 
The use of specific causal mechanisms should have an impact of the timing of CDM and GEF 
effectiveness. Financial payments are expected to have an immediate effect due to the direct incentive 
provided, and capacity building an indirect, deferred effect on technology adoption (Jung et al., 2010). 
RE policies can have a direct effect on RE diffusion (Jung et al., 2010) but the GEF has only an indirect 
effect on policy adoption via providing advice to policy makers. Therefore, we expect that the CDM has 
an immediate, positive effect on renewable energy diffusion, while the GEF has rather a lagged effect (hypothesis 1). 
 
Due to the causal mechanisms described above, both CDM and GEF report substantial effectiveness in 
promoting renewable energies. GEF estimates its own projects to reduce more than 10 million tCO2eq 
per year via renewable energies, while CDM has certified GHG emission reductions of more than 70 
million tCO2eq last year (see Table 8). CDM claims higher effectiveness than GEF for all RE 
technologies except geothermal and solar.   
 
In terms of effectiveness per USD of funding, GEF project documents claim 0.04 tonnes of CO2 per 
USD of funding, while for the CDM no data is contained in project documents. When using 10 USD as 
estimate for the average payment per CDM credits (see footnote 43 for details), CDM reduces around 
0.1 tCO2eq per USD of funding by promoting renewable energies, so more than double compared to 
GEF. If the 10 USD per carbon credit is valid for all project types45, CDM is more effective than GEF 
per USD in promoting all RE technologies except geothermal and hydro. 
 
On average, CDM and GEF assume that renewable energies are reducing GHG emissions during a 
similar amount of years (see last two columns in Table 8), so numbers should be comparable in this 
regard. 
 
 
  
                                                     
45 Effectiveness per USD of funding may differ between renewable technologies due to different credit prices but no reliable 
data on these differences is available. 
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Table 8: Estimated effectiveness of CDM and GEF (2007 USD) 
 
Effectiveness in 
M tCO2eq per year 
(2010-2011)
Effectiveness in 
tCO2eq per USD 
of funding
Years of GHG emissions 
reductions
 GEF1 CDM2 GEF1 CDM2 GEF1 CDM2
Renewable energy 11.6 75.1 0.04 [0.10] 19 18
Biomass 3.0 4.7 0.09 [0.10] 13 17
Geothermal 4.9 1.5 0.18 [0.10] 24 21
Hydro 0.8 41.4 0.19 [0.10] 23 20
Solar  1.0 0.1 0.02 [0.10] 18 15
Wind 1.9 27.4 0.10 [0.10] 20 20
1 All values are based on a database from Stadelmann (2009), using documents from GEF (2010d). Effectiveness is based on projections of 
directly measurable reductions (“direct reductions”) of projects registered by mid-2009. For effectiveness per USD of funding, the 
effectiveness values are divided by the GEF grants in 2007 USD for the respective projects; median values for each type are taken. Years of 
GHG emissions reductions are the reported lifetimes of technologies. 
2 Effectiveness is derived from the number of CDM credits issued in the year 2011 (URC 2012), which is similar to the number of credits per 
year expected from projects registered by mid-2009. Effectiveness per USD of funding is not reported by the CDM documents. The number 
in brackets (indicating uncertainty) is the inverse of 10 USD/ tCO2, the estimated average primary price in the years 2004-2009 (see footnote 
43 for details). In these numbers, we neglect that the CDM as offset mechanism is actually replacing CO2 reductions in industrialized 
countries.  
 
 
 
5.3.2 Overestimation of effectiveness due to missing or asymmetric information 
 
The officially46 estimated effectiveness as cited above – both in absolute terms and relative to funding – 
may substantially be overestimated because of at least two reasons: non-perfect availability of 
information on drivers of RE diffusion at the level of project investors and developers, and asymmetric 
information due to incentives for investors and developers not to reveal relevant information they have.   
 
The first reason for overestimations is that project developers may not be aware of all information on the 
drivers of RE diffusion, so they link the diffusion to CDM and GEF, while this diffusion may also have 
happened without their support because of a plethora of domestic and international drivers: Domestic 
drivers for RE include demand for electricity (Carley, 2009; Popp et al., 2011; Sathaye et al., 2011), energy 
independence (Carley, 2009; Marques et al., 2010; Popp et al., 2011), the attempt to diversify energy 
sources (Awerbuch and Sauter, 2006; Sathaye et al., 2011), increased economic resources for covering 
higher costs of RE technologies (Popp et al., 2011; Sathaye et al., 2011), the development of an advanced 
financial market (Brunnschweiler, 2010), increasing knowledge on RE within science, business and 
politics (Jacobsson and Johnson, 2000; Foxon et al., 2005; Popp et al., 2011), natural resource 
endowments (Carley, 2009; Edenhofer et al., 2011; Marques et al., 2011) and last but not least national 
RE policies (Mitchell et al., 2006; Butler and Neuhoff, 2008). Among international drivers, we find 
international energy prices (Marques et al., 2011; Michaelowa and Michaelowa, 2011b), development 
assistance and loans of MDBs (Martinot, 2001; UNEP, 2008; Kehler Siebert et al., 2010; Delina, 2011) 
and participation in international climate change agreements (Michaelowa and Michaelowa, 2011b; Popp 
et al., 2011). It is very unlikely that CDM and GEF project proponents are perfectly aware of all these 
drivers at the time of writing their documents. Indeed, energy market players are often found to have 
imperfect information (Aleem, 1990; Jaffe et al., 2005; Streimikiene et al., 2007).  
                                                     
46 In case of CDM, the estimated effectiveness per USD of funding is not an official estimate, as it is not only based on the official 
claim that each CDM credit represents one tonne of CO2 reduced but also on non-official estimates for payments per CDM 
credit.  
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The second reason for overestimation is asymmetric information as several actors in the GEF and CDM 
funding chain have incentives not to display information to other actors who want to evaluate the 
effectiveness of GEF and CDM projects. This resembles the typical principal-agent problem (Grossman 
and Hart, 1983; Laffont and Martimort, 2002): A principal delegates a certain task to an agent (in our 
case the task is to reduce CO2 via renewable energies), but the principal cannot fully observe the 
performance of the agent because the agent withholds information that is available only to him. In case 
of the CDM and GEF delegation chain (see Figure 14), there are many of these principal-agent 
relationships. The ultimate agents are the GEF project investors and the GEF host countries, who are 
the ones who have most information on the drivers of RE adoption. However, they have incentives not 
to reveal information on ineffective projects to their principals (CDM credit buyers and GEF 
implementing agencies), because funding is linked to effectiveness. Furthermore, these principals 
themselves are agents of higher order principals (governments or GEF), to whom they will not display all 
information either, as GEF funding and the rights to use low-cost CDM credits are linked to 
effectiveness. Governments themselves can be seen as agents of their voters or tax payers, to whom they 
may also not display all information. Therefore, it is very unlikely that the highest order principals 
(voters) have enough information to assess whether CDM and GEF are really promoting renewable 
energies, or if other drivers are relevant. This situation is similar to the multiple principal-agent problems 
in multilateral development funding, as identified by Vaubel (2006). 
 
 
Figure 14: Delegation of mitigation (grey arrows) and project screening (thin black arrows) for CDM and GEF   
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Asymmetric information between principal and agents can be reduced by either trustworthy “signaling” 
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through the certification process: so-called Designated Operational Entities (DOEs) “screen” projects 
and verify emission reduction claims47, while the CDM EB, on behalf of the countries having ratified the 
Kyoto Protocol, has to approve this verification and issue CDM credits. In case of the GEF, claims in 
the project documents are screened by the GEF secretariat, who delegates some screening work to the 
Scientific and Technical Advisory Panel. As both the CDM and GEF screening process itself involve 
delegation (see thin black arrows in Figure 14) and the screening institutions itself face asymmetric 
information, it seems not surprising that several studies have found that the screening is far from perfect: 
in case of the CDM, both DOEs and the EB have imperfect information as well (Michaelowa and 
Purohit, 2007; Schneider, 2009b) and DOEs even have own interests to not very thoroughly check the 
claims as they are paid by the investors themselves (Michaelowa, 2007a). Furthermore, EB members also 
have interests in low scrutiny for ineffective projects originating from their own countries (Flues et al., 
2010). In case of the GEF, the assessment on emission reductions is generally found to be inconsistent 
and not very reliable (Eberhard et al., 2004; Stadelmann, 2009). Therefore, we can assume that screening 
applied in the CDM and GEF supply chain will not remove the problem of asymmetric information, so 
achievements may still be overestimated by the different project proponents. 
 
Because of these two reasons, (1) the many drivers for RE that developers of CDM and GEF 
effectiveness may neglect in their effectiveness assessment and (2) the asymmetric information due to 
interests of both project developers and evaluators not to display available information on the real 
drivers, we can assume that CDM and GEF effectiveness in promoting renewable energy and thereby reducing GHG 
emissions is lower than officially estimated (hypothesis 2). To assess the actual effect, all drivers of renewable 
energy diffusion must be taken into account48.  
 
 
5.3.3 Comparative effectiveness of the two mechanisms 
 
While we have set the hypotheses that GEF and CDM are effective in reducing CO2 via renewable 
energies but overestimate their contribution, a further question is: which one of the two mechanisms is 
comparatively more effective per USD of funding? This may be important information to allocate the 
USD 100 billion funding pledged in Copenhagen 2009 (UNFCCC, 2009b). As documented above (Table 
8), according to official numbers, the CDM is more effective per USD of funding, except for hydro and 
geothermal power (assuming a credit price of 10 USD).   
 
The question is whether the higher effectiveness of CDM holds if we take into account the just discussed 
overestimation due to neglecting relevant drivers for RE, which can happen both because of  
information that project developers are missing (e.g. whether upcoming policy change will enable or 
disenable investments) or information that is not revealed by some actors. Overestimations due to 
generally missing information seems to be more likely in case of the GEF as ex-ante calculation and 
verification of CO2 reductions are not well elaborated (Eberhard et al., 2004; Stadelmann, 2009), and 
evaluating GEF’ impacts through measures such as capacity building and support for regulatory change 
involves high uncertainty (Mee et al., 2008). Overestimations due to information not revealed by some 
actors could be more pronounced for either GEF or for CDM. On the one hand, GEF project 
developers or implementing agencies may find it less difficult to disclose information on GHG emissions 
reductions, as project documents are less thoroughly checked and funding is not directly conditional on 
GHG emissions reductions. On the other hand, CDM project developers have clear financial incentives 
                                                     
47 Certification of emission reductions can also be seen as “signal” of project owners to buyers that their projects actually reduce 
emissions. 
48 Unfortunately, with the empirical strategy used, it will not be possible to assess whether drivers are non-intentionally (reason 1) 
or intentionally (reason 2) not taken into account. For assessing this, expert interviews would be needed. 
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to hide information (e.g. that some of the projects are BAU) as CDM funding is directly linked to CO2 
emission reductions. Furthermore, several overestimations have not been detected leading to some BAU 
projects being approved for CDM support (Michaelowa and Purohit, 2007; Haya, 2009; Schneider, 
2009b).  
 
Summing up, there is a lower chance of overestimation in the CDM due to generally missing information 
given the more elaborated GHG accounting methodologies but we can theoretically not be sure whether 
overestimation due to non-revealed information, is more pronounced in case of GEF or CDM. Given 
this uncertainty on overestimation, it can be assumed that the estimates of the funding institutions hold 
that, in case of biomass, solar and wind power, the CDM is more effective than the GEF per USD of funding in 
promoting renewable energies, while in case of geothermal and hydro, the GEF is more effective (Hypothesis 3).   
 
 
5.4 Empirical strategy and models 
 
We will test these hypotheses by using macro level panel models estimating the determinants of RE 
diffusion in different developing countries. There are several reasons for using macro (country level) 
rather than micro (project level) data. First, effectiveness of CDM funding has already been examined on 
the micro level (Michaelowa and Purohit, 2007; Haya, 2009; Schneider, 2009b), so a comparison with 
macro level methods may provide interesting insight. Second, micro level data analysis on effectiveness 
of climate finance suffers the same problem that haunts CDM verifiers: what would happen in the 
absence of climate finance? Only the project owner will know the probable answer as the situation 
without climate finance is a counterfactual situation. Using macro level data, we can try to approximate 
the counterfactual situation of a country by comparing it with very similar countries and with the same 
country in different years. In contrast, micro level data on “very similar” projects without CDM and 
GEF funding is not available. Third, some of our hypotheses can only be tested on a macro level, e.g. the 
overestimation due to neglecting the influence of macro level drivers of diffusion. 
 
Equation 1 shows the basic model we use. The dependent variable is REit , the CO2 reductions emerging 
from renewable electricity production49 in country i and year t. The main independent variables are 
GEFit, the GEF payments received by a country, and CDMit the expected future income from registered 
CDM projects. Xit is representing the control variables and uit the error term. The coefficients 1 and 2 
are estimating the impact of GEF and CDM on RE diffusion and can, therefore, be used to test 
hypothesis 1 (positive impact), hypothesis 2 (lower impact of GEF and CDM when comparing 
coefficients of models controlling for all drivers – represented by the matrix β’ * Xit – with officially 
estimated effectiveness or model coefficients when not controlling for these drivers) and hypothesis 3 
(higher effectiveness per USD of CDM compared to GEF funding, for biomass, wind and solar). Given 
that RE production may largely depend on the last year’s production, we include the lagged dependent 
variable L.REit as independent variable.  
 
REit = 0 + 1 * GEFit + 2 * CDMit + β’ * Xit +	 *L.REit + uit           ( 1 ) 
 
  
                                                     
49 While the installed capacity of renewable energies would be less sensitive to annual changes in natural resources (biomass, wind, 
solar), there are several disadvantages of using installed capacity: First, installed capacity itself does not guarantee electricity 
production and CO2 reductions; the effectiveness of CDM RE projects has often been overestimated in ex-ante calculations 
(Castro and Michaelowa, 2008). Second, without production data, no CO2 reductions can be estimated. Third, data for installed 
capacities in developing countries are only available for 5 years (2005-2009), so we would lose many observations. 
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5.4.1 Two-step estimation strategy 
 
As our dependent variable is censored – it has no negative values but many zeros (as many developing 
countries do not produce RE-based electricity at all) – the use of all data in standard models for 
continuous variables (e.g. ordinary least square with fixed effects) would result in biased results. The 
more appropriate model for such censored data is the Tobit model but the later does not accurately 
model situations where some coefficients may have different signs in selection and regression equation 
(Greene, 2008: 877). Furthermore, country fixed effects cannot be included. We will, therefore, use a 
two-step estimation strategy as suggested by Wooldridge (2009: 595) for such cases.  
 
The first step is a selection (or adoption) model analyzing the determinants of whether countries produce 
renewable electricity (coded as 1) or not (coded as 0). For such a binary dataset, a Logit model is well 
suited, as it takes the boundaries of the dataset into account.  
 
As second step, we apply models for continuous variables only using data from countries where RE is 
present. Among such models, we use fixed-effects and random-effects models (Wooldridge, 2010) and 
compare the results with Arellano and Bond (1991) and Blundell and Bond (1998) Generalized Methods 
of Moments (GMM) models to correct for bias due to potentially endogenous variables. These diffusion 
models are now further explained. 
 
 
5.4.2 Fixed and random effects models  
 
Compared to cross-sectional data, panel data allows us to correct our estimates for country fixed-effects 
(FE) on RE diffusion. For this purpose we include dummies for each country, which equals deducting 
the country mean value from the dependent variable and all determinants (see equation 2). The 
coefficients are then estimated with OLS regressions. 
 
ܴܧ௜௧ െ ܴܧതതതത௜ = 0 + 1ሺܩܧܨ௜௧ െ ܩܧܨ௜ሻ+ 2ሺܥܦܯ௜௧ െ ܥܦܯ௜ሻ+ βሺࢄ࢏࢚ െ ࢄ࢏ሻ+ (L.REit െ L.	ܴܧ௜) + ݑ௜௧- ݑ௜		( 2 ) 
 
 
Additionally, we estimate random effects generalized least square models, which should result in more 
efficient estimations than fixed effects models as both between and within country variation are used. 
Estimators from random effect models can be inconsistent, so the Hausman test (Greene, 2008: 209) is 
used to test consistency of random-effects when compared to fixed-effects estimators. 
 
 
5.4.3 Generalized methods of moments (GMM) models  
 
Apart from the standard panel models – fixed and random effects – we will also specify Generalized 
Methods of Moments (GMM) models, which allow for correcting biased estimates if the lagged 
dependent variable is an important predictor (dynamic panel setting) and some other independent 
variables are not strictly exogenous. 
 
In our case, the lagged dependent variable – the past level of RE diffusion – may be a particularly 
powerful predictor as RE installations have a lifetime of more than 10-20 years, and past adoption of RE 
may drive knowledge, networks and institutions (Jacobsson and Johnson, 2000), thereby even further 
promoting renewable energies. Simply including the lagged dependent variable in standard fixed effects 
models will not solve the problem of biased estimators as the lagged dependent variable is by definition 
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endogenous (correlated with the error term), and the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable will be 
downward biased. Using ordinary least square model with clustered standard errors is also not a solution 
as it would result in upward biased estimates of the lagged dependent variable (Bond, 2002).  
 
Beside bias in the lagged dependent variable, dynamic panel models may also result in other biased 
coefficients, which would affect our estimates of GEF and CDM effectiveness. Even if results of Monte 
Carlo simulations suggest that bias of these coefficients should be less pronounced than bias of the 
lagged dependent variable (Judson and Owen, 1999), we may have to care about potential bias on 
coefficients of CDM and GEF because these variables may be partly endogenous on their own: both 
CDM and GEF funding may target countries where substantial diffusion is expected. 
 
An often used way to address endogeneity of variables is to use instrumental variables in regression 
models. However, finding good instrumental variables is very difficult as they should be exogenous, 
highly correlated with and influencing the endogenous variable but have no direct effect on the 
dependent variable. In case of dynamic panel models, Anderson and Hsiao (1982) proposed to use a 
differenced model (see equation 3) to both remove fixed effects and use the second lagged dependent 
variable (in our case ܴܧ௜௧ିଶ) as instrument. As ܴܧ௜௧ିଶ may alone not be strongly correlated with ∆ܴܧ௜௧ିଵ 
even deeper lags may be useful, but one data year is lost per further lag used as an instrument, 
substantially lowering our sample size. 
  
∆ܴܧ௜௧  = 0 + 1∗ ∆ܩܧܨ௜௧+ 2∗ ∆ܥܦܯ௜௧+ β *∆ࢄ࢏࢚ ൅ ∗ ܮ. ∆ܴܧ௜௧ିଵ+ ݁௜௧- ݁௜																																													( 3 ) 
 
 
Arellano and Bond (1991) suggested to use a GMM differenced model (with lagged instruments) that 
performs better than the Anderson-Hsiao model in Monte-Carlo simulations50, and allows to use a 
different set of instruments for each period, and thereby less observations have to be dropped 
(Roodman, 2006)51.  These instruments are assumed to be not correlated with the errors, which is equal 
to the so-called “moment conditions”. The minimization of these moment conditions is then the basis of 
the GMM estimators. Whether the instruments are jointly valid, meaning that they are not correlated 
with the errors, can be tested with a Sargant or Hansen chi-square test.  
 
In our case, GMM framework is not only useful to instrument the endogenous lagged variable but also to 
instrument other variables that are endogenous, i.e. correlated with present errors, or predetermined, i.e. 
independent of current errors but not strictly exogenous as correlated with past errors (Roodman, 2006). 
Such endogenous or predetermined variables are, for example, GEF and CDM funding as they may be 
influenced by past or projected levels of renewable energies. A further advantage of Arellano Bond 
GMM estimators is that they are well suited for panels with few periods and many countries (Roodman, 
2006), corresponding to our dataset. 
 
Unfortunately, Arellano-Bond difference GMM performs quite poorly if the development of the 
dependent variable is close to a random walk, i.e. changes in the dependent variable are random. In such 
cases, lagged instruments contain little information. We may face this problem particularly when 
                                                     
50 According to Monte-Carlo simulations by Judson and Owen (1999), who compare bias in different dynamic panel models, 
GMM models are preferable to FE models, and preferable or equal to Anderson-Hsiao models if T≤20, which is the case for our 
dataset. Judson and Owen (1999) also find that a corrected FE dynamic panel model according to Kiviet (1995) is preferable to 
GMM if the panel is balanced, which is not the case here, as we only use positive values, so some years are dropped for some 
countries. Bruno (2005) developed a corrected FE estimator for unbalanced panels but the related Stata command (xtlsdvc) lacks 
important test statistics and standard error options. When using Bruno’s corrected FE estimator, the coefficient results (see Annex 
10.2) did not differ substantially compared to the GMM results presented in the following. 
51 The idea of using different sets of instruments for each period was already proposed by Holtz-Eakin et al. (1988). 
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analyzing hydro and geothermal power, where large plants have been built before our sample starts, and 
no subsequent changes occur. To address this problem of hardly (i.e. only randomly) changing 
dependent variables, Blundell and Bond (1998) have proposed to use not only difference but also levels 
equations for GMM estimations. By also using level equations, differenced lags can be used as further 
instruments. This system GMM estimator makes a further assumption: the differenced lags have to be 
uncorrelated with errors, which implies that the initial value for the dependent variable has to be in 
stationary equilibrium, i.e. the initial values’ deviation from the long-term convergent values has to be 
uncorrelated with the fixed effects. This initial stationarity condition is, in cases where all countries have 
a common starting point for renewable energies, equal to stationarity at the start of the study period 
(Roodman, 2009). Such stationarity at the panel start should be given in case of hydro and geothermal 
power where the levels of power production are already substantially determined at the start of the panel, 
while this condition is not clearly given in case of solar and wind power that had not yet substantially 
diffused at the start of the study period. However, we will see that Arellano-Bond models for solar and 
wind power, which do not require stationary equilibrium, are showing similar results than Blundell Bond 
models. 
 
We use Rodman’s (2006) xtabond2 STATA command to estimate both Arellano and Bond’s difference 
and Blundell and Bond’s system GMM52. Apart from marking GEF and CDM as endogenous, we will 
also include time dummies to make the GMM models assumption of no correlation across countries 
more likely (Roodman, 2006). 
 
 
5.5 Operationalization of variables and data 
 
We use a data set covering 122 developing countries and 19 years (1991 to 2009), which corresponds to 
the period when GEF (since 1991) and CDM (since 2005) have been operational. In this section, we 
describe the operationalization of the dependent, the independent and control variables, including data 
sources. In order to assure comparability, variables containing financial values have been transformed to 
2007 constant USD, using deflators from the OECD (2010b). 
 
 
5.5.1 Dependent variable: CO2 reductions via renewable energy diffusion 
 
As dependent variable, we use the annual grid-based RE production, measured in gigawatt hours (GWh), 
using data from the US Energy Information Administration (EIA, 2010). The grid-based production is 
split into biomass and waste, geothermal, hydro, wind and solar energy production. In order to 
understand the related effect on CO2 emissions, we multiply each GWh of grid-based RE production 
with 500 tonnes of CO2, the average emission intensity in developing world in the panel period according 
to IEA (2009b). Using such a standard CO2 factor for each unit of electricity can be justified because of 
the growing globalization of fossil fuel markets (Neumann, 2009; Li et al., 2010), which levels out 
deviation in CO2 intensities of power production. The standard CO2 factor has two further advantages: 
first, our dataset is not diminished by missing data on grid factors for some countries and second, each 
tonne of CO2 represents an equal amount of RE production, so that we can compare our results with the 
literature on RE diffusion. As disadvantage, it is less precise than country-specific CO2 factors, so we 
show models using country-specific CO2 factors (average over the period) in the Annexes 10.2.3-10.2.7. 
To take into account the size of countries, we divide all values by the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 
USD million.  
                                                     
52 For BB estimations, we use the specification for matrix H (the initial estimate of the variance of errors) as used in Arellano-
Bond’s own statistical package (Dornik et al., 2001).  
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As sensitivity analysis, we also estimated models using CO2 reduction via RE electricity production per 
capita and RE as percentage of total electricity production as dependent variables. Results for these 
alternative models are only shown in the Annex (10.2.3-10.2.7) and differences to the results of the basic 
model will be noted in the following. We can expect more conservative results on effectiveness if RE is 
divided per GDP or the overall electricity production, as RE production mainly increases with GDP and 
overall electricity production, and less with a raising population53. 
 
 
5.5.2 Independent variables: CDM and GEF 
 
CDM: our variable is the expected value of future CDM credits from RE projects registered by the 
CDM in the respective year. The expected credits are the ones claimed in project design documents, as 
collected by URC (2011), the most used database for CDM projects. Only expected credits until 2012 are 
included, as credit  purchases after 2012 have been highly uncertain (see post-2012 prices in GTZ, 2010; 
GIZ, 2011); modeling results with post-2012 are shown in the Annex (10.2.3-10.2.7). The expected 
credits are adjusted in several ways: credits for off-grid renewable energies, for heat production and 
methane avoidance are subtracted, in order to have a precise measure for credits related to grid-based 
renewable electricity production. The number of expected credits at registration is also corrected for the 
percentage of expected credits that is really issued per project, again using data from URC (2011). These 
expected credits are multiplied with USD 10 as credit price estimate (see footnote 43 for details)54. For 
the models, we sum up the expected credit value of projects registered in the three previous years into 
one variable, as the different lags heavily correlate. We use only lags as it takes at least one year from the 
investment decision, which is not taken before CDM registration if CDM funding is really vital, and the 
start of electricity production, given that the construction time of RE power plants takes several months 
in case of solar and wind (First Solar, 2012; Wind Energy Facts, 2012) and even more than 1-2 years in 
case of advanced biomass, geothermal and hydro power (Lesser, 1994; Faaij et al., 1997; Mbohwa and 
Fukuda, 2003; Rangel, 2008). Using even deeper lags (four years ago an earlier) is not meaningful as the 
first CDM projects have only been registered in 2005. As sensitivity analysis, we estimated the impact of 
different CDM lags, see Annexes 10.2.3-10.2.7. 
 
GEF: the variable contains GEF grants for the different RE technologies. Grant numbers are taken 
from a database compiled by Stadelmann (2009) using official information from the GEF project 
management information system, a GEF internal database system that entails further information than 
the GEF internet database (GEF, 2010d). Only funding related to grid-based renewable energies is 
included and funding for biomass, geothermal, hydro, solar and wind is separated. The funding is 
adjusted to real disbursement until the end of 2008, using a document by the World Bank as GEF trustee 
(GEF, 2009c). As the year of real disbursement is not known, the grant numbers are allocated to the year 
of GEF CEO endorsement, which is closer to the real disbursement than the GEF Council approval55. 
For measuring the whole effect of GEF, we sum the 1st to 9th lag of GEF commitments in the standard 
model56. To allow for distinguishing short from long term effects, we also specify alternative models (see 
                                                     
53 This theoretical assumption is confirmed by our database that shows a correlation of 0.82 between RE electricity production 
and both GDP and total electricity production, while the correlation is only 0.65 between RE electricity and population. 
54 The credit price assumed here is only important when comparing CDM with GEF effectiveness. When comparing official 
claims for CDM with estimates of our models, the assumed credit price does not matter, as the same credit price is assumed for 
both official and the model estimates. 
55 In cases where the endorsement year is not known, a distance of 1.4 years between GEF council approval and CEO 
endorsement is assumed, which is the average distance of approval and endorsement (Stadelmann, 2009). In case of the few mid-
size projects (below USD 1 million of funding), CEO approval is taken as funding year, as endorsement is not needed.  
56 The use of these deep lags does not affect the number of observations, as we have observations for this variable that are much 
older than the period we are analyzing. 
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Annex) where the 1st to 3rd lag are clustered, representing the immediate effect, while the 4th to 6th lag 
and the 7th to 9th lag are clustered, representing the longer term effects.  
 
To take into account the size of countries, we divide all CDM and GEF funding by the Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) in USD million. Therefore, we have the same standardization as in case of the dependent 
variable, and we can therefore state an expectation for the GEF and CDM coefficients. If we assume that 
1 tCO2 can be reduced for 10 USD, and that new RE installations will last for about 20 years, we can 
expect GEF and CDM coefficients of roughly 0.005 in the following models. 
 
 
5.5.3 Control variables: other drivers for renewable energy diffusion 
 
The control variables are particularly relevant for testing hypothesis 2 (reduced effectiveness of GEF and 
CDM when other drivers are taken into account). For identifying the most important drivers for RE 
diffusion, we reviewed the literature, particularly focusing on quantitative studies in industrialized 
countries (Carley, 2009; Marques et al., 2010; Popp et al., 2011) and literature reviews (Sims et al., 2007; 
Mitchell et al., 2011). Based on this, we derived the drivers of RE as shown in Figure 15, which will be 
explained in the following. For all control variables, we use the first lags (if not noted differently) as 
changes in electricity production will depend on investment decisions undertaken in the past; we can 
expect around 0.5-1.5 years delay between investment decision and production, see the section on GEF 
and CDM. 
 
 
Figure 15: Modeling renewable energy diffusion: potential drivers 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Knowledge: Creating knowledge has been identified as a key function of socio-technical systems in 
general (Hekkert et al., 2007) and of systems promoting renewable energies in particular (Jacobsson and 
Johnson, 2000; Foxon et al., 2005). Popp et al. (2011) have found, based on data of international patents 
of RE technologies that knowledge on renewable energies has a significant influence on RE diffusion in 
OECD countries.  To control for the RE knowledge in a country we include a knowledge variable, based 
on the number of patents a country filed under the international Patent Cooperation Treaty, whereas 
patents are allocated to the residence country of the applicant and to the year of the priority data, which 
corresponds to the first filing worldwide and is therefore closest to the invention date (OECD, 2012a). 
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The knowledge stock (KS) of country i in year t is calculated with the same formula (4) as used by Popp 
et al. (2011), which assumes that knowledge in patents both diffuse and decay over time. For 
standardization, we divide knowledge stock by the population in million inhabitants. 
 
ܭ ௜ܵ,௧ ൌ ∑ ݁ି஽ா஼ሺ௟ሻሺ1 െ ݁ି஽ூிሺ௟ାଵሻஶ௟ୀ଴ ሻܲܽݐ݁݊ݐݏ௧ି௟																																																																																			( 4 ) 
 
 
As Popp et al. (2011), we assume a decay rate (DEC) of 10% and a diffusion rate (DIF) of 25% per year. 
Data for PCT patent filing per country and RE technology was taken from the OECD (2012a) for the 
period 1980-2009. For the biomass knowledge stock we used patents on biomass waste energy and 
biofuels, for hydropower the ones on conventional and new hydro power, and for solar the ones of solar 
PV and solar thermal. Given the period restriction of our patent data, the summing in formula (4) does 
not go back to infinity but only to the year 1980, so e.g. l=20 in case of the year 2000. In one of the 
sensitivity analyzes (see annexes 10.2.3-10.2.7), we replaced our patent stock variable with the tertiary 
education gross enrolment rate (% of age-group), using intra- and extrapolations from World Bank 
(2012) data. 
 
Domestic policies: National RE policies have been decisive for the diffusion of renewable energies in 
OECD countries (Mitchell et al., 2006; Butler and Neuhoff, 2008; Johnstone et al., 2010; Dong, 2012) 
and, even when the design is considered to be improvable, also in China (Cherni and Kentish, 2007; 
Wang et al., 2010). All RE policies existing in a country are summed up, using data from a database by 
IEA (2010c), complemented with information from REN21 (2011b) and REEEP (2011). In order to 
capture the impact of new policies, our RE policy variable, different for each technology, entails the 
number of three previous years, in which a new policy has been adopted. In the sensitivity analysis, we 
use the total number of policies in the previous year as alternative specification, while we also analyze the 
impact of technology-unspecific RE policies and dominant types of policies (see Annex 10.2.3-10.2.7)57. 
Using the policy change terminology of Knill et al. (2012), our policy variable measures the density of 
regulation (number of policies) but due to missing data not the intensity (e.g. tightness of standards or 
level of feed-in tariff).  
 
Domestic energy market drivers: The increased use of electricity in many developing countries is 
considered a major driver for renewable energies (Carley, 2009; Popp et al., 2011; Sathaye et al., 2011). 
We, therefore, include the electricity consumption as control variable, using data from EIA. Another 
phenomenon promoting renewable energies is dependence on foreign energy sources (Carley, 2009; 
Marques et al., 2010; Popp et al., 2011). Thus we control for the net oil imports in thousands barrels a 
day (exports are deducted) as proxy of energy dependence, divided by the oil consumption for 
standardization, using data from EIA (2010). In the sensitivity analysis, we have tested for the influence 
of other energy market drivers such as the share of hydro power in the grid and grid losses as proxies for 
the flexibility and stability of the electricity grid, which are both important for renewable energies (Sims 
et al., 2011). 
 
Domestic financial resources and financial market: Economic resources are relevant for covering 
higher costs of renewable energies and may indirectly drive renewables via energy market growth (Popp 
et al., 2011; Sathaye et al., 2011), so we include the GDP per capita as control, using data from the World 
Bank (2011). Apart from economic resources in general, the development of a well-functioning financial 
market has been detected as important determinant of RE diffusion (Brunnschweiler, 2010). Among the 
                                                     
57 In general, technology-specific policies have a positive effect (although only significant in case of wind power) while 
technology-unspecific RE policies had not.  Among different types of policies, financial incentives had the largest effect in case of 
biomass, geothermal and solar, portfolio standards in case of hydro, and tenders in case of wind (see Annex 10.2.3-10.2.7).  
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three indicators for financial market development used by Brunnschweiler, we use the amount of liquid 
liabilities as a percentage of GDP, as the other indicators would substantially lower our sample58. Liquid 
liabilities are a broad measure for financial depth; it includes all banks and bank-like and nonbank 
financial institutions and is defined as “currency plus demand and interest-bearing liabilities of banks and 
other financial intermediaries to GDP” (Beck et al., 2009: 4).  The information on liquid liabilities is 
taken from a dataset of Beck et al. (2009). 
 
Natural resources: endowment with natural resources is seen as an important variable influencing RE 
diffusion (Edenhofer et al., 2011) and, therefore, most quantitative analyzes on RE control for it (e.g. 
Carley, 2009; Castro, 2011; Marques et al., 2011). We control for the natural resources needed for 
renewable power production using different variables for each type of RE. Biomass resources are 
approximated with annual roundwood production in m3 per capita (FAO, 2012), geothermal resources 
with the number of volcanoes per km2 as indicator for geothermal activity (Smithsonian Institution, 
2011), hydropower resources with the average rainfall  in the relevant period (DWD/WZN, 2010) times 
average elevation of the country (Gallup et al., 2001), solar resources with the latitude tilt radiation in 
kWh/m2/day, and wind resources with the average wind speed in m/s  in the years 1983-2005 (NASA, 
2011). The original hydro, solar and wind data was pixel-based with a precision of 1 degree (geographical 
coordinates); the variables were created by allocating each pixel to countries (using Google maps 
coordinates) and averaging the hydro, solar and wind data in the pixels allocated to the respective 
country. In the sensitivity analyzes (see annexes 10.2.3-10.2.7), we have included alternative or additional 
resource variables, such as agricultural area in km2 per capita for biomass, absolute number of volcanoes 
for geothermal, altitude as well as present and last year rainfall for hydro (essentially splitting our 
variables into different parts), horizontal irradiation for solar and percentage of time wind speed is above 
6m/s for wind power.  
 
International financial resources: Among public international finance, both bilateral development 
assistance and loans of bilateral and multilateral development banks have substantially supported 
renewable energies over the past 20 years (Martinot, 2001; UNEP, 2008; Kehler Siebert et al., 2010; 
Delina, 2011; Michaelowa and Michaelowa, 2011b). For ODA, we control for commitments for the 
support of renewable energies, using data from Michaelowa et al. (2010), which is based on a review of 
information reported to the OECD (2011b). For development bank loans, we use OECD (2011b) data 
on commitments for other official flows (OOF) supporting RE. This latter variable is only used for 
sensitivity analysis and not in the main model, as OOF data on renewable energies only goes back to 
1995 and therefore substantially reduces the sample size. The 1st to 9th lags are taken together for the 
ODA variable, and only 1st to 3rd lags for the OOF in order not to lose even more observations. These 
values are divided by the GDP in USD billions for comparability.  
 
International energy prices: international energy prices, particularly the oil price are an often cited 
driver for renewable energies (Marques et al., 2011; Michaelowa and Michaelowa, 2011b). Therefore, we 
could use the Europe Brent Spot Price for crude oil in USD per barrel from EIA (2011) to control for 
international energy prices. However, as the oil price in our data is only changing over time but not 
across countries, we do not have include the oil price as time dummies already control for the oil price. 
To see whether the oil price has an impact, it is only included in one of the alternative analyses, see 
annexes 10.2.3-10.2.7. 
 
International agreements:  industrialized countries have been prompted to invest in renewable energies 
due to participation in international climate change agreements, such as the Kyoto Protocol (Popp et al., 
                                                     
58 Using such a smaller sample, we also tested whether private credit by deposit money bank as % of GDP (Beck et al., 2009) 
influences RE diffusion but this variable had no influence on any of the five renewable energy types. 
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2011). As developing countries have no legally binding obligation to reduce CO2 emissions, the 
UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol should primarily have an indirect influence via the GEF and the 
CDM. Nevertheless, we include the years since Kyoto Protocol ratification as additional control variable 
in one of the sensitivity analyzes to see whether there is an influence beyond GEF and CDM. 
 
The summary descriptions for all variables can be found in Table 9, while summary statistics are 
provided in Annex 10.2.1. GDP and electricity demand are highly correlated (see correlation table in 
Annex 10.2.2), so only GDP is included in the basic models, while electricity demand is replacing GDP 
in one of the sensitivity analyses (see Annexes 10.2.3-10.2.7). As liquid liabilities reduce the sample size, 
we also use this variable only in one of the sensitivity analyses. 
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Table 9: Summary descriptions of variables  
Function  Variable  Unit Description Sign1 Sources 
Dependent 
variable 
Renewable  
electricity 
tCO2 per 
USD 
Grid-based renewable electricity 
production, multiplied with 500 tCO2 per 
GWh as average grid factor, see IEA 
(2009b), per million USD of GDP 
 EIA(2010) 
Independent 
variable 
CDM ppm Expected CDM payments until 2012, in 
USD, for projects registered in lags 1 to 3, 
corrected for issuance success, assuming 
USD 10 per credit, for each RE 
technology, per million USD of GDP 
+ URC (2011) 
 GEF ppm GEF grants that are CEO approved or 
endorsed, in USD,  for each RE, per 
million USD of GDP, lags 1 to 9 
+ World Bank (2011), 
Stadelmann (2009) 
Control 
variables in 
standard 
model 
Knowledge # Knowledge stock due to past and current 
patents, for each RE technology, per 
million inhabitants, last year 
+ Based on data from 
OECD (2012a) 
Policies # Number of 3 previous years with 
additional RE policies, for each technology 
+ IEA (2010c), 
REN21(2011b) & 
REEEP(2011) 
 Oil imports % Daily imports minus exports of crude and 
refined oil in barrels, in % of oil consumed, 
last year 
+ EIA(2010) 
 GDP per 
capita 
k USD/ 
p.c. 
Gross domestic product in USD per 
capita, last year 
+ World Bank (2011) 
 Biomass 
resources 
m3/p.c. Annual roundwood production in m3 per 
capita  
+ FAO (2012)  
 Geothermal 
resources 
k #/km2 Thousands volcanoes in the country per 
km2 
+ Smithsonian 
Institution (2011) 
 Hydro 
resources 
m4 Rainfall (average over country area ) * 
average elevation, level and last year  
+ DWD/WZN (2010), 
Gallup et al. (2001) 
 Solar 
resources 
kWh/ 
m2/day 
Latitude tilt radiation in kWh/m2/day 
(average over country area) in years 1983-
2005    
+ NASA(2011) 
 Wind 
resources 
m/s Average wind speed (average over country 
area) in years 1983-2005   
+ NASA(2011) 
 ODA  ppb Official development assistance 
commitments in lags 1to9, in USD, for 
each RE technology, per  billion USD of 
GDP 
+ Michaelowa and 
Michaelowa (2010) 
Additional 
control 
variables for 
sensitivity 
analysis 
Kyoto 
Protocol 
Years Years since ratification of Kyoto Protocol, 
last year 
+ UNFCCC(2011c) 
Electricity 
use 
GWh 
per 
capita. 
Total electricity consumed per capita, last 
year 
+ EIA(2010) 
Financial 
market 
%  Liquid liabilities in percentage of GDP, last 
year 
+ Beck et al. (2009) 
Develop-
ment loans  
ppm Other official flow commitments for RE, 
per million USD of GDP, lags 1 to 3 
+ OECD (2011b) 
 Policies 
(measure 2) 
# Number of RE policies, for each 
technology, last year 
+ IEA (2010c), 
REN21 (2011b) & 
REEEP(2011) 
 Oil price USD per 
barrel 
Europe Brent Spot Price for crude oil in 
USD per barrel, last year 
+ EIA (2011) 
 Grid 
stability 
% % of hydro power in the grid + EIA (2011) 
1 Expected sign of the coefficient 
k = 1000, M = million, p.c. = per capita, ppm = parts per million, ppb = parts per billion, RE = renewable energy, USD = 2007 constant USD 
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5.6 Results 
 
In the following, the estimation results are presented. For each type of RE, four estimates are shown. 
First, the results for the Logit selection model with clustered standard error, to see if GEF and CDM 
have an influence on whether the decision of countries to use renewable energies or not59. Second, 
results for three different models using only cases with positive dependent variables; 
 
(1) Models with country fixed or random effects controlling for all covariates, and using robust standard 
errors. The random effects model is shown if the Hausman test suggests that it is consistent; otherwise 
the fixed effects model is presented.  
 
(2) Estimations from a Blundell-Bond (BB) one-step GMM system model, also controlling for all 
covariates. In the version presented below, CDM, GEF, ODA and policies are assumed to be 
endogenous, so they are instrumented like the lagged dependent variables. The same coefficients are 
significant (and the coefficient are similar) when assuming exogeneity of all independent variables (except 
the lagged dependent variables), see annexes 10.2.3-10.2.7. In the same annexes, the results for the 
Arellano Bond models can be found, which are less convincing than the BB results as the coefficient of 
the lagged dependent variable is not always between the coefficient of the OLS estimators60, which tends 
to be upward biased (Bond, 2002), and the fixed effects estimators, which tend to be downward biased 
(Nickell, 1981; Bond, 2002: 144). In all BB models, there is no evidence for remaining first-order 
autocorrelation and the Hansen test suggest that the instruments are jointly valid (except for some 
biomass and hydro power specifications). Unfortunately, the Hansen test is weakened by the high 
number of instrumental variables used (Roodman, 2006)61.  
 
(3) BB one-step GMM system model with only GEF and CDM and the lagged dependent variable as 
covariates are shown in order to approximate the assessment of GEF and CDM effectiveness before any 
control.  Only the lagged dependent variable is instrumented, as policy makers can be assumed to not 
reflect on endogeneity in their assessment. 
 
For BB models, all of the following sensitivity analysis did not substantially change the results for CDM 
and GEF: tertiary education, alternative variables for natural resources, inclusion of Kyoto ratification, 
electricity demand, liquid liabilities and other official flows as control variables, different variables for 
GEF, CDM and policy influence, see annexes 10.2.3-10.2.7. 
 
  
                                                     
59 These models exclude fixed effects and the lagged dependent variable, as most observations would be lost when including 
them, given that there are hardly any changes from 0 to 1 within a country. 
60 The OLS estimators with full control variables, including the lagged dependent variable are presented in the annexes 10.2.3-
10.2.7.  
61 The validity of the Hansen test can be improved by reducing the instruments below the number of panels (Roodman, 2006). In 
our case, models with fewer instruments do not produce convincing results, as the coefficients on the lagged dependent variable 
move out of the credible range.  
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5.6.1 Biomass power 
 
Results in Table 10 show that CDM funding has a significant influence on both presence and diffusion 
of biomass power. The CDM impact also remains stable if we model RE production per capita or use 
the real grid factor model, although the coefficient is lower in case of the per capita model. In contrast, 
GEF has no significant and clearly a lower impact than CDM funding, corresponding to our hypothesis. 
From the other covariates, ODA has a significant impact in the fixed effect models, and natural 
resources have a significant impact in the BB model.  
 
 
Table 10: CDM/GEF effectiveness in reducing CO2 via biomass power 
 
Logit selection 
model, 
clustered SE 
Fixed effects
model, robust SE 
 
Blundell-Bond
GMM system model, 
one step, robust SE 
Blundell-Bond
GMM system model, 
one step, robust SE
 dy/dx SE  Coeff. SE Coeff. SE Coeff. SE 
Lagged DV    0.650 (0.139) *** 0.715 (0.152) *** 0.627 (0.210) ***
CDM  0.017 (0.010) * 0.018 (0.004) *** 0.017 (0.005) *** 0.020 (0.006) ***
GEF -0.000 (0.000)  0.002 (0.003) -0.001 (0.001) -0.003 (0.003)
Knowledge 5.636 (6.377)  -2.848 (4.110) -5.809 (5.255)   
Policies 0.043 (0.074)  0.368 (0.418) 0.348 (0.494)   
Oil imports 0.005 (0.007)  -0.055 (0.060) 0.075 (0.027)   
GDP per capita 0.015 (0.010)  -0.044 (0.082) -0.055 (0.039)   
Nat. resources 0.031 (0.040)  0.795 (0.866) 0.602 (0.236) **   
ODA -0.000 (0.001)  0.655 (0.252) ** 0.461 (0.289)    
Constant    0.453 (0.954) 0.175 (0.481) 0.651 (0.482)
Year FE Yes   Yes Yes Yes  
N 2182   503 503 503  
Groups 133   36 36 36  
Wald-test  0.00 (Wald, p-value) 0.00 (Wald, p-value) 0.00 (Wald, p-value) 0.00 (Wald, p-v.)
Various stat. 0.08  (Pseudo-R2) 0.84 (R2) 0.96 (AR2, p-value) 0.99 (AR2, p-v.)
Hansen test     0.00 (p-value) 1.00  
# instruments    403 199  
Endogenous 
variables 
-   - CDM, GEF, ODA, 
policies 
- 
Dependent variable: tonnes of CO2 reduced with biomass power generation, per million USD of GDP (2007 USD), assuming 500 tCO2 reduced 
per GWh of renewable power production 
Significance levels: * = p-value of coefficient <0.1, ** = p-value <0.05, *** = p-value <0.01  
Consistent with theory, the Blundell Bond coefficient for the lagged dependent variable is between 0.650 (fixed effects coefficient) and 
0.941(coefficient of OLS model with control variables, see annex) 
 
 
 
5.6.2 Geothermal power 
 
CDM has a significant influence on diffusion of geothermal power in the random effects model but not 
in the full BB model (see Table 11). However, in some of the alternative specifications in the sensitivity 
analysis, the CDM coefficient becomes significant. GEF has both an effect on selection and diffusion, 
and the significance of the impact is not sensitive to alternative BB specifications (see Annex 10.2.4). 
GEF’s has an impact in the short- and mid-term (1 to 6 years after GEF funding approval), while no 
long-term impact (7 to 9 years) could be found, see Annex 10.2.4. Still, GEF’s impact is not completely 
robust as the coefficient becomes insignificant if we are modeling geothermal power per capita instead of 
per GDP. Therefore, CDM and GEF may have an impact on diffusion of RE but in both cases, the 
significance of the impact depends on the model specification. 
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Among, the other covariates oil imports have a significant impact in the selection model, while natural 
resources as well as ODA promote diffusion of geothermal power. 
 
 
Table 11: CDM/GEF effectiveness in reducing CO2 via geothermal power 
 
 
Logit selection 
model,  
clustered SE 
Random effects
model, robust SE 
Blundell-Bond
GMM system model, 
one step, robust SE 
Blundell-Bond
GMM system model
one step, robust SE
 dy/dx SE  Coeff. SE Coeff. SE Coeff. SE 
Lagged DV    0.862 (0.045) *** 0.813 (0.041) *** 0.884 (0.024) ***
CDM  0.000 (0.000)  0.004 (0.002) * 0.004 (0.003) 0.006 (0.003) **
GEF 0.005 (0.003) * 0.005 (0.002) ** 0.007 (0.002) *** 0.010 (0.002) ***
Knowledge -1.464 (1.988)  -136.51 (126.64) -122.135 (93.685)
Policies 0.061 (0.045)  -0.222 (0.301) -0.244 (0.199)
Oil imports 0.010 (0.005) ** 0.390 (0.371) 0.422 (0.346)
GDP per capita 0.002 (0.002)  0.027 (0.122) -0.053 (0.122)
Nat. resources -1.864 (16.342)  9.509 (3.848) ** 12.606 (4.271) *** 
ODA 0.015 (0.015)  0.497 (0.167) *** 0.528 (0.130) *** 
Constant    1.257 (1.265) 2.146 (1.332) 0.651 (0.482)
Year FE Yes   Yes Yes  Yes 
N 2010   164 164  164 
Groups 122   10 10 10   
F-/Wald-test  0.00 (Wald, p-value) - (Wald, p-value) 0.00 (Wald, p-value) 0.00 (Wald, p-v.)
Various stat. 0.16  (Pseudo- R2) 0.97 (R2) 0.51 (AR2, p-value) 0.83 (AR2, p-v.)
Hansen test    1.00 (p-value) 1.00 (p-value)
# instruments   229 158 
Endogenous 
variables 
-  - CDM, GEF, 
ODA, policies 
- 
Dependent variable: tonnes of CO2 reduced with geothermal power generation, per million USD of GDP 2007 USD), assuming 500 tCO2 
reduced per GWh of renewable power production 
Significance levels: * = p-value of coefficient <0.1, ** = p-value <0.05, *** = p-value <0.01  
Consistent with theory, the Blundell Bond coefficient for the lagged dependent variable is between 0.766 (fixed effects coefficient) and 0.862 
(coefficient of OLS model with control variables, see annex) 
 
 
 
5.6.3 Hydro power 
 
CDM has no significant impact on diffusion of hydro power production (see Table 12), although the 
coefficient in the BB model is close to significance, and actually becomes significant at the 90% level in 
few alternative specifications (see Annex 10.2.5). GEF finance perfectly predicts the use of hydro power 
in a country but has no significant impact on diffusion, which does not depend on the model 
specification. 
 
Among control variables, policies perfectly predict the existence of hydro power. Natural hydro 
resources and oil imports support the adoption of hydro power but have no significant influence on 
diffusion. In the Logit selection model, ODA for RE negatively influences the adoption of grid-based 
hydro power. This may be due to the focus of hydro-related ODA on rather poor countries with a low 
electrification rate – e.g. among the small part of ODA for RE that is channeled through multilateral 
organizations, most is flowing through the IDA (see Figure 13), the World Bank Group’s funding 
institution for less-affluent countries. 
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In general, it is very difficult to model hydro power due to large fluctuations from year-to-year that may 
be related to local changes in water availability at the hydro power locations. Our national hydro resource 
variable neither captures such local variability nor water flowing cross borders.  
 
 
Table 12: CDM/GEF effectiveness in reducing CO2 via hydro power 
 
Logit selection 
model, 
clustered SE 
Random effects 
model, robust SE 
 
Blundell-Bond
GMM system model, 
one step, robust SE 
Blundell-Bond
GMM system model, 
one step, robust SE
 dy/dx SE  Coeff. SE Coeff. SE Coeff. SE
Lagged DV    0.954 (0.014) *** 0.964 (0.019) *** 0.951 (0.023)
CDM  -0.000 (0.000)  0.009 (0.011) 0.018 (0.014) 0.022 (0.015)
GEF Predicts success perf. -0.008 (0.009) -0.009 (0.025)  -0.005 (0.014)
Knowledge 0.736 (0.704)  -13.905 (9.970) -17.550 (12.476)  
Policies Predicts success perf.  11.876 (5.589) 24.603 (18.691)   
Oil imports 0.001 (0.000) * 0.055 (0.059) 0.122 (0.153)  
GDP per capita -0.004 (0.003)  -0.027 (0.224) -0.092 (0.260)  
Nat. resources 0.118 (0.026) *** 2.146 (2.008) 2.766 (2.745)  
ODA -0.002 (0.001) ** -0.078 (0.131) -0.587 (0.576)  
Constant    -1.581 (3.612) -2.959 (3.836) 2.470 (7.602)
Year FE Yes   Yes Yes  Yes  
N 1800   1625 1625  1625  
Groups 121   101 101 1101  
F-/Wald-test  0.00 (Wald, p-value) 0.00 (Wald, p-value) 0.00 (Wald, p-value) 0.00 (Wald, p-v.)
Various stat. 0.22  (Pseudo- R2) 0.99 (R2) 0.20 (AR2, p-value) 0.10 (AR2, p-v.)
Hansen test     0.00 (p-value) 1.00 (p-value)
# instruments    505 219  
Endogenous 
variables 
-   - CDM, GEF, ODA, 
policies 
- 
 
Dependent variable: tonnes of CO2 reduced with hydro power generation, per million USD of GDP (2007 USD), assuming 500 tCO2 reduced 
per GWh of renewable power production 
Significance levels: * = p-value of coefficient <0.1, ** = p-value <0.05, *** = p-value <0.01  
The Blundell Bond coefficient for the lagged dependent variable is not between 0.914 (fixed effects coefficient) and 0.961 (coefficient of OLS 
model with control variables, see annex 102.5), as would be required for a credible estimator. For a credible coefficient, see the Blundell Bond 
estimations without endogenous variables that produce similar results (see annex 10.2.5). 
 
 
 
5.6.4 Solar power 
 
In the solar power models (see Table 13) the CDM is not included as no carbon credits for solar power 
have been issued until the end of 2009.  GEF has no significant influence on solar power diffusion.  In 
only one alternative model specification – if we model solar power generation per capita (instead of per 
GDP) – the GEF impact is significant, although substantially lower than officially claimed (see Annex 
10.2.6). 
 
Among control variables, oil imports, GDP and development assistance directed at solar power increases 
the chance of adopting solar power but only development assistance has a significant impact on diffusion 
(FE model). Solar irradiation and oil imports have a significant positive influence on diffusion in some 
alternative specifications (see Annex 10.2.6)  
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Table 13: CDM/GEF effectiveness in reducing CO2 via solar power 
 
Logit selection 
model, 
clustered SE 
Fixed effects
model, robust SE 
 
Blundell-Bond
GMM system model, 
one step, robust SE 
Blundell-Bond
GMM system model, 
one step, robust SE
 dy/dx SE  Coeff. SE Coeff. SE Coeff. SE 
Lagged DV    0.485 (0.024) *** 0.849 (0.042) *** 0.913 (0.017) ***
CDM      
GEF 0.000 (0.000)  -0.000 (0.000) -0.000 (0.000) -0.000 (0.000)
Knowledge -0.059 (0.050)  0.044 (0.155) -0.190 (0.276)  
Policies -0.009 (0.013)  0.009 (0.006) 0.004 (0.007)  
Oil imports 0.006 (0.002) *** 0.028 (0.030) 0.044 (0.028)  
GDP per capita 0.003 (0.002) * 0.001 (0.003) -0.001 (0.001)   
Nat. resources -0.013 (0.013)  0.041 (0.028)   
ODA 0.037 (0.018) ** 0.004 (0.001) *** -0.012 (0.011)  
Constant    0.026 (0.026) -0.194 (0.142)  0.009 (0.004)
Year FE Yes   Yes Yes Yes 
N 2009   125 125 125 
Groups 122   13 13 13 
F-/Wald-test  0.00 (Wald, p-value) - (Wald, p-value) 0.00 (Wald, p-value) 0.00 (Wald, p-v.)
Various stat. 0.11  (Pseudo- R2) 0.85 (R2) 0.27 (AR2, p-value) 0.25 (AR2, p-v.)
Hansen test     1.00 (p-value) 1.00 (p-value)
# instruments    173 130 
Endogenous 
variables 
-   - CDM, GEF, ODA, 
policies 
- 
 
Dependent variable: tonnes of CO2 reduced with solar power generation, per million USD of GDP (2007 USD), assuming 500 tCO2 reduced 
per GWh of renewable power production 
Significance levels: * = p-value of coefficient <0.1, ** = p-value <0.05, *** = p-value <0.01  
Consistent with theory, the Blundell Bond coefficient for the lagged dependent variable is between 0.485 (downward biased fixed effects 
coefficient) and 0.984 (upward biased coefficient of OLS model with control variables, see annex 10.2.6). 
 
 
 
5.6.5 Wind  power 
 
In case of wind power (see Table 14), CDM perfectly predicts the adoption of wind power but has no 
significant impact on the diffusion. In contrast, GEF has no influence on adoption of wind power but 
on diffusion. However, the model without control clearly overestimates the effectiveness. GEF’s effect is 
most pronounced in short- and mid-term (1 to 6 years after funding approval), while no long-term effect 
can be found, see annex 10.2.7. GEF’s impact also remains stable in most alternative specifications, e.g. 
when modeling wind energy generation per capita instead of per GDP, or as percentage of overall power 
production. However, the impact vanishes if real grid factors are used. 
 
Oil imports, GDP and ODA all promote the adoption but not the diffusion of wind power. Wind power 
policies are significant in the BB model, if the alternative specification for policies – total number instead 
new ones added in the three previous years – is used.  Furthermore, liquid liabilities and the oil price have 
a significant influence (see alternative specifications in Annex 10.2.7). 
 
 
Effectiveness of international climate finance    Chapter 5: Renewable energy diffusion 
 
 
90 
Table 14: CDM/GEF effectiveness in reducing CO2 via wind power 
 
Logit selection 
model, 
clustered SE 
Fixed effects 
model, robust SE 
 
Blundell-Bond
GMM system model, 
one step, robust SE 
Blundell-Bond
GMM system model, 
one step, robust SE
 dy/dx SE  Coeff. SE Coeff. SE Coeff. SE 
Lagged DV    0.932 (0.132) *** 0.972 (0.080) *** 0.927 (0.126)
CDM  Predicts success perf. 0.001 (0.002) 0.001 (0.002)  0.001 (0.002)
GEF -0.000 (0.000)  0.002 (0.001) *** 0.002 (0.000) *** 0.003 (0.001) **
Knowledge 0.261 (0.226)  -0.242 (0.497) -0.251 (0.737)   
Policies 0.039 (0.026)  0.036 (0.040) 0.044 (0.028)   
Oil imports 0.109 (0.004) *** 0.224 (0.171) 0.023 (0.028)   
GDP per capita 0.004 (0.004) ** -0.010 (0.027) -0.004 (0.007)   
Nat. resources 0.006 (0.017)   -0.003 (0.027)   
ODA 0.109 (0.057) * -0.078 (0.084) -0.005 (0.071)   
Constant    -0.120 (0.058) * 0.526 (0.268)  0.526 (0.268)
Year FE Yes   Yes Yes Yes  
N 1973   240 240 240  
Groups 122   25 25 25  
F-/Wald-test  0.00 (Wald, p-value) - (Wald, p-value) 0.00 (Wald, p-value) 0.00 (Wald, p-v.)
Various stat. 0.16.  (Pseudo- R2) 0.92 (R2) 0.28 (AR2, p-value) 0.28 (AR2, p-v.)
Hansen test     1.0 (p-value) 1.0 (p-value)
# instruments    292 185  
Endogenous 
variables 
-   - CDM, GEF, ODA, 
policies 
- 
Dependent variable: tonnes of CO2 reduced with wind power generation, per million USD of GDP (2007 USD), assuming 500 tCO2 reduced 
per GWh of renewable power production 
Significance levels: * = p-value of coefficient <0.1, ** = p-value <0.05, *** = p-value <0.01  
Consistent with theory, the Blundell Bond coefficient for the lagged dependent variable is between 0.932 (downward biased fixed effects 
coefficient) and 1.021 (upward biased coefficient of OLS model with control variables, see annex 10.2.7).  
 
 
 
5.6.6 Comparing results with hypotheses 
 
Our first hypothesis has been that the CDM has a positive, immediate effect on RE diffusion in the 
short-term, while the GEF rather has a lagged effect. We have to partly reject this hypothesis as we have 
only found a significant influence of CDM on biomass and potentially on geothermal and hydro power, 
and only a significant influence of GEF on wind and potentially geothermal power. Furthermore, GEF’s 
influence on geothermal and wind power has not only been lagged (up to 6 years) but also immediate in 
the first two years after approval (see annexes 10.2.3 and 10.2.7). This suggests that GEF’s financing of 
pilot plants with its rather immediate benefits has been equally important as capacity building and policy 
support with its longer term focus. 
 
The second hypothesis has been that CDM and GEF effectiveness in promoting RE is lower than 
officially reported. For evaluating this hypothesis, we compare the official estimates for effectiveness per 
USD of funding with the effectiveness estimated in the full models controlling for all variables. For 
making numbers comparable, we have to multiply the estimated coefficients, which represent the one-
year change in renewable energy production per USD of funding, with a credible lifetime of new RE 
plants. According to CDM and GEF documents, RE plants have 20 years lifetime on average (see Table 
8), Under this 20 year lifetime assumption, the overestimation hypothesis is only rejected in case of 
CDM’s support for biomass power. In all other cases, effectiveness has been either much lower than 
officially claimed (see Figure 16), or we have not found any significant effects at all. However, due to the 
large standard errors, the model estimate effectiveness is not significantly below the reported 
Effectiveness of international climate finance    Chapter 5: Renewable energy diffusion 
 
 
91 
effectiveness in case of geothermal and hydro power. The results also show that BB models without any 
control variables tend to overestimate the effectiveness. 
 
In fact, real effectiveness may be even lower and overestimation by official figures higher, as the 20 year 
lifetime may be too optimistic: lifetimes may be lower both because of technological failure and because 
promising RE sites would also be harvested without CDM and GEF after some years. This idea is also 
supported by the estimated coefficients on the lagged dependent variable. According to these coefficients 
(between 0.65-0.95), lifetimes of new RE power plants are substantially below 20 years for all RE plants 
except hydro62.  If we use lifetimes according to these coefficients, even the effectiveness of CDM 
support for biomass plants is overestimated by official estimates (see Annex 10.2.8), and the 
overestimations are always significant with the exception of support for hydro power. 
 
Our third hypothesis has been that the CDM is more effective per USD of funding than the GEF in 
promoting biomass, solar and wind power, while the GEF is more effective in case of geothermal and 
hydro. We have to reject any hypotheses on differences except for the case of biomass, where CDM has 
been clearly more effective. In all other cases, the differences between effectiveness are not significant, 
when looking at the 90%-confidence intervals in Table 16 (whiskers), although we estimated a higher 
mean effectiveness for CDM in case of hydro, and a higher one for GEF in case of geothermal and 
wind. 
 
The assumed carbon price (10 USD per tCO2) does not affect the testing of hypothesis 1, as significance 
of CDM coefficients will not change, and also not the testing of hypothesis 2, as the same carbon price is 
both assumed in case of official and estimated CDM effectiveness, so judgments on “over-estimation” 
should not be affected. However, in case of hypothesis 3 (GEF-CDM comparison), the carbon price 
matters, as it affects the CDM but not the GEF coefficient. However, our conclusion that only in case of 
biomass power there is a significant difference is not very sensitive to the carbon price assumption:  
lower assumed carbon prices do not affect this finding at all, while higher carbon prices can have an 
effect but the assumed price has to be at least double (20 instead of 10 USD per tCO2), in order that 
there are some changes: GEF becomes significantly more effective than CDM in case of wind and 
geothermal power (BB models). In case of biomass, even a carbon price of 50 USD per tCO2, higher 
than the all-time high of the CDM secondary price, would not affect the significant difference between 
CDM and GEF. 
 
  
                                                     
62 The lifetimes of RE plants (biomass = 2.7 years, geothermal = 8.6, hydro = 21.7, solar = 11.5 and wind =13.7) were estimated 
by the following formula: ∑ γ୧ଵ଴଴୧ୀ଴  (with γ = coefficient of the lagged dependent variable, in the full Blundell Bond models). 
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Figure 16:  Effectiveness of CDM / GEF in tCO2 reduced per USD of funding (20 years persistence of effect assumed) 
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the lower whisker of the 90%-confidence interval is outside the 
graph, no significant effect has been found. Values are based on 
20 year technology lifetimes and 500 tonnes of CO2 reduced per 
GWh of renewable electricity production. 
To make comparison with coefficients possible, CDM official 
claims show reported effectiveness per USD of funding  (0.1 
tCO2 per USD, using the same carbon price as in the models - 10 
USD per tCO2). 
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5.7 Discussion  
 
5.7.1 Explanations for differences between technologies 
 
The insignificant effect of CDM in case of wind, solar and probably geothermal and hydro power can be 
explained with the arguments discussed in the theoretical section: information on the real drivers for RE 
adoption is missing and different actors have incentives not to reveal information, which makes it 
impossible for evaluators and voters to assess whether CDM funding is vital for the decision to invest in 
RE projects. According to our result, the overestimation may even be larger than expected, as CDM has 
not clearly a significant impact on any technology except biomass.  Actually, these findings correspond 
well to the results of case studies (e.g. Michaelowa and Purohit, 2007; Schneider, 2007; Haya, 2009). Our 
results that CDM has a significant effect only on biomass (and may be hydro) power is also consistent 
with the findings of Schneider (2007) and Schneider et al. (2010) that among different renewable 
energies, CDM impact is only substantial in case of biogas power that also receive CDM credits for 
methane reductions (e.g. landfill gas power, which is in our case also part of biomass power). While 
CDM can make solid biomass and hydro power projects under specific circumstances (e.g. electricity 
price, discount rates) profitable, this is hardly ever the case for wind power and solar photovoltaic (PV) 
power, see Figure 17. The modeling results, therefore, support from a macro perspective what has been 
found at a micro level. 
 
 
Figure 17: Impact of CDM funding on profitability of different RE technologies  
 
 
Source: Schneider et al. (2010); note: profitability above zero implies that projects are profitable 
 
 
 
The overestimation of GEF funding corresponds well to our hypothesis, which was based on the 
deficient CO2 calculation methodologies (Mee et al., 2008; Stadelmann, 2009) and the incentive for host 
countries and implementing agencies to claim high benefits of their projects in order to make the 
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approval process easier. In contrast, the non-significant effect in case of biomass, hydro and solar power 
is more difficult to explain. One general reason may be that the fixed allocation of funding to countries 
(GEF, 2010c) clearly reduces the incentive to develop sound projects. Furthermore, we may find reasons 
that are very specific for each technology. In case of solar power, the likely reason for no significant 
impact is linked to very high mitigation costs of solar power (Schneider et al., 2010; Edenhofer et al., 
2011), which cannot be lowered by GEF’s capacity building or framework policy support. In case of 
hydro power, the information and regulatory barriers the GEF often targets may be relatively 
unimportant, as hydro has been an already established technology in many countries before the GEF was 
founded: more than three quarter of the countries in our sample already had hydropower at this time 
(EIA, 2010). Finally, in case of biomass power, GEF’s non-significant influence is rather surprising.  
 
The finding that, in case of solar and wind power, CDM is probably not more effective than GEF, may 
be linked to the potential non-ability of the CDM to mobilize any solar or wind power projects at all. In 
case of biomass including landfill gas, where the CDM is likely to have a major impact (see Figure 17), 
CDM indeed outperforms the GEF as predicted, probably related to the well-established carbon 
assessment methodologies as discussed in the theory section, or to the direct incentives provided. 
However, in case where CDM’s support cannot or is unlikely to overcome the profitability threshold (e.g. 
solar and wind, see Figure 17), CDM credits may in many cases just be an additional income for RE 
investors but not the one that determines the investment decision, although CDM developers may claim 
in official documents that CDM is decisive. This idea is not only consistent with the case study literature 
Michaelowa and Purohit, 2007; Schneider, 2007; Haya, 2009; Schneider et al., 2010; World Bank, 2010)  
but also with the following confidential statements made by insiders in the last 5 five years, when the 
author challenged additionality of their CDM projects: 
 
“Yes, the CDM is just the icing on the cake” (International wind power lobbyist) 
 
“Investments in RE are not happening because of the CDM” (RE investor in East Asia) 
 
“As far as I understand, you just adapt the numbers so that projects seem to be additional” (European developer of 
hydro power plants in China) 
 
 “I can create you any document you need for showing additionality” (Chinese RE developer) 
 
In case of RE technologies where CDM funding is not decisive (generally all RE except biomass projects 
with methane component), public finance programs may have some advantages compared to the CDM, 
as they can target investment barriers beyond technology cost, such as missing information or regulatory 
barriers.  
 
 
5.7.2 Validity of estimated effectiveness per USD 
 
This section discusses to which extend our estimated effectiveness of GEF and CDM are valid. Three 
issues are considered: the assumed CO2 emission reductions per unit of renewable electricity production, 
the validity of the models used and the validity beyond the macro level. 
 
First, our estimated GHG emissions reductions per dollar of GEF and CDM funding rely on the 
assumption that CO2 emissions are reduced by feed-in of renewable power into the grid. We calculated 
the reductions due to RE feed-in to the grid by multiplying RE power generation with the IEA (2009b) 
grid emission factors. With this calculation, we assume two things: on the one hand, we assume that each 
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unit of RE produced will replace one average unit of electricity in the grid. However, this is not 
necessarily true, given that additional production should lead to lower electricity prices and increased 
electricity consumption, as the electricity demand is not fully inelastic to electricity prices (Lijesen, 2007). 
Furthermore, the electricity market in many developing countries is not fully liberalized (e.g. Spalding-
Fecher and Matibe, 2003), so we cannot be sure that regulators will plan less fossil fuel electricity 
production due to additional renewable power plants. On the other hand, by using the IEA (2009b) 
factors, we assume that new electricity displaces the “average” power production, which consists of 
around 75% of fossil fuel power generation in developing countries (EIA 2010). However, it may be the 
case that some types of power plants may reduce their production more than others63. Empirically, York 
(2012) has estimated, using a cross-country regression model, that each additional unit of renewable 
electricity production only reduces around 10% of the same unit in fossil fuel electricity production, so 
lower than the 75% we assumed by using the average IEA (2010) grid factor. If York’s estimation is 
correct, then our estimates for effectiveness of CDM and GEF are too optimistic. However, further 
studies on fossil fuel replacement rates may be needed.  
 
One of our additional assumptions in the GHG estimation is that RE power plants do not lead to GHG 
emissions by themselves. However, at least for Brazil, there are two potential types of substantial GHG 
emissions: first, hydro power plants may enable soy bean production, which may lead to deforestation 
(Cole and Roberts, 2011), and second, large hydropower reservoirs in tropical regions may imply 
substantial methane emissions (Rosa et al., 2004; dos Santos et al., 2006). Similar to the case of the RE-
fossil replacement rate, more studies on these emission sources would be needed. 
 
Secondly, the validity of the estimated effectiveness also depends on the macro level models we used to 
compare diffusion of renewable energies in different countries. Such macro level models have their own 
pitfalls such as the need to reduce the real-world complexity and the risk of omitting important variables. 
However, we tested the robustness of our results by applying different models and including different 
variables, and the main findings (overestimations, significance) remain similar (see Annex 10.2.3-7). 
Another challenge for the model validity may be that the effects on the macro level may not be 
significant because of two reasons: the first reason is that CDM and GEF may only fund a very small 
portion of RE projects in many countries and, therefore, their effect may not become visible, even if 
individual projects are effective. However, this problem should hardly affect the modeling results for 
wind, hydro and biomass power, where CDM supports one sixth or more of newly installed capacity in a 
median country (Spalding-Fecher et al., 2012: 91ff). The second reason is that the lagged dependent 
variables explain a very large part of the variation, which may render CDM and GEF coefficients 
insignificant. However, the main findings do not change if we estimate BB models using the differences 
as dependent variable64. Summing up, several issues could challenge the validity of the models but our 
sensitivity analyses do not question the results.  
 
Thirdly, is our estimated effectiveness in promoting RE technologies valid beyond the macro level? As 
we only estimate the average over all countries, the two funding channels may have different 
                                                     
63 In case of the CDM, it is assumed that primarily flexible production such as natural gas and coal power is reduced, while hydro 
and other renewable power stations are considered as power plants that have low marginal generation costs and will, therefore, 
continue to run even when additional power is fed into the grid. Because of this assumption, the average country grid factor in the 
CDM is 820 tCO2 per GWh (IGES, 2012), i.e. higher than what we assumed in the regressions (500 tCO2 per GWh). So we may 
both have underestimated the GHG emissions reductions by assuming an “average” replacement in the grid, or overestimated it 
by assuming one-to-one replacement. 
64 The significant GEF and CDM coefficients slightly decrease. Similar as in case of modeling % of electricity production, the 
CDM coefficient becomes significant for geothermal power, while the GEF one turns insignificant (see Annex 10.2.3-7).  Also 
when estimating fixed or random-effects models with differences as dependent variables (not displayed in the Annex) results 
remain similar. 
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effectiveness in case of specific countries or projects. For instant, the substantially varying profitability of 
RE technologies in different developing countries (Schmidt et al., 2012) indicate that, given a specific 
carbon credit price, CDM may be able to overcome investment barriers in case of some countries will it 
may have no significant impact in others. This is also the case for some CDM biomass power projects 
that have been found to be BAU (Michaelowa and Purohit, 2007; Schneider, 2007), so the overall CDM 
effectiveness in promoting biomass does not mean that all CDM biomass projects are effective.  
 
 
5.8 Conclusions  
 
This study has found that CDM and GEF as international climate finance mechanisms have only a 
limited effect on the reduction of GHG emissions through renewable energies. CDM has only an effect 
on biomass and potentially geothermal and hydro power, while GEF influences wind and potentially 
geothermal power diffusion. The effects are in all cases lower than officially estimated (except CDM’s 
impact on biomass power), which is what we expected from theory given the many drivers of RE and the 
substantial interest of various actors to overestimate effectiveness and not reveal information. 
Interestingly, the CDM is only in case of biomass more effective per USD of funding than the GEF, 
which is in contrast to some of our theoretical expectations. The main explanation for the low 
effectiveness of CDM is that only in case of biomass power with methane reductions the CDM support 
is substantial enough to make projects profitable. Other projects claim that CDM funding is needed but 
actually, other determinants such as oil dependence or national policies may drive the investment 
decision. Actually, the CDM EB may be aware that renewable energies are driven by national policies, 
but – in order to avoid perverse incentives – it has made clear that climate-friendly national policies 
adopted after 2001 do not impede the registration of CDM projects (UNFCCC, 2005b). Due to this rule, 
policy makers may have an incentive to set-up RE policies as they can expect that CDM will cover part 
of the policy costs. Therefore, the CDM may be more effective than estimated by our models, if we find 
a significant impact of CDM on RE policy adoption in the next chapter. 
 
What do these results imply for the future of international climate finance? In case of CDM, the lower 
and in some case even non-significant effectiveness substantially questions whether the CDM fulfills its 
core functions according to the Kyoto Protocol, namely to assist industrialized countries in achieving 
their emission targets. If CDM credits for renewable energies do not lead to additional CO2 reductions 
(or only to a very limited extent), then industrialized countries buying CDM credits from renewable 
energies may only seemingly fulfill their Kyoto targets. In fact, if CO2 emissions are correctly accounted 
for, it may be cheaper for them to reduce CO2 reductions domestically than by purchasing CDM credits 
from RE projects in developing countries. Therefore, it may be warranted for industrialized countries to 
lower the purchase of CDM credits from renewable energies until regulatory reforms to improve the 
effectiveness of the CDM in promoting renewable energies are undertaken. Such reforms would have to 
make sure that CDM credited renewable energies are either enabled by direct CDM financing or via 
CDM support for policies. 
 
Among the many CDM reform options proposed (Schneider, 2009b; Bakker et al., 2011) there are at 
least three relevant options for improving the CDM’s effectiveness in promoting renewable energies. 
First, the existing assessment tools whether CDM projects are additional to BAU case could be 
tightened, see Schneider (2009). However, a tightening will certainly also imply that more projects 
needing support will be excluded. Instead of false positives, so projects approved even when they do not 
need CDM support, we will find more false negatives (Trexler et al., 2006), so projects are not approved 
even if they need CDM support. A second CDM reform option is to create positive list (UNFCCC, 
2009a) for technologies not needing an additionality test and negative lists (Wara, 2007) for non-eligible 
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RE technologies. While such lists can create investment certainty and weed out specific project types 
where CDM effectiveness is unlikely, these lists may create false positives and false negatives on their 
own. Furthermore, these lists will have to be adapted over time due to changing economics of 
technologies. A third option is to combine CDM or other carbon credits with other support from 
industrialized countries (Castro et al., 2011b): as long as the carbon price is not high enough for making 
renewable energies profitable, a mix of carbon credits, public finance and national policies may be 
applied to close the cost gap. In such cases, it will have to be guaranteed that only the CDM credit buyer 
but not the public finance provider or the national government claims the CO2 emission reductions 
(Hayashi and Wehner, 2012).  
 
In case of GEF our results suggests that GEF funding has an impact on diffusion of wind and 
potentially geothermal power but the effect is lower than claimed, while GEF has no effect on other 
renewable energies. These findings are particularly useful as GEF projects have only been evaluated at a 
project level, while this study has looked at the country level. The overestimated effect certainly implies 
that methodologies for calculation of CO2 estimations have to be more elaborated; it also means that 
GEF’s tools like capacity building and regulatory reforms are not likely to be successful in case of 
technologies that are already well established (hydro power) or very far from being economically 
attractive (solar power), while they may be more appropriate in cases where technologies are already or 
almost commercially attractive but information and regulatory barriers exist (biomass, geothermal and 
wind power). A focus on promising technologies may therefore be warranted. 
 
Our results have also shown that RE policies are substantial drivers for RE diffusion, which is consistent 
with many case studies. Therefore, international climate finance may have to focus more on approaches 
that promote the adoption of RE policies. One such approach is not only to credit projects as in case of 
the CDM but also national policy actions. Related ideas are the crediting of Nationally Appropriate 
Mitigation Actions (Okubo et al., 2011) and sectoral crediting (Schmidt et al., 2008; Ward et al., 2008). 
Another approach is to more closely link public financing to the implementation of national policies. 
While, at the moment, all developing countries receive GEF funding, future funding could focus on 
countries with ambitious mitigation policies. As making funding strictly conditional upon national policy 
reforms has not been particularly successful in case of development assistance (Collier et al., 1997; 
Killick, 1997), other ways of promoting national RE policies via climate finance may have to be found, 
such as rewards for long-term positive changes (Collier et al., 1997). Another approach that avoids 
conditionality is information transmission (Killick, 1997) but this would resemble GEF’s capacity 
building approach that apparently seems to be less effective than officially claimed.  
  
As input for this discussion on how international climate finance can promote renewable energy policies, 
it may be interesting to study past effectiveness in inducing policies, which is conducted in the next 
chapter. 
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6 Climate policy innovation in the South - domestic and international drivers for 
renewable energy policies in developing and emerging countries65 
 
 
Abstract 
This article aims to disentangle the drivers of the adoption of renewable energy (RE) support policies in 
developing and emerging countries. By analyzing policies already implemented in industrialized countries, 
we focus on diffusion but not invention of climate-relevant policies. We look at four different types of 
policies (RE targets, feed-in tariffs, other financial incentives and framework policies) and consider both 
domestic factors and international diffusion mechanisms utilizing a discrete-time events history model 
with a Logit link on a self-compiled dataset of RE (grid-based electricity) policy adoption in 114 
developing and emerging countries from 1998 to 2009. In general, we find stronger support for the 
domestic drivers of policy adoption, but also substantial influence from the international level. Countries 
with a larger population and a higher income will have a higher probability of adopting RE policies. 
Having natural endowments for producing RE does only in specific cases encourage governments to 
adopt policies, and hydro power resources may even deter the adoption of targets. Among the 
international drivers, learning from countries with the same former colonizer and membership within the 
EU seem to facilitate policy adoption. International climate finance flows are less relevant, as capacity 
building via the Global Environmental Facility and incentives under the Clean Development Mechanism 
only tend to increase the adoption of framework policies and targets, while they have no influence on 
financial incentives and feed-in tariffs in the short- and medium term. 
 
 
Keywords: Renewable energies, policy diffusion, developing countries, climate finance 
 
  
                                                     
65 This chapter has been written together with Paula Castro. 
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6.1 Introduction 
 
Energy generation and use is one of the most important global sources of GHG emissions. Electricity 
and heat production accounted for 28% of global emissions in 2005 (WRI, 2012). Renewable energy 
(RE) is increasingly considered by policy-makers as a key energy form to support and pursue, not only to 
prevent climate change, but also to improve energy security, reduce local air pollution and generate 
employment (Mitchell et al., 2011). For this reason, in this chapter we will focus on the adoption of 
policies that support RE electricity generation. 
 
There is a growing body of literature that focuses on the national adoption of policies that financially 
support or otherwise promote the deployment of RE, such as feed-in tariffs (FITs), renewable portfolio 
standards or tax credits. Most of the empirical literature, however, looks at industrialized countries or at 
sub-national units in industrialized countries (Jacobsson and Lauber, 2006; Vachon and Menz, 2006; 
Huang et al., 2007; Matisoff, 2008). Also the most recent work on adoption of climate and energy 
policies using quantitative diffusion models focuses on the EU (Schmitt et al., 2012) or US states 
(Matisoff and Edwards, 2012).  
 
Empirical work on RE policies in developing countries mostly focuses on the policies’ impact (Lewis and 
Wiser, 2007; Yu et al., 2009; Wang et al., 2010), whereas literature on policy adoption is limited to few 
case studies (e.g. Benecke, 2009). However, knowing the drivers that encourage developing and emerging 
country governments to adopt RE policies is very important from an international climate policy 
perspective; developing countries already generate more than half of global GHG emissions, will 
substantively expand their power generation facilities in the next few decades and are, therefore, 
projected to contribute more than 70% of energy-related GHG emissions by 2035 (IEA, 2010a). 
Whether policy adoption drivers are the same as in industrialized countries is questionable, given the 
difference in political systems, international commitments to mitigate climate change66, and economic 
development. For instance, the rapid growth in emerging economies at a time of high oil prices may have 
encouraged the search for alternative energy forms. Furthermore, less affluent countries may need 
international financial and capacity building support to implement RE technologies with high investment 
costs. Therefore, we can expect that international climate finance, both from public sources and the 
carbon market will help to set up new policies.  
 
According to our knowledge, these potential differences between developing and developed country 
policy adoption have not yet been analyzed. This article starts filling this research gap by analyzing the 
reasons why developing and emerging countries adopt RE support policies. Policies are understood here 
as national-level public policies67, i.e. government decisions (Dye, 1972) on goals or means (Jenkins, 
1978). Among the three aspects of climate policy innovation – invention, diffusion and impact of climate 
policies (Huitema and Jordan, 2012), we focus on the diffusion of policies already in place in other 
countries, as most of the RE policies observed in developing countries (e.g. FITs) have been invented in 
the North (REN21, 2007). Thereby, we follow Walker’s concept of policy innovation as first-time adoption of a 
policy in a country (Walker, 1969: 881). Walker’s policy innovation concept of one-time legislative adoption 
is a simplication, as policies are composed of a set of interrelated decisions (Jenkins, 1978). In reality, 
only the core concepts of policies may be diffused, e.g. the guaranteed electricity tariff in case of FITs, 
see Jacobs (2012), while their details, e.g. the actual level of the FIT, are elaborated in a domestic decision 
                                                     
66 While developing countries have committed to undertake mitigation actions (see e.g. UNFCCC, 2010), the concrete measures 
are voluntary in nature and not legally binding such as industrialized countries’ emission target under the Kyoto Protocol. 
67 In several developing countries, also sub-national policies are relevant for renewable energy, see e.g. the case of India (Schmid, 
2012). 
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process. Therefore, our study can only capture the diffusion process of policies’ core features, while the 
actual adaptation of policies to the country context would have to be studied by case studies.  
 
Our focus on diffusion rather than invention allows us to analyze RE policies that have already proven 
to enable substantial reduction of carbon emissions in the North – e.g. FITs (see Mendonça, 2007; Butler 
and Neuhoff, 2008). Further advantages are that diffusion processes cover a larger part of developing 
nations and GHG emissions than invention processes, and that we can measure the impact of 
international climate finance, which will promote rather diffusion of Northern policies and not Southern 
inventions. As downside, our analysis neglects that developing countries can also be relevant inventors of 
RE policies, see e.g. the Brazilian Alcohol Program promoting the use of sugarcane as transport fuel in 
the 1970s (Moreira and Goldemberg, 1999). 
 
Following Berry and Berry (2007), we assess whether it is mostly domestic factors that drive adoption – 
dependence on increasingly expensive fossil fuels, concerns about air pollution, domestic environmental 
pressure groups, socio-economic, structural and institutional factors (see e.g. Buen and Castro, 2012) –, 
or whether international policy diffusion mechanisms also play a role. We consider that both 
mechanisms of horizontal diffusion (between countries) and vertical diffusion (from the international to 
the national level) could be at play. These international diffusion channels may be linked to the diffusion 
mechanisms outlined in the literature: emulation, learning, coercion (including financial incentives) and 
competition (Simmons et al., 2006; Dobbin et al., 2007; Shipan and Volden, 2008). Policies could be 
emulated from neighboring countries or countries within the same region, with similar cultural and 
historical background. Diffusion among economic peers, particularly countries within the same trade 
bloc, may also be a signal of competition. Furthermore, diffusion may also be enabled by learning and 
financial incentives connected to international public finance and the carbon market.  
 
These potential effects are tested using a panel dataset of RE support policies in 163 developing 
countries over the period from 1998 to 2009; the dataset was constructed using data from various 
international organizations (e.g. EBRD, 2011; IEA, 2011a; REEEP, 2011; REN21, 2011b). We use a 
discrete time event history model with a Logit link for estimating the probability of policy adoption of 
four selected policy types (RE targets, FITs, other financial incentives and policy frameworks), including 
time fixed effects to model the baseline hazard of adopting a policy.  
 
We start the paper by giving an overview on RE policies in developing countries, their adoption patterns 
and potential drivers. Then we provide a theoretical framework for RE policy, adapted to developing and 
emerging countries, and derive hypotheses. After lining out the empirical strategy and the 
operationalization of the theoretical concepts, we present and discuss the empirical results, draw 
conclusions and propose directions for further research. 
 
 
6.2 RE support policies in developing countries: A brief overview 
 
The world is currently witnessing an accelerated development in the field of RE, in parallel with the 
rising needs for energy (IEA, 2010b). RE now accounts for about 13% of total global energy supply 
(Edenhofer et al., 2011), albeit most of this supply is still provided by traditional biomass used for 
cooking or heating in developing countries (roughly 6%) or by large-scale hydroelectric power (2.3%). 
Still, some modern RE sources – small-scale hydro, wind, solar, geothermal, tidal energy and biofuels – 
are growing very fast. For the past 5 years, solar photovoltaic and wind electricity capacity have grown at 
an average annual rate of 60% and 27%, respectively (REN21, 2010). About 19% of global electricity 
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supply is now sourced from RE (Edenhofer et al., 2011). These trends are being witnessed both in 
industrialized OECD countries and in some emerging and developing economies. 
 
In addition to economic drivers, such as rising energy demand and costs of fossil fuels (EIA, 2009), 
technological improvements and lowered technology costs due to learning and economies of scale 
(Junginger, 2005; Junginger et al., 2005; Nemet, 2006; Jamasb and Köhler, 2008), policies have been 
crucial for driving the growth in RE capacity (Mitchell et al., 2011). Governments have implemented 
technology-push policies, such as support for research and development (R&D), and demand-pull 
policies such as indicative and mandatory RE targets or financial incentives (REN21, 2010).  
 
Internationally, renewable energies have been supported by development assistance and development 
banks since the 1980s, while further incentives emerged from the climate regime (e.g. GHG emission 
targets for industrialized countries and financial support for developing countries). In the following 
paragraphs, we describe the main domestic policy instruments related to RE deployment in developing 
countries, which are the focus of analysis of this article. 
 
Different types of domestic policies can help to overcome the various barriers that prevent the diffusion 
of RE technologies. R&D and other technology-push policies are used for fostering innovations and 
long-term cost reductions in RE. Broader electricity-sector restructuring policies, including the 
liberalization of the sector, the regulation of access to transmission and distribution grids and the 
admittance of independent power producers may also affect RE deployment, depending on their design 
(Kozloff, 1998; Martinot et al., 2002). 
 
The focus of this article is on policies directly promoting market growth of grid-based power generation 
by RE technologies. We classify such policies in accordance with the definitions used in IEA (2011b, 
2011a) and REN21 (2011a)68, as follows: 
 
General strategy 
- RE targets: goals for RE generation or installed capacity; usually strategy guidelines and not 
mandatory.  
- Framework policies: generic plans and framework laws for the promotion of renewable 
energies. 
 
Regulatory policies 
- Renewable portfolio standards (RPS) or quotas: mandatory standards that establish a 
minimum portion of electricity generation or installed capacity to be from renewable sources. 
In this case, the government ensures that utilities meet the required targets. 
- Feed-in tariffs (FITs) or production payments: instruments guaranteeing a price, over a 
certain period of time, at which power producers can sell electricity to the grid. Depending 
on policy design, the difference between the guaranteed price and the average electricity price 
can be covered by the consumer or by the government. 
- Improved grid access: policies that grant a priority or a guaranteed access to the transmission 
and distribution network for RE sources. 
 
 
                                                     
68 This structure is similar to the one used by Schaffrin et al. (2012), based on IEA (2011b, 2011a). Compared to the IEA 
classification, we exclude education and outreach, research and development, tradable permits as well as voluntary agreements 
here, as we have insufficient data on these policies. Furthermore, we add renewable energy portfolio standards, feed-in tariffs, grid 
access, competitive bidding and targets as these key policies are hidden in the IEA classifications. 
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Public financing 
- Financial incentives: capital grants or concessional loans; investment or production tax 
credits; and reductions in sales, energy, value-added, import or other taxes. 
- Public investments: Equity or debt financing originating from public sources, on a non-
concessional basis (concessional loans are included under financial incentives above).  
- Competitive bidding or tenders: a system of periodic tenders by which contracts to build and 
operate specific RE projects are awarded. 
 
We have compiled a dataset of RE policies using data from different sources covering the years 1998 to 
2009 (e.g. EBRD, 2011; IEA, 2011a; REEEP, 2011; REN21, 2011b). From the 163 analyzed developing 
and emerging countries, of which 21 are European economies in transition69, 112 have some sort of 
policy or strategy to incentivize renewable power generation. The most common policies are targets, 
framework policies, the provision of financial incentives through tax reductions or subsidies, and FITs 
(see Table 15). 
 
 
Table 15: Adoption of RE policies in developing and emerging countries (all policies) 
 
Type of policy Number of countries (excluding 
European economies in transition) 
 
 1999 2004 2009 
General strategy    
  RE targets 3(1) 18(11) 56(43) 
  Framework policies (strategies, plans, generic laws) 19(14) 55(41) 96(78) 
Regulatory policies    
   Renewable portfolio standards / utility quotas 0 3(1) 9(6) 
   Feed-in tariff and energy production payments 4(2) 15(9) 40(26) 
   Improved access to the electricity grid  4(2) 17(11) 26(16) 
   Other regulatory measures 3(2) 8(6) 13(10) 
Public financing    
   Financial incentives 7(4) 21(14) 42(30) 
   Public investment 2(2) 3(2) 17(13) 
   Competitive bidding / tenders 0 1(1) 8(6) 
   Research & development 5(4) 8(6) 13(10) 
Total Countries with RE policies/strategies 31(22) 72(54) 112(92) 
Numbers in parentheses exclude European economies in transition, which are sometimes not considered as developing or emerging countries 
Source: Own compilation using data from IEA (2011b), REEEP (2011) and REN21 (2011b) 
 
 
 
For the further analysis, we will focus on the four policy types that have diffused most, as depicted in 
Figure 18: RE targets, framework policies, FITs and financial incentives (grants, concessional loans and 
tax reductions). As Matisoff and Edwards (2012), we consider that different mechanisms may drive the 
adoption of different types of policies, thus the comparison across these four policies. Two of these 
policy types provide financial support (FITs and financial incentives), while the other two (targets and 
                                                     
69 European economies in transition are defined as European countries who have undergone a transition from socialist to market 
economies after the downfall of the former Eastern bloc and Yugoslavia: Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Poland, 
Romania, Russia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia and Ukraine. 
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framework policies) are general strategies or guidelines, that often form the basis of more specific 
policies. 
 
 
Figure 18: Adoption of RE policies in developing and emerging countries (4 analyzed policies) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Own compilation using data from IEA (2011b), REEEP (2011) and REN21 (2011a) 
 
 
 
Case studies have shown that domestic factors (e.g. the possibility of developing a new industry, 
generating employment and providing affordable energy access) are very important drivers of RE 
policies in developing countries (Mitchell et al., 2011: 879). However, the wide array of policies and the 
considerable variation in patterns of adoption shown in Table 15 and Figure 18 are an indication that not 
only domestic interests may drive policy adoption, but also external factors such as emulation and 
learning from peers, incentives provided by international climate policy initiatives or other policy 
diffusion mechanisms. Thus, in this study we aim at analyzing more systematically when, where and why 
new policies to support RE emerge in developing countries, and whether there are differences across 
different policies.  
 
 
6.3 Policy adoption, innovation and diffusion: Theoretical background 
 
As has been shown in Table 16, in recent years more and more developing countries have adopted one 
or various policies to support the development of RE. In agreement with the mainstream literature on 
policy innovation, we consider that a policy innovation takes place whenever a country adopts a new 
policy for the first time, even if such a policy already exists in other countries (Walker, 1969: 881). This 
allows us to consider both internal (domestic) drivers of policy adoption and external (international) 
diffusion mechanisms.  
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By both considering country-internal and external determinants, we follow the suggestion by Berry and 
Berry (2007) that a fully developed policy diffusion model cannot rely on internal or external covariates 
only; an approach also suggested by Tews (2005) for studying environmental policy diffusion. While we 
are aware that internal and external drivers may overlap (e.g. international public finance may only occur 
if domestic governments ask for support), we are separating them here conceptually.  
 
Several theories seek to explain which factors affect the adoption of public policies. Environmental 
studies discuss environmental and resource pressures (Lester et al., 1983; Ringquist, 1994); 
developmentalists argue that socio-economic factors determine policy outputs and outcomes; 
institutionalist approaches posit that the political institutions and organizations in the country structure 
such policy decisions; public choice theory emphasizes the role of preferences and interests of different 
actors for decision-making and policy outcomes; sociological perspectives and policy diffusion theories 
underscore the role of formal and informal relationships and networks within and outside of the political 
system in determining policy outputs and outcomes (John, 1998). In the following, we draw from these 
theories for outlining our hypotheses regarding domestic and external drivers of policy adoption.  
 
 
6.3.1 Domestic determinants 
 
Environmental factors 
 
Environmental and resource pressures are traditionally considered to be the trigger of policy-making in 
the environmental field: as populations grow, industrialization advances, and consumption increases, 
more pressures on the environment and the natural resources are generated. The severity of these 
problems is expected to influence environmental policy-making (Lester et al., 1983; Ringquist, 1994). A 
long tradition of studying environmental pressures exists, for example, in public policy studies that 
compare state-level policy making in the US (Ringquist, 1994; Sapat, 2004; Vachon and Menz, 2006; 
Huang et al., 2007). However, there are very few studies looking at environmental policy-making across 
developing countries (Fredriksson et al., 2005). In the energy field, increased energy demand and volatile 
or rising fossil fuel prices may make governments more willing to promote renewables due to energy 
security concerns, especially if they rely on fuel or electricity imports (Bird et al., 2005; Marques et al., 
2010). Furthermore, local air pollution may motivate governments to support low-emission technologies 
such as RE. We hence expect that energy-related environmental problems (domestic energy security and air pollution) 
may positively influence the adoption of policies that support RE deployment.  
 
Another environmental factor is the natural endowment with RE resources, such as solar irradiation, 
waterfalls or strong winds, which need to be present in sufficient quantity and quality to make RE 
investments competitive (Bird et al., 2005). We expect that governments will more likely decide to support RE 
technologies if their countries have the natural resources to make them work in the first place. 
 
Socio-economic factors  
 
Among the socio-economic factors, wealth and income have frequently been regarded as variables 
leading to stronger environmental policies, as policy adoption and implementation cost money (Lester 
and Lombard, 1990; Ringquist, 1994; Vachon and Menz, 2006). This should be especially true in a highly 
technical and investment-intensive field such as renewable power generation. Furthermore, higher levels 
of income are usually accompanied with stronger environmental preferences of the population (Elliott et 
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al., 1997; Vachon and Menz, 2006)70. However, while empirical studies have sometimes found significant 
positive effects of wealth and income on environmental regulation (Ringquist, 1994; Zarnikau, 2003; 
Sapat, 2004; Fredriksson et al., 2005; Vachon and Menz, 2006), some have also found insignificant 
effects (Lester et al., 1983; Ringquist, 1994; Arkesteijn and Oerlemans, 2005), or even marginally 
significant negative effects (Ek, 2005). In our case, we expect a clear positive relationship especially in the 
case of policies that provide subsidies for RE, because they will require a government with sufficient 
resources to finance them, and because higher income may both lead to stronger environmental 
preferences and higher electricity demand. Thus, we expect that higher levels of income will be associated with 
more adoption of policies that financially support RE deployment. 
 
Similarly, a higher level of education makes the population more aware of environmental issues (Elliott et 
al., 1997), and leads to a better assessment of the costs and benefits of different policy options. This 
results in increased support for environmental policies (Zarnikau, 2003; Vachon and Menz, 2006). 
Furthermore, a high level of education among the general population may indicate a better capability by 
the administration to design new policies. Consequently, we expect that a higher level of education will be 
positively correlated with adoption of policies to promote RE.  
 
Institutional factors  
 
Institutional theories posit that the characteristics of the political system influence policy adoption. There 
is an extensive literature on the role of democracy for environmental protection. Congleton (1992) 
theorizes that authoritarian regimes will adopt less stringent environmental standards than democratic 
ones, as democratic regimes follow the preferences of the median voter, who benefits more from the 
public provision of environmental quality than the authoritarian ruler. Following a similar argument, 
Fredriksson (1997) and Deacon (2000) argue that democratic governments, being more inclusive and 
welfare-oriented, provide more environmental public goods than less democratic ones. While some 
literature has questioned this democracy-environment link (e.g. Midlarsky, 1998), newer studies such as 
those by Fredriksson and Gaston (2000), Neumayer (2002), Li and Reuveny (2006), as well as Bättig and 
Bernauer (2009) show that democracies tend to show stronger environmental commitment than non-
democracies. We hence hypothesize that the more democratic the government, the more likely it will adopt policies 
that support RE deployment. 
 
The institutional literature has also analyzed the effect of fractionalized political systems and of the 
number of veto players on policy adoption (Tsebelis, 1995, 1999), arguing that the more decision-making 
instances are involved in agreeing a new policy, the less able is a government to adopt the policy. These 
theories have also been applied to the study of environmental policy adoption, for example by Knill et al. 
(2010) and Ashworth et al. (2006). The attractiveness of this theory is that it is applicable to any type of 
political regime, not only to democracies, and is thus more applicable to developing countries. In 
accordance, we posit that the more veto players within the political process, the less likely the government will adopt 
policies that support RE.  
 
 
                                                     
70 The link between income and environmental quality is also made by the vast literature (e.g. Selden and Song, 1994; Roberts and 
Grimes, 1997; Narayan and Narayan, 2010) on the Environmental Kuznet Curve (EKC). This literature finds that environmental 
damage is positively related to increased income in case of poor countries, while the relationship becomes negative after a certain 
income threshold is reached. However, the empirical evidence on the EKC remains contested (Dinda, 2004; Stern, 2004), and the 
findings on environmental quality cannot directly be translated to our case of RE policy adoption: the EKC studies analyze 
environmental quality, not environmental policies. RE policy adoption may even grow when at the same time fossil-fuel energy 
use (as proxy for environmental damage) increases due to growth in poor countries. This theoretical reasoning is also confirmed 
by  the non-significant impact of GDP2 on policy adoption (see Annex 10.3.7)  
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Interest groups and preferences 
 
On one hand, the strength of environmental groups has been positively linked with more or stronger 
environmental policy, including policies that support the deployment of RE energy (Fredriksson et al., 
2005; Vachon and Menz, 2006) but, on the other hand, it can be argued that environmental groups 
sometimes lobby against specific RE investments that affect local environmental or social quality. 
Environmental groups may particularly oppose large hydro power projects, which may result in 
displacement of local populations and are thus opposed by environmental groups. However, large hydro 
power is usually not targeted by policies that support RE deployment, as it is a technology that is already 
competitive at current energy prices. Thus, we will expect that countries with high presence of environmental (and 
civil society) groups will be more likely to adopt RE support policies.  
 
Ecological preferences of decision-makers and the public have been shown to be positively correlated 
with environmental policy-making (List and Sturm, 2006; Vachon and Menz, 2006; Knill et al., 2010). 
The rationale behind this is that a government of a population that generally cares about the 
environment can be expected to promote environmental policies, including the ones deploying more RE. 
We will hence expect that in countries with high environmental preferences, the government will be more likely to adopt 
RE support policies. 
 
 
6.3.2 International determinants, including climate finance 
 
Horizontal diffusion mechanisms 
 
The policy diffusion literature draws from theories of organizational decision-making to assert that 
policy-makers look for ways to simplify their decision-making processes because capacity constraints 
prevent them from consulting all possible sources of information to find the best policy alternative. As a 
result, they look for solutions in other contexts (states or countries), where other policy-makers have 
faced similar problems and solved them successfully (Walker, 1969). Such learning – change in beliefs due 
to new evidence – or emulation – imitation due to socially constructed policy norms (Simmons et al., 
2006) – is more likely to take place in case of neighboring countries, or countries within the same region 
(MacGarvie, 2005), because such peers are more likely to meet in common fora and exchange with each 
other (Berry and Berry, 2007). Following this literature, we hypothesize that the adoption of a specific RE 
support policy will be more likely in a country if its neighbors have already adopted it. 
 
In addition, countries with cultural, historic or economic commonalities are also more likely to learn 
from each other (Simmons and Elkins, 2004) or even to compete for markets, e.g. for RE technology 
exports. Adoption of policies from culturally or historically similar countries can be understood as 
learning or emulation of peers “with psychological proximity”, an idea based on constructivist theories, 
while adoption of policies from countries with similar economic structures may be a sign of competition 
(Simmons et al., 2006). Hence, we expect that the adoption of a specific RE support policy will be more likely if 
countries with a common language, the same colonial history, or within the same economic and regional bloc have already 
adopted it.  
 
Vertical diffusion mechanisms 
 
Apart from the three horizontal diffusion mechanisms of competition (with trade bloc partners), learning 
and emulation (from neighbors, regional and trade bloc partners and countries with similar culture and 
history) there is also a vertical diffusion mechanism: coercion by more powerful actors (Simmons et al., 
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2006; Dobbin et al., 2007; Shipan and Volden, 2008). Different types of coercion are physical force, the 
monopolization of information or expertise and the manipulation of economic costs and benefits 
(Dobbin et al., 2007). The last type, manipulation of economic costs and benefits, does not need to be 
coercive, so we may add financial incentives as additional diffusion mechanism. Both coercion and 
incentive mechanisms of diffusion have been found in research on state-level policy adoption in the US 
(Daley and Garand, 2005). At the international level, such top-down diffusion originating from a central 
government is missing but hegemonic countries (e.g. the US) may have coercive power (Dobbin et al., 
2007). In the context of developing countries, the influence of former colonizers may be particularly 
relevant, as strong economic and political ties have remained after independence (Neumayer, 2003; 
Neumayer and Perkins, 2005; Albaugh, 2009). Therefore, we stipulate that the adoption of RE policies will be 
more likely if the former colonizer has already adopted them.  
  
Vertical coercion or incentives may not only emerge from powerful countries but also from the global level. 
Studies have found that international agreements (Tews et al., 2003), international organizations 
(Edwards, 1997) and transnational networks at UN conferences (True and Mintrom, 2001) may influence 
national policies. As the international climate regime does not provide direct obligations for developing 
countries, and emission targets of transition countries under the Kyoto Protocol are not strict enough to 
require government actions, we expect that a direct signal from the signature of the UN Framework 
Convention or Kyoto Protocol on RE policies is relatively unlikely. However, developing countries may 
have reacted to more specific components of international climate policy that are targeted towards them. 
In the chapter before, we have seen that financial flows linked to the UN Framework Convention have 
supported different types of RE technologies, partly via financial incentives and capacity building for RE 
policy adoption. Therefore, we hypothesize that developing country governments may have reacted to 
the financial opportunity provided by the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), see von Stein (2008), 
and to RE-related capacity building under development and environmental finance initiatives (Heggelund 
et al., 2005). While reacting to the CDM would imply a form of incentive-based policy diffusion 
mechanism such as the one observed by Welch and Thompson (1980) or Daley and Garand (2005), the 
effects of capacity building and technical assistance would rather resemble learning. We thus postulate 
that developing countries with interest in participating in the CDM, or with RE-related projects under international 
environmental or development funding will more likely adopt policies that support RE.  
 
In case of European economies in transition, the European Union (EU) as international institution may 
both enable learning and use of coercive power, e.g. by imposing RE targets on all member states 
(REN21, 2007). Therefore, we assume that the accession to the EU has a positive influence on adoption of RE 
policies. 
 
 
6.4 Empirical strategy and model 
 
In the recent literature, the internal and external determinants of policy innovation are usually estimated 
by event history analysis, which can be used to model the changing probability over time that an event 
(in our case policy adoption) will take place, see also Schmitt et al. (2012). In the type of event history 
analysis applied here, we use discrete time (yearly) data and set the dependent variable (policy adoption) 
to 0 in all periods before adoption, to 1 in the period in which the policy is adopted, while excluding all 
countries from the dataset after the policy is adopted, as we are not interested in the presence but in the 
adoption of policies (Berry and Berry, 2007). This technique is also used by Matisoff and Edwards 
(2012). While it may be more difficult to identify the exact year of policy adoption in the past compared 
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to identifying policies in the present year, the strategy of modeling “adoption per year” has the advantage 
that useful information on early versus late adopters and diffusion between countries can be contained71.  
 
We estimate the probability of policy adoption with a Logit model, a standard model used for estimating 
discrete-time event history models, using maximum likelihood techniques for estimation. We include 
time dummies to allow the data to determine the baseline hazard function in a non-parametric way rather 
than pre-determining it as would be the case when using a linear or any other trend (Tekle and Vermunt, 
2010). Including country fixed effects is not possible as country dummies would predict non-success 
perfectly in case of countries where a policy is never adopted, so these countries would have to be 
excluded from the dataset.  
 
 
6.5 Operationalization of variables and data 
 
6.5.1 Dependent variables 
 
As dependent variables we use dummies indicating the adoption year of each of the four RE support 
policies analyzed. The considered time span starts in the year 1998, as data on earlier adoption is not 
reliable, and ends in 2009. While we have some data for the years 2010 and 2011 (EBRD, 2011; IEA, 
2011a; REN21, 2011b), an important source only included information up to 2009 (REEEP, 2011) so we 
restrict our dataset to the years where data is available from all sources. The variables were coded with 
the value of one in the adoption years as reported by the sources. If both the year of legislative decision 
and of entry into force were reported (e.g. IEA, 2011a), we used the year of entry into force to allow for 
comparability because the most important source (REN21, 2011b) just reported whether a policy is in 
place or not. If two sources reported different adoption years, we used the data from the sources with 
more contextual information (IEA, 2011a; REEEP, 2011). 
 
 
6.5.2 Domestic determinants 
 
Environmental factors 
 
Domestic energy security: we proxy domestic energy security with a variable reflecting the generic energy 
independence (% of domestic energy that is produced in-country). This variable therefore captures both 
net energy imports (when the values are below 1) and net energy exports (when they are above 1). All 
data is sourced from EIA (2010). As additional measure for energy security, we would preferably also 
control for the average oil price in the relevant year, using data for the crude oil price from EIA (2011). 
However, as international energy prices only vary over time but not between countries, we can only test 
the influence of oil prices if we exclude the time fixed effects. Therefore, we will use models with oil 
prices only in the sensitivity analysis. In the sensitivity analysis, also the pump price for diesel fuel (USD 
per liter) in 2010 was included, using data from the World Bank (2012). 
 
Air pollution: among all major air pollutants (SOX, NOX, PM10, VOC, and NH3), SOX is the only one for 
which the power sector is the most important source: roughly 70% of SOX emissions in Europe (EEA, 
2012) and of SO2 emissions in the US (EPA, 2012)72 originate from electricity production. In South and 
                                                     
71 Furthermore, modeling the presence of a policy in the current year does not solve the challenge that some policies are adopted 
by several legislative or governmental decisions that can be taking place in different years, so it may not be clear whether a policy 
is adopted in a specific year or not. 
72 The US EPA does only report SO2 but no other SOX emissions by sector. 
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East Asia, the share was similar in 2000 (EDGAR, 2012). We therefore measure electricity-related air 
pollution with metric tonnes of SO2 per square meter of populated land area, using cross-sectional data 
of the year 2000 from EDGAR as reported in the Quality of Government dataset (QOG, 2012). 
 
Natural resources: we use the same variables for geothermal, hydropower, wind and solar resources as in 
the chapter before.  
 
Socio-economic factors 
 
Level of income/wealth: the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita is the usual way to measure the 
relative level of income and/or wealth (see e.g. Zarnikau, 2003; Sapat, 2004; Fredriksson et al., 2005; 
Vachon and Menz, 2006). We use power purchasing parity (PPP) figures for GDP to reflect the in-
country value of the income, obtaining data from the World Bank (2011). The GDP level was 
standardized to 2007 US dollars using deflators from the OECD (2010b), and the logarithm was taken to 
improve the distribution of the variable. In addition to the level of income, we also include the GDP per 
capita growth in percentages to capture the influence of the change in income. As the level of income 
may not only have a direct influence on RE policy adoption (due to resources available for expensive RE 
technologies) but also an indirect one via energy consumption, we use the amount of electricity (in 
MWh) consumed per capita as control variable in one of the sensitivity analysis. 
 
Level of education and population: the percentage of gross secondary school enrolment was taken as 
proxy for the level of education (World Bank, 2011), as data on tertiary education is only available for a 
limited amount of countries and years. For few country-year points, data was missing and we used linear 
interpolation to fill the gaps73. To control for overall size of a country, we included the logarithm of the 
population as further determinant, using data from the World Bank (2011). 
 
Institutional factors 
 
Democracy: all available indices for democracy over time have substantial drawbacks in 
conceptualization, measurement, and aggregation (Munck and Verkuilen, 2002), and only two (Polity and 
Freedom House Index) cover more than 150 countries and the time period 1995-2010. Of these two 
indicators with wide coverage, the Polity IV variable (Marshall et al., 2010) shows more advantages, e.g. 
inter-coder reliability, clear and detailed coding rules (Munck and Verkuilen, 2002) and is, therefore, 
taken as our indicator for democracy. Polity IV classifies countries from -10 (institutionalized autocracy) 
to 10 (institutionalized democracy), while the classification is based on five criteria: competitiveness of 
political participation, regulation of political participation, competitiveness of executive recruitment, 
openness of executive recruitment, and constraints on the chief executive.  
 
Veto players: the number of veto players is taken from the Database of Political Institutions 2009 
(updated March 2010), as contained in the Quality of Government database (QOG, 2012). The variable 
was first coded by Keefer and Stasavage (2003), is at minimum one, and further increases the more veto 
players are involved in legislative decision-making.  
 
  
                                                     
73 We also tried including a more specific variable for RE-related knowledge based on international patent applications for 
renewable energy technology per applicant country, taken from the OECD (2012a). As this variable was never significant, we did 
not include it in the final specifications presented in the following.  
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Interest groups and preferences 
 
Civil society and environmental groups: The strength of civil society is measured with the number of 
development civil society organizations in the year 2000 (Grimes, 2008). Environmental pressure groups 
are measured with the presence of Greenpeace members in a country (data from von Stein, 2008) and 
the number of environmental Non-Governmental Organizations as listed in Europa Publications (2000) 
and Hartley et al. (2009); data between 2000 and 2009 was linearly interpolated. For all variables except 
the Greenpeace dummy we used the natural logarithm to improve the distribution of the variable and 
take into account that the influence of NGO numbers probably has diseconomies of scale.  
 
Environmental preferences: As we do not have a direct measure of ecological preferences for all 
countries included in our sample74, we used dummies for the existence of a Green Party, their presence 
in national parliaments (Global Greens, 2012) and the terrestrial protected areas in % of total land area in 
the year 2008 (World Bank, 2011) as proxies. 
 
 
6.5.3 International determinants, including international climate finance 
 
Horizontal diffusion mechanisms (learning, emulation and competition) 
 
To proxy diffusion mechanisms originating from learning from, emulating and competing with 
geographical, cultural and economic peers, we generate four variables that entail the percentage of peer 
countries that had already adopted the relevant policy in the previous time period. To construct the 
neighbor, common colonizer, and language variables, we use dyadic data from CEPII (2011) on land 
borders, common colonizers and on countries with a common language spoken by at least 9% of the 
population. For the regional trade blocs, we use memberships in regional and trade organizations as 
contained in the 2.3 version of the COW-2 International Organizations Dataset, originally coded by 
Pevehouse et al. (2004), taking the 2005 membership data (as proxy for the period 2000-2010)75. Each 
country was assigned to only one organization, e.g. all North African states were assigned to the Arab 
League but not to the African Union. A list of the regional and trade organizations coding is provided in 
Annex 10.3.1.  
 
Vertical diffusion mechanisms (coercion, incentives and learning) 
 
For measuring the influence of the former colonizer, we construct a variable containing the percentage of 
former colonizers (only post 1945 colonies) that have adopted the policy in the previous time period, 
using dyadic data from CEPII (2011). If countries have not existed in colonial times, the colonizer of the 
respective geographical area was taken. For the Clean Development Mechanism we use a measure for how 
many of the past three years (t-1, t-2, t-3) the country has been host of at least one registered CDM 
project involving RE. We can rule out potential endogeneity, given that CDM projects are already 
planned at least 1-2 years before registration76 so it is very unlikely that their planning is influenced by 
policies adopted 2-5 years later. International environmental funding relevant for renewable energies mainly 
stems from the Global Environmental Facility (GEF), the operational entity of the UNFCCC financial 
mechanism since the early 1990s. We use data from GEF (2011a) on whether RE funding has been 
                                                     
74 The World Values Survey does not cover all developing and emerging countries.  
75 We treated UNASUR (2012) members as one regional bloc even when it did not yet exist in 2005. However, in 2005 all of these 
countries except Guyana and Suriname were full or associate members of Mercosur. 
76 Historically, CDM projects have been registered on average 300-750 days after the start of the comment period (URC, 2012), 
when projects are already at an advanced planning stage.  
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approved in the previous 3 periods, as coded by Stadelmann (2009). For international development funding, 
we use a dummy on whether official development assistance entailing support for RE was committed for 
the relevant country in the previous three periods. The data for development assistance promoting RE 
was taken from the appendix to Michaelowa and Michaelowa (2011b). For measuring the effect of EU 
membership, a dummy variable was created taking on the value of 1 if the country was member of the EU 
in the respective year. 
 
Table 16 provides an overview of all variables, their summary statistics and their expected influence. 
Given that we control for many covariates, we only have full data for 114 of the 163 countries in our 
dataset; data from other countries is excluded from Table 16. One limitation of the dataset is that for 
several variables only cross-sectional data is available. While in some cases this is not problematic as the 
average value should have an influence (e.g. geothermal, solar and wind potential), in other cases (e.g. 
civil society, pollution level) yearly values would be needed to reflect changes over time.  
 
The specification of the variables, as summarized in Table 16, should help to avoid endogeneity due to 
simultaneity in the models: while many variables are clearly exogenous by themselves (e.g. natural 
resources, GDP, democracy, membership in organizations), others would potentially be endogenous (e.g. 
CDM, GEF, domestic energy, air pollution) but are specified as values in the past that should not be 
influenced by future policy adoption, so these variables should not be endogenous in a Logit model 
without country fixed effects. 
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Table 16: Overview of variables  
Variable Description  Sign Source N Mean SD Min Max
Target 
adoption 
Adoption of renewable energy targets 
in specific year (dummy) 
 
Own coding using 
data from EBRD, 
2011; IEA, 2011b; 
REEEP, 2011; 
REN21, 2011b;  
1119 0.04 0.20 0.0 1.0
Tariff 
adoption 
Adoption of feed-in tariffs in specific 
year (dummy) 
 1137 0.03 0.17 0.0 1.0
Incentive 
adoption 
Adoption of financial incentive for RE 
in specific year (dummy) 
 1143 0.03 0.18 0.0 1.0
Framework 
adoption 
Adoption of framework policy for RE 
in specific year (dummy) 
 862 0.07 0.26 0.0 1.0
Domestic 
energy 
% of energy consumption produced 
domestically, last year 
- EIA (2010) 1119 -0.65 1.89 -8.5 5.0
GDP per 
capita 
Natural logarithm of GDP per capita in 
2007 USD, PPP 
+ World Bank (2011) 1119 8.28 1.16 5.6 11.3
GDP per 
capita growth 
% growth in GDP per capita in 2007 
USD, PPP (compared to last year 
+ Calculated based on 
World Bank (2011) 
1119 0.03 0.05 -0.2 0.6
Population Natural logarithm of population + World Bank (2011) 1119 16.11 1.49 13.1 21.0
Education % gross secondary school enrolment + World Bank (2011) 1119 0.61 0.29 0.1 1.2
Hydro 
resources 
Natural logarithm of annual rainfall * 
average elevation 
+/- DWD/WZN (2010), 
Gallup et al. (2001) 
1119 5.84 1.47 1.0 8.3
Wind 
resources 
% of time wind speed is above 6 m/s, 
average over country area* 
+ NASA(2011) 1119 18.48 13.51 0.1 52.9
Solar 
resources 
Latitude tilt radiation in kWh/m2/ day, 
average over country area* 
+ NASA(2011) 1119 4.96 0.84 2.7 6.4
Geothermal 
resources 
Number of volcanoes in the country* + Smithsonian 
Institution (2011) 
1119 3.77 10.98 0.1 73.0
Biomass res. Roundwood production in m3 /capita + FAO (2012)  1119 0.77 1.11 0.0 7.9
Democracy Polity IV index (10=full democracy, -10 
= full autocracy) 
+ Marshall et al. (2010) 1119 2.20 6.46 -10.0 10.0
Pollution  SO2 emissions per square meters* +/- EDGAR (2012) 1119 3.97 13.84 0.0 131.0
Civil society 
organizations 
Natural logarithm of development civil 
society organizations in 2000* 
+ Grimes (2008)  1119 4.30 1.42 -2.3 6.6
Veto players # of  veto players in the country - QOG (2012) 1119 2.60 1.56 1.0 18.0
EU member EU membership (dummy) + Own coding 1119 0.05 0.21 0.0 1.0
CEFTA Membership in CEFTA (dummy) + Own coding 1119 0.04 0.20 0.0 1.0
Language % countries with same language having 
adopted the policy one year ago 
+ Own coding using 
CEPII (2011)  
1119 0.11 0.15 0.0 1.0
Neighbors % neighbor countries having adopted 
the policy one year ago 
+ Own coding using 
CEPII (2011)  
1119 0.12 0.22 0.0 1.0
Tradebloc % of countries within the same bloc 
having adopted the policy one year ago
+ Based on Pevehouse 
et al. (2004) 
1119 0.08 0.12 0.0 0.9
Colony 
 
% of countries with same colonizer 
having adopted the policy a year ago 
+ Own coding using 
CEPII (2011)  
1119 0.07 0.11 0.0 0.4
CDM projects CDM projects for RE registered in 3 
previous years (dummy) 
+ URC (2012) 1119 0.09 0.38 0.0 3.0
GEF funding GEF grants for RE approved in 3 
previous years (dummy) 
+ Stadelmann (2009) 1119 0.11 0.31 0.0 1.0
Development 
aid 
ODA grants for RE committed in 3 
previous years (dummy) 
+ Michaelowa and 
Michaelowa (2011b) 
1119 0.56 0.50 0.0 1.0
* Only cross-sectional data (all other variables contain panel data)  
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6.6 Results  
 
For each of the four types of policies in our dependent variables, we have estimated full models 
including all variables described above (see Annex 10.3.2 and 10.3.3) and parsimonious models only 
including variables that had a significant or almost significant impact in at least one of the full models 
(Table 17). There are only few changes when comparing full and parsimonious models. Any difference 
between full and parsimonious models will be mentioned when discussing the results. 
 
Only in case of RE targets, the full 1119 observations could be used; in case of framework policies, only 
864 observations are available for the dependent variable (see Table 15), as countries that have adopted a 
policy drop out of a dataset. In case of tariffs, and financial incentives, the year dummies leads to the loss 
of 1 years in case of tariffs and 2 years in case of incentives, as no policy was adopted in these years. 
 
We conducted likelihood ratio tests to make sure that the excluded variables were not jointly statistically 
significant. The parsimonious models performed better in terms of the Akaike Information Criterion 
(AIC) and the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) –, which assess maximum likelihood models both in 
terms of fit and parsimony77. In all models and for all independent variables, we report the marginal 
effects at the average value of all variables in the model, which makes it easier to understand the actual 
magnitude of the effect on RE policy adoption. 
 
In general both domestic and international determinants are important for policy adoption but we find 
slightly more evidence for the relevance of domestic compared to international drivers, as shown by the 
model evaluation criteria for the separate international and domestic models78.  
 
 
6.6.1 Domestic determinants 
 
Environmental factors 
 
We hypothesized that energy insecurity and bad air quality would have a positive effect on RE policy 
adoption. In terms of energy insecurity, our findings show that the share of domestically-produced 
energy decreases the probability of FIT adoption and financial incentives, as expected. Furthermore, 
higher diesel prices significantly increase the chance of FIT adoption (see annex 10.3.7). Our indicator 
for air quality (SO2) never displayed significant coefficients, which may be due to the fact that two 
opposing effects may be at play: while bad air quality may encourage governments to adopt policies that 
help to reduce air pollution, good air quality may be an indicator of an environmentally-friendly 
government that is more inclined to support RE policy. 
 
In terms of natural resources, we find significant positive influence of wind resources on target adoption, 
and biomass and hydro resources on tariff adoption (all as expected), while we cannot observe similar 
effects for all the other combinations analyzed. In addition, hydrological resources seem to have the 
opposite impact than expected on the adoption of targets. We may explain this negative influence in two 
                                                     
77 As alternative measure for fit of the models, the Pseudo-R2 as displayed by STATA lies at 30% in case of targets, tariffs and 
incentives, while it is only at 17% in case of framework policies (see Table 17). However, the Pseudo-R2 is less suitable for model 
comparison because it does not take into account parsimony as adjusted-R2 and AIC/BIC, and because for logistic regressions, 
there is not a generally accepted R2 as for OLS, so it should only be interpreted with caution (IDRE, 2012). 
78 While the Pseudo-R2 and log-likelihood show more explanatory power for domestic determinants in case of all models, this 
may be partly because of more domestic variables in the model. If we look at AIC and BIC values that both incorporate fit and 
parsimony of models, the AIC always favors the domestic model, while generally BIC favors international model except for the 
case of targets (see Annex 10.3.4). 
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ways: First, renewable targets often exclude large-scale hydro power (REN21, 2011b). Second, countries 
with larger hydrological resources will already have a substantial share of RE. For them, setting a higher 
target is not very attractive as an increase in the share of RE will look tiny in public, while being 
financially costly. Two examples within Europe are the cases of Norway and Switzerland, which – 
despite being two of the wealthiest nations – have not adopted targets for the overall share for renewable 
electricity so far (REN21, 2011b). 
 
In summary, we have some evidence that energy security concerns are driving decisions to support RE 
deployment in developing countries but we do not have evidence that air pollution has an effect, and 
having natural potential for producing RE does only in specific cases move developing country 
governments to adopt supportive policies.  
 
Socio-economic factors 
 
GDP per capita has a significant effect on the adoption of FITs and other financial incentives79 but not 
for other policies, as predicted. There seems to be a direct effect of GDP on RE policy adoption, as the 
coefficient remains significant if we control for electricity consumption that accounts for the indirect 
effect80. We also expected to find a positive effect of education on RE policy adoption, but the positive 
coefficient is not significant in any of our full models so we excluded it from the concise ones. As our 
education variable is highly correlated with GDP per capita (see Annex 10.3.5), such a weak effect is not 
surprising. In contrast, the population, as measure for the size of a country has constantly positive 
influence on policy adoption. 
  
Institutional factors 
 
Our indicator for democracy is a significant predictor for adoption of feed-in tariffs and financial 
incentives – although in the parsimonious tariff model the coefficient is not significant –, while the 
coefficient is also positive but not significant in the other models. When replacing our indicator Polity IV 
with other democracy indicators – Freedom House and Bertelsmann Democracy Status –, we obtain 
similar results81 and can, therefore, be quite confident that, in the case of RE financial incentives, 
Congleton’s (1992) theory that democracies are more likely to adopt environmental regulation holds. 
 
Veto players have no significant impact, although the expected negative coefficient is almost significant 
at the 10% level in case of financial incentives. A negative impact on financial incentives seems generally 
most reasonable among chosen policies as financial incentives involve more financial resources than 
targets and framework policies, so opposition from major political players is more likely, while in case of 
FITs, important veto players may be in favor (see Jacobsson and Lauber, 2006 for the case of Germany). 
 
Interest groups and preferences 
 
All the variables related to the potential effect of interest groups (civil society organizations, 
environmental NGOs) and environmental preferences (natural protected areas, green party existence) do 
not seem to have a significant effect on RE policy adoption, except for the adoption of framework 
policies, on which Green party representation in the parliament had a significant impact (see Annex 
10.3.7). One limitation of this finding is that our indicators for interest groups and environmental 
                                                     
79 The impact of income on incentives becomes insignificant in the full model. 
80 Electricity consumption has only an effect on RE policy adoption if GDP per capita is left out. Nevertheless, given the high 
correlation between the two variables, we cannot rule out that there is an indirect effect of GDP via electricity consumption. 
81 When using the Freedom House “Political rights” indicator, democracy even had a significant impact on target adoption. 
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preferences are sub-optimal; membership of environmental NGOs and environmental voting behavior 
of national parliaments would be preferable indicators but data is not available. Therefore, we cannot 
rule out that interest groups and governmental preferences are influential; we can just conclude that most 
indicators we used have no significant influence.  
 
 
6.6.2 International determinants, including international climate finance 
 
When turning to the international diffusion mechanisms, we never find a significant impact of policy 
adoption by neighbors, trade bloc partners, colonizing countries and countries with the same language82. 
In contrast, adoption by the former colonizer promotes targets (see Annex 10.3.6)83, and adoption by 
countries that had the same colonizer has a significant impact on adoption of FITs, incentives and 
framework policies. Having the same colonial past may imply a similar regulatory culture that promotes 
policy diffusion, in the same way as the Walker regions (US states with similar regulatory history), see 
Matisoff and Edwards (2012). Membership to the EU proved to be an influential factor for adoption of 
targets and financial incentives. This underlines the institutional role of the EU as early mover in policies 
to promote RE and reduce greenhouse gases, and is in line with the policy convergence theories 
(Holzinger et al., 2008) and also with the findings by Schmitt et al. (2012) on air quality regulation. 
 
With respect to the vertical channels of policy diffusion, the registration of CDM projects was irrelevant 
for all policies in the standard model except for target adoption, while the influence was also significant 
at the 10% level for framework policies if other lags for the CDM were used (see Annex 10.3.7). The 
potential influence on target setting and framework policies may relate to the positive signal of CDM 
project registration on the feasibility of more ambitious RE targets, while the clearly non-significant 
influence on financial incentives and tariffs may relate to the fear of developing countries that, after 
adoption of new incentive policies, their RE projects are not considered as “additional” to the BAU 
scenario any more, which would make them ineligible for CDM funding (Winkler, 2004). While such a 
perverse incentive of the CDM on policy adoption should not exist anymore after a 2004 decision of the 
CDM EB that domestic climate-friendly policies adopted after 2001 should not be considered when 
establishing the baseline of CDM projects (CDM EB, 2004), substantial uncertainty on the practical 
implementation of the new decision has remained, with recent heated debates in the case of wind and 
hydro power projects in China (He and Morse, 2010; Lewis, 2010).  
 
In the end, the non-significant influence of CDM on adoption of FITs and other financial incentives, 
which are among the main RE promotion policies (Mendonça, 2007; REN21, 2011b), strengthens the 
finding in the last chapter that the CDM has limited influence on RE diffusion. If we had found a 
significant influence of the CDM on these RE policies, then the CDM would have an indirect influence 
on RE diffusion via policies. Therefore, the CDM EB’s decision of not taking into account the effect of 
climate-friendly policies (e.g. RE policies) when evaluating CDM projects may have led to the 
registration of many projects where the CDM had neither a direct influence nor an indirect one via 
policies. 
 
Funding from the Global Environment Facility seems to have, in the short term (first three years after 
GEF funding approval), a positive influence on adoption of framework policies, while the impact was 
                                                     
82 Adoption by these peers also did not have an influence when we estimated separate models with only one peer adoption 
variable (language, colony, trade bloc or neighbor) included, see Annex 10.3.6. The only exception was incentive adoption that 
was significantly influenced by neighbor country adoption. Therefore, neighbors were included in the parsimonious model. 
83 The colonizer variable was not included in Table 1 (due to missing data on framework policy adoption by colonizers); the 
exclusion does not affect whether other variables are significant at the 10% level or not. 
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not significant for other policies. This result is consistent with the GEF’s focus on capacity building and 
support for developing national RE strategies, roadmaps and standards, while direct financing is rather 
channelled through private intermediaries and not government policies (GEF, 2011c). However, we have 
to be cautious about concluding that GEF has been successful in driving framework policies in the short 
term as the GEF coefficient is quite sensitive to the model specification (e.g. the coefficient is not 
significant in the full model, see Annex 10.3.3).  In the long term, we find a significant effect of GEF 
funding on targets and tariffs six years after funding approval (see Annex 10.3.5), which is consistent 
with the long-term capacity building approach under the GEF. 
 
Development assistance (ODA) does not significantly increase the probability of policy adoption – only 
in case of FITs we find an influence that is almost significant at the 10% level. Given these unclear 
results on tariffs, more in-depth analysis may be needed to evaluate recent efforts of industrialized 
countries to replicate their successful tariff policies in developing countries, see e.g. GIZ (2012b, 2012a) 
for the case of German capacity building for FITs in South Africa and China. 
 
 
Table 17: Logit estimations of the probability of policy adoption (parsimonious models)  
  Targets      Feed-in-tariffs Financial incentives Framework policies
 dy/dx SE  dy/dx SE dy/dx SE dy/dx SE  
Domestic energy+ -0.001 (0.001)  -0.003 (0.001) ** -0.002 (0.001) -0.004 (0.004)  
GDP per capita 0.001 (0.002)  0.009 (0.004) ** 0.009 (0.004) ** 0.011 (0.008)  
GDP growth -0.041 (0.053)  0.006 (0.058) 0.055 (0.046) -0.211 (0.152)  
Population+  0.009 (0.002) *** 0.005 (0.002) ** 0.008 (0.003) *** 0.018 (0.005) ***
Hydro resources -0.005 (0.002) ** 0.004 (0.002) * 0.002 (0.002) -0.005 (0.004)  
Wind resources 0.000 (0.000) ** 0.000 (0.004) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000)  
Solar resources -0.001 (0.003)  -0.005 (0.004) 0.005 (0.004) -0.012 (0.010)  
Geothermal res. -0.000 (0.000)  -0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) -0.000 (0.001)  
Biomass res. -0.002 (0.003)  0.004 (0.002) * 0.001 (0.002) 0.000 (0.007)  
Democracy 0.001 (0.000)  0.001 (0.001) * 0.001 (0.000) * 0.002 (0.001)  
Veto players 0.002 (0.001)  -0.001 (0.002) -0.002 (0.001) -0.001 (0.004)  
EU member 0.032 (0.016) ** 0.001 (0.012) 0.027 (0.014) ** -0.025 (0.049)  
CEFTA 0.016 (0.009)  0.007 (0.009) 0.016 (0.009) * 0.030 (0.028)  
Neighbours 0.011 (0.010)  -0.012 (0.011) 0.012 (0.009) 0.021 (0.023)  
Colony -0.003 (0.021)  0.050 (0.026) * 0.084 (0.039) ** 0.073 (0.040) *
CDM projects 0.008 (0.004) * -0.004 (0.004) 0.003 (0.004) 0.025 (0.018)  
GEF funding 0.006 (0.005)  0.007 (0.005) 0.004 (0.004) 0.034 (0.018) *
Development aid -0.004 (0.004)  0.009 (0.006) 0.007 (0.006) 0.009 (0.015)
Year FE Yes   Yes Yes Yes  
N 1119   935 938 861  
Years 12   10 10 12  
log likelihood -140.0   -112.1 -110.5 -185.9  
AIC 339.9   280.2 277.0 431.9  
BIC 490.5  415.8 412.6 574.6  
Pseudo-R2 0.28  0.25 0.29 0.17  
dy/dx: Marginal effects at mean values of all other independent variables 
SE: standard error 
Significance levels: * = p-value of coefficient <0.1, ** = p-value <0.05, *** = p-value <0.01  
+ For these variables the 2009 values have been extrapolated. 
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Our results are similar if we exclude economies in transition and focus on developing countries only. 
However, some coefficients become insignificant due to the smaller sample size (e.g. hydro has no 
impact on tariffs, and democracy no impact on incentives and tariffs any more) and the omission of EU 
countries. 
 
The results remain similar if year fixed effects are excluded, and the oil price and the year are included as 
control variables, assuming a linearly increasing or decreasing baseline hazard over time84. 
 
 
6.7 Conclusions 
 
In this article, we attempted to disentangle the drivers of the adoption of RE support policies in 
developing countries, considering both domestic factors and international diffusion mechanisms and 
four different types of RE policies.  
 
Among domestic determinants, we distinguished between environmental, socio-economic, institutional 
and political-economic factors. Among international diffusion mechanisms, we distinguished between 
horizontal diffusion (emulation and competition among peers) and vertical diffusion (learning processes 
and incentives from international organizations and powerful nations). In general, we find support for 
both domestic and international drivers of policy adoption. 
 
Among domestic factors, environmental factors and interest groups are only partly relevant for RE 
policy adoption. We find that the share of energy produced domestically, as a proxy for energy security, 
decreases the probability of promoting RE through FITs and financial incentives, while the level of 
environmental quality does not have a significant influence. Furthermore, we find some evidence that 
having natural hydrological potential decreases the probability of adopting RE targets, which often 
exclude traditional hydro power, while other renewable resources can increase the probability of policy 
adoption. Our indicators of interest groups – Greenpeace memberships, number of environmental 
NGOs, and other civil society groups – have no influence on RE policy adoption but given that these 
indicators are quite imperfect, further examinations may be needed. In case of indicators for 
environmental preferences, membership of green parties in parliaments has a significant influence on 
framework policy adoption. 
 
In contrast to environmental factors, preferences and interest groups, we have strong evidence that 
socio-economic and institutional characteristics affect the probability of policy adoption. Countries with 
a higher income85 and a larger population have a higher probability of adopting policies that support the 
deployment of RE, while a more democratic system promotes the adoption of financial incentives and 
FITs.  
 
The finding that renewable energies are not primarily promoted because of environmental 
considerations, such as climate change, but more by socio-economic influences support the ideas of 
Winkler et al. (2007; 2008) and Sathaye et al. (2011), who argue that climate and RE policies should be 
integrated into national development  policies and plans rather than pursued separately. 
                                                     
84 We find a significant impact of the year variable but not of the oil price. This result is, however, not very robust as the 
correlation between the year and the oil price is very high (almost 0.9). When excluding the time variable, the coefficient on the oil 
price becomes positive and significant.  
85 It has to be noted that the positive effect of high income on RE policy adoption may be partly due to an indirect effect via 
higher energy demand. A higher energy demand will make adoption of RE policies more likely and, therefore, the question of 
“energy security” is probably more important than just measured by the influence of the share of domestically produced energy. 
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In terms of international policy diffusion, we have found little evidence for horizontal and vertical 
diffusion mechanisms. Our models estimate that only adoption by peers that had the same colonizer 
increases the likelihood of policy adoption, while adoption of a policy by neighbors, regional partners 
and countries with the same language has no influence. These results match with the findings from the 
US (Matisoff and Edwards, 2012), where adoption by neighbor states had no impact on RE policy 
adoption, while states with similar regulatory histories (“Walker regions”) influence each other. Such 
diffusion among peers with similar colonial history may be related to established institutions or fora that 
that enable exchange, such as the Commonwealth (Leichter, 1983; Stone, 2000), or similar administrative 
and political systems (Gregg and Banks, 1965; Weiner, 1987; Weber et al., 2009) that may simplify 
emulation and learning.  Case studies may help to understand these diffusion mechanisms in detail. 
Vertical channels of policy diffusion are also relevant. Membership to the EU increases adoption of RE 
policies. 
 
We also find some evidence of influence by international climate finance: funding from the Global 
Environment Facility has, in the short term, positive effects on the adoption of framework policies but 
not of more specific support policies, while in the long-term (6 years after funding approval), a 
significant impact on targets and tariffs can be observed. These findings are in line with the primary role 
of the GEF as capacity building organization promoting long-term learning processes, while it lacks funding 
for substantial short-term incentives. Having CDM support for RE increases the adoption of RE targets 
and policy frameworks according to some model specifications, while it does clearly not affect the 
probability of adopting financial incentives and FITs. This is an important finding, given that CDM has 
also been discussed as disincentive for RE policy adoption (Winkler, 2004; He and Morse, 2010). The result 
also implies that further research may be needed on how the CDM may better promote national policies 
and whether international carbon market mechanisms at the sectoral or national level (Schmidt et al., 
2008; Schneider and Cames, 2009) may be better suited in this regard. 
 
The study has some limitations that show potential further areas of research. One limitation is that the 
distinction between domestic and international drivers is rather simplistic. In reality, domestic and 
international determinants may interact, e.g. the share of domestic energy is also dependent on the price 
and availability of international energy sources and the impact of international climate funding will 
depend on national institutions. Therefore, more qualitative work on the interplay between domestic and 
international actors and institutions may provide further insights. Such qualitative studies may also 
explore whether the effects of the EU and international climate finance rather relates to learning and 
emulation or to coercion and incentives. 
 
Second, Walker’s (1969) definition of first-time adoption of a policy within a country neglects the multi-
step policy process, so further research may analyze the processes of adapting policies to the national 
context and of tightening or relaxing policies after first-time adoption (see Schmitt et al., 2012). 
Furthermore, it may be fruitful to use event history models also for the study of other climate policies in 
developing countries, such as climate change adaptation strategies and generic policies pledged under 
recent climate agreements. 
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7 Focusing on private finance mobilization – how does it influence the (cost-)effecti-
veness of climate finance in reducing greenhouse gases? 
 
 
Abstract 
 
In order to achieve the commitment to mobilize USD 100 billion to assist developing countries in coping 
with climate change by 2020, Northern governments call for increasing the mobilization of private 
finance. This study analyzes whether directing public finance towards projects mobilizing private finance 
is a cost-effective strategy to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. In our theoretical analysis, we 
conclude that a focus on projects that mobilize most private finance will lower (cost-) effectiveness, if 
governments are well informed about (cost-)effectiveness of projects in reducing GHG emissions and 
already select the most (cost-)effective options.  However, selection of private-finance-intensive projects 
may increase (cost-)effectiveness in case of non-informed policy-makers that are not able to select the 
most (cost-)effective projects. This thesis is confirmed by our empirical analysis of more than 300 
projects in developing countries that are supported by climate finance: the projects with most private 
finance involved are different from those with the highest cost-effectiveness in reducing GHG emissions 
but there is a small positive correlation. In general, policy makers have to be cautious when subsidizing 
projects that claim to mobilize substantial private finance as high private finance numbers are a signal 
that projects may have happened without public support as well.  
 
 
Keywords: Climate policy, developing countries, private finance, mitigation, cost-effectiveness 
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7.1 Introduction 
 
In recent climate agreements (Copenhagen 2009, Cancun 2010), industrialized countries pledged to 
mobilize USD 100 billion of public and private resources for climate change mitigation and adaptation in 
developing countries. Politicians from industrialized countries request that the main part of the USD 100 
billion should come from private sector sources. For example, both the EU (2011) and G20 (2011) have 
called for improving the mobilization (“leverage”) of private finance. Similar calls can be found in studies 
written by funding institutions (Assmann et al., 2011; World Bank Group et al., 2011) and the grey 
literature (LSE, 2009; Ward, 2010; Brown and Jacobs, 2011). Even the CDM as climate policy instrument 
that is actually clearly focusing on GHG reductions, now highlights as first benefit the “USD 215.4 
billion investment in CDM projects spurred by end of 2012” (UNFCCC, 2012). It seems that mobilizing 
private finance and investment has in a way become a climate policy objective in itself. 
 
The academic literature has not yet studied the implications of a focus on mobilizing private finance in 
climate policy. While scholars generally agree that private finance is needed given its substantial share in 
overall investment capital (Lile et al., 1998; Zhang and Maruyama, 2001; Schmidt et al., 2008; Brinkman, 
2009; Bowen, 2011; Olbrisch et al., 2011), the impact of mobilizing private finance on cost-effectiveness 
and effectiveness of climate policy has not yet been studied. This chapter addresses this literature gap on 
cost-effectiveness and effectiveness implications of private finance mobilization in climate policy.  
 
Is there a theoretical argument why mobilizing private finance could improve cost-effectiveness and 
effectiveness of climate policy? One may suppose that private sector finance improves cost-effectiveness 
because implementation of public policy programs is in most cases found to be more cost-effective when 
the private sector is involved (Dunkerley, 1995; Estache, 2001; Mueller, 2003; Pattillo, 2006; Hodge and 
Greve, 2007). However, the calls in climate policy do not refer to private implementation but to private 
financing. In principle, a project may well be financed by the public sector and then implemented by the 
private sector – so these are different issues. Furthermore, the literature only finds a higher cost-
effectiveness of the private sector when implementing given (or similar) projects. In practice, however, 
private finance might be targeting a different basket of projects. The targeting of different projects may have 
an effect on GHG emission reductions, which may go in the reverse direction. 
 
Is there thus a theoretical argument why mobilizing private finance could in fact decrease cost-
effectiveness and effectiveness of climate policy? Introducing mobilization of private finance as a new 
focus could create trade-offs for policy makers between the primary policy focus (maximizing GHG 
mitigation) and the secondary focus (mobilization of private finance). Such trade-offs could exist because 
the private sector has other priorities (e.g. profits, public relations) than climate change mitigation when 
investing in climate change programs86. Such other priorities will still exist if companies receive direct 
payments for GHG mitigation (e.g. in the carbon market), as they also receive other revenues than the 
ones for GHG mitigation, e.g. payments for electricity production or waste treatment. 
 
Summing up, there are indeed theoretical reasons to assume that introducing the new focus of mobilizing 
private finance may rather decrease cost-effectiveness if climate policy makers are well informed, and – under 
the assumption that the private sector does not cover any mitigation costs – also reduce effectiveness of 
climate policy in mitigating climate change. To our knowledge, no study has analyzed this question so far, 
neither theoretically nor empirically. 
 
                                                     
86 While also the public sector may have other priorities than public policy goals such as greenhouse gas emission reductions (e.g. 
being re-elected in case of politicians), this would not replace the trade-off between private finance mobilization and GHG 
reductions but add another trade-off for policy makers: the one between own interests and public policy goals.  
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This study will address this research gap by studying the case of international funding for climate change 
mitigation in developing countries, to which the call for mobilizing private finance mainly corresponds. 
We start off by defining the key terms (cost-effectiveness and private finance), followed by a detailed 
theoretical analysis under two situations (policy makers well and less informed about cost-effectiveness 
of projects in reducing GHG emissions), and an empirical application on 300 real world projects. We 
conclude that selecting climate change mitigation projects according to mobilization of private finance 
will decrease cost-effectiveness in case of informed governments, while it may improve it in the case of 
non-informed government. We finally discuss the results, including the implications for effectiveness, 
and explore different explanations why the public sector calls for private finance mobilization, even when 
it may result in less cost-effective and effective results. One of the most convincing explanations seems 
to be that policy makers have self-interests in mobilizing private finance, as they have to reach the USD 
100 billion goal. 
 
 
7.2 Theoretical analysis 
 
For the theoretical analysis, clear definitions of the main terms (“cost-effectiveness” and “private 
finance”) are required. Cost-effectiveness of international climate finance is defined in the same way as 
lined out in the introduction: the amount of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions reduced per dollar of 
economic costs. Economic costs are more clearly defined here as abatement costs87, so investment and 
operation costs minus the non-climate revenues of low-carbon interventions. For this chapter, we need 
the additional clarification that costs both encompass public and private costs, which is the standard 
definition of costs as applied by economists (see e.g. Mankiw, 2001).  
 
Private finance can be defined in two ways (see Figure 19). The first definition of private finance is 
“private investments” or finance where the owner expects returns, a definition used in most calls for 
mobilization of private finance (see e.g. Assmann et al., 2011; EU, 2011). The second definition is “net 
private abatement spending”, which we define here as “private investment and operation costs of a 
project minus non-climate revenues (e.g. selling of electricity) and climate revenues (e.g. public grants, 
grant-equivalence of concessional loans, tax breaks and revenues from the carbon market)”. This second 
type, private abatement spending, includes private donations for climate change mitigation and 
investments where the investor is willing to accept a lower overall economic return because of the 
climate change mitigation benefits. The investor might take such choices because they can be indirectly 
beneficial for his image or because he personally values the environmental benefit (or both). However, 
this will certainly not be the general rule. 
 
 
 
  
                                                     
87 “Abatement costs” are understood here as the absolute finance spent for abatement (USD), while in the literature the term 
“abatement costs” is also used for the finance spent per unit of abatement (USD per tCO2) 
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Figure 19: Private funding understood as private investment and private abatement spending  
 
  Private investments 
 
            
Costs  
 
Revenues             Private abatement spending 
 
 
Abatement costs (public,  
carbon market and private) 
 
For making figures comparable, all cost and revenue values are discounted to reflect values at the time of investment. 
 
           
What is missing in Figure 19 (for simplicity) is that some of the investment costs may also be provided 
by publicly-owned companies expecting the same profits as private companies. Later in the empirical 
analysis, we will include public sector investments as control variable. 
 
In the following, we analyze the decision-making process by a public institution (e.g. an international 
organization such as the GEF, or a national government agency), who has to decide how to spend a given 
budget for international climate change mitigation programs, assuming that there is a given basket of 
projects with fixed project features (e.g. volume of private finance, GHG mitigation, and costs). The 
analysis is split into two situations; in the first situation the government is well-informed about GHG 
mitigation (chapter 7.2.1), in the sense that it knows the programs that reduce GHG emissions most 
cost-effectively. In the second situation it is not well informed (chapter 7.2.2), in the sense that it does 
not know the cost-effectiveness of projects in mitigating climate change. In both situations, we assume 
that the government will try to achieve its public policy goals, no matter whether it is cost-effective GHG 
mitigation or private finance mobilization; if public institutions were putting more effort in one of these 
goals, our comparative analysis would not be possible.  
 
 
7.2.1 Public institution is informed about cost-effectiveness in reducing GHG emissions 
 
We look at scenarios with different policy goals. In scenario 1 the public institution has the goal of 
maximizing the cost-effectiveness in reducing GHG emissions. For this purpose it allocates funding, 
among a pre-defined basket of projects, to the projects reducing GHG emissions most cost-effectively. 
Under this scenario, private sector finance may be mobilized or not; the government does not care, it is 
just concerned about cost-effectiveness. In scenarios 2a and 2b, the public institution has a new goal: 
mobilizing private finance. Under scenario 2a, the public institution maximizes private sector finance 
and, by chance, the selected projects equal the projects reducing GHG emissions most cost-effectively. 
This scenario could apply if private sector profits and cost-effectiveness in reducing GHG emissions are 
perfectly correlated, or in a situation where the private sector is altruistic and prioritizes projects 
according to cost-effectiveness in reducing GHG emissions. Under scenario 2b, private sector finance is 
maximized but the projects selected are not the ones with most GHG emission reductions per USD. 
What happens to cost-effectiveness with if we move from scenario 1 (Reducing GHG emissions as 
policy goal) to scenarios 2a and 2b (mobilizing private finance as policy goal)? The impact depends on 
whether we see private finance as private investment or private abatement spending.  
 
 Non-climate revenues Climate revenues (pu-
blic & carbon market)
Private investment costs Private operation costs
Effectiveness of international climate finance    Chapter 7: Mobilizing private finance 
 
 
123 
We first look at the case when private finance is defined as private abatement spending (Table 18). In 
scenario 1, the public institution chooses the projects maximizing GHG reduction per USD of 
abatement costs. If necessary, it will also include projects where the private sector takes over abatement 
costs ሺܽܿ௣௥௜௩ሻ but it does not care about private abatement costs on its own. If scenario 2a applies, i.e. 
GHG emission reductions stay at the same level when the public institution switches from a cost-
effectiveness to a private finance goal, then overall cost-effectiveness will stay equal as the public 
institution selects the same projects as in scenario 1, so both GHG emission reductions and abatement 
costs stay equal. In scenario 2b, where the new goal of maximizing private finance leads to less cost-
effective projects, we see an increase in abatement spending as additional private sector abatement 
spending is mobilized. The mitigation of GHG can decrease as GHG emission reductions are lowered 
due to the shift to less cost-effective projects but they can also increase as more finance is spent for 
abatement, enabling more projects to be financed88. However, as we have assumed that already the most 
cost-effective projects have been selected in scenario 1, the net effect on cost-effectiveness in mitigating 
climate change is by definition negative.   
 
 
Table 18: Cost-effectiveness when selection programs according to mobilized net private abatement spending 
 Policy goal  
 
Policy outcome Abatement costs 
(=Abatement 
spending) 
Effectiveness Cost-effectiveness 
 
Scenario 1   Maximizing cost-
effectiveness  
 
Cost-effective-
ness maximized ܽܿ௣௨௕ ൅ aܿ௣௥௜௩ ܩܪܩ ܩܪܩaܿ௣௨௕ ൅ aܿ௣௥௜௩  
Scenario 2a Mobilizing private 
finance  
 
Cost-effective-
ness maximized ܽܿ௣௨௕ ൅ aܿ௣௥௜௩ ܩܪܩ ܩܪܩܽܿ௣௨௕ ൅ aܿ௣௥௜௩
Scenario 2b  Mobilizing private 
finance  
Cost-effective-
ness not maxim.
 
ܽܿ௣௨௕ ൅ aܿ௣௥௜௩ ൅ aܿ௣௥௜௩ା
 
ܩܪܩേ ܩܪܩ ܩܪܩേ ܩܪܩܽܿ௣௨௕ ൅ aܿ௣௥௜௩ ൅ aܿ௣௥௜௩ା
	
ቆ൏ ܩܪܩܽܿ௣௨௕ ൅ aܿ௣௥௜௩ቇ
	
ac = abatement costs; pub = public; priv = private; priv+= additional private costs in Scenario 2b; GHG = GHG emission reductions; 
GHG = Change in GHG mitigation in Scenario 2b 	
 
 
 
In case of mobilization of investment costs (see Table 19) the public institution will maximize the GHG 
mitigation per USD of abatement costs in scenario 1. In scenario 2a, overall cost-effectiveness and 
effectiveness will stay equal as the public institution selects the same projects as in scenario 1. In scenario 
2b, effectiveness in reducing GHG is lowered due to the shift to less cost-effective projects, while 
abatement spending is not increased, as the additional private finance mobilized only consists of 
investment costs and not abatement spending. 
 
 
  
                                                     
88 This potential increase in cost-effectiveness actually assumes that the government does not achieve the maximization of GHG 
reductions in scenario 1, as it simply selects the most cost-effective projects and neglects some of the more costly projects where 
the private sector takes over abatement costs.  
Effectiveness of international climate finance    Chapter 7: Mobilizing private finance 
 
 
124 
Table 19: Cost-effectiveness when selection programs according to mobilized private investment  
 Policy goal  
 
Policy outcome Abatement costs 
(=Abatement 
spending) 
Effectiveness Cost-effectiveness 
 
Scenario 1   Maximizing cost-
effectiveness  
 
Cost-effective-
ness maximized ܽܿ௣௨௕ ൅ aܿ௣௥௜௩ ܩܪܩ ܩܪܩaܿ௣௨௕ ൅ aܿ௣௥௜௩  
Scenario 2a Mobilizing private 
finance  
 
Cost-effective-
ness maximized ܽܿ௣௨௕ ൅ aܿ௣௥௜௩ ܩܪܩ ܩܪܩܽܿ௣௨௕ ൅ aܿ௣௥௜௩
Scenario 2b  Mobilizing private 
finance  
Cost-effective-
ness not maxim.
ܽܿ௣௨௕ ൅ aܿ௣௥௜௩  ܩܪܩെ ܩܪܩ 
1.  ܩܪܩെ ܩܪܩ
ܽܿ௣௨௕ ൅ aܿ௣௥௜௩  
 
	ቆ൏ ܩܪܩܽܿ௣௨௕ ൅ aܿ௣௥௜௩ ቇ 
 
ac = abatement costs; pub = public; priv = private; GHG = GHG mitigation, GHG = Change in GHG mitigation in Scenario 2b 
(GHG mitigation will always decrease) 
 
 
The analysis has shown that, under a situation of a well-informed public institution, mobilization of 
private finance as new policy goal will either mean equal cost-effectiveness (scenario 2a) or decreased 
cost-effectiveness (scenario 2b). This conclusion is the same for mobilizing private abatement spending 
(Table 17) and profit-oriented private investments (Table 18).  
 
For effectiveness in reducing GHG emissions, mobilizing private finance either implies equal 
effectiveness (scenario 2a), decreased effectiveness (scenario 2b, when profit-oriented private investment 
is mobilized) or either an increase or decrease in effectiveness (scenario 2b, when private abatement 
spending is mobilized). 
 
Now, how reasonable is scenario 2a, where cost-effectiveness is still maximized after switching to the 
goal of private finance mobilization, compared to scenario 2b, where cost-effectiveness is not any more 
maximized? In case of mobilizing private abatement spending, scenario 2a will only occur if the most cost-
effective projects are the same as the projects that maximize private abatement spending. This is, 
however, quite unlikely as private sector players who are willing to take over abatement costs (e.g. NGOs 
or companies caring about climate change) will often but not always select the most cost-effective 
options; in some cases, they will pay for GHG abatement in projects within their own industry, or in 
technologies where they want to enter into the market (e.g. solar energy), which will not necessarily be 
the most cost-effective programs. In case of mobilizing private investment, scenario 2a is only occurring in 
the improbable case that project selection according to the level of private investment (Scenario 2) is the 
same as selection according to cost-effectiveness in mitigating GHG emissions (Scenario 1). There are 
many reasons why the most cost-effective projects may not be the same as the private investment 
maximizing projects, e.g. non-climate revenues leading to high investment intensities in energy projects 
and public sector control of important production sectors in some developing countries. It thus appears 
that scenario 2b should be much more likely to occur. 
 
We therefore obtain the result that, assuming the public institution is well-informed about GHG 
mitigation, the goal of mobilization of private finance cannot increase cost-effectiveness of climate policy 
compared to the situation where the goal of the public institution is to maximize cost-effectiveness. It is 
even likely that cost-effectiveness decreases as private finance and cost-effectiveness will hardly ever be 
perfectly correlated. Therefore, we hypothesize that under a situation where the public institution is already well 
informed about GHG mitigation, mobilizing private finance will decrease cost-effectiveness (hypothesis 1).    
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The theoretical discussion also reveals that, in case of well-informed public institutions, mobilizing 
private finance can only increase effectiveness in reducing GHG emissions if the mobilized private 
finance covers abatement costs, and if this additional private abatement spending can compensate the 
losses in GHG reduction due to the shift to less cost-effective projects. If the mobilized private 
investment simply consists of private investment, then effectiveness in reducing GHG emissions will 
tend to decrease when private finance is maximized. In the following, we will test the theoretical ideas on 
cost-effectiveness and discuss the implications of our empirical findings on effectiveness at the end of 
the paper. 
 
 
7.2.2 Public institution is not informed about cost-effectiveness in reducing GHG emissions 
 
As we have seen, the new policy goal of mobilizing private finance cannot improve cost-effectiveness in 
a scenario where the public institution is well-informed. The reason is that a well-informed public 
institution will select the most cost-effective projects, so the correlation between his project ranking and 
the cost-effectiveness of projects in reducing GHG emissions is perfect (or 1 if expressed as a correlation 
coefficient). In such a situation, a new selection according to private finance will always reduce cost-
effectiveness as long as private finance and cost-effectiveness do not perfectly correlate (see Figure 20 
left). 
 
The situation is different if a public institution is not informed about cost-effectiveness (see Figure 20 
right). In such a case, the public institution will have to randomly select projects as it has no knowledge 
about projects provide GHG mitigation most cost-effectively, so the expected correlation between his 
selection and cost-effectiveness in reducing GHG emissions is zero. Now, a goal of mobilizing private 
finance may become useful if there is a positive correlation between private finance and GHG 
mitigation89.  
 
Figure 20: Cost-effectiveness impact when shifting policy goal from cost-effectiveness to private finance  
 
 
 
                                                     
89 It is clear that the two situations of fully informed and fully informed public institutions are extreme cases, the reality will be 
somewhere between these situations. 
Cost-effectiveness decreases
both if private finance &
cost-effectiveness are
positively correlated… 
…. and if they are
negatively correlated
Cost-effectiveness increases
if private finance &
cost-effectiveness are
positively correlated
Cost-effectiveness decreases
if private finance &
cost-effectiveness are
negatively correlated
Well-informed government official          Non-informed government official 
Correlation of
allocation with
cost-effec-
tiveness in 
reducing GHG
0
1
-1
0
1
-1
Prior allocation of government official 
Prior allocation of government official 
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Can we expect private finance to be positively correlated with cost-effectiveness in reducing GHG 
emissions? On one hand, there may be a positive correlation as the private sector may more efficiently 
finance projects compared to public funding institutions. Furthermore, if implementation and finance are 
linked, privately financed projects may benefit from efficient implementation by the private sector (see 
literature review of Mueller, 2003). On the other hand, there may be a non-significant correlation as the 
private sector primarily follows profit expectations and will, therefore, have other investment priorities 
than investments leading to more greenhouse gas emission reductions90. As the potentially non-
significant impact is based on different investment priorities, we can assume that, under a scenario where 
public institutions have no information on cost-effectiveness, mobilizing private finance has a positive influence on cost-
effectiveness if similar project types are compared (hypothesis 2).   
 
 
7.3 Empirical analysis of international climate financing 
 
From our theoretical analysis we have derived two main hypotheses. First, if the public institution is 
informed about cost-effectiveness, then funding allocation according to mobilization of private finance 
can be expected to lower cost-effectiveness. Second, if the public institution is not informed then project 
selection according to private finance has a positive influence on cost-effectiveness if similar investment 
projects are compared. 
 
We will test these theoretical hypotheses by carrying out an empirical analysis of more than 300 real-
world climate change mitigation projects supported by international climate finance. The projects stem 
from a sample of projects supported by the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and the Global 
Environment Facility (GEF). The CDM and GEF were selected because of availability of data on GHG 
reduction and private finance in their project documents, the wide range of policy instruments applied, 
and the direct link to the UNFCCC. 
 
At first sight, the use of CDM data for analyzing climate finance allocation by the public sector is 
surprising, as the CDM is mostly referred to as carbon market instrument. However, the analysis of 
CDM data makes sense because of at least three reasons. First, CDM data covers most GHG mitigation 
areas, is of very high quality as it is verified, and most importantly it is publicly available. Second, the 
CDM credit (and therefore CDM funding) allocation is governed by public sector institutions, the CDM 
Executive Board and the UNFCCC COP. These public institutions could theoretically decide to allocate 
CDM credits not according to GHG emission reductions, but according to other goals, such as 
sustainable development or mobilized private investments. Third, public institutions (e.g. the World 
Bank and industrialized country governments) are major buyers of carbon credits, so these public 
institutions could decide to buy only credits from projects that mobilize substantial private investments. 
Summing up, analyzing CDM data is both useful because of the high quality of publicly available data, 
and the role of public institutions in determining to which projects the CDM funding should flow.  
 
We select a sample of 101 GEF-supported and 224 CDM-supported projects. The 101 analyzed GEF-
supported projects have been selected randomly and represent more than half of all projects with 
disbursements until the end of 2008. The sample mean does not significantly differ from the whole 
population in terms of approval year, project size or share of RE projects (95% confidence interval). The 
CDM sample is based on data from Castro (2012) and is considered as representative regarding project 
types as it covers projects from all 21 CDM project types (URC classification) with at least 0.2% of 
                                                     
90 If the government initiates a substantial carbon price (e.g. through a carbon tax or an emission trading scheme), private 
investments would more strongly correlate with CO2 emission reductions in general. However, we do not consider here projects 
that are already profitable because of other government interventions, as these projects do not need further support. 
Effectiveness of international climate finance    Chapter 7: Mobilizing private finance 
 
 
127 
credits expected by 2012. The only major project type excluded is HFC, for which investment data is not 
available in project documents due to confidentiality, and where investment data in the literature (e.g. 
Wara, 2008) are not verified. The sample includes projects from 29 countries, which host 99.8% of all 
CDM-supported projects registered by the end of 2010 (URC, 2011)91. Data for the 224 CDM-supported 
projects is taken from Castro (2012) but non-registered projects and the ones with missing investment 
data are excluded. Castro (2012) actually uses 28 types but we merged the different sub-types of biomass, 
landfill, methane and N2O projects into 4 main project types (biomass, landfill, methane and N2O). 
Furthermore, we updated some information, using the newest project documents from UNFCCC 
(2011f).  
 
The analysis is based on data from both ex-ante project documents and evaluation documents. As 
evaluation documents, we use terminal evaluations in case of the GEF and verified monitoring reports in 
case of the CDM. While we have only evaluation data for 42 GEF and 68 CDM projects, data quality 
may be higher as cost-effectiveness is not only projected but really evaluated. 6 of the 224 CDM projects 
had negative abatement costs and where, therefore, excluded in all steps, as the cost-effectiveness of 
financing these projects is difficult to analyze: if these projects are only undertaken because of additional 
climate change support, the support is very cost-effective; in contrast, if these projects would also be 
undertaken without climate change, then the support is very cost-ineffective as no additional GHG 
emission reductions are generated. We will return to this problem when discussing the results. 
 
The empirical analysis is conducted in two steps. In a first step, correlation coefficients are calculated 
between cost-effectiveness in reducing GHG emissions and mobilizing private finance.  This step will 
help to see whether the correlation is indeed below 1 and, therefore, mobilizing private finance will lead 
to lower cost-effectiveness in case of a well-informed public institution, as we have postulated in the first 
hypothesis. The correlation analysis will also help to see whether mobilizing private finance improves 
cost-effectiveness in case of a non-informed public institution. In a second step we will control for other 
determinants of cost-effectiveness in reducing GHG emissions (see chapter 5), in order to see whether 
there is indeed a positive relationship between private finance and GHG mitigation when we compare 
“similar investment projects”, so focusing on private investment mobilization will improve cost-
effectiveness in case of non-informed public institutions, as postulated under the second hypothesis. 
 
 
7.4 Empirical analysis I:  Correlation of private finance and cost-effectiveness 
 
For the first part of the empirical analysis, we use both Pearson’s correlation coefficient and Spearman’s 
rank-ordered correlation coefficient. Pearsons’ coefficient is the usual coefficient used for continuous 
variables. However, it is quite sensitive to outliers, so we apply also the Spearman’s rank-ordered 
correlation coefficient to check robustness of our results. 
 
 
7.4.1 Operationalization of variables and data 
 
For the correlation analysis, we have to operationalize the two concepts of cost-effectiveness and private 
finance. For cost-effectiveness, we have to operationalize both GHG mitigation and abatement costs.  
 
  
                                                     
91 However, the sample is not fully representative of the countries involved, as some countries are underrepresented (India, 
Brazil), while others (Malaysia and South Korea) are over-represented. 
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GHG mitigation  
 
In case of the CDM, GHG mitigation was accounted for in the first crediting period, so in the first 7 to 
10 years after project start. This is a different operationalization as in chapter 5 where we accounted for 
lifetime of projects, which is not possible here, as technology lifetimes are not available for all 
technologies in the dataset92. In case of the GEF, GHG mitigation was accounted during the different 
lifetime of applied technologies – 5 to 50 years. The GEF operationalization is the same as in chapter 5. 
We refrain from standardization of GHG reduction years as this would distort the results in favor of 
short-term mitigation measures. As CDM crediting period and GEF technology lifetimes are not fully 
comparable and data is of different quality, we will keep CDM and GEF analysis separated. For GHG 
mitigation at the evaluation stage, we use the numbers as contained in terminal evaluation documents 
(source: GEF, 2011a) for GEF, while we multiply the amount of expected GHG emissions reductions of 
CDM projects with the % of credit issuance success until July 2012 for, as reported by URC (2012). 
Because of their rather speculative nature, we excluded GEF estimations for “indirect emission 
reductions” expected from capacity building and policy change. While the quality of CDM data was 
sufficient due to the detailed accounting methodologies applied, the GEF data often had to be 
transformed by assuming the same lifetime per same technology and the same GHG emission factor per 
fuel. Furthermore, all costs from both GEF and CDM were transformed to constant 2009 USD, using 
deflators from the OECD (2010b). 
 
Abatement costs 
 
In the case of the CDM, abatement costs are investment and operation costs minus non-CDM revenue, 
all of which are discounted according to discount rates found in the project documents. In the case of 
the GEF, abatement costs are assumed to be equal to GEF grants as the GEF policy is to only finance 
incremental costs, so the GEF should not pay for non-climate related costs, which are to be covered by 
development or other co-finance.  
 
Private finance 
 
For private finance we use private investment costs, so our first definition of private finance. We do not 
use the second definition of private finance (private abatement spending) here because of two reasons. 
First, we only have data on private investment but not on private abatement spending. Secondly, only 
using one definition can also be justified as our theoretical analysis suggests that maximizing private 
finance will lower cost-effectiveness (compared to the case where a well-informed public institution 
allocates funding according to the projects reducing GHG emissions most cost-effectively), no matter 
which of the two definitions of climate finance we use. For standardization, private investments are 
divided by the amount of climate finance (GEF or CDM payments) needed to mobilize these 
investments. In case of GEF, this amount of climate finance equals GEF grants, while in case of CDM, 
this amount equals abatement costs (and not total CDM payments). By this standardization, the private 
finance variable is equal to the amount of private finance that can be mobilized per unit of public sector 
funding, which is what some recent studies call the “leverage ratio”, which they want to maximize. 
 
As some project investors are publicly owned, we had to separate public and private investment. In case 
of GEF, project documents separate between public and private investment in most cases; in a few cases 
the internet had to be consulted on whether an investor is publicly or privately owned. In case of the 
CDM, the host country project participant was taken as proxy for the investor. Then the public or 
                                                     
92 Using technology lifetimes (and crediting periods in cases where no technology lifetimes were available) instead of crediting 
periods, the results did not differ substantially (same sign and significance of coefficients at 90% confidence level). 
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private ownership of the CDM project participant was identified using information in the project 
documents and on the internet.  
 
If not noted differently, all data – GHG mitigation in tonnes CO2-equivalent, abatement costs in USD 
and private investment costs – were taken from the CDM and GEF project documents available on their 
official websites (GEF, 2011a; UNFCCC, 2011f).   
 
 
7.4.2 Data overview 
 
The summary statistics for the GEF and CDM data we use for the analysis are presented in Table 20. 
The mean cost-effectiveness of GEF and CDM are not comparable here as the mechanisms do not use 
the same project lifetimes, and the depth of GHG calculations is more advanced in case of CDM (see 
chapter 5). For the analysis, standardization of project lifetimes is not needed as the analysis for CDM 
and GEF is conducted separately. 
 
 
Table 20: Summary statistics of project-level data from the GEF and the CDM (main variables) 
Source: online project documents of GEF (GEF, 2011c) and CDM (UNFCCC, 2011f). CDM cost-effectiveness data is from Castro (2010)  
USD = 2009 constant USD, ln = natural logarithm, PD = Project documents, SD = Standard deviation, EV = evaluations 
 
 
 
7.4.3 Correlation results  
 
Table 4 shows the correlation results for the GEF-supported projects. Private investments are 
significantly and positively correlated with the natural logarithm of cost-effectiveness, both in case of the 
Pearson’s product-moment correlation coefficient (Table 21 left) and the Spearman’s rank-ordered pair-
wise correlation coefficient (Table 21 right)93. However, correlations between private investments and 
                                                     
93 The logarithm is taken as this is the value used in the regression results (where a good distribution of the dependent variable is 
advantageous). If pure cost-effectiveness values and not the logarithm are taken, then the coefficients are by definition the same in 
case of the Spearman’s coefficient or similar in case of the Pearson’s coefficient (see annexes 10.4.2 and 10.4.3) 
Variable Description Obs Mean SD Min Max 
GEF       
Cost-effectiveness (PD) tCO2eq reduced/GEF grant in USD, project doc. (PD) 101 0.79 1.90 0.00 14.51
Ln cost-effectiveness (PD) ln of tCO2eq  reduced/GEF grant  in USD, PD 89 -1.70 1.95 -6.75 2.67
Cost-effectiveness (EV) tCO2eq reduced/GEF grant in USD , evaluations (EV) 43 0.92 2.31 0.00 13.26
Ln cost-effectiveness (EV) ln of tCO2eq reduced/GEF grant in USD, EV 40 -2.05 2.55 -8.51 2.58
Private investments Private investments/ GEF grant 101 1.62 2.39 0.00 12.87
     
CDM     
Cost-effectiveness tCO2eq reduced/ abatement costs in USD, PD 224 0.47 0.78 -0.76 4.85
Ln cost-effectiveness ln of tCO2eq reduced/abatement costs in USD, PD 218 -1.64 1.64 -7.31 1.58
Cost-effectiveness (EV) tCO2eq reduced/abatement costs in USD, EV 68 0.32 0.77 0.00 5.90
Ln cost-effectiveness (EV) ln of tCO2eq reduced/abatement costs in USD, EV 68 -2.26 1.75 -7.45 1.78
Private investments Private investments/CDM payments needed to cover 
abatement costs  
224 2.02 3.57 -7.30 17.12
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cost-effectiveness are far from 1. In terms of our hypotheses, hence, this would mean that funding 
allocation according to mobilized private finance would indeed substantially decrease cost-effectiveness 
in mitigating GHG, if the public institution is well informed and would otherwise select the most cost-
effective projects. However, allocation according to private finance may slightly improve cost-
effectiveness if the public institution is non-informed about GHG mitigation, and would, therefore, 
otherwise not know which projects to select.  
 
 
Table 21: Correlation between private investment intensity and cost-effectiveness of GEF-supported projects (PD data) 
 
 
Pearson’s pair-wise
correlation coefficient 
 
Spearman’s rank-ordered pair-wise 
correlation coefficient 
 
Ln cost-effectiveness (PD) 
GEF  
Ln cost-effectiveness (PD) 
GEF 
Private investments 0.20* 0.23** 
N=89  
* = p-value <0.1, ** = p-value <0.05, *** = p-value <0.01  
 
 
 
Also in case of the CDM, there is a positive correlation between private investment intensity and the 
natural logarithm of cost-effectiveness, and the correlation is even highly significant for both the Pearson 
and the Spearman’s rank-ordered coefficient (see Table 22)93. However, as the coefficients are far from 1, 
we would see a decrease in cost-effectiveness when switching from project selection according to climate 
change mitigation to selection according to mobilized private finance, if we assume a well-informed 
public institution. 
 
 
Table 22: Correlation between private investment intensity and cost-effectiveness of CDM-supported projects (PD data) 
 
 
Pearson’s pair-wise
correlation coefficient 
Spearman’s rank-ordered pair-wise 
correlation coefficient 
 
 
Ln cost-effectiveness (PD) 
CDM 
Ln cost-effectiveness (PD) 
CDM 
Private investments 0.20*** 0.19*** 
N=218 
* = p-value <0.1, ** = p-value <0.05, *** = p-value <0.01  
 
 
 
The correlation results from both the CDM and the GEF nurture our theoretical assumptions that 
selecting programs according to private investment intensity will decrease cost-effectiveness of climate 
policy if public institutions are well informed, while it may increase cost-effectiveness if they are not 
informed at all and would select programs randomly in the absence of the private investment indicator. If 
public institutions are partly informed, then private investment intensity as allocation criterion will only 
improve cost-effectiveness if the correlation coefficient of their own project ranking with cost-
effectiveness is lower than the correlation coefficient of private investment intensity with cost-
effectiveness (0.2 in both our CDM and GEF sample). Therefore, only a poorly informed public 
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institution will improve cost-effectiveness of his funding allocation when switching to private finance 
mobilization as allocation criteria.  
 
 
7.5 Empirical analysis II: Controlling for other determinants of cost-effectiveness 
 
The downside of a simple correlation analysis is that the link between private finance and mitigation 
cost-effectiveness may be either overestimated or underestimated because further determinants influence 
cost-effectiveness. In addition, we do not really compare “similar investment projects”, which we need 
for testing the second hypothesis (“in case of a non-informed public institution, private finance has a 
positive influence on cost-effectiveness if similar investment projects are compared”). Therefore, as 
second step, we conduct ordinary least-square regression that analyzes which part of the variation in 
cost-effectiveness of projects can be explained by private investments, after controlling for other 
determinants. Such an analysis will show the average impact of private investments on cost-effectiveness 
when comparing similar projects, and will also enable us to see whether we find better indicators for 
cost-effectiveness than private investments. 
  
 
7.5.1 Determinants of cost-effectiveness according to the literature 
 
For modeling the “similar investment projects”, the features of investment projects that may have an 
influence on cost-effectiveness have to be specified. From the literature we derive that the following 
variables may be relevant determinants of cost-effectiveness: project type, size of the economy, project 
size, time, implementing entity, non-climate public grants and public investments. 
 
Project type: Cost-effectiveness varies a lot between climate change mitigation project types, both in 
theory according to marginal abatement cost studies (Criqui et al., 1999; Klepper and Peterson, 2006; 
Kuik et al., 2009) as well as in practice, see the case of carbon markets (Castro, 2012) and public finance 
(Stadelmann, 2009). Thus, the project type may have a significant influence on cost-effectiveness of 
climate change mitigation projects. 
 
Size of the economy: in case of the GEF where only governments can access funding, larger economies 
can be expected to have higher bureaucratic and economic resources, and can therefore submit more 
elaborated projects. However, larger economies may also be able to afford less cost-effective projects 
because of substantial own resources. 
 
Project size: larger projects may benefit from economies of scale, which are given if an increase in the 
levels of all input factors can lead to more than proportional increases in the levels of outputs produced 
(Panzar and Willig, 1977). Economies of scale are a standard assumption or finding in climate and energy 
policy (Ironmonger et al., 1995; Neij, 1997; Jacobsson and Johnson, 2000; Ryan et al., 2006), while 
examples of diseconomies of scale are rather rare (e.g. Isoard and Soria, 2001).  
 
Timing: it is reasonable that countries and project developers first implement the least cost projects. 
This issue has been discussed as the low-hanging fruit phenomenon in the carbon market (Narain and 
van't Veld, 2008) and the empirical evidence shows that the phenomenon occurs in a limited way 
(Castro, 2012). Yet, cost-effectiveness may also improve over time as learning improves cost-
effectiveness of renewable energies over time (see Junginger et al., 2005; Nemet, 2006).  
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Implementing entities: Given the relevant role of different implementing entities in case of GEF, it 
seems to be warranted to control for the entity that implements GEF projects. 
 
Public grants for non-climate purposes: some climate change projects also receive grants from 
development agencies and developing country governments. Such grants are not considered as part of 
abatement costs, as they have other aims than climate change, e.g. health or energy security. Such grants 
may both enhance cost-effectiveness as synergies between other goals and climate funding can be 
harvested (e.g. in the case of renewable energies that are also contributing to energy independence) and 
project size is increased, but it can also decrease cost-effectiveness as these grants have other goals than 
climate change mitigation.  
 
Public investment: as mentioned above, in many countries public or publicly-owned investors are also 
important for providing equity and debt financing. Furthermore, MDBs provide loans for climate change 
mitigation projects (see e.g. Martinot, 2001), which may influence cost-effectiveness of investments.  
 
To ensure that we measure the influence of private investment intensity on cost-effectiveness, we control 
for all these variables. 
 
 
7.5.2 Operationalization of variables and data 
 
Cost-effectiveness and private finance are operationalized in the same way as in the correlation analysis 
before. We use the natural logarithm of cost-effectiveness in reducing GHG emissions, measured in 
tonnes of CO2-equivalents per USD (lnCO2pUSD), as dependent variable because the logarithmic form 
fits a normal distribution much better than the non-logarithmic version (see Annex 10.4.1). 
Unfortunately, taking the logarithm excludes the 12 GEF projects with zero cost-effectiveness (zero 
GHG impact).  The other determinants identified in the literature are operationalized as follows; 
 
Project type: For the CDM, dummies are created for all project types included in the URC database on 
CDM projects (URC, 2011). For GEF projects (GEF, 2011a), the same project types are used and two 
additional project types – mix of renewable energies and mix of RE and energy efficiency – are added 
because some projects include several technologies. 
 
Size of the economy: We include the total GDP of the host country in the approval year (in constant 
2009 USD) as proxy for the size of the economy, using data from the World Bank (2011). 
 
Size of project: As proxy for project size, we use expected annual carbon credits in the first crediting 
period for CDM projects (URC, 2011) and the grant in USD for GEF projects (GEF, 2011a). As 
expected CDM credits are a proxy for climate revenues, it is comparable to GEF grants. In case of the 
GEF, GHG mitigation would not be a good approximation for the project size as some projects directly 
invest in emission reduction activities while others promote capacity building and have hardly any direct 
GHG impact. 
 
Date of approval: For the CDM, we take the year of registration as proxy for approval time, while in 
the GEF case, the year of CEO acceptance is used, which is in GEF terminology the “CEO 
endorsement” for full size projects and “CEO approval” for medium size projects. These years represent 
the approximate date of the project documents we analyzed. 
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Implementing entity: In case of the GEF, supported projects are implemented by international 
organizations (Heggelund et al., 2005; Mee et al., 2008), in our sample UNDP or the World Bank. 
Therefore, we included a dummy for the World Bank to control for potential differences between public 
implementing entities. Lindholt (2005) argues that the World Bank should be more efficient than UN 
organizations. 
 
Public grants for non-climate purposes: In case of the CDM, we do not control for non-climate 
public grants as the information is not available in project documents. Furthermore, development 
assistance should only play a minor role in the financing of CDM projects due to a UNFCCC (2001) 
decision that public funding for CDM projects should not divert Official Development Assistance and 
OECD (2004) rules that funding for CDM credits cannot be counted as Official Development 
Assistance. In case of the GEF, we control for international grants per USD of GEF grant and national 
grants per USD of GEF grant, using information in project documents (GEF, 2011a). 
 
Public investment: In case of the CDM, public investment intensity is calculated as investment costs of 
projects with a publicly-owned project participant divided by CDM payments needed to cover abatement 
costs. In case of the GEF, investments of national or international publicly-owned institutions are 
divided by GEF grants. Information on costs and ownership is taken from project documents (GEF, 
2011a; UNFCCC, 2011f) and supplemented by internet information in case public or private ownership 
of investors was not visible in project documents. 
 
 
7.5.3 Data overview 
 
We use the same sample of 101 GEF-supported and 242 CDM-supported projects as in the correlation 
analysis before. The summary statistics for the data we use for the regression analysis are presented in 
Table 23 (project type dummies are not shown; for the data on private finance and cost-effectiveness, 
see Table 20).  
 
 
Table 23: Summary statistics of project-level data from the GEF and the CDM (control variables) 
SD = Standard deviation; sources: economy size from World Bank (2011), all other GEF data are extracted from online project documents 
(GEF, 2011a), all other CDM data are extracted from Castro (2010) and complementary data from the project documents (UNFCCC, 2011f)  
 
Variable Description Obs Mean SD Min Max
GEF    
World Bank Dummy (=1 if World Bank  implementing) 101 0.51 0.50 0.00 1.00
Size of the economy GDP of the country in billion 2000 USD  101 265 445 0.46  1908
Size of project GEF grant (million 2009USD)  101 6.66 8.74 0.38 49.80
Date of approval Year of approval, deviation from 1990 101 9.51 3.80 1.00 16.00
International grants International development grants/GEF grant 101 0.39 0.90 0.00 5.15
National grants National development grants/GEF grant 101 0.82 1.38 0.00 9.27
Public investments Public investments (loans) / GEF grant 101 1.23 2.00 0.00 8.84
CDM 
Size of the economy GDP in thousand billion 2007 USD  224 1.70 1.51 0.00 4.08
Size of project Annual credits in the 1st crediting period  224 261.0 970.5 0.17 10017
Date of approval Year of approval, deviation from 2005 224 2.76 1.08 0.00 6.00
Public investments  Public investments/abatement costs  224 2.46 6.94 -7.43 53.07
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To analyze the potential for high multicollinearity, we have calculated Variance Inflation Factors (VIFs). 
VIFs for all our regression are below 2.5, indicating that we have low multicollinearity. As a rule of 
thumb, scholars have proposed that VIFs above 5-10 indicate serious multicollinearity. According to 
O’Brien (2007), even higher VIFs may not discount the results. 
 
 
7.5.4 Regression results for projects supported by the Global Environment Facility 
 
The regression results using data from project documents as dependent variable (see Table 24, left) show 
that the positive impact of private investment on cost-effectiveness is slightly lowered if we control for 
other covariates. This means that the positive influence of private investments on cost-effectiveness can 
be split into two parts. A larger part is due to more efficient financing of similar investment projects 
(which is what we have expected from theory), while a smaller part of the impact is due to selection of 
more efficient project types, which we did not expect from theory. Private investment alone can only 
explain a small part of the variation in cost-effectiveness (R2=0.04). The fit of the model substantially 
improves if we include project type dummies and other covariates (R2=0.50). Particularly the different 
RE types proved to be significant indicators for cost-effectiveness. Other potential determinants 
(development funding, approval year, project size, World Bank) do not have any significant effect.  
 
If we look at the regressions on cost-effectiveness as reported by Terminal Evaluation (TE) documents 
(Table 24, right), private sector investments also remain a significant predictor after controlling for 
further variables. The coefficients on private sector investment are larger than in the project document 
case, and they have a larger decrease (from 0.3 to 0.2) when including additional covariates. Again, the 
decrease in the coefficient means that private investors do not only invest in more cost-effective among 
similar projects, they also select more cost-effective project types. This may be due to the variety of GEF 
projects, which also include projects with mainly capacity building and less investments in concrete 
technologies. Substantial investments in GEF projects may imply concrete technology applications and, 
therefore, more GHG emissions reductions. As with ex-ante project documents, several project types 
have an impact on cost-effectiveness, with RE projects (hydro, solar and mixed) showing a lower cost-
effectiveness than “energy efficiency in households”, the reference project type. Another significant 
predictor is the size of the economy. 
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Table 24: Regressing cost-effectiveness of GEF-supported projects  
Dependent variable Cost-effectiveness 
(logarithm) 
Cost-effectiveness 
(logarithm) 
Cost-effectiveness 
(logarithm) 
Cost-effectiveness 
(logarithm) 
Estimation method OLS OLS OLS OLS 
Data Project document Project document Evaluation data Evaluation data 
Coeff.   SE Coeff.  SE Coeff. SE Coeff. SE 
Private investments 0.16 (0.06) ** 0.14 (0.06) ** 0.33 (0.14) ** 0.20 (0.10) ** 
International grants   -0.02 (0.21)   0.68 (0.60) 
National grants   0.09 (0.11)   0.23 (0.17) 
World Bank   0.43 (0.48)   1.17 (0.79) 
Size of the economy   0.00 (0.00)   0.00 (0.00) ** 
Size of project   -0.00 (0.03)   -0.09 (0.05) * 
Date of approval   -0.02 (0.06)   0.01 (0.11) 
Public investments   -0.09 (0.12)   0.23 (0.36) 
EE industry   0.63 (0.75)   -3.35 (1.72) * 
EE service   -1.00 (0.87)   -0.80 (1.73) 
EE/RE combined   -1.02 (1.04)   -1.18 (1.32) 
EE (Mix)   -1.39 (0.90)   -2.71 (1.38) * 
HFC   0.83 (0.69)    
Methane   -0.91 (0.78)   -1.91 (0.98) * 
Biomass power   -1.62 (1.03)   -1.18 (1.12) 
Geothermal power   -0.98 (0.69)   -3.75 (1.12) *** 
Hydro power   -2.39 (1.10) **   -3.86 (1.85) ** 
Renew. Energy (Mix)   -2.84 (0.70) ***   -3.76 (1.18) *** 
Solar power   -2.80 (0.74) ***   -3.65 (0.91) *** 
Wind power   -2.10 (0.91) **    
Transport   -0.79 (0.68)    
Constant -1.77 (0.249) *** -0.51 (0.90) -2.38 (0.49) *** -1.75 (1.35) 
R2  0.04 0.50 0.12 0.68  
N 89 89 40 40  
F-test (Prob >F) 0.01 . 0.02 . 
Significance levels: * = p-value of coefficient <0.1, ** = p-value <0.05, *** = p-value <0.01  
SE = robust standard-errors 
EE = Energy efficiency 
Coefficients of project dummies express deviations from projects promoting energy efficiency in households (omitted dummy).  
 
 
 
7.5.5 Regression results for projects supported by the Clean Development Mechanism  
 
The CDM regression results for project documents (see Table 25, left) show that private investment 
intensity has again a significantly positive influence on cost-effectiveness. As the coefficient increases 
after controlling for other covariates, we can derive that the positive correlation of private investment 
intensity with cost-effectiveness is not due to the financing of more cost-effective project types but to 
the financing of more cost-effective among projects of the same type. This finding that private 
investments finance the more cost-effective among similar projects is what we expected from hypothesis 
2. The coefficient on private investment is 0.11, which means that cost-effectiveness increases by 
approximately 10% per additional unit of private investment intensity. However, investment intensities 
alone can only explain a small part of the variation in the cost-effectiveness of projects (R2=0.06). Model 
fit substantially improves (R2=0.73) if we include project type dummies and other covariates. Particularly 
the various non-CO2 project types (N2O, SF6, methane avoiding projects) explain a substantial part of 
variation in cost-effectiveness. As expected, projects have become less cost-effective over time.  
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When looking at data from evaluated CDM projects (see Table 25, right) we have similar results than for 
data from project documents, although most coefficients are less significant and some project type 
dummies were omitted due to the smaller sample size. Private investment intensity has again a highly 
significant positive influence on cost-effectiveness, and given that the coefficient is higher when 
controlling for project types, we can derive that private investors do not select the most cost-effective 
project types but the more cost-effective among similar projects. 
 
 
Table 25: Regressing cost-effectiveness of CDM-supported projects  
Dependent variable Cost-effectiveness 
(logarithm) 
Cost-effectiveness 
(logarithm) 
Cost-effectiveness 
(logarithm) 
Cost-effectiveness 
(logarithm) 
Estimation method OLS OLS OLS OLS 
Data Project document Project document Evaluation data Evaluation data 
 Coeff. SE Coeff. SE Coeff.  SE Coeff.  SE 
Private investments 0.09 (0.03) *** 0.11 (0.02) *** 0.11 (0.08) 0.20 (0.08) ** 
Size of the economy   0.00 (0.00) ***   0.00 (0.00) 
Size of project   0.00 (0.00)   0.00 (0.00) 
Date of approval   -0.21 (0.07) ***   -0.34 (0.16) ** 
Public investments   0.06 (0.01) ***   0.04 (0.02) ** 
Cement   0.30 (0.35)   -0.20 (0.79) 
Coal-Bed methane   1.30 (0.29) ***   -0.33 (0.52) 
EE households   1.03 (0.36) ***   1.32 (0.64) ** 
EE industry   -0.34 (0.68)   0.42 (0.44) 
EE own generation   0.50 (0.21) **   -0.11 (0.87) 
EE service   -0.68 (0.29) **   n/a  
EE supply side   0.04 (0.25)   n/a  
Fossil fuel switch   -0.67 (0.00) ***   -0.16 (0.88) 
Fugitive emissions   0.86 (0.62)   n/a  
Geothermal power   0.14 (0.30)   0.69 (0.78) 
Hydro power   -0.49 (0.26) *   0.69 (0.68) 
Landfill gas   1.37 (0.23) ***   1.92 (0.67) *** 
Methane avoidance   1.11 (0.25) ***   1.21 (0.63) * 
N2O destruction   2.82 (0.61) ***   3.58 (0.68) *** 
PFC/SF6 avoidance   2.62 (0.54) ***   3.10 (0.63) *** 
Reforestation   1.53 (0.32) ***   n/a  
Solar power   -3.03 (0.55) ***   -1.64 (1.04) 
Wind power   -1.16 (0.21) ***   -0.46 (0.49) 
Constant  -1.83 (0.00) *** -2.36 (0.31) *** -2.35 (0.26) *** -2.82 (0.84) *** 
R2 0.06 0.73 0.01 0.67 
N 218 218 68 68 
F-test (Prob >F) 0.00 - 0.06 - 
Significance levels: * = p-value of coefficient <0.1, ** = p-value <0.05, *** = p-value <0.01  
SE = robust standard-errors 
EE = Energy efficiency 
Coefficients of project dummies express deviations from project promoting biomass (omitted dummy).   
 
 
 
Summing up, the CDM results confirm the GEF results that private sector investment may help a non-
informed policymaker in choosing GHG reduction projects, but there is clearly a better indicator for 
cost-effectiveness (the project type), so private investment should rather be a secondary funding 
allocation criterion after the most cost-effective project types have been pre-selected. The use of private 
investment as secondary criterion is possible as the coefficient on private investment remains positive 
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and significant after controlling for other determinants, in both the GEF and the CDM case. This result 
is true for both data from project documents and evaluations.  
 
 
7.6 Discussion: Reasons to be cautious about private finance as project selection criteria 
 
Generally, the positive correlation between private finance and cost-effectiveness as well as the 
significant positive impact of private investments on cost-effectiveness in regression models imply that 
projects involving private investment are more cost-effective than projects without mobilizing private 
investments, so private finance could be an interesting project selection criteria for a public institution 
that is non-informed about cost-effectiveness of projects.  
 
However, there are several reasons to be cautious about using private investment intensity as project 
selection criterion. Such reasons are both resulting from our empirical analysis and reasons beyond this 
analysis. 
 
 
7.6.1 Reasons derived from the empirical analysis: low correlation and public investments  
 
One reason we can derive from the empirical analysis is that the correlation between cost-effectiveness 
and private investment is quite low (coefficient around 0.2), so the knowledge of the public institution 
on cost-effectiveness of projects has to be limited in order that private investment intensity as primary 
project selection criteria can help him improving cost-effectiveness compared to allocation according to 
his own knowledge on cost-effectiveness. 
 
The low correlation between private finance and cost-effectiveness is partly related to the fact that most 
of the very cost-effective non-CO2 projects (particularly N2O, methane avoidance but also HFC, which 
was not analyzed in our case) have low investment intensity close to one (see Figure 21). The private 
investment intensity is equal to one if climate finance is the only source of revenue. In such cases, the 
abatement costs are equal to the investment costs, and the investment intensity is one, as it is defined as 
investment costs per abatement costs. Therefore, a public institution has to assure that it does not 
exclude these project types when using private investment intensity as criterion for allocation of funding. 
Once the most cost-effective project types are pre-selected by the public institution, private finance may 
be useful as secondary criterion to select among several projects of the same type given that the 
regressions have shown that the influence of private investment intensity on cost-effectiveness remains 
quite stable when controlling for the project type. Our detailed analysis also shows that the correlation 
between investment intensities and cost-effectiveness substantially increases if we look at RE, energy 
efficiency and non-CO2 projects separately. 
 
Another reason to remain cautious that we can derive from the empirical analysis is the fact that in 
several countries (e.g. China) public investment plays a major role. In our CDM sample, we have found 
that in around 40% of projects, the public sector has at least partial ownership. While our regression 
analysis has shown that publicly-owned projects tend to be less cost-effective, some of the most cost-
effective projects in the sample are still publicly owned. Therefore, public institutions should not blindly 
focus on private investment when supporting projects but also consider public investors in countries 
with largely government-owned companies, such as in China. Still, as we find in most cases higher 
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coefficients of public than private investment intensities, private investors may lead to more cost-
effective results when a real choice between public and private investors is occurring94.  
 
 
Figure 21: Cost-effectiveness and total (public and private) investment intensity of different CDM project types  
 
Source: Stadelmann et al. (2011c)  
 
 
 
7.6.2 Reasons beyond the analysis: support for BAU projects 
 
A further reason why policy-makers have to be cautious when using private investment intensity as 
project selection criteria is that some of the projects we analyzed may be BAU projects, which is not 
revealed by the GEF/CDM data we have used, as this data assumes that all projects are mobilized by 
GEF/CDM.  In other words, our operationalization of cost-effectiveness in supporting climate change 
mitigation projects is not perfect, given missing data on whether some projects are BAU. 
 
Support for BAU projects is particularly relevant in the private finance context as high private 
investment intensities for energy projects may be an indication that these projects are not additional to 
the BAU case. This can be illustrated with the case of electricity from renewable energies, assuming that 
all technologies receive the same price per generated unit of electricity95. A very expensive technology 
                                                     
94 However, within our analysis we could not control for all influence factors that may affect relative cost-effectiveness of public 
and private investors. For instant, public investors undertake more risky interventions, so their projects are less cost-effective by 
purpose. A counterargument would be that some private actors take over substantial risks in order to secure markets. 
95 This assumption only holds in a liberalized and competitive electricity market where tariffs for electricity fed in to the grid are 
the same for all technologies. In many countries, this assumption does not hold as different renewable energies receive different 
feed-in tariffs covering the production costs of each technology. However, in such cases, the idea of mobilizing investment and 
reducing GHG with climate finance becomes less relevant, as investments in RE will be undertaken anyway. 
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like solar PV will need a substantial amount of climate finance compared to the electricity revenues, so 
that the investment intensity will be very low. Compared to this, a technology almost competitive on the 
market, like wind or hydro, will only need a very small amount of climate finance compared to the 
electricity revenues, so the investment intensity will be high. If the technology is very close to 
competitiveness, then abatement costs tend to zero and the investment intensity goes to infinity.  
 
Given that countries and project developers have an interest to receive climate finance, they may tend to 
report not negative but very small costs for already profitable technologies. Such projects are very 
challenging for policymakers: projects close to zero abatement costs may either be the most cost-
effective options for financial support, if costs are indeed very low, or they may be the least cost-
effective options for financial support, if costs are negative and the investments would have taken place 
anyway. This challenge has been discussed in the CDM literature where several studies (Michaelowa and 
Purohit, 2007; Schneider, 2007; Haya, 2009) have concluded that it is very difficult for CDM verifiers to 
detect which projects are profitable (and therefore part of BAU) and which ones not. In conclusion, very 
high investment intensities for energy projects may either mean that supporting them is very cost-
effective but it may also signal that the project is already competitive, so support is very cost-ineffective 
as public climate finance will not generate additional GHG emissions reductions.  
 
In case of the GEF, it is particularly questionable whether all of the GHG emissions reductions and 
private investments are mobilized by public climate finance. Figure 22 shows that 43% of GEF project 
finance comes from international and national grants or loans, which can also be expected to have a 
“mobilization effect”. An interviewee from a GEF implementing agency (see Annex 10.1) even said that 
according to his impression, it is rather the public co-finance (grants and loans) mobilizing the GEF 
funding, and not the GEF funding mobilizing the co-finance. While this is certainly an overstatement, 
given that the amount of GEF funding per country is given, it supports the idea that not all private 
investment, and even less the other co-funding, is mobilized by GEF grants. So GEF statements like 
“we have provided more than US$8.6 billion [...], leveraging more than US$36 billion in co-financing” 
(GEF, 2009b: 1) are certainly over-estimating the real finance mobilization by GEF. For a review on 
GEF and other public institutions misleading definitions of “leveraged” co-finance, see Brown et al. 
(2011). 
 
 
Figure 22: Financing of GEF projects (sample of 101 out of 190 projects with disbursements until 2009) 
 
 
 
Source: own analysis derived from GEF project documents (GEF, 2011a) 
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The question whether projects are BAU or not also applies to projects where the abatement costs of a 
low-carbon technology are negative as the revenues of this technology are larger than the investment and 
operation costs, which is the case for many energy efficiency projects. The implementation of these 
projects is hindered by high transaction costs and market failures such as asymmetric information (Jaffe 
and Stavins, 1994; Kesicki and Ekins, 2012). In case of GEF, most of these transaction costs are 
included in the cost-assessment, so costs are positive and, therefore, both cost-effectiveness and private 
investment intensities are positive (see Figure 23). Indeed, GEF only supports energy efficiency 
technologies if it can be shown that transaction costs (e.g. capacity building) are to be covered. However, 
as actual abatement costs for the GEF-promoted energy efficiency technologies are often negative, it is 
possible that national government would promote these projects anyway (or the private sector 
undertakes them anyway), so projects are BAU and GEF support is not needed. To better understand 
whether this is the case or not, a closer look at specific projects would be warranted.  
 
In the CDM case, most transaction costs are not included in the assessment of negative abatement cost 
projects so projects have negative costs and, according to our definitions, we receive the strange result 
that cost-effectiveness and private investment intensities can be negative for some energy efficiency 
projects (see Figure 21). How to interpret such negative values, does it mean that projects are cost-
effective or not? We may face two situations: In the first situation, the projects are still profitable after 
transaction costs are included, so projects are BAU96, and CDM support is not needed. In this case, 
negative cost projects on their own are very cost-effective, as no costs occur, but their support via CDM 
would not be cost-effective, as CDM generates no effect but at least some administrative costs occur. In 
the second situation, overall costs including transaction costs are positive, so climate finance is needed. 
In this case, cost-effectiveness of support by the CDM can be very high if costs including transaction 
costs are low. But how to correctly specify these transaction costs? In the CDM, project developers 
operationalize such transaction costs by claiming technological or financial barriers. Yet, these barriers 
can hardly be assessed in an objective way (Schneider, 2009b). Similar to the case of competitive hydro 
power projects, small differences in costs can have a substantial impact on the assessment whether such 
energy efficiency measures are very cost-effective on their own (as costs are negative), and should, 
therefore, not be supported at all because they are profitable, or whether supporting them is very cost-
effective due to low costs. Therefore, negative private investment intensity may both mean very high or 
very low cost-effectiveness of climate finance support.  
                                                     
96 As mentioned in the introduction to this thesis, negative cost projects are not necessarily BAU, as they can face high transaction 
costs. However, once transaction costs are included in the assessment, negative cost projects should be BAU (if one assumes that 
no market failure like asymmetric information occurs). 
Effectiveness of international climate finance    Chapter 7: Mobilizing private finance 
 
 
141 
Figure 23: Cost-effectiveness and co-finance intensity of different GEF project types 
 
Source: Stadelmann et al. (2011c)  
 
 
 
7.7 Discussion: Explaining public calls for private finance mobilization 
 
Why do public agencies continue calling for more mobilization of private sector funding? Our results 
show that cost-effectiveness of climate policy cannot really be the reason if public institutions are well 
informed. Therefore, we analyze other explanations why public institutions are calling for private 
finance: alternative public policy goals, own interests of bureaucrats and politicians and misleading 
perceptions of the public sector on cost-effectiveness. 
 
 
7.7.1 Alternative public policy goals  
 
One main reason why policy makers may call for private finance mobilization is that they have other 
public policy goals (e.g. private sector engagement, capital for long-term projects and environmental 
effectiveness) than reducing GHG emissions cost-effectively. We will discuss whether these potential 
alternative goals are really alternative policy goals, which can justify a focus on mobilizing private 
finance, or whether they are rather intermediate targets to achieve cost-effectiveness in the end. In case 
of real alternative policy goals, it will be discussed if they really imply a focus on mobilizing private 
finance. 
 
Private sector engagement: the GEF has been criticized that it has not been successful in engaging the 
private sector sufficiently (Streck, 2001; GEFEO, 2002, 2005)97. Is “engaging the private sector” an 
                                                     
97 One may question this critique given our analysis that roughly 40% of funding in GEF projects is coming from the private 
sector and the assessment of Clémençon (2006) that GEF private sector co-financing is way higher than the voluntary 
partnerships for sustainable development emerging from the Johannesburg summit in 2002.  
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alternative or an intermediate policy goal? In our view, it is always an intermediate policy goal, which 
does not depend on the reasoning given for engaging the private sector. If it is needed to improve short-
term cost-effectiveness in implementation, as supported by our analysis and a literature review by 
Mueller (2003), then it is clearly an intermediate policy goal. If the private sector has to be engaged, to 
build capacity and create interests of the private sector for long-term mitigation, similar to long-lived 
tradable allowances that create private sector interests in climate policy (McKibbin and Wilcoxen, 2007), 
then it should also serve cost-effectiveness but only in the long term. 
 
Capital for technologies with very long-term lifetimes: For achieving ambitious emission reduction 
targets, low-carbon technologies with very long lifetimes and thus large investment volumes (e.g. 
buildings, power plants) have to be implemented as early as possible (Lecocq et al., 1998; Michaelowa 
and Rolfe, 2001; Jaccard and Rivers, 2007; Vogt-Schilb and Hallegatte, 2011). As we understand the 
argument, capital for long-term investment is not a goal in itself but a mean to achieve cost-effectiveness 
in the long-term: if only investments with short technology lifetimes are implemented in the short run, 
then climate policy may become very costly in the long run, as not yet amortized technologies may have 
to be replaced (Vogt-Schilb and Hallegatte, 2011). This problem can partly be handled if cost and 
benefits are measured along longer periods, as conducted in our assessment of GEF projects.  However, 
even our long-term cost-benefit assessment may not lead to the highest long-term cost-effectiveness if 
long lifetime technologies (e.g. building energy efficiency) required to achieve the 2-degrees target remain 
very cost-ineffective, even under a long-term cost-effectiveness assessment. This would imply that 
implementation of long lifetime projects may be postponed leading to high economic costs when non-
amortized investments (e.g. energy-inefficient buildings) have to be replaced later on. This supports the 
potential usefulness of private investment intensity as intermediate policy goal in a high ambition policy 
scenario98, while it is not an argument for considering it as alternative policy goal. The long-term 
investment argument makes clear that policy makers will have to reflect long-term goals and the risk of 
having to replace non-amortized technologies when analyzing cost-effectiveness of their decisions. Such 
an inter-temporal analysis of cost-effectiveness goes beyond the scope of this paper. 
 
Environmental effectiveness:  Policy makers may not be primarily interested in cost-effectiveness of 
climate policy but in overall effectiveness in reducing GHG emissions.  This is clearly another policy 
goal than cost-effectiveness but does it justify a focus on private finance mobilization?  
 
First of all, the same logic as for the case of cost-effectiveness as policy goal can be applied: if a public 
institution is really aiming at environmental effectiveness it may simply choose the projects with highest 
effectiveness per unit of climate finance. As long as the public institution is well-informed and able to 
select the projects that mitigate most GHG per unit of public finance, a new focus on projects 
mobilizing private finance cannot help to improve effectiveness. Only in case that the public institution 
is not informed about effectiveness of mitigations options, focusing on private finance mobilization can 
help a public institution to improve effectiveness of climate finance.  
 
The analysis is different in the special case that a public institution aiming at environmental effectiveness 
only has information about cost-effectiveness in reducing GHG but not effectiveness per unit of climate 
finance. For this situation we can use our previous analysis (in Table 19) on a public institution that, by 
default, selects the most cost-effective projects: if mobilized private finance does not cover any 
abatement costs, effectiveness in mitigating GHG emissions should be maximized with the same 
projects that maximize cost-effectiveness, so a focus on projects that mobilize most private finance will 
tend to lower effectiveness compared to the selection of the most cost-effective projects. In this case, 
                                                     
98 However, not all of these expensive but long-term low-carbon projects are private investment intensive, e.g. solar power will 
probably be needed under high ambition mitigation scenarios but private sector intensity is currently low. 
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effectiveness is not an alternative public policy goal and does not justify the switch from cost-
effectiveness to mobilizing private finance as criteria for allocation of climate finance. However, the 
analysis is different if mobilized private finance consists of private abatement spending. In this case, 
mobilizing private finance increases the overall amount of abatement spending (if public climate finance 
is fixed), which is actually a net increase, as we have to deduct the climate finance spent for mobilization, 
which cannot be used anymore for reducing GHG emissions. This net increase in abatement spending 
can increase GHG emissions reductions (see Table 18) but only if the additional GHG emissions 
reductions due the net increase in abatement spending can compensate for GHG losses emerging from 
the shift to less cost-effective projects.  
 
In conclusion, environmental effectiveness as alternative policy goal can justify a focus on mobilizing 
private finance (rather than a focus on the most cost-effective projects) but only if a) the public 
institution has only information on cost-effectiveness but not effectiveness per unit of public finance, b) 
a net increase of abatement spending occurs when focusing on private finance mobilization, and c) 
additional GHG mitigation mobilized by the net increase in abatement spending compensate for a shift 
to less cost-effective projects. However, it is highly unlikely that these conditions are all given, 
particularly a net increase in abatement spending due to private finance mobilization seems very 
unlikely99. 
 
Summing up, two potential alternative policy goals – engaging the private sector and capital for long-
term projects – are in fact intermediary policy goals to achieve cost-effectiveness in the end, so they 
rather call for a closer cost-effectiveness assessment and not for mobilizing private finance on its own. 
Only environmental effectiveness can be seen as a goal on its own that may justify the selection of 
projects with most private finance mobilization (instead of the most cost-effective projects) if some 
conditions are given: the public institution has to be non-informed about effectiveness per unit of public 
finance (otherwise it could simply maximize effectiveness by choosing the right projects), the mobilized 
private finance has to lead to a net increase in abatement spending, which is quite unlikely, and the 
additional GHG emissions reductions have to compensate for losses due to the shift to less cost-
effective projects.  
 
 
7.7.2 Self-interests of public institutions and politicians 
 
The explanations discussed before assume that public institutions act in the interest of the public. 
However, officials may also or even mainly pursue their own interests (Mueller, 2003). Why could calls 
for private finance mobilization be in the self-interest of politicians and government officials? For them, 
the easiest way to meet a finance target including public and private sources is to ensure that the private 
share is maximized. By mobilizing private finance, the goal can be achieved without being dependent on 
public budgets that are under pressure. Furthermore, public institutions can also take advantage of the 
widely shared view (Mueller, 2003) that the private sector is in most cases more cost-effective, so voters 
                                                     
99 Such a net increase in abatement spending only occurs if the private sector pays for some investment or operation costs without 
being fully compensated by some non-climate or public climate revenues. Such a mobilizing of private abatement spending by 
climate finance seems to be unlikely as can be illustrated for all reasons of private sector cost coverage: philanthropy and strategic 
investments, financial incentives and regulations. In case of philanthropy and strategic investments, the private coverage of 
abatement costs is voluntary, so not due to public climate finance; if costs of philanthropic or strategic investments are covered by 
climate finance, no net increase in abatement spending occurs. In case of financial incentives via climate finance subsidies, the 
private sector does not spend on abatement on its own, as the costs are covered by climate finance. In case of abatement spending 
due to governmental regulations (e.g. standards) or government-induced financial incentives (e.g. taxes, ETS) in the South, the 
abatement spending is not likely to be higher than the climate finance spent for mobilizing these regulations and financial 
incentives, as the respective country would have higher costs than its compensation. 
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and tax payers may perceive high figures for mobilized private finance as indication for improved cost-
effectiveness even if it is not necessarily true.  
 
 
7.7.3 Misleading perceptions of the public sector on cost-effectiveness  
 
Finally, it may also be the case that some public sector officials see the maximization of private finance 
mobilization as cost-effective because of misleading perceptions: either they make the foregone 
judgment that private finance must always improve cost-effectiveness because the private sector is 
efficient, or they only consider public sector costs in their cost-effectiveness assessment and neglect 
private sector costs.  
 
 
7.8 Conclusions 
 
From a theoretical point of view, the mobilization of private finance as new policy goal may decrease 
cost-effectiveness and effectiveness of climate policy. The reason is that introducing a second goal 
(private finance) in climate change mitigation policy will lead to trade-offs with the primary goal (GHG 
mitigation). Empirical data from the GEF and CDM as two international climate finance mechanisms 
confirms that selecting programs according to “mobilized private finance” will substantially decrease 
cost-effectiveness of climate finance compared to a situation where well-informed public institutions 
already select the most cost-effective GHG reducing projects. 
 
Only in a situation where public institutions are missing information on relative cost-effectiveness of 
projects, selecting projects according to the mobilization of private finance may be beneficial as private 
finance is positively correlated with cost-effectiveness and the positive relationship is persistent when 
controlling for other determinants. Still, our empirical analysis has shown that the project type is a much 
better indicator for cost-effectiveness, so private investment should rather be used as secondary criteria 
for project selection after considering the project type. Furthermore, notwithstanding the significant 
correlation, private finance may not be a robust indicator for cost-effectiveness of climate finance 
because high private investment intensity can be an indication that projects are actually BAU, and do not 
need climate finance support. 
 
Why are policy makers calling for mobilizing as much private finance as possible even if it is possible 
that it decreases cost-effectiveness? The calls can be explained by three different reasons: first, policy 
makers may pursue different public policy goals such as improving environmental effectiveness. 
Improvements in environmental effectiveness via private finance mobilization are, however, highly 
unlikely as the public institution would have to be non-informed about effectiveness of projects, and the 
mobilized private finance would have to cover costs of GHG emissions reductions (without 
compensation by any revenues), which is unlikely to happen if the private sector is profit-oriented. 
Second, mobilizing private finance may be in the self-interest of public officials; private finance helps 
policy makers to achieve international financing goals and reduce the need for raising taxes. 
Furthermore, showing high private finance numbers may be an attractive way for policy makers to claim 
high performance as the public does not understand that cost-effectiveness may be lowered. Third, 
policy makers may simply have the foregone conclusion that mobilization of private finance will always 
improve cost-effectiveness. Among the three potential explanations, self-interest of public officials 
seems to be the most reasonable explanation but interviews would have to be conducted to reveal this. 
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In a broader sense, the main lesson of this paper is that means and ends of climate policy are not to be 
confused: while mobilizing private sector investment may be an important mean of climate policy, given 
the substantial need for investments in low-carbon technologies in the next decades (Olbrisch et al., 
2011), it is not the final goal. The private sector has a key role in financing and implementation of 
climate policy (e.g. within the carbon market or in public-private partnerships) but policymakers should 
be cautious about seeing private finance as goal on its own.  
 
This study leaves research gaps in at least two areas. First, the empirical part could be extended to 
further funding channels and instruments. Given data constraints we focused on certain climate finance 
instruments, e.g. performance-based payments (CDM), capacity building and financing instruments 
(GEF), while we omitted certain project types hardly or not promoted by CDM and GEF (reduced 
deforestation, nuclear power and agricultural projects) and further instruments where a more substantial 
link between private finance mobilization and cost-effectiveness is possible (e.g. public guarantees). 
Second, it remains unclear whether alternative policy goals, own interests of policy makers or 
misjudgment on cost-effectiveness is the best explanation for policy maker’s calls for mobilizing private 
finance. Expert interviews would help to bring more light into this question.  
 
The research results have important implications for climate policy. In climate change policy, it seems 
that the goal of mobilizing USD 100 billion from public and private sources bears the risk that public 
institutions have incentives to prioritize programs with the highest intensity of private sector finance. 
Unfortunately, these programs will probably not be the most cost-effective ones. Therefore, it would be 
beneficial to replace the USD 100 billion goal with a lower public finance goal or, even better, with a 
GHG reduction and adaptation target. If this is not possible, public institutions should at least refrain 
from selecting programs according to private sector mobilization as long as they have better indicators 
or knowledge about cost-effectiveness. 
 
These conclusions can be transferred to other policy areas, e.g. development assistance. Whenever a 
primary policy goal like public health is supplemented with the additional goal of mobilization private 
finance, then achievement of the primary goal will probably decrease, if public institutions are well aware 
of cost-effectiveness of options.   
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8 Conclusions 
 
This final chapter will discuss conclusions on the effectiveness of international climate finance in 
supporting low-carbon development. First, the research questions are answered based on the previous 
chapters, then the internal and external validity of the results is discussed, and finally some implications 
for policy making and further research are lined out. 
 
 
8.1 Answers to research questions and validity 
 
In this section, we will answer the four research question on the effectiveness of international climate 
finance as set out in chapter 3 (literature and research gaps), relying on the analysis conducted in chapters 
4 to 7. Furthermore, the validity of the results are discussed, both the internal validity (within the studied 
cases) and the external one (generalizability beyond the studied cases)100. Answers and validity are 
discussed for each of the four research questions separately. 
 
 
8.1.1 Effective definitions of “New and additional” 
 
Chapter four addressed the first question, which focused on the provision of climate finance: How would 
the term “new and additional” have to be defined to enable an actual increase of climate finance without redirection of 
development aid? For answering this question, the chapter discussed eight different options to define “new 
and additional” climate finance.  
 
From a climate finance effectiveness point of view, the option “above existing climate finance” is most 
effective. The option “above existing climate finance” implies that new and additional climate finance 
must exceed past climate finance levels, so more funding for climate change mitigation should be 
available under this definition. Furthermore, the definition “above existing development assistance” may 
also lead to comparative high climate funding and more environmental effectiveness, as contributors are 
free in how to allocate a planned increase in funding for developing countries, so they can allocate all to 
climate change. Other baseline definitions, such as “above 0.7% of ODA“, “no ODA”, “only new UN 
channels”, “only new source”, or “above  development assistance an and climate finance projections” are 
considered to restrict the provision of climate finance, and may, therefore, reduce the effectiveness in 
reducing GHG emissions. 
 
However, options most beneficial for provision of climate finance and environmental effectiveness may 
lead to substantial diversion of development assistance to climate finance, and are, therefore, not 
acceptable to most developing countries101. Figure 24 (slightly adapted from figure 12 in chapter 4) 
illustrates the resulting dilemma in the definition of “new and additional” climate finance. If a high level 
of development assistance (DA) and climate finance is set as baseline, no development assistance should 
be diverted and no “old” climate finance pledged as “new” but then the possibility to provide new 
climate finance would be restricted, if we assume a budget constraint. If, in contrast, a low level of 
funding is set as baseline, substantial climate finance should flow but funding will be diverted from 
                                                     
100 See Campbell et al. (1966) for the fundamental distinction between internal and external validity. 
101 In addition the option “above existing climate finance” may not be institutionally feasible as data of existing or past climate 
finance is not available: while ODA donors report to the OECD how much of their ODA has climate change as significant or 
principal objective, the assessment is deficient in practice (Roberts et al., 2010a; Michaelowa and Michaelowa, 2011a), and no 
definition of climate finance has yet been agreed on internationally (Buchner et al., 2011a; Haites, 2011).  
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development assistance or will also consist of “old”, re-counted climate finance, so it will hardly be 
acceptable for developing countries.  
 
 
Figure 24: Impact of climate finance baseline in case of budget constraint (with potential new sources) 
 
 
  
 
 
According to our analysis, two baseline options may minimize the trade-offs and be politically and 
institutionally feasible:  “above pre-defined projection of DA and climate finance” and “new sources”. 
The first one, “above pre-defined projection of DA and climate finance” would avoid diversion of 
development assistance and still imply that climate finance will flow, assuming that the DA and climate 
finance projection does not reach the budget constraint. The second compromise, “new sources”, 
essentially increases the budget constraint by mobilizing new financial sources (e.g. via CO2 taxes or 
auctioning of allowances) so diversion of DA becomes unlikely, while the amount of climate finance 
increases. Trade-offs may even be further minimized if the two baselines are combined: “from new 
sources or above pre-defined BAU level of DA and climate finance”. In this case, neither DA should be 
diverted nor “old” climate finance relabeled as “new” and all potential sources (general budget and new 
sources) may be tapped for climate finance, thereby improving “environmental effectiveness”. 
 
Are these results for the term “new and additional” climate finance valid, both internally (situation at the 
moment, which we analyzed) and externally (situations in the past and the future)? Internally, the results 
may be challenged on the premise that there is no absolute ceiling for the budget, so actually an 
ambitious definition of the baseline may lead governments to provide more funding for developing 
countries. A counter-argument is that industrialized countries have never been willing to agree on a 
definition for “new and additional” and that they have never come close to the 0.7% of GNI provided as 
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ODA, which both indicates that there are some limits to funding provision, even when they are flexible 
over time. 
 
Another challenge for the internal validity of the results may be the thesis that the term “new and 
additional” funding may matter even without a clear definition. We can derive this thesis from interviews 
conducted with representatives from industrialized governments (see 10.1). However, while these 
interviewees indicated that the term “new and additional” induced them to provide additional climate 
funding, their wording also suggested that actually some DA funding was diverted, so the dilemma 
between climate and development funding still exists.  
 
Finally, it is very difficult to say how externally valid (so generalizable beyond the present) our results are. 
When some assumptions change, the judgment of the baseline options may also change, e.g. if ODA will 
not rise but decrease, then “above current DA and climate finance” would be less environmentally 
effective as more resources than planned would have to be spent for DA to meet the baseline. If more 
countries move beyond the 0.7% of GNI provided to ODA, the “0.7% GNI” baseline will become 
politically more acceptable, but less effective. As well, the world of climate finance contributor may 
substantially change, as all countries – including non-ODA providers – could become contributors of 
climate finance, as suggested by the Mexican proposal for a World Climate Change Fund (Gomez 
Robledo, 2008). In such a case, the term “new and additional” may have to be restricted to industrialized 
countries or to be related to “climate finance” for non-ODA contributors.  
 
 
8.1.2 Effectiveness in supporting RE diffusion 
 
Chapter 5 analyzed the second question, which was based on the challenge that the CDM may not reach 
the theoretical effectiveness due to the problem that some BAU projects are supported: How effective has 
the CDM been in reducing GHG emissions via renewable energy diffusion, and how effective has public finance been in 
comparison? We analyzed this question by estimating the determinants of the diffusion of renewable 
electricity production in more than 120 developing countries, using both fixed effects and random 
effects, as well as Generalized Methods of Moments models.  
 
According to our models the CDM has no significant effect on renewable electricity production apart 
from the case of biomass (and potentially geothermal and hydro) power. Other determinants, such as 
dependence on foreign oil, national policies and RE potential were decisive for diffusion of renewable 
energies in the last 20 years. Only in case of biomass power, CDM has clearly a significant impact, while 
there was clearly no impact in case of solar and wind power. In case of geothermal power, CDM has a 
significant impact according to few specifications but the mean effect is lower than the official CDM 
figures (significantly lower if 10 year persistence of one-year effect is assumed, but not significantly lower 
if 20 years is assumed). In case of hydro, models also estimate a significant effect according to very few 
specifications but hydro power diffusion was generally difficult to model. The CDM effectiveness in case 
of biomass electricity can be explained by the fact that – at past CDM credit prices – the CDM support 
was available to cover the abatement costs of many biomass technologies, particularly biogas and waste 
water treatment plants (Schneider et al., 2010), while in case of other technologies, CDM support was 
either not substantial enough to cover abatement costs (wind and solar), so public policies were needed 
to make projects feasible, or projects may have been profitable anyway, e.g. in case of some hydro power 
projects (Schneider, 2007; Haya, 2009). This implies that CDM governing institutions – in the case of 
solar and wind, but also potentially geothermal power– either intentionally approved BAU projects or 
approved them as they were not aware that these projects are BAU due to asymmetric information. 
Intentional approval of BAU projects will at least partly take place, because of two reasons: First, some 
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CDM EB decisions have been connected to interests of host countries and the World Bank (Flues et al., 
2010). Second, the EB rule that reductions due to climate-friendly policies are also credited will by 
definition lead to CDM approval of BAU projects. 
 
The same models find that GEF has a significant impact on geothermal and wind power, although a 
lower one than officially reported. In case of biomass, hydro and solar, the models suggest no significant 
impact, so the GEF may have overestimated its effectiveness for all technologies (although in case of 
hydro, the over-estimation by official estimates is not significant). This overestimation seems reasonable 
because of several reasons. First, implementing agencies and GEF may feel inclined to seem effective in 
reducing GHG emissions, while GEF contributors and their tax-payers can hardly review claimed 
effectiveness because of asymmetric information. The idea that GHG figures may be important for GEF 
actors is supported by the fact that they are prominently placed in GEF brochures (GEF, 2009b, 2011c). 
Second, expert interviews revealed that the selection of GEF supported programs is not mainly based on 
cost-effectiveness but is a result of bargaining among national ministries, strategic considerations within 
implementing agencies and also the GEF itself. These “political” or administrative costs along the 
complex GEF supply chain (a result of the early set-up of GEF, see Fairman, 1996) make it very unlikely 
that the GEF can reduce GHG emissions for the claimed 4 USD per tonne of CO2 (or around 0.2 US-
cents per kWh of renewable power), which would be substantially below the incremental technology 
costs of most renewable energies (Edenhofer et al., 2011). Third, estimating the GHG impact of GEF’s 
capacity building activities is technically very difficult or even impossible (Mee et al., 2008), so GEF 
agencies may also unintentionally overestimate reductions. Finally, several studies have found that GEF’s 
GHG estimation methods are not very elaborated (Eberhard et al., 2004; Mee et al., 2008; Stadelmann, 
2009).  
  
Are these results internally and externally valid? Internal validity will mainly depend on the quality of the 
model: while the GMM model estimates with robust standard errors reflect potential heteroskedasticity, 
autocorrelation and most sources of endogeneity, it cannot be ruled out that some determinants have 
been omitted or not been adequately measured, which would lead to biased results. The selected 
independent variables are based on a literature review, so the quality of the model will depend on how 
well the literature has grasped the most important determinants on RE diffusion. Furthermore, some of 
the data is based on reporting by countries (e.g. the data on RE production), and it was not possible to 
review the quality, apart from the fact that the data generally seemed to be reasonable, based on the 
cross-country knowledge of the researcher.  Therefore, it cannot be ruled out that the results are not fully 
valid. However, validity of the results is backed by existent case study research on CDM RE projects, 
which have shown that many RE projects would have also happened without CDM support 
(Michaelowa and Purohit, 2007; Schneider, 2007; Haya, 2009) and that abatement costs for solar and 
wind power are much higher than CDM market prices, while hydro power projects can already be 
profitable (Schneider et al., 2010).  
 
External validity of the results is either not necessary or limited: generalizability to other countries is not 
necessary, as we have covered all countries that received climate finance for renewable energies. In 
contrast, generalizability to other time periods is only possible to a limited extent: the effectiveness of the 
CDM in promoting renewable energies is dependent on the carbon price and RE technology costs, 
which both will change: if the carbon price rises (currently not the case) and/or technology costs fall (as 
projected, see Nemet, 2006; Edenhofer et al., 2011), wind and solar power may once effectively be 
financed by CDM. However, once these technologies become profitable, CDM would become very 
ineffective in promoting them, unless the CDM regulators exclude them. The optimal inclusion or 
exclusion of specific RE technologies from the CDM will, however, be very difficult to determine, as it 
may not be very clear if technologies are profitable, see the case of hydro power. In case of GEF, validity 
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relies on the question whether its capacity building tools will – in the future – still be effective for already 
well-known technologies, such as onshore wind. For staying effective in case of wind and geothermal, 
and becoming effective in case of biomass, hydro and solar, GEF programs may have to focus on more 
advanced technologies that are less known and have less diffused (e.g. second-generation biomass power, 
enhanced geothermal systems, offshore wind, or emerging PV technologies).  
 
Given that the models control for RE policies, the real effectiveness of GEF and CDM in reducing 
GHG may be underestimated, if there is an indirect effect via promotion of RE policies. Therefore, the 
following findings on effectiveness in inducing RE policies are relevant for estimating overall 
effectiveness of international climate finance in promoting RE technologies. 
 
 
8.1.3 Effectiveness in inducing RE policies 
  
Chapter 6 analyzed research question 3, which is based on theories about the role of international 
environmental regimes in creating rules and institutions, particularly national policies:  Has international 
climate finance induced developing countries to undertake renewable energy policies? This chapter addressed this 
research question by using an event history model for estimating the determinants of four different types 
of RE policy adoption – RE targets, framework policies, feed-in tariffs and financial incentives – in 114 
developing and emerging countries. The models controlled for both domestic (socio-economic, 
environmental and institutional) drivers and international diffusion mechanisms (learning and emulation 
from peers and incentives from the international level). 
 
The model found that CDM funding has not clearly a significant effect on adoption of any of the four 
analyzed RE policies, although it tends to have a positive influence on all policies apart from feed-in-
tariffs where it tends to have a negative influence. However, all of these influences are not significant, 
apart from few alternative specifications in case of targets and frameworks. On one hand, this result 
implies that the CDM EB’s decision to still credit GHG emissions reductions even if they are enabled by 
national climate-friendly policies (UNFCCC, 2005b) seems to have avoided a potential perverse incentive 
of the CDM on RE policy adoption. On the other hand, this result also means that the CDM incentive 
has not proven to be strong enough to promote feed-in tariffs and financial incentives, which are seen as 
key for RE diffusion. Given that the CDM only covers a small part of the incremental costs of 
technologies – particularly wind and solar (Schneider et al., 2010) –, this result seems to be reasonable. 
 
GEF tends to have a positive influence on all types of RE policies in the short term (first three years 
after funding approval) but the effect is only significant at the 10% level in case of framework policies 
However, even the effect on framework policies is sensitive to the model specification. In the long-term 
(6 years after funding approval), we find a significant effect of GEF on target and tariff adoption. These 
result is reasonable as GEF provides capacity building for policies, which in the short term may rather 
influence “soft” policies like frameworks, while an effect on more concrete or costly policies like tariffs 
or incentives may rather happen in the long-term, as GEF does not provide direct financing. 
Interestingly, development assistance for renewable energies almost significantly increases the adoption 
of feed-in tariffs. This may relate to targeted ODA programs to transfer knowledge on feed-in tariffs, see 
e.g. GIZ (2012a, 2012b).  
 
Internal validity of the results has been backed up by estimating different lags for GEF and CDM 
influence, controlling for a range for domestic and international control variables and controlling for 
maturation with time fixed effects. Nevertheless, the ultimate decision process within a country is only 
approximately captured because data on national environmental pressure groups and preferences is not 
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perfect and the complex interactions between national governments, interest groups and international 
actors cannot be fully modeled in a simple event history model; these interactions are case-specific and 
not known in detail. 
 
External validity of the finding that CDM and GEF have hardly supported the set-up of RE policies is 
difficult to draw. Generalization to other countries is hardly possibly as we included all large developing 
countries but excluded some very small countries where data was not available. One has also to be 
hesitant to generalize to other types of policies or to other project types (e.g. energy efficiency and 
landfill gas flaring) as the economics may be different. Finally, it also difficult to predict the future impact 
of GEF and CDM on RE policy adoption, as framework policies may become less important and the 
carbon price may change. Furthermore, CDM PoAs may offer a closer link between CDM and national 
policies, although the liability rules for verifiers are a significant challenge for PoAs (Halbritter and 
Ohndorf, 2012). 
  
 
8.1.4 Effectiveness of a focus on mobilizing private finance 
 
Finally, Chapter 7 analyzed research question 4, which challenged the idea that mobilizing private finance 
is an effective strategy in climate policy: How does a focus on mobilizing private finance influence the cost-effectiveness 
of climate finance? This question was answered by both a theoretical and empirical analysis. In the 
theoretical analysis, the impact of mobilizing private finance on cost-effectiveness was analyzed under 
different assumptions (informed versus non-informed public institutions, cost-covering versus profit-
oriented private finance). In the empirical part, data from more than 300 GEF and CDM projects were 
used to estimate, first, the correlation between private finance intensity and cost-effectiveness, and 
second, to analyze the impact of private finance intensity on cost-effectiveness when controlling for a 
range of covariates. 
 
The theoretical analysis concludes that a focus of climate finance on mobilizing private finance will tend 
to decrease cost-effectiveness of climate policy as long as public institutions are well informed about 
GHG benefits of mitigation options and would select the most cost-effective options without private 
finance as policy goal. This is because there are trade-offs between private finance intensity and GHG 
mitigation, as private investors will receive income beyond climate finance in case of mitigation projects. 
A focus on private finance would also decrease effectiveness in reducing GHG emissions, if the public 
institution is well-informed about effectiveness per unit of public finance (and could, therefore, just 
select the most effective projects), or if the mobilized private finance simply consists of profit-oriented 
investments. If public institutions are not informed about (cost-)effectiveness of options, then a focus on 
mobilizing private finance will increase (cost-)effectiveness) if there is a positive correlation between 
private finance and (cost-) effectiveness. 
 
The theoretical ideas are backed up by results from empirical analysis. First, there is a positive but far 
from perfect correlation between private finance and cost-effectiveness. This means that privately 
financed projects indeed tend to be cost-effective, as often found in the literature. Therefore, in case of a 
non-informed public institution that would otherwise randomly select projects, a focus on the projects 
with the highest private finance intensity increases cost-effectiveness. However, in case of a well-
informed public institution that is able to select the most cost-effective options, a focus on the projects 
with the highest private finance intensity will clearly decrease cost-effectiveness. Second, if we estimate 
the determinants of cost-effectiveness with regression models, private finance remains a significant 
predictor but can only explain a small part of the variation while the project types can explain a large 
part. This means for a public institution aiming at cost-effectiveness – if it has no detailed information on 
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single projects – that it should first select the most cost-effective project types, and only select projects 
with more private finance if it compares very similar projects (e.g. two wind power plants in China with 
an installed capacity of 50 megawatts). 
 
Are these results internally and externally valid? Internal validity of the results is supported by the fact 
that the models control for many covariates and also for potential heteroskedasticity. However, one 
challenge for internal validity is data quality: as we derive the data on cost-effectiveness from project 
documents, it may be the case that some projects are actually BAU projects so supporting them is very 
ineffective. Support for BAU projects could be particularly challenging for one of our conclusions: that 
private finance intensity is positively correlated with cost-effectiveness. This conclusion may be 
challenged as projects with high private finance intensity are more likely to be BAU: projects with very 
high private investments compared to the “needed” public finance (e.g. large hydro power) are more 
likely to be BAU than projects where a high percentage of investment costs is to be covered by public 
finance (e.g. solar power). Therefore, support for BAU projects is a challenge for the conclusion that 
private finance and cost-effectiveness of support is positively related, and it further supports the thesis 
that a focus on private finance may also reduce the cost-effectiveness of climate finance. One of our 
public administration interviewees suggested that the risk of supporting BAU projects also exists if 
substantial public finance is claimed to be “mobilized”. This is particularly important for the case of 
GEF and the CIFs that claim to mobilize substantial co-finance (CIF, 2010; GEF, 2010b), which does 
not only include private finance but also loans from MDBs and bilateral grants. 
 
External validity of the results differs according to the direction of generalization: generalization of the 
results to all CDM and GEF projects can be justified on the ground that we have selected a 
representative sample. Generalization to all climate change projects is more questionable, as specific 
projects (e.g. nuclear power, avoided deforestation) are not part of the sample as they are excluded by 
GEF and the CDM. However, the risks that these project types may substantially change the results are 
minor as the correlation between private finance and cost-effectiveness cannot become perfect by adding 
further projects, so the trade-off will remain, and the positive impact of private finance on cost-
effectiveness should hardly change if we keep controlling for the project type in the regression. Finally, 
generalization to other climate finance channels apart from GEF and CDM is only partly possible: while 
similar patterns, such as non-perfect correlation between private finance and GHG reduction, will 
probably also occur in case of other public climate finance programs, we may see a higher correlation 
between private finance and cost-effectiveness in some of the more private-sector oriented tools, such as 
loans, guarantees and equity instruments of development banks.  
 
 
8.2 Policy implications and further research  
 
The results have various implications for policy makers, and also leave some gaps for further research. 
We will first discuss policy implication and remaining research gaps in three areas (provision of climate 
finance, effective spending and private finance mobilization) and, finally, line out some key policy 
recommendations. 
 
 
8.2.1 Policy implications and further research on provision of climate finance 
 
In case of provision of climate finance, it seems relevant that negotiators clearly define the amount of 
climate finance to be provided – similar to the need for clearly defined commitments on GHG emissions 
reductions. Definitions on climate finance should not only include the amount, timing and type of 
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finance (investment finance, grants or concessional loans) but also the baseline to make sure that all 
countries have a similar understanding of the term “new and additional”. At best, countries would agree 
on a common baseline definition to make finance numbers comparable, and according to our analysis 
“above pre-defined development assistance and climate finance” and “new sources” would be suited to 
both enable an increase in climate finance without diversion of development assistance. As second best 
solution, industrialized countries may attach an own baseline to their financing. During the last two years, 
policy makers have undertaken first steps in this direction: several countries have begun to define 
baselines for their “new and additional” finance during the fast-start finance period (e.g. Canada, Iceland, 
Liechtenstein, New Zealand, Switzerland, see Ciplet et al. (2011)). Furthermore, the biennial reporting 
guidelines, as adopted by the COP in Durban (UNFCCC, 2011a), ask industrialized countries to describe 
how they determine that finance is “new and additional”.  This new requirement for industrialized 
countries is important given that major contributors (US and Japan) have never described their baseline 
for “new and additional”; it may also allow independent researchers to assess whether development 
assistance is diverted (as seems to be the case under most current definitions). 
 
The study on the term “new and additional” finance has also revealed – apart from the need to clearly 
define climate finance terms – that new sources of finance may be needed to overcome the trade-off 
between development and climate finance under a budget constraint. Such new sources are e.g. carbon 
taxes, air transport levies or auctioning of emission rights. Given that setting up new funding sources will 
take time (e.g. the introduction of new taxes will require parliamentary approval), policy makers may have 
to plan in advance, by setting up these sourcing instruments early in order to be prepared when both 
actions on mitigation and finance are stepped up in the future (e.g. 2015 or 2020). From a research side, 
the country-internal dynamics of providing climate finance, e.g. the debates on how much climate 
finance should be provided and whether it should aim at mitigation, sustainable development or political 
self-interests are not yet fully understood. An interesting case study could be to explore how Germany 
decided to use part of its revenues from auctioning emissions allowances as new source of international 
climate finance. 
 
 
8.2.2 Policy implications and further research on effective spending of climate finance for RE 
 
Implications for policy makers on the effective spending of climate finance differ for market-based and 
public climate finance. In case of market-based international climate finance (carbon price), policy 
makers may have to become aware that the CDM does not fully fulfill its role of assisting industrialized 
countries in meeting their GHG targets under the Kyoto Protocol in a cost-effective way. This is because 
the CDM support for renewable energies leads to substantially lower GHG emissions reductions than 
certified, so CDM projects are not always more cost-effective than mitigation projects in the North. If 
the results are true that CDM support only enables biomass energy projects, while having no impact on 
other RE102, then more than 80% of CDM certificates from RE and at least 30% of expected CDM 
credits until 2012 are representing GHG emissions reductions that would have occurred without the 
CDM. Therefore, the CDM undermines the environmental integrity of the Kyoto Protocol – agreed 
GHG targets are only met on a legal but not a real physical basis. This may imply that CDM reforms are 
needed, e.g. registration could be restricted to project types where CDM support is vital or to cases 
where non-CDM funding from the credit buyers assures that incremental costs of RE technologies can 
be met. However, no CDM reform will overcome the challenge of asymmetric information between 
project owner and verifiers on the counterfactual GHG emission situation without CDM support, so 
                                                     
102 This is clearly a simplification, as our results are only an estimate on the average impact of the CDM on RE diffusion. Some 
biomass projects may not be effective, while some geothermal, wind and solar projects may be effective. 
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with every CDM reform (e.g. also with standardized baselines) funding will flow to BAU projects, while 
transaction costs for verifying emission reductions remain substantial.   
 
Therefore, it seems to be warranted to use the carbon price signal not in relation to counterfactual GHG 
emissions reductions but in relation to factual GHG emissions. This may be undertaken with very well-known 
instrument: e.g. a carbon tax or an ETS that obliges emitters to render an emission allowance per tonne 
of CO2.  Clearly, the question arises, how these instruments can be introduced and linked to international 
climate finance. In case of a carbon tax, international climate finance may both be used for capacity 
building or as compensation for domestic economic losses of a carbon tax (at best this compensation 
would be earmarked for climate change programs). In case of an ETS, international climate finance may 
be used for capacity building (as currently conducted by the World Bank Partnership for Market 
Readiness) or for purchasing emission credits in the South, e.g. by linking an existing industrialized 
country ETS with a developing country ETS. While such a use of international climate finance will 
certainly involve some economic losses for industrialized countries (e.g. if a developing country 
establishes an ETS with GHG caps above projected emissions), it may help to set-up national policies 
that introduce a carbon price for a large part of GHG emissions, which is seen a cornerstone for 
successful climate policy by many (e.g. Nordhaus, 2006; Stern, 2007). If a national ETS is politically not 
acceptable in developing countries, sectoral emission trading (Gavard et al., 2011), sectoral crediting 
(Schneider and Cames, 2009) or CDM standardized baselines (Hayashi et al., 2010; Spalding-Fecher and 
Michaelowa, 2013) may be used as intermediary steps. The concrete design of these mechanisms and the 
effectiveness of the first pilot approaches (e.g. the recently announced EU support for the pilot ETS in 
China) are interesting areas for further research. 
 
In case of public climate finance, such as the GEF, policy makers may have to consider that climate 
finance may actually be less effective than officially claimed, for which there are several reasons: intended 
overestimations due to political pressure, asymmetric or missing information on the real drivers of low-
carbon investments, deficient calculation methodologies and, last but not least, the underachievement of 
planned results, e.g. the promotion of national RE policies. What are potential remedies, at least for the 
case of GEF, which we have studied? One idea is improve the projection and review of GHG emissions 
reductions. While this is technically challenging as many uncertainties are involved (Mee et al., 2008), a 
more consistent estimation method with transparency on assumptions, and a review of the results may 
help to improve the understanding of project effectiveness, and thereby, promote learning. A second 
remedy may be to increase competition between countries for funding. Until now, GEF funding is 
allocated according to a fixed allocation formula, which does take into account the emission reduction 
potential and the past environmental policy performance (GEF, 2010c), but not the actual climate policy 
plans of each country. A stronger alignment with the ambition and the own contribution of a country 
may be needed. Some scholars would even go as far as saying that, once a uniform carbon price is in 
place (and ETS in North and South are linked), any public funding schemes, such as the GEF, become 
obsolete and will reduce cost-effectiveness of international climate finance. However, public finance may 
still be needed for correcting market failures, as explained in the following paragraph.  
 
While an ETS or carbon taxes may be the cornerstone of a climate policy for developing countries that 
creates transformational change, additional policies or finance may be needed to overcome market 
failures that cannot be alleviated by a carbon price: e.g. support for research and development to 
overcome the problem of sub-optimal technology development in the situation of knowledge spill-over 
(Jaffe et al., 2005), feed-in tariffs or other quantity instruments for renewable energies to improve 
learning-by-using, create economies of scale and, thereby, reduce long-term technology costs (Junginger 
et al., 2005; Nemet, 2009) and, as already discussed in chapter 3.3.2, financial incentives, energy standards 
or information instruments for unlocking energy efficiency potential that is hindered by asymmetric 
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information or very high information costs (Jaffe and Stavins, 1994; Sorrell et al., 2004; Schleich and 
Gruber, 2008). It is certainly very difficult to assess, when such public policies beyond a carbon price are 
warranted to be supported by international climate finance. For answering this question, detailed case 
studies are needed, opening up a wide range of potential research. Particularly, an open question is 
whether and when international public finance may not only support technology-pull policies (e.g. feed-
in tariffs, standards) as conducted by the GEF, but also technology-push policies (e.g. research & 
development). Finally, researchers and policymakers may not only have to consider whether and when 
support for national policies is warranted but also how international climate finance can support the set-
up of policies. 
 
In case of climate finance support for national policies, policy maker may have to acknowledge that 
neither existing capacity building (GEF) nor minor financial payments (CDM) have proven to be 
successful in driving incentive-based RE policies, such as financial incentives and FITs. This may imply 
that policymakers, including the ones governing the Green Climate Fund, may have to look for new ways 
to support RE policies via international climate finance. There are at least three ideas that could be 
explored. First, financial incentives and capacity building may be used in joint programs to overcome 
financial, information and regulatory barriers at the same time. Second, different climate finance streams 
may be combined, e.g. carbon market and public finance, to cover a larger part of the costs of FITs 
(Castro et al., 2011b). Third, international climate finance may strategically be targeted to support 
countries that undertake ambitious climate policies and measures. Some related ideas are extra funding 
for countries that introduce ambitious cap-and-trade systems (Wagner et al. 2009) and budget support 
for climate change (Horstmann et al., 2009), which may be used to integrate climate change in 
development plans and implement policies. In case of budget support, the international community 
would not impose specific policies but offer capacity building and review the results, similar to the 
planned MRV of supported NAMAs (UNFCCC, 2010). International climate finance could be channeled 
via national funding entities (Gomez-Echeverri, 2010) that coordinate the national spending for 
programs. All of these ideas would strengthen host country ownership, which is one of the key principles 
of aid effectiveness (OECD, 2008).  
 
However, for all of these ideas for supporting national policies via international climate finance – and 
particularly for areas beyond RE – evidence is missing or scarce, so empirical research may be needed. 
First, to start with, empirical cases studies of RE policy adoption may help to improve the understanding 
of the complex national decision process, and how international climate finance influences “soft” policies 
but fails to enable costly FITs or financial incentives. Such case studies may also explore, whether and 
how ODA programs, such as the one GIZ (2012a, 2012b), have influenced FIT adoption. Second, both 
quantitative models (similar to our RE study) and case studies may explore whether GEF, CDM and 
other climate finance programs have been successful in enabling policies in the energy efficiency field. 
Third, researchers may explore newer international climate finance programs that have tried to focus 
more on the national policy level, e.g. the Climate Investment Funds, which aim to improve country 
ownership and alignment with national planning (CIF, 2011b), programmatic CDM, which is more 
closely linked to policies than project CDM, and finally new national funds, such as the Bangladesh 
Climate Change Resilience Fund and the Indonesia Climate Change Trust Fund. 
 
A remaining research question is why climate finance continues to flow to non-effective programs, even 
when there is ever-growing empirical evidence that many programs are not working as planned. Potential 
explanations are institutional inertia, self-interests of policy makers, political compromises as results of 
bargaining between countries and a knowledge gap between the research and political community. 
Interviews with policy makers may help to address this research gap. 
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8.2.3 Policy implications and further research on private finance mobilization 
 
For policy makers, the private finance results imply that, from a climate change mitigation perspective, 
they should refrain from seeing private investments as primary goal of climate finance, and better focus 
climate finance on projects and programs reducing GHG emissions most effectively. Private finance may 
be used as project selection criteria if very similar projects are compared and if no better information on 
(cost-)effectiveness is available. The simplest way to achieve GHG emission reductions cost-effectively is 
to set a price on carbon emission, via a carbon tax, ETS and, if politically needed, with an intermediary 
tool between CDM and a national ETS. With such a carbon price, the private sector would invest by 
itself in the most cost-effective mitigation technologies and opportunities (assuming no market failures), 
and private finance is mobilized on its own. Any deviation away from a pure carbon price signal to an 
instrument that primarily aims at mobilizing private investments in low-carbon technologies will lead to 
less effective results in terms of GHG mitigation, as long as the mobilized private finance does not cover 
abatement costs. If policy makers realize that some cost-effective low-carbon investments are not 
undertaken even under a carbon price (due to market failures), an analysis of the investment barriers and 
the use of complementary policy instruments (e.g. capacity building tools, regulatory change and in some 
cases public investment or guarantees to buy down risks) may be needed. However, such a policy will 
only be (cost-)effective if it focuses on the investment barriers of the most (cost-)effective projects, and 
not on the investment barriers of the projects mobilizing most private investments. Evaluating whether 
and which of such complementary finance tools is needed requires detailed scrutiny of specific cases by 
policy makers.  
 
The result on private finance mobilization leave at least two research gaps open. First, has public climate 
finance ever induced the private sector to take over costs of mitigation (meaning that the private sector 
takes over costs for which it is not compensated with carbon credit sales or public subsidies)? Second, 
are private finance and effectiveness in reducing GHG emissions more strongly aligned in case of finance 
facilitating tools of the development banks (e.g. public-private equity funds, credit lines, guarantees)?  
 
 
8.3 Key policy recommendations  
 
As final part of this thesis, we can derive at least five key policy recommendations related to the 
effectiveness of international climate finance:  
(1)  Policy makers have to carefully define major climate finance terms, such as “new and additional”, to allow 
for transparency, common expectations and assessment of compliance. The choice of the 
definitions may have major implications on the level of climate finance and related effectiveness.  
(2)  Policy makers have to be more careful in using carbon market tools that require assessment of 
counterfactual emission reductions, such as in the CDM. Transformation of the carbon price signal from 
supporting counterfactual GHG emission reductions to pricing factual GHG emissions is a key 
endeavor for international climate finance in the next years.  
(3)  Policy makers have to strengthen the assessment of public climate finance effectiveness in order to avoid 
overestimations. For this, detailed and transparent GHG calculation methodologies and the review 
of the results are needed, also in case of the new Green Climate Fund. An important ingredient of 
effective public finance may be a detailed case-specific assessment on whether a market failure is 
indeed given, and which programs are best suitable for removing this market failure. Results from 
existing and future academic research may be helpful in this regard.  
(4) As existing climate finance has not been very successful in supporting the set-up of national climate 
policies as key drivers for a low-carbon transformation, new ways to support national policies via 
Effectiveness of international climate finance    Chapter 8: Conclusions 
 
 
157 
international climate finance have to be explored, e.g. by combining price signals with capacity building 
or by strategically supporting developing countries that undertake ambitious measures.  
(5)  While the private sector is often cost-effective in implementation and will be required as key 
provider of low-carbon investments, public institutions should be careful that a focus on projects 
mobilizing most private finance does not exclude some of the most (cost-)effective mitigation options, such as non-
CO2 reducing projects or publicly owned programs in China. As long as public institutions have 
enough information, they can achieve more (cost-)effective results when focusing international 
climate finance on projects and programs that reduce GHG emissions most (cost-)effectively. 
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10 Annexes 
 
10.1 Conducted expert interviews 
 
Position of interviewee Institution Date of interview
CDM expert International NGO, Peru 29/10/2010
Senior operational officer World Bank, USA 30/11/2010
Senior environment specialist World Bank, USA 30/11/2010
Senior official Global Environment Facility, USA 07/12/2010
CDM administrator, delegation member in the climate 
negotiations  
Government, Vietnam 08/12/2010
University researcher, delegation member in the 
climate negotiations 
University, Peru 09/12/2010
Director National funding institution, Peru 09/12/2010
Climate change expert European country’s embassy, Peru 03/02/2011
Former senior expert on energy efficiency Ministry of Energy & Mines, Peru  04/02/2011
Expert for CDM Programmes of Activities Private company, Germany 23/03/2011
Senior Project Manager, CDM fund Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau, 
Germany 
29/03/2011
Head of sustainability International Finance Corporation, 
USA 
08/07/2011
Senior program director, private finance specialist International NGO, Switzerland 14/07/2011
Head of climate fund European Investment Bank, 
Luxembourg 
15/07/2011
Expert for clean tech venture capital funds Asian Development Bank, 
Philippines 
15/07/2011
Manager, clean energy finance United Nations Environment 
Programme, Kenya/France  
23/07/2011
Senior expert, public-private climate fund Department for International 
Development, United Kingdom 
29/07/2011
Senior expert, public-private climate fund Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau, 
Germany 
29/07/2011
Senior official, member of the climate negotiations 
delegation 
Government, Chile 22/09/2011
University researcher, CDM official University & Government, China 21/09/2011
Senior expert, delegation member in the climate 
negotiations 
Federal Office for the Environment, 
Switzerland 
 20/08/2012 
Senior expert, delegation member in the climate 
negotiations 
State Secretariat for Economic 
Affairs, Switzerland 
 12/09/2012 
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10.2 Annex to Chapter 5 (Drivers for renewable energy diffusion) 
 
 
10.2.1 Summary statistics (only observations with positive dependent variable) 
 
Biomass power Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Dependent variable 503 2.87 3.65 0.01 26.29
Lagged DV 503 2.73 3.45 0.00 26.29
CDM 503 4.56 38.13 0.00 562.23
GEF 503 4.53 28.34 0.00 295.78
Knowledge 503 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.14
Policies 503 0.04 0.22 -1.00 2.00
Oil imports 503 0.40 4.03 -24.98 1.19
GDP per capita 503 4.24 3.26 0.37 18.45
Nat. resources 503 0.76 0.70 0.05 3.52
ODA 503 0.04 0.18 0.00 1.56
Kyoto Protocol 503 1.35 2.19 0.00 8.71
Electricity use 503 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
Financial mark. 485 0.44 0.27 0.11 1.69
FDI 503 0.03 0.03 -0.08 0.22
Develop. Loans 344 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Policies (Altern.) 503 0.04 0.23 0.00 2.00
Oil price 503 38.09 18.16 17.32 92.28
Grid stability 501 385.74 312.41 0.00 999.05
 
 
 Geothermal power Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Dependent variable 164 14.02 13.25 0.00 56.77
Lagged DV 164 13.84 13.46 0.00 56.77
CDM 164 13.39 69.43 0.00 427.12
GEF 164 24.94 94.76 0.00 481.96
Knowledge 164 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
Policies 164 0.34 0.88 0.00 3.00
Oil imports 164 0.59 0.71 -1.39 1.11
GDP per capita 164 3.18 2.52 0.16 8.80
Nat. resources 164 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
ODA 164 1.31 2.51 0.00 11.07
Kyoto Protocol 164 1.13 2.17 0.00 9.73
Electricity use 164 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Financial mark. 163 0.43 0.21 0.15 1.16
FDI 164 0.02 0.02 -0.03 0.09
Develop. Loans 110 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Policies (Altern.) 164 0.20 0.40 0.00 1.00
Oil price 164 38.00 19.41 17.32 92.28
Grid stability 161 331.00 262.99 41.25 990.46
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Hydro power Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Dependent variable 1625 172.26 488.58 0.03 5346.34
Lagged DV 1625 174.61 503.88 0.00 5770.18
CDM 1625 5.84 56.85 0.00 961.04
GEF 1625 4.25 39.28 0.00 666.15
Knowledge 1625 0.01 0.04 0.00 0.70
Policies 1625 0.11 0.53 0.00 3.00
Oil imports 1625 -2.03 18.67 -361.19 2.94
GDP per capita 1625 2.51 3.33 0.11 27.51
Nat. resources 1625 1.63 1.42 0.01 9.41
ODA 1625 5.37 14.38 0.00 171.55
Kyoto Protocol 1625 0.89 1.84 0.00 9.93
Electricity use 1619 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
Financial mark. 1547 0.40 0.29 0.00 2.32
FDI 1590 0.03 0.05 -0.21 0.90
Develop. Loans 1062 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
Policies (Altern.) 1625 0.06 0.24 0.00 1.00
Oil price 1625 37.33 17.84 17.32 92.28
Grid stability 1612 476.45 348.77 0.21 1000.00
 
 
Solar power Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Dependent variable 125 0.08 0.19 0.00 1.05
Lagged DV 125 0.07 0.17 0.00 1.05
CDM 125 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
GEF 125 21.23 73.52 0.00 396.67
Knowledge 125 0.02 0.04 0.00 0.21
Policies 125 0.03 0.31 -1.00 2.00
Oil imports 125 0.35 0.69 -0.96 1.04
GDP per capita 125 4.72 4.78 0.18 18.45
Nat. resources 125 5.22 0.65 3.10 6.10
ODA 125 0.17 0.80 0.00 4.37
Kyoto Protocol 125 1.73 2.13 0.00 7.93
Electricity use 125 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
Financial mark. 125 0.67 0.44 0.19 1.80
FDI 125 0.02 0.02 -0.01 0.09
Develop. Loans 101 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Policies (Altern.) 125 0.13 0.46 0.00 2.00
Oil price 125 45.40 21.05 17.32 92.28
Grid stability 123 136.38 113.23 0.00 490.47
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Wind power Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Dependent variable 240 0.61 1.17 0.00 6.23
Lagged DV 240 0.52 1.06 0.00 5.80
CDM 240 6.23 29.76 0.00 255.39
GEF 240 11.75 39.99 0.00 247.18
Knowledge 240 0.02 0.04 0.00 0.38
Policies 240 0.16 0.50 0.00 3.00
Oil imports 240 0.39 0.73 -2.09 1.18
GDP per capita 240 4.99 4.85 0.44 27.51
Nat. resources 240 4.71 0.92 2.60 6.60
ODA 240 0.18 0.46 0.00 4.06
Kyoto Protocol 240 1.53 2.12 0.00 8.13
Electricity use 240 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
Financial mark. 240 0.58 0.34 0.15 1.69
FDI 240 0.03 0.03 -0.01 0.22
Develop. loans 204 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Policies (Altern.) 240 0.21 0.52 0.00 3.00
Oil price 240 43.98 20.31 17.32 92.28
Grid stability 236 286.36 287.82 0.24 916.18
 
 
 
 
10.2.2 Correlation tables (only observations with positive dependent variable) 
 
 
Biomass power 
 
Dependent var. 1.00 
Lagged DV 0.94 1.00
CDM 0.38 0.37 1.00 
GEF -0.06 -0.06 -0.01 1.00 
Knowledge -0.06 -0.06 0.00 -0.02 1.00 
Policies -0.03 -0.03 0.00 -0.01 0.20 1.00
Oil imports 0.16 0.15 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.04 1.00
GDP per capita -0.25 -0.24 -0.04 -0.04 0.47 0.11 -0.11 1.00
Nat. resources 0.21 0.22 0.10 -0.11 -0.04 0.00 -0.28 -0.05 1.00
ODA 0.13 0.11 -0.01 -0.03 -0.04 -0.03 0.06 -0.17 0.05 1.00
Kyoto Protocol 0.15 0.16 0.28 0.03 0.12 0.15 0.08 0.14 -0.04 0.00 1.00
Electricity use -0.21 -0.21 -0.02 0.01 0.20 0.09 -0.21 0.81 -0.22 -0.15 0.11 1.00
Financial mark. -0.06 -0.07 0.02 0.32 0.16 0.29 0.19 0.21 -0.25 -0.03 0.17 0.27 1.00 
FDI -0.05 -0.05 0.03 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.15 0.03 -0.05 0.04 0.28 0.15 0.33 1.00 
Develop. Loans -0.12 -0.12 0.01 -0.01 -0.03 -0.01 0.02 -0.10 -0.12 -0.04 -0.03 -0.11 0.04 -0.03 1.00 
Policies (Altern.) 0.01 -0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.41 0.85 0.05 0.22 0.01 -0.03 0.21 0.15 0.29 -0.01 -0.02 1.00 
Oil price 0.06 0.07 0.23 0.02 0.21 0.21 0.06 0.18 -0.03 -0.07 0.76 0.11 0.18 0.24 0.03 0.29 1.00
Grid stability -0.02 -0.01 -0.05 -0.14 -0.05 0.00 -0.09 -0.09 0.43 -0.10 -0.08 -0.36 -0.29 -0.12 0.01 0.03 -0.07 1.00
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Geothermal power 
 
Dependent var. 1.00 
Lagged DV 0.98 1.00
CDM 0.15 0.14 1.00 
GEF 0.42 0.41 -0.01 1.00 
Knowledge -0.17 -0.16 -0.02 -0.02 1.00 
Policies 0.48 0.47 0.07 0.70 0.07 1.00
Oil imports 0.40 0.34 0.10 0.15 0.03 0.08 1.00
GDP per capita -0.39 -0.35 -0.06 -0.15 0.12 -0.17 -0.49 1.00
Nat. resources 0.48 0.47 0.23 0.08 -0.05 0.16 0.10 -0.05 1.00
ODA 0.63 0.58 -0.07 0.56 -0.06 0.56 0.06 -0.35 0.06 1.00
Kyoto Protocol 0.12 0.09 0.61 -0.09 -0.04 0.05 0.06 0.19 0.34 -0.26 1.00
Electricity use -0.43 -0.29 -0.06 -0.19 0.01 -0.09 -0.50 0.89 -0.11 -0.36 0.05 1.00
Financial mark. -0.18 -0.19 -0.01 0.07 0.00 0.06 0.08 -0.16 -0.15 0.05 0.04 0.10 1.00 
FDI -0.08 -0.07 0.00 -0.03 0.00 -0.02 0.07 0.03 -0.07 -0.07 0.17 0.19 0.04 1.00 
Develop. loans -0.09 -0.08 -0.05 -0.04 0.13 0.09 -0.31 -0.12 -0.07 0.24 -0.14 -0.12 0.05 -0.05 1.00 
Policies (Altern.) 0.47 0.44 0.24 0.46 0.16 0.77 0.09 -0.19 0.15 0.41 0.19 -0.11 0.08 -0.02 0.22 1.00 
Oil price 0.04 -0.01 0.40 -0.11 0.18 -0.01 0.09 0.21 0.01 -0.23 0.66 0.11 0.08 0.15 -0.02 0.20 1.00
Grid stability -0.03 -0.01 -0.09 -0.12 -0.03 -0.05 0.14 -0.13 -0.23 -0.15 -0.07 -0.41 -0.36 -0.12 -0.21 -0.09 -0.04 1.00
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Hydro power 
 
Dependent var. 1.00 
Lagged DV 0.99 1.00
CDM -0.02 -0.02 1.00 
GEF -0.02 -0.02 0.01 1.00 
Knowledge -0.03 -0.03 0.00 0.14 1.00 
Policies 0.11 0.12 -0.02 0.00 -0.02 1.00
Oil imports 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.02 -0.07 1.00
GDP per capita -0.13 -0.13 0.00 -0.05 0.22 -0.08 -0.09 1.00
Nat. resources 0.17 0.17 0.09 0.04 -0.03 0.14 -0.04 -0.12 1.00
ODA 0.11 0.12 -0.03 -0.02 -0.03 0.13 0.04 -0.15 0.36 1.00
Kyoto Protocol -0.04 -0.03 0.30 0.10 0.11 -0.01 -0.08 0.12 0.05 -0.13 1.00
Electricity use 0.09 0.08 -0.02 -0.02 0.20 -0.05 0.03 0.73 -0.18 -0.19 0.08 1.00
Financial mark. -0.15 -0.15 0.03 -0.05 0.03 -0.05 0.12 0.30 -0.11 -0.09 0.11 0.31 1.00 
FDI 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.06 0.06 -0.14 -0.01 0.03 0.01 0.13 0.04 0.07 1.00 
Develop. loans -0.03 -0.03 -0.01 0.57 -0.02 -0.03 0.02 -0.02 0.03 -0.02 0.05 -0.03 0.03 -0.02 1.00 
Policies (Altern.) 0.08 0.09 -0.01 0.02 -0.02 0.83 -0.04 -0.07 0.15 0.12 0.10 -0.04 0.00 0.02 -0.03 1.00 
Oil price -0.03 -0.02 0.18 0.09 0.17 0.02 -0.04 0.06 0.01 -0.14 0.73 0.09 0.14 0.21 0.05 0.10 1.00
Grid stability 0.36 0.36 0.01 0.04 -0.09 0.14 0.02 -0.24 0.44 0.21 -0.06 -0.32 -0.37 -0.06 0.04 0.12 -0.06 1.00
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Solar power 
 
Dependent var. 1.00 
Lagged DV 0.92 1.00
CDM . . . 
GEF 0.14 0.19 . 1.00 
Knowledge 0.13 0.01 . 0.05 1.00 
Policies -0.04 -0.04 . 0.00 -0.01 1.00
Oil imports 0.31 0.22 . 0.22 0.05 0.01 -0.34
GDP per capita -0.24 -0.26 . -0.13 0.38 -0.04 -0.15 1.00
Nat. resources 0.32 0.31 . -0.01 -0.10 -0.04 0.19 -0.03 1.00
ODA 0.13 0.16 . -0.04 -0.07 -0.01 0.07 -0.17 0.21 1.00
Kyoto Protocol 0.02 0.05 . 0.11 0.26 0.02 -0.45 0.17 0.00 0.26 1.00
Electricity use -0.22 -0.24 . -0.21 0.20 -0.03 0.03 0.87 -0.06 -0.20 0.11 1.00
Financial mark. 0.32 0.26 . -0.09 0.00 0.00 -0.09 -0.15 0.00 -0.16 0.00 -0.01 1.00 
FDI -0.26 -0.22 . -0.03 -0.04 -0.01 0.06 -0.04 -0.09 -0.02 0.12 -0.04 0.07 1.00 
Develop. loans -0.15 -0.13 . -0.01 -0.06 0.11 0.04 -0.20 0.04 -0.06 -0.13 -0.22 0.08 -0.04 1.00 
Policies (Altern.) -0.11 -0.10 . 0.04 -0.02 0.49 0.09 -0.03 -0.33 -0.01 0.19 -0.06 -0.07 -0.03 0.09 1.00 
Oil price 0.27 0.25 . 0.13 0.19 0.01 0.10 0.12 0.02 0.15 0.77 0.06 0.15 0.12 -0.15 0.20 1.00
Grid stability -0.08 -0.01 . 0.57 -0.10 0.06 -0.34 -0.31 -0.20 -0.06 -0.10 -0.45 -0.16 -0.05 0.06 0.09 0.00 1.00
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Wind power 
 
Dependent var 
 
 
 
1.00 
 
 
Lagged DV 0.95 1.00
CDM 0.33 0.31 1.00 
GEF 0.31 0.24 -0.02 1.00 
Knowledge -0.06 -0.05 -0.02 -0.03 1.00 
Policies 0.02 0.01 0.05 -0.03 -0.03 1.00
Oil imports 0.22 0.20 0.11 0.13 0.07 -0.00 1.00
GDP per capita -0.18 -0.17 -0.03 -0.06 0.50 0.03 -0.01 1.00
Nat. resources -0.02 0.00 0.14 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.09 0.16 1.00
ODA 0.33 0.23 0.13 -0.02 -0.05 0.04 0.05 -0.10 0.14 1.00
Kyoto Protocol 0.16 0.13 0.41 -0.08 0.17 0.06 -0.41 0.10 -0.07 0.16 1.00
Electricity use -0.20 -0.19 -0.01 -0.13 0.25 -0.02 0.26 0.80 0.05 -0.12 0.10 1.00
Financial mark. -0.02 -0.03 0.06 0.00 0.05 0.15 0.16 0.39 0.20 0.15 0.00 0.21 1.00 
FDI 0.12 0.11 0.02 0.07 -0.02 -0.03 0.04 0.04 0.10 0.00 0.25 0.10 0.34 1.00 
Develop. loans 0.12 0.14 0.25 -0.03 -0.05 -0.01 0.03 -0.10 -0.12 0.37 0.15 -0.17 0.09 -0.03 1.00 
Policies (Altern.) 0.15 0.11 0.18 -0.05 -0.02 0.64 0.03 0.00 -0.04 0.06 0.26 -0.05 0.14 -0.04 -0.01 1.00 
Oil price 0.21 0.17 0.27 0.04 0.20 0.08 0.08 0.17 -0.04 0.19 0.76 0.08 0.12 0.36 0.11 0.27 1.00
Grid stability 0.07 0.10 -0.12 -0.04 -0.11 0.08 0.06 -0.20 -0.42 -0.09 0.01 -0.38 -0.45 -0.05 -0.02 0.10 0.04 1.00
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10.2.3 Biomass power: alternative specifications and sensitivity analyzes  
 
BIOMASS Selection model 
Logit with 
clustered SE 
Blundell-Bond (BB), 
One step, robust SE , 
w/o control 
Fixed effects,  
robust SE 
Blundell-Bond (BB) 
GMM system model, 
One step, robust SE 
 dy/dx SE  Coeff SE  Coeff SE  Coeff SE  
GEF_L1-3 -0.004 (0.003)  0.000 (0.002) -0.005 (0.019)  0.000 (0.002)
GEF_L4-6 -0.000 (0.002)  -0.001 (0.001) 0.002 (0.003)  -0.001 (0.001)
GEF_L7-9 -0.000 (0.003)  -0.001 (0.001) 0.002 (0.003)  -0.001 (0.002)
Year FE Yes   yes   Yes  Yes   
N 2182   503   503  503   
Groups 133   36   36   36   
F-/Wald-test  0.0 (Wald, p-value) 0.0 (Wald, p-value) 0.0 (F-test, p-value) 0.0 (Wald, p-value) 
Various stats 0.08 (Pseudo-R2) 0.85 (AR2, p-value) 0.84 (R2) 0.95 (AR2, p-value)
Hansen test    1.00     1.00   
# instruments    288     409   
Not displayed: Control variables +lagged DV for Random effects and BB; endog. variables in BB: CDM, GEF, ODA, policies 
 
 
 
BIOMASS Blundell-Bond 
GMM system model, 
One step, robust SE; 
CDM Lag1 
Blundell-Bond 
GMM system model, 
One step, robust SE; 
CDM Lag1-2 
Blundell-Bond 
GMM system model, 
One step, robust SE; 
GEF Lags 1-6 
Blundell-Bond 
GMM system model, 
One step, robust SE; 
GEF Lags 1-2 
 Coeff SE  Coeff SE  Coeff SE  Coeff SE  
CDM 0.029 (0.002) *** 0.017 (0.005) *** 0.017 (0.005) *** 0.017 (0.005) *** 
GEF -0.000 (0.001)  -0.001 (0.001) -0.000 (0.001)  0.006 (0.016)
Year 
dummies Yes 
 
Yes
  
Yes
 
 Yes 
  
N 503   482   503   482   
Groups 36   36   36   36   
F-/Wald-test  0.0 (Wald, p-value) 0.0 (Wald, p-value) 0.0 (Wald, p-value) 0.0 (Wald, p-value) 
Various tests 0.57 (AR2, p-value) 0.96 (AR2, p-value) 0.96 (AR2, p-value) 0.96 (AR2, p-value) 
Hansen test 1.0   1.0   1.0   1.0   
# instruments 387   387   387   386   
Not displayed: Lagged DV + control variables; Endogenous variables: CDM, GEF, ODA, policies 
 
 
 
BIOMASS Fixed effects,  
bias corrected,   
bootstrap SE  
OLS with clustered 
SE 
 
Random effects,  
robust standard errors  
 
Arellano Bond GMM 
difference model, 
robust standard errors
 Coeff SE  Coeff SE  Coeff SE  Coeff SE  
Lagged DV 0.781 (0.066) *** 0.941 (0.053) *** 0.941 (0.053) *** 0.534 (0.200) *** 
CDM 0.017 (0.002) *** 0.012 (0.002) *** 0.012 (0.002) *** 0.020 (0.004) *** 
GEF_L1-9 0.001 (0.004)  0.000 (0.001)  0.000 (0.001)  -0.005 (0.008)
Knowledge -2.903 (5.714)  -5.552 (3.189) * -5.552 (3.189) * -10.997 (11.95)
Policies 0.364 (0.167) ** 0.324 (0.386)  0.324 (0.386)  0.101 (0.246)
Oil imports -0.048 (0.060)  0.032 (0.009) *** 0.032 (0.009) *** -0.021 (0.068)
GDP per capita -0.027 (0.040)  -0.004 (0.012)  -0.004 (0.012)  -0.187 (0.179)
Nat. resources 0.705 (0.495)  0.299 (0.091) *** 0.299 (0.091) *** 0.489 (0.919)
ODA 0.543 (0.317) * 0.561 (0.140)*** 0.561 (0.140) *** 0.304 (0.458)
Constant    -0.244 (0.243) -0.228 (0.262)   
Year FE Yes   Yes Yes   Yes   
N 503   503   503   481   
Groups 36   36    36   36   
F-/Wald-test - (Wald, p-value) 0.0 (F-test, p-value) - (Wald, p-value) 0.0 (Wald, p-value)
Various stats - (R2) 0.91 (R2) 0.91 (R2) 0.96 (AR2, p-value)
Hansen test        1.0   
# instruments        186   
Dependent variable: tonnes of CO2 reduced with biomass power generation, per million USD of GDP (2007 USD), assuming 500 tCO2 reduced 
per GWh of renewable power production; for bias-corrected FE estimator, the xtlsdvc Stata command was used, and the BB estimator was 
chosen to initialize the bias correction, all independent variables assumed to be exogenous in all models.  
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BIOMASS Blundell-Bond 
GMM system model, 
robust standard errors   
Blundell-Bond 
GMM system model, 
robust standard errors 
Blundell-Bond 
GMM system model, 
robust standard errors   
Blundell-Bond 
GMM system model, 
robust standard errors  
 Coeff SE  Coeff SE  Coeff SE  Coeff SE   
Lagged DV 0.715 (0.152) *** 0.705 (0.157) *** 0.691 (0.164) *** 0.660 (0.173) ***  
CDM 0.017 (0.005) *** 0.016 (0.005) *** 0.017 (0.006) *** 0.017 (0.006) ***  
GEF -0.001 (0.001)  -0.001 (0.001) 0.000 (0.001)  -0.001 (0.001)
Knowledge -5.809 (5.255)  -3.112 (5.779)  -7.575 (5.566)
Policies 0.348 (0.494)  0.385 (0.499) 0.391 (0.466)  0.347 (0.481)
Oil imports 0.075 (0.027)  0.071 (0.026) *** 0.083 (0.033) ** 0.111 (0.038) *** 
GDP per capita -0.055 (0.039)  -0.068 (0.045)   -0.056 (0.044)  
Nat. resources 0.602 (0.236) ** 0.639 (0.251) ** 0.655 (0.243) *** 0.864 (0.310) *** 
ODA 0.461 (0.289)  0.381 (0.308)  0.662 (0.330) ** 0.448 (0.382)  
Kyoto Protocol    0.168 (0.111)     
Electricity use     -162.64 (112.44)    
Financial mark.     -0.097 (0.443)    
Develop. loans      -244.63 (225.67)
Constant 0.175 (0.481)  -0.691 (0.715) 0.071 (0.436)  0.146 (0.506)
Year FE Yes   Yes  Yes   Yes    
N 503   503    485   344    
Groups 36   36    35   36    
F-/Wald-test  0.0 (Wald, p-value) 0.0 (Wald, p-value) 0.0 (Wald, p-value) 0.0 (Wald, p-value)
Various tests 0.96 (AR2, p-value) 0.95 (AR2, p-value) 0.71 (AR2, p-value) 0.78 (AR2, p-value)
Hansen test 0.0   1.0   1.0   0.0    
# instruments 403   387   374   333    
Endogenous variable: CDM, GEF, ODA, development bank loans, policies  
 
 
 
BIOMASS Blundell-Bond 
GMM system model, 
robust standard errors  
Blundell-Bond 
GMM system model, 
robust standard errors 
Blundell-Bond 
GMM system model, 
robust standard errors 
Blundell-Bond 
GMM system model, 
robust standard errors  
 Coeff SE  Coeff SE  Coeff SE  Coeff SE   
Lagged DV 0.712 (0.153) *** 0.699 (0.155) *** 0.723 (0.149) *** 0.715 (0.151) ***  
CDM 0.017 (0.005) *** 0.017 (0.005) *** 0.016 (0.005) *** 0.017 (0.005) ***  
GEF_L1-9 -0.001 (0.001)  -0.001 (0.001) -0.001 (0.001)  -0.001 (0.001)
Knowledge    -7.014 (4.920) -5.832 (5.258)  -5.721 (5.358)
Policies 0.342 (0.492)  0.289 (0.485) 0.368 (0.54)  0.352 (0.497)
Oil imports 0.077 (0.033) ** 0.080 (0.029) *** 0.079 (0.027) *** 0.068 (0.024) *** 
GDP per capita -0.049 (0.039)  -0.057 (0.040)  -0.054 (0.039)  -0.050 (0.038)  
Nat. resources 0.592 (0.233) ** 0.621 (0.246) ** 0.733 (0.270) *** 0.643 (0.266) ** 
ODA 0.476 (0.288) * 0.468 (0.288)  0.334 (0.266)  0.472 (0.275) * 
3rd education -0.003 (0.009)     
Oil price    0.002 (0.005)     
Stability     -0.001 (0.000)    
Agricult. area      -78.834 (100.61)  
Constant 0.114 (0.531)  0.595 (0.484)  0.354 (0.581)  0.189 (0.494)
Year FE Yes   No  Yes   Yes    
N 503   503    501   503    
Groups 36   36    36   36    
F-/Wald-test  0.0 (Wald, p-value) 0.0 (Wald, p-value) 0.0 (Wald, p-value) 0.0 (Wald, p-value)
Various tests 0.97 (AR2, p-value) 0.92 (AR2, p-value) 0.94 (AR2, p-value) 0.96 (AR2, p-value)
Hansen test 1.0   0.0   1.0   1.0    
# instruments 386   370   385   387    
Endogenous variable: CDM, GEF, ODA, policies 
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Alternative 
DV 
CO2 reduction via RE 
per capita 
 
Share of RE electricity 
production 
 
CO2 reduction via RE 
per GDP (country-
specific grid factors) 
CO2 reduction via RE 
per GDP (difference 
to last year) 
BIOMASS Blundell-Bond 
GMM system model, 
robust standard errors 
Blundell-Bond 
GMM system model, 
robust standard errors 
Blundell-Bond 
GMM system model, 
robust standard errors 
Blundell-Bond 
GMM system model, 
robust standard errors 
 Coeff SE  Coeff SE  Coeff SE  Coeff SE  
Lagged DV 0.797 (0.136)  0.809 (0.102) *** 0.804 (0.130) ***   
CDM 0.011 (0.005) ** 0.062 (0.014) *** 0.017 (0.005) *** 0.010 (0.001) *** 
GEF_L1-9 0.003 (0.003)  -0.002 (0.006)  -0.001 (0.001)  0.000 (0.000)  
Knowledge -50.176 (34.799)  -49.143 (27.189)  -3.089 (2.831)  -6.357 (4.042)  
Policies 4.939 (5.095)  4.556 (4.045)  0.024 (0.145)  0.298 (0.332)  
Oil imports 0.416 (0.131) *** 0.451 (0.133) *** 0.023 (0.016)  0.024 (0.011) ** 
GDP per capita 0.310 (0.119) *** 0.000 (0.000) ** -0.045 (0.029)  0.010 (0.011)  
Nat. resources 3.920 (1.438) *** 3.687 (1.399) *** 0.047 (0.134)  0.249 (0.120) ** 
ODA -0.930 (0.856)  1.025 (1.382)  0.640 (0.313) * 0.001 (0.000) *** 
Constant -2.710 (1.858)  0.466 (2.037) 0.144 (0.399)  0.256 (0.463)  
Year FE Yes   No Yes   Yes   
N 503   501   503   503   
Groups 36   36   36   36   
Wald-test  0.0 (Wald, p-value) 0.0 (Wald, p-value) 0.0 (Wald, p-value) 0.0 (Wald, p-value) 
Various stat. 0.25 (AR2, p-value) 0.65 (AR2, p-value) 0.23 (AR2, p-value) 0.82 (AR2, p-value) 
Hansen test  1.00 (p-value) 1.00 (p-value) 1.00 (p-value) 1.00 (p-value) 
# instruments 385   388   389   217  
Note: In case of CO2 reduction via RE per capita, CDM, GEF and ODA are standardized per capita and not per USD of GDP. Not displayed: 
Endogenous variables in BB: CDM, GEF, ODA, policies 
 
 
Influence of number of policies in first lag & inclusion of post2012 CER value in CDM variable 
 
BIOMASS Blundell-Bond 
GMM system model, 
robust standard errors 
Blundell-Bond 
GMM system model, 
robust standard errors 
Blundell-Bond 
GMM system model, 
robust standard errors 
Blundell-Bond 
GMM system model, 
robust standard errors 
 Coeff SE  Coeff SE  Coeff SE  Coeff SE  
Lagged DV 0.723 (0.147) *** 0.697 (0.153) *** 0.710 (0.151) *** 0.706 (0.152) *** 
CDMtil2012 0.017 (0.005) *** 0.017 (0.005) *** 0.017 (0.005) ***   
CDMtil2020      0.011 (0.003) *** 
GEF_L1-9 -0.001 (0.002)  -0.001 (0.001)  -0.001 (0.001)  -0.001 (0.001)  
Knowledge -4.856 (5.593)  -7.965 (3.164) ** -7.407 (4.393) * -5.498 (5.602)  
Policies      0.330 (0.491)  
L.Policy 0.743 (0.601)   0.652 (0.621)    
L.REPolicy -0.105 (0.103)      
L.Policy_RPS    -1.308 (1.891)     
L.Policy_I&S    1.966 (1.642)     
Oil imports 0.075 (0.026) *** 0.074 (0.027) *** 0.075 (0.027) *** 0.077 (0.028) *** 
GDP per capita -0.039 (0.037)  -0.061 (0.041)  -0.056 (0.039)  -0.057 (0.038)  
Nat. resources 0.539 (0.209) ** 0.573 (0.236) ** 0.599 (0.234) ** 0.617 (0.241) ** 
ODA 0.487 (0.285) * 0.480 (0.304)  0.456 (0.294)  0.490 (0.288) * 
Constant 0.329 (0.499)  -0.044 (0.507)  -0.027 (0.506)  0.256 (0.463)  
Year FE Yes   Yes Yes  Yes  
N 503   503 503 503  
Groups 36   36 36 36  
Wald-test  0.0 (Wald, p-value) 0.0 (Wald, p-value) 0.0 (Wald, p-value) 0.0 (Wald, p-value) 
Various stat. 0.97 (AR2, p-value) 0.98 (AR2, p-value) 0.97 (AR2, p-value) 0.98 (AR2, p-value) 
Hansen test  1.00 (p-value) 1.00 (p-value) 1.0 (p-value) 1.00 (p-value) 
# instruments 436   383 384 386  
Note: Post-2012-CER price of 3 USD per CER assumed, which is roughly the average post-2012 CER price as reported by GTZ (2010) for the 
period 2005-2008. Not displayed: Endogenous variables in BB: CDM, GEF, ODA, policies; all policy variables entail the number of policies in 
the lag; TEN = tenders, RPS = Renewable portfolio standards, I&S=Incentives& Subsidies, FIT=Feed-in tariffs 
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10.2.4 Geothermal power: alternative specifications and sensitivity analyzes 
 
GEO-
THERMAL 
Selection model 
Logit with 
clustered SE 
Blundell-Bond (BB), 
One step, robust SE , 
w/o control 
Random effects,  
robust SE 
Blundell-Bond (BB) 
GMM system model, 
One step, robust SE 
 dy/dx SE  Coeff SE  Coeff SE  Coeff SE  
GEF_L1-3 0.004 (0.002) * 0.005 (0.002) ** 0.005 (0.003) ** 0.005 (0.002) ** 
GEF_L4-6 predicts success. perfect. 0.010 (0.002) *** 0.007 (0.004) ** 0.006 (0.002) ** 
GEF_L7-9 predicts success. perfect. 0.004 (0.003)  0.004 (0.004)  0.004 (0.003)  
Year FE Yes   Yes   Yes  Yes   
N 2001   164   164  164   
Groups 122   10   10   10   
F-/Wald-test  0.0 (Wald, p-value) 0.0 (Wald, p-value) - (Wald, p-value) 0.0 (Wald, p-value) 
Various stats 0.13 (Pseudo-R2) 0.44 (AR2, p-value) 0.97 (R2) 0.36 (AR2, p-value)
Hansen test    1.00     1.00   
# instruments    179     229   
Not displayed: Control variables +lagged DV for Random effects and BB; endog. variables in BB: CDM, GEF, ODA, policies 
 
 
 
GEO-
THERMAL 
Blundell-Bond 
GMM system model, 
One step, robust SE; 
CDM Lag1 
Blundell-Bond 
GMM system model, 
One step, robust SE; 
CDM Lag1-2 
Blundell-Bond 
GMM system model, 
One step, robust SE; 
GEF Lags 1-6 
Blundell-Bond 
GMM system model, 
One step, robust SE; 
GEF Lags 1-2 
 Coeff SE  Coeff SE  Coeff SE  Coeff SE  
CDM -0.002 (0.007)  0.004 (0.003)  0.004 (0.003)  0.004 (0.002)  
GEF 0.006 (0.002) *** 0.007 (0.002) *** 0.004 (0.001) *** 0.011 (0.004) *** 
Year FE Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   
N 164   157   164   157   
Groups 10   10   10   10   
F-/Wald-test  0.0 (Wald, p-value) 0.0 (Wald, p-value) 0.0 (Wald, p-value) 0.0 (Wald, p-value) 
Various tests 0.54 (AR2, p-value) 0.58 (AR2, p-value) 0.22 (AR2, p-value) 0.50 (AR2, p-value) 
Hansen test 1.0   1.0   1.0   1.0   
# instruments 229   225   226   217   
Not displayed: Lagged DV + control variables; Endogenous variables: CDM, GEF, ODA, policies 
 
 
 
GEO-
THERMAL 
Fixed effects,  
bias corrected,   
bootstrap SE 
OLS 
with clustered SE 
Fixed effects,  
robust standard 
errors  
Arellano Bond GMM 
difference model,  
robust standard errors
 Coeff SE  Coeff SE  Coeff SE  Coeff SE  
Lagged DV 0.796 (0.024) *** 0.862 (0.045) *** 0.766 (0.037) *** 0.787 (0.021) *** 
CDM  0.006 (0.004)  0.004 (0.002)  0.006 (0.004)  0.005 (0.003) * 
GEF_L1-9 0.004 (0.003)  0.005 (0.002) * 0.004 (0.002) ** 0.003 (0.003)  
Knowledge 87.322 (415.4)  -136.51 (126.64)  42.826 (153.29)  11.427 (116.34)  
Policies -0.094 (0.519)  -0.222 (0.301)  -0.458 (0.174) * -0.261 (0.372)  
Oil imports -0.786 (1.908)  0.390 (0.371)  -0.213 (0.683)  0.361 (0.911)  
GDP per capita -1.019 (0.830)  0.027 (0.122)  -0.675 (0.737)  -0.143 (0.371)  
Nat. resources       9.509 (3.848) ** Omit.       
ODA 0.611 (0.130) *** 0.497 (0.167) ** 0.727 (0.213) *** 0.618 (0.1498) *** 
Constant    1.474 (1.700) 5.334 (2.772) *  
Year FE Yes   Yes   Yes  Yes   
N 164   164   164   157   
Groups 10   10   10   10   
F-/Wald-test - (Wald, p-value) 0.0 (F-test, p-value) - (Wald, p-value) 0.0 (Wald, p-value)
Various stats - (R2) 0.97  (R2)  0.95 (R2) 0.30 (AR2, p-value)
Hansen test        1.0   
# instruments        138   
Dependent variable: tonnes of CO2 reduced with biomass power generation, per million USD of GDP (2007 USD), assuming 500 tCO2 reduced 
per GWh of renewable power production; for bias-corrected FE estimator, the xtlsdvc Stata command was used, and the BB estimator was 
chosen to initialize the bias correction, all independent variables assumed to be exogenous in all models.  
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GEO-
THERMAL 
Blundell-Bond 
GMM system model, 
robust standard errors   
Blundell-Bond 
GMM system model, 
robust standard errors 
Blundell-Bond 
GMM system model, 
robust standard errors 
Blundell-Bond 
GMM system model, 
robust standard errors; 
 Coeff SE  Coeff SE  Coeff SE  Coeff SE   
Lagged DV 0.813 (0.041) *** 0.817 (0.041) *** 0.807 (0.040) *** 0.776 (0.068) ***  
CDM 0.004 (0.003)  0.003 (0.003)  0.004 (0.003)  0.002 (0.002)   
GEF_L1-9 0.007 (0.002) *** 0.007 (0.002) *** 0.007 (0.001) *** 0.016 (0.005) *** 
Knowledge -122.135 (93.69)  56.566 (99.26)   -30.085 (117.97)  
Policies -0.244 (0.199)  -0.389 (0.197) ** -0.278 (0.157) * -0.127 (0.420)  
Oil imports 0.422 (0.346)  0.502 (0.367)  0.451 (0.366)  -0.032 (0.430)  
GDP per capita -0.053 (0.122)  -0.082 (0.126)   -0.234 (0.123)  
Nat. resources 12.606 (4.271) *** 10.979 (4.292) *** 12.028 (4.202) *** 20.996 (6.801) *** 
ODA 0.528 (0.130) *** 0.541 (0.000) *** 0.001 (0.000) *** 0.349 (0.214)  
Kyoto Protocol    0.274 (0.217)     
Electricity use     -635.71 (614.44)    
Financial mark.     -0.699 (1.263)    
Develop. loans       -971.2    (827.7) 
Constant 2.146 (1.332)  0.611 (1.430)  3.045 (1.386) ** 3.100 (1.66) ** 
Year FE Yes   Yes  Yes   Yes    
N 164   164    163   110    
Groups 10   10    10   10    
F-/Wald-test  0.0 (Wald, p-value) 0.0 (Wald, p-value) 0.0 (Wald, p-value) 0.0 (Wald, p-value)
Various tests 0.51 (AR2, p-value) 0.53 (AR2, p-value) 0.51 (AR2, p-value) 0.80 (AR2, p-value)
Hansen test 1.0   1.0   1.0   1.0    
# instruments 164   230   228   166    
Endogenous variable: CDM, GEF, ODA, development bank loans, policies 
 
 
 
GEO-
THERMAL 
Blundell-Bond 
GMM system model, 
robust standard errors   
Blundell-Bond 
GMM system model, 
robust standard errors 
Blundell-Bond 
GMM system model, 
robust standard errors  
Blundell-Bond 
GMM system model, 
robust standard errors 
 Coeff SE  Coeff SE  Coeff SE  Coeff SE   
Lagged DV 0.811 (0.044) *** 0.815 (0.043) *** 0.813 (0.043) *** 0.833 (0.045) ***  
CDM 0.004 (0.003)  0.002 (0.004)  0.004 (0.003)  0.006 (0.003) **  
GEF_L1-9 0.007 (0.001) *** 0.004 (0.002) * 0.007 (0.001) *** 0.006 (0.001) *** 
Knowledge    -175.37 (133.68)  -149.54 (122.93)  -184.4 (121.6)  
Policies -0.171 (0.181)  -0.065 (0.277)  -0.226 (0.178)  -0.242 (0.175)  
Oil imports 0.497 (0.363)  0.552 (0.312) * 0.348 (0.447)  0.955 (0.918)  
GDP per capita 0.020 (0.113)  -0.027 (0.120)  -0.059 (0.121)  0.012 (0.240)  
Nat. resources 13.506 (4.619) *** 12.221 (4.623) *** 12.465 (4.284) ***   
ODA 0.547 (0.150) *** 0.546 (0.147) *** 0.532 (0.131) *** 0.489 (0.134) *** 
3rd education -0.039 (0.043)      
Oil price    0.026 (0.020)     
Stability     0.000 (0.002)    
Volcanoes abs.      0.049 (0.030)  
Constant 2.676 (1.531)  -0.200 (0.691)  2.802 (1.556) * 2.166 (2.562)  
Year FE Yes   No  Yes   Yes    
N 164   164    161   164    
Groups 10   10    10   10    
F-/Wald-test  0.0 (Wald, p-value) 0.0 (Wald, p-value) 0.0 (Wald, p-value) 0.0 (Wald, p-value)
Various tests 0.50 (AR2, p-value) 0.24 (AR2, p-value) 0.51 (AR2, p-value) 0.48 (AR2, p-value)
Hansen test 1.0   1.0   1.0   1.0    
# instruments 229   212   225   229    
Endogenous variable: CDM, GEF, ODA, policies 
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Alternative 
DV 
CO2 reduction via RE 
per capita 
 
Share of RE electricity 
production 
 
CO2 reduction via RE 
per GDP (country-
specific grid factors) 
CO2 reduction via RE 
per GDP (difference 
to last year) 
GEO-
THERMAL 
Blundell-Bond 
GMM system model, 
robust standard errors   
Blundell-Bond 
GMM system model, 
robust standard errors   
Blundell-Bond 
GMM system model, 
robust standard errors   
Blundell-Bond 
GMM system model, 
robust standard errors   
 Coeff SE  Coeff SE  Coeff SE  Coeff SE  
Lagged DV 0.869 (0.040) *** 0.806 (0.054) *** 0.839 (0.038) ***   
CDM 0.007 (0.001) *** 0.026 (0.002)  0.003 (0.001) ** 0.006 (0.002) *** 
GEF_L1-9 0.001 (0.004)  0.038 (0.001) * 0.005 (0.002) *** 0.004 (0.003)  
Knowledge -279.16 (394.55)  -482.16 (552.69)  -23.878 (71.084)  90.799 (54.440) * 
Policies -0.401 (0.667)  -2.605 (1.600)  0.076 (0.174)  -0.229 (0.468)  
Oil imports 1.195 (1.759)  0.194 (3.230)  -0.293 (0.231)  -0.177 (0.333)  
GDP per capita 1.166 (0.741)  0.000 (0.000)  -0.162 (0.087) * 0.109 (0.103)  
Nat. resources 44.155 (19.988) ** 105.732 (34.513) *** 6.453 (1.542) *** 2.283 (1.865)  
ODA 0.737 (0.323) ** 2.153 (0.726) *** 0.427 (0.170) ** 0.176 (0.134)  
Constant -3.493 (3.122)  19.056 (9.211) * 2.172 (1.038)  -0.546 (0.715)  
Year FE Yes   Yes Yes Yes  
N 164   161 164 164  
Groups 10   10 10 10  
Wald-test  0.0 (Wald, p-value) 0.0 (Wald, p-value) 0.0 (Wald, p-value) 0.0 (Wald, p-value)
Various stat. 0.45 (AR2, p-value) 0.17 (AR2, p-value) 0.75 (AR2, p-value) 0.67 (AR2, p-value)
Hansen test  1.00 (p-value) 1.00 (p-value) 1.00 (p-value) 1.00 (p-value)
# instruments 229   224 230 187  
Note: In case of CO2 reduction via RE per capita, CDM, GEF and ODA are standardized per capita and not per USD of GDP. Not displayed: 
Endogenous variables in BB: CDM, GEF, ODA, policies 
 
 
Influence of number of policies in first lag & inclusion of post2012 CER value in CDM variable 
 
GEO-
THERMAL 
Blundell-Bond 
GMM system model, 
robust standard errors   
Blundell-Bond 
GMM system model, 
robust standard errors   
Blundell-Bond 
GMM system model, 
robust standard errors   
Blundell-Bond 
GMM system model, 
robust standard errors   
 Coeff SE  Coeff SE  Coeff SE  Coeff SE  
Lagged DV 0.813 (0.037) *** 0.802 (0.033) *** 0.812 (0.039) *** 0.813 (0.041) *** 
CDMtil2012 0.003 (0.003)  0.004 (0.003)  0.004 (0.003)    
CDMtil2020      0.003 (0.002) * 
GEF_L1-9 0.004 (0.001) *** 0.005 (0.001) *** 0.005 (0.002) *** 0.007 (0.002) *** 
Knowledge -219.10 (111.90) * -152.21 (93.495)  -149.52 (103.63)  -121.848 (93.551)  
Policies       -0.244 (0.199)  
L.Policy 0.374 (0.549)   0.105 (0.691)    
L.REPolicy -0.210 (0.191)      
L.Policy_TEN    -1.074 (0.537) **    
L.Policy_I&S    0.757 (0.687)     
Oil imports 0.327 (0.355)  0.402 (0.351)  0.403 (0.340)  0.422 (0.346)  
GDP per capita -0.022 (0.13)  -0.059 (0.128)  -0.043 (0.136)  -0.053 (0.122)  
Nat. resources 11.756 (3.928) *** 12.986 (4.023) *** 12.758 (4.229) *** 12.598 (4.270) *** 
ODA 0.510 (0.161) *** 0.518 (0.155) *** 0.514 (0.15) *** 0.001 (0.130) *** 
Constant 3.248 (1.638)  2.246 (1.388)  2.118 (1.428)  2.143 (1.333)  
Year FE Yes   Yes Yes  Yes  
N 164   164 164 164  
Groups 10   10 10 10  
Wald-test  0.0 (Wald, p-value) 0.0 (Wald, p-value) 0.0 (Wald, p-value) 0.0 (Wald, p-value)
Various stat. 0.36 (AR2, p-value) 0.44 (AR2, p-value) 0.44 (AR2, p-value) 0.51 (AR2, p-value)
Hansen test  1.00 (p-value) 1.00 (p-value) 1.0 (p-value) 1.00 (p-value)
# instruments 238   225 226 224  
Note: Post-2012-CER price of 3 USD per CER assumed, which is roughly the average post-2012 CER price as reported by GTZ (2010) for the 
period 2005-2008. Not displayed: Endogenous variables in BB: CDM, GEF, ODA, policies; all policy variables entail the number of policies in 
the lag; TEN = tenders, RPS = Renewable portfolio standards, I&S=Incentives& Subsidies, FIT=Feed-in tariffs 
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10.2.5 Hydro power: alternative specifications and sensitivity analyzes 
 
HYDRO Selection model 
Logit with 
clustered SE 
Blundell-Bond (BB), 
One step, robust SE , 
w/o control 
Random effects,  
robust SE 
Blundell-Bond (BB) 
GMM system model, 
One step, robust SE 
 dy/dx SE  Coeff SE  Coeff SE  Coeff SE  
GEF_L1-3 predicts success. perfect. 0.004 (0.032)  -0.008 (0.006)  0.005 (0.016)  
GEF_L4-6 predicts success. perfect. -0.287 (0.014)  -0.008 (0.028)  -0.007 (0.042)  
GEF_L7-9 predicts success. perfect. -0.012 (0.057)  -0.006 (0.036)  0.012 (0.037)  
Year FE    Yes   Yes  Yes   
N 1800   1613   1625  1625   
Groups 121   101   101   101   
F-/Wald-test  0.0 (Wald, p-value) 0.0 (Wald, p-value) 0.0 (Wald, p-value) 0.0 (Wald, p-value) 
Various stats 0.22 (Pseudo-R2) 0.22 (AR2, p-value) 0.99 (R2) 0.20 (AR2, p-value)
Hansen test    1.00     0.00   
# instruments    229     522   
Not displayed: Control variables +lagged DV for Random effects and BB; endog. variables in BB: CDM, GEF, ODA, policies 
 
 
 
HYDRO Blundell-Bond 
GMM system model, 
One step, robust SE; 
CDM Lag1 
Blundell-Bond 
GMM system model, 
One step, robust SE; 
CDM Lag1-2 
Blundell-Bond 
GMM system model, 
One step, robust SE; 
GEF Lags 1-6 
Blundell-Bond 
GMM system model, 
One step, robust SE; 
GEF Lags 1-2 
 Coeff SE  Coeff SE  Coeff SE  Coeff SE  
CDM 0.077 (0.057)  0.033 (0.020)  0.018 (0.014)  0.018 (0.013)
GEF -0.003 (0.025)  -0.003 (0.025) -0.009 (0.024)  -0.002 (0.021) 
Year FE Yes   Yes   Yes  Yes   
N 1619   1542   1619  1542   
Groups 1101   1101   1101   1101   
F-/Wald-test  0.0 (Wald, p-value) 0.0 (Wald, p-value) 0.0 (Wald, p-value) 0.0 (Wald, p-value) 
Various tests 0.19 (AR2, p-value) 0.19 (AR2, p-value) 0.19 (AR2, p-value) 0.19 (AR2, p-value) 
Hansen test 0.00   0.00   0.00   0.00   
# instruments 505   502   505   500   
Not displayed: Lagged DV + control variables; Endogenous variables: CDM, GEF, ODA, policies 
 
 
 
HYDRO Fixed effects,  
bias corrected,   
bootstrap SE 
OLS, with clustered 
SE 
 
 
Fixed effects,  
robust standard 
errors  
 
Arellano Bond 
GMM difference 
model, robust 
standard errors 
 Coeff SE  Coeff SE Coeff SE  Coeff SE 
Lagged DV 1.008 (0.013) *** 0.961 (0.017) *** 0.914 (0.046) *** 0.906 (0.069) *** 
CDM  0.012 (0.028) 0.009 (0.012) 0.012 (0.011)  0.038 (0.023)  
GEF -0.010 (0.040) -0.008 (0.008) -0.012 (0.011)  0.020 (0.043)  
Knowledge -90.62 (56.881) -11.620 (10.683) -86.553 (55.365)  -346.06 (207.1) * 
Policies 4.908 (3.090) 12.400 (9.299)  5.958 (6.978)  16.081 (10.60)  
Oil imports 0.242 (0.102) ** 0.055 (0.059) 0.272 (0.209)  0.444 (0.351)
GDP per capita 4.013 (3.428)  0.021 (0.235) 3.566 (1.863) * 10.794 (9.775)
Nat. resources -0.018 (9.092)  1.169 (1.667) 0.637 (21.567)  11.744 (31.085)
ODA -0.445 (0.144) * 0.114 (0.096) -0.514 (0.502)  -1.796 (1.223)
Constant    2.017 (4.379) 8.835 (34.739)   
Year FE Yes   Yes Yes  Yes  
N 1625   1625  1625  1530  
Groups 101     101   100  
F-/Wald-test  - (Wald, p-value) 0.0 (F-test, p-value) - (F-test, p-value) 0.0 (Wald, p-value) 
Various stats - (R2) 0.99 (R2)  0.99 (R2) 0.22 (AR2, p-value) 
Hansen test        0.0  
# instruments      197   
Dependent variable: tonnes of CO2 reduced with biomass power generation, per million USD of GDP (2007 USD), assuming 500 tCO2 reduced 
per GWh of renewable power production; for bias-corrected FE estimator, the xtlsdvc Stata command was used, and the BB estimator was 
chosen to initialize the bias correction, all independent variables assumed to be exogenous in all models.  
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HYDRO Blundell-Bond 
GMM system model, 
robust standard errors   
Blundell-Bond 
GMM system model, 
robust standard errors 
Blundell-Bond 
GMM system model, 
robust standard errors 
Blundell-Bond 
GMM system model, 
robust standard errors   
 Coeff SE  Coeff SE  Coeff SE  Coeff SE   
Lagged DV 0.964 (0.019) *** 0.964 (0.019) *** 0.969 (0.022) *** 0.957 (0.013) ***  
CDM 0.018 (0.014)  0.009 (0.023) 0.011 (0.013)  0.007 (0.017)  
GEF_L1-9 -0.009 (0.025)  -0.011 (0.025) -0.021 (0.022)  0.006 (0.037) 
Knowledge -17.550 (12.476) -15.918 (12.861)  -17.033 (12.781)
Policies 24.603 (18.691)  24.609 (18.912) 24.112 (18.922)  38.992 (33.405)
Oil imports 0.122 (0.153) 0.128 (0.155) 0.135 (0.162)  0.130 (0.163)
GDP per capita -0.092 (0.260) -0.117 (0.276)  0.003 (0.371)
Nat. resources 2.766 (2.745) 2.740 (2.711) 2.454 (2.675)  5.176 (4.326)
ODA -0.587 (0.576) -0.583 (0.573) -0.001 (0.001)  -1.378 (0.147)
Kyoto Protocol   1.063 (1.776)     
Electricity use     -3923.1 (2173.0) *   
Financial mark.     6.498 (6.675)    
Develop. loans      -1927.5 (3056.6)  
Constant -2.959 (3.836) -8.234 (8.829)  0.631 (4.923)  -5.200 (4.983)  
Year FE Yes   Yes  Yes   Yes    
N 1625   1625    1541   1062    
Groups 101   101    98   101    
F-/Wald-test  0.0 (Wald, p-value) 0.0 (Wald, p-value) 0.0 (Wald, p-value) 0.0 (Wald, p-value)
Various tests 0.20 (AR2, p-value) 0.20 (AR2, p-value) 0.19 (AR2, p-value) 0.23 (AR2, p-value)
Hansen test 1.0   1.0   0.0   0.0    
# instruments 505   506   498   460    
Endogenous variable: CDM, GEF, ODA, development bank loans, policies  
 
 
 
HYDRO Blundell-Bond 
GMM system model, 
robust standard errors   
Blundell-Bond 
GMM system model, 
robust standard errors 
Blundell-Bond 
GMM system model, 
robust standard errors;   
Blundell-Bond 
GMM system model, 
robust standard errors;   
 Coeff SE  Coeff SE  Coeff SE  Coeff SE   
Lagged DV 0.965 (0.019) *** 0.964 (0.019) *** 0.961 (0.018) *** 0.967 (0.021) ***  
CDM 0.022 (0.014)  0.014 (0.016) 0.025 (0.016)  0.022 (0.013) *  
GEF_L1-9 -0.025 (0.025)  0.001 (0.028) -0.021 (0.025)  0.001 (0.025) 
Knowledge    -21.650 (13.302) -9.988 (12.714)  -17.951 (10.566) * 
Policies 24.577 (18.482)  24.841 (17.410) 24.654 (19.214)  25.196 (19.344)
Oil imports 0.162 (0.169)  0.143 (0.167) 0.115 (0.163)  0.101 (0.141)
GDP per capita 0.737 (0.664)  -0.087 (0.268) 0.162 (0.219)  -0.138 (0.246)
Nat. resources 2.844 (2.753)  2.712 (2.715) 1.224 (2.963)   
ODA -0.622 (0.597)  -0.593 (0.542) -0.587 (0.582)  -0.000 (0.001)
3rd education -0.302 (0.200)     
Oil price    -0.168 (0.188)     
Stability     0.017 (0.008) **   
Nat. res 
Rainfall      0.005 (0.003)
L. Rainfall      -0.004 (0.003)
Altitude       -0.004 (0.011)
Constant 2.406 (5.144)  6.778 (8.712) -6.158 (4.010)  -2.968 (6.779)  
Year FE Yes   No  Yes   Yes    
N 1625   1619    1612   1625    
Groups 101   101    101   101    
F-/Wald-test  0.0 (Wald, p-value) 0.0 (Wald, p-value) 0.0 (Wald, p-value) 0.0 (Wald, p-value)
Various tests 0.20 (AR2, p-value) 0.19 (AR2, p-value) 0.21 (AR2, p-value) 0.20 (AR2, p-value)
Hansen test 0.0   1.0   0.0   0.0    
# instruments 505   488   492   507    
Endogenous variable: CDM, GEF, ODA, policies; in specification 4 with lagged national resources, the line “natural resources” does represent 
the level value of hydro resources and not the level and the lag. 
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Alternative 
DV 
CO2 reduction via RE 
per capita 
 
Share of RE electricity 
production 
 
CO2 reduction via RE 
per GDP (country-
specific grid factors) 
CO2 reduction via RE 
per GDP (difference 
to last year) 
HYDRO Blundell-Bond 
GMM system model, 
robust standard errors   
Blundell-Bond 
GMM system model, 
robust standard errors   
Blundell-Bond 
GMM system model, 
robust standard errors   
Blundell-Bond 
GMM system model, 
robust standard errors  
 Coeff SE  Coeff SE  Coeff SE  Coeff SE  
Lagged DV 1.049 (0.035) *** 0.885 (0.036) *** 0.922 (0.024) ***  
CDM -0.001 (0.014)  0.029 (0.033)  0.010 (0.007)  0.021 (0.028)  
GEF_L1-9 0.084 (0.126)  0.031 (0.051)  0.086 (0.087)  -0.026 (0.035)  
Knowledge -99.004 (69.852)  -66.015 (24.801) *** -31.693 (22.325)  -8.469 (14.010)  
Policies 24.979 (21.768)  3.633 (5.814)  -0.344 (0.633)  8.430 (10.284)  
Oil imports 0.149 (0.185)  0.134 (0.093)  0.054 (0.035)  0.070 (0.126)  
GDP per capita -0.969 (1.149)  0.000 (0.000)  -0.177 (0.103) * 0.199 (0.439)  
Nat. resources 5.085 (3.328)  11.007 (4.271) *** 0.605 (0.433)  1.920 (2.914)  
ODA -1.116 (0.959)  0.252 (0.326)  -0.070 (0.084)  0.639 (0.684)  
Constant -23.374 (9.164)  32.981 (18.217) -1.544 (2.385)  -8.592 (5.223)  
Year FE Yes   Yes Yes Yes  
N 1607   1610 1242 1625  
Groups 100   100 78 101  
Wald-test  0.0 (Wald, p-value) 0.0 (Wald, p-value) 0.0 (Wald, p-value) 0.0 (Wald, p-value)
Various stat. 0.98 (AR2, p-value) 0.36 (AR2, p-value) 0.61 (AR2, p-value) 0.20 (AR2, p-value)
Hansen test  0.00 (p-value) 1.00 (p-value) 1.00 (p-value) 0.00 (p-value)
# instruments 505   494 501 332  
Note: In case of CO2 reduction via RE per capita, CDM, GEF and ODA are standardized per capita and not per USD of GDP. Not displayed: 
Endogenous variables in BB: CDM, GEF, ODA, policies 
 
 
Influence of number of policies in first lag & inclusion of post2012 CER value in CDM variable 
 
HYDRO Blundell-Bond 
GMM system model, 
robust standard errors   
Blundell-Bond 
GMM system model, 
robust standard errors   
Blundell-Bond 
GMM system model, 
robust standard errors   
Blundell-Bond 
GMM system model, 
robust standard errors   
 Coeff SE  Coeff SE  Coeff SE  Coeff SE  
Lagged DV 0.965 (0.019) *** 0.968 (0.020) *** 0.966 (0.019) *** 0.964 (0.019)*** 
CDMtil2012 0.024 (0.011) ** 0.016 (0.017)  0.026 (0.013) **   
CDMtil2020      0.014 (0.011)  
GEF_L1-9 -0.030 (0.031)  -0.029 (0.028)  -0.032 (0.033)  -0.009 (0.023)  
Knowledge -8.571 (12.954)  -22.173 (17.707)  -10.382 (13.445)  -17.571 (12.505)  
Policies      24.603 (18.812)  
L.Policy 57.806 (50.318)   60.150 (49.998)    
L.REPolicy -0.751 (4.272)      
L.Policy_RPS    33.709 (27.737)     
L.Policy_I&S    -16.555 (23.433)     
Oil imports 0.103 (0.150)  0.067 (0.081)  0.100 (0.135)  0.122 (0.153)  
GDP per capita 0.002 (0.442)  -0.226 (0.244)  -0.055 (0.282)  -0.092 (0.260)  
Nat. resources 2.293 (2.112)  3.407 (3.353)  2.302 (2.334)  2.764 (2.748)  
ODA -0.510 (0.503)  -0.393 (0.365)  -0.520 (0.518)  -0.001 (0.576)  
Constant -9.992 (9.713)  -4.433 (4.075)  -13.635  -2.968  
Year FE Yes   Yes Yes Yes  
N 1625   1625 1625 1625  
Groups 101   101 101 101  
Wald-test  0.0 (Wald, p-value) 0.0 (Wald, p-value) 0.0 (Wald, p-value) 0.0 (Wald, p-value)
Various stat. 0.20 (AR2, p-value) 0.21 (AR2, p-value) 0.20 (AR2, p-value) 0.20 (AR2, p-value)
Hansen test  0.00 (p-value) 1.00 (p-value) 0.0 (p-value) 0.00 (p-value)
# instruments 615   472 498 505  
Note: Post-2012-CER price of 3 USD per CER assumed, which is roughly the average post-2012 CER price as reported by GTZ (2010) for the 
period 2005-2008. Not displayed: Endogenous variables in BB: CDM, GEF, ODA, policies; all policy variables entail the number of policies in 
the lag; TEN = tenders, RPS = Renewable portfolio standards, I&S=Incentives& Subsidies, FIT=Feed-in tariffs. 
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10.2.6 Solar power: alternative specifications and sensitivity analyzes 
 
SOLAR Selection model 
Logit with 
clustered SE 
Blundell-Bond (BB), 
One step, robust SE , 
w/o control 
Fixed effects,  
robust SE 
Blundell-Bond (BB) 
GMM system model, 
One step, robust SE 
 dy/dx SE  Coeff SE  Coeff SE  Coeff SE  
GEF_L1-3 0.001 (0.001)  -0.000 (0.000)  0.000 (0.000)  -0.000 (0.000)
GEF_L4-6 0.001 (0.001)  -0.000 (0.000)  -0.000 (0.000)  -0.000 (0.000)
GEF_L7-9 0.002 (0.001)  -0.000 (0.001)  -0.000 (0.000)  0.000 (0.001)
Year FE    Yes   Yes  Yes   
N 2009   126   125  125   
Groups 122   13   13   13   
F-/Wald-test  0.0 (Wald, p-value) 0.0 (Wald, p-value) - (F, p-value) 0.0 (Wald, p-value) 
Various stats 0.12 (Pseudo-R2) 0.27 (AR2, p-value) 0.84 (R2) 0.24 (AR2, p-value)
Hansen test    1.00     1.00   
# instruments    164     185   
Not displayed: Control variables +lagged DV for Random effects and BB; endog. variables in BB: CDM, GEF, ODA, policies 
 
 
 
SOLAR Blundell-Bond 
GMM system model, 
One step, robust SE; 
CDM Lag1 
Blundell-Bond 
GMM system model, 
One step, robust SE; 
CDM Lag1-2 
Blundell-Bond 
GMM system model, 
One step, robust SE; 
GEF Lags 1-6 
Blundell-Bond 
GMM system model, 
One step, robust SE; 
GEF Lags 1-2 
 Coeff SE  Coeff SE  Coeff SE  Coeff SE  
CDM         
GEF -0.000 (0.000)  -0.000 (0.000)  -0.000 (0.000)  -0.000 (0.000)
Year FE Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   
N 125  122  125   122   
Groups 13  13  13   13   
F-/Wald-test  0.0 (Wald, p-value) 0.0 (Wald, p-value) 0.0 (Wald, p-value) 0.0 (Wald, p-value) 
Various tests 0.25 (AR2, p-value) 0.26 (AR2, p-value) 0.26 (AR2, p-value) 0.25 (AR2, p-value) 
Hansen test 1.0   1.0   1.0   1.0   
# instruments 173   171   173   167   
Not displayed: Lagged DV + control variables; Endogenous variables: CDM, GEF, ODA, policies 
 
 
 
SOLAR Fixed effects,  
bias corrected,   
bootstrap SE 
OLS with clustered 
SE 
 
Random effects,  
robust standard errors  
Arellano Bond GMM 
difference model, 
robust standard errors
 Coeff SE  Coeff SE  Coeff SE  Coeff SE  
Lagged DV 0.624 (0.090) *** 0.984 (0.049) *** 0.984 (0.049) *** 0.695 (0.018) *** 
CDM        
GEF_L1-9 -0.000 (0.000)  -0.000 (0.000) -0.000 (0.000)  -0.000 (0.000)  
Knowledge 0.028 (0.678)  -0.246 (0.345) -0.246 (0.345)  0.081 (0.145)  
Policies 0.010 (0.029)  -0.010 (0.008) -0.010 (0.008)  0.005 (0.006)  
Oil imports 0.061 (0.086)  0.032 (0.026) 0.032 (0.026)  0.025 (0.026)  
GDP per capita 0.002 (0.005)  -0.000 (0.001) -0.000 (0.001)  -0.004 (0.005)
Nat. resources    0.028 (0.025) 0.028 (0.025)   
ODA 0.004 (0.009)  -0.020 (0.014) -0.020 (0.014)  0.002 (0.005)  
Constant    -0.145 (0.134) -0.141 (0.136)   
Year FE Yes   Yes Yes   Yes    
N 125   125  125   122    
Groups 13   13  13   13    
F-/Wald-test  - (Wald, p-value) - (F-test, p-value) - (Wald, p-value) 0.0 (Wald, p-value) 
Various stats - (R2) 0.90 (R2)  0.90 (R2) 0.26 (AR2, p-value) 
Hansen test       1.0    
# instruments         111    
Dependent variable: tonnes of CO2 reduced with biomass power generation, per million USD of GDP (2007 USD), assuming 500 tCO2 reduced 
per GWh of renewable power production; for bias-corrected FE estimator, the xtlsdvc Stata command was used, and the BB estimator was 
chosen to initialize the bias correction, all independent variables assumed to be exogenous in all models.  
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SOLAR Blundell-Bond 
GMM system model, 
robust standard errors 
Blundell-Bond 
GMM system model, 
robust standard errors 
Blundell-Bond 
GMM system model, 
robust standard errors   
Blundell-Bond 
GMM system model, 
robust standard errors 
 Coeff SE  Coeff SE  Coeff SE  Coeff SE   
Lagged DV 0.849 (0.042) *** 0.649 (0.181) *** 0.812 (0.068) *** 0.838 (0.042) ***  
CDM         
GEF_L1-9 -0.000 (0.000)  0.000 (0.001)  -0.000 (0.000)  -0.000 (0.000)  
Knowledge -0.190 (0.276)  -0.327 (0.361)   -0.277 (0.340)  
Policies 0.004 (0.007)  0.008 (0.008)  0.004 (0.006)  -0.007 (0.009)  
Oil imports 0.044 (0.028)  0.029 (0.014) ** 0.042 (0.023) * 0.049 (0.031)  
GDP per capita -0.001 (0.001)  0.002 (0.003)  -0.001 (0.001)
Nat. resources 0.041 (0.028)  0.073 (0.042) * 0.043 (0.027)  0.042 (0.029)
ODA -0.012 (0.011)  0.009 (0.014)  0.008 (0.007)  -0.014 (0.012)  
Kyoto Protocol   -0.067 (0.051)      
Electricity use    -9.045 (6.855)    
Financial mark.    -0.051 (0.045)    
Develop. loans      -15.937  (16.80)  
Constant -0.194 (0.142)  0.052   (0.127) -0.242 (0.161) * -0.195 (0.144)
Year FE Yes   Yes  Yes   Yes    
N 125  125    125   101   
Groups 13  13    13   13   
F-/Wald-test  0.0 (Wald, p-value) 0.0 (Wald, p-value) 0.0 (Wald, p-value) 0.0 (Wald, p-value) 
Various tests 0.27 (AR2, p-value) 0.19 (AR2, p-value) 0.28 (AR2, p-value) 0.26 (AR2, p-value) 
Hansen test 1.0   1.0   1.0   1.0    
# instruments 173   174   173   146    
Endogenous variable: CDM, GEF, ODA, development bank loans, policies  
 
 
 
SOLAR Blundell-Bond 
GMM system model, 
robust standard errors   
Blundell-Bond 
GMM system model, 
robust standard errors 
Blundell-Bond 
GMM system model, 
robust standard errors   
Blundell-Bond 
GMM system model, 
robust standard errors  
 Coeff SE  Coeff SE  Coeff SE  Coeff SE   
Lagged DV 0.845 (0.037) *** 0.835 (0.066) *** 0.853 (0.031) *** 0.841 (0.030) ***  
CDM         
GEF_L1-9 -0.000 (0.000)  -0.000 (0.000)  -0.000 (0.000)  -0.000 (0.000)  
Knowledge    -0.229 (0.327)  -0.184 (0.264)  0.114 (0.154)  
Policies 0.007 (0.007)  0.009 (0.008)  0.004 (0.008)  0.002 (0.005)  
Oil imports 0.046 (0.027) * 0.059 (0.039)  0.042 (0.027)  0.046 (0.028) * 
GDP per capita 0.005 (0.004)  -0.003 (0.002) -0.001 (0.001)  -0.000 (0.002)
Nat. resources 0.026 (0.020)  0.050 (0.037) 0.040 (0.027)   
ODA -0.011 (0.010)  -0.012 (0.010)  -0.011 (0.010)  -0.012 (0.010)  
3rd Education -0.002 (0.001)           
Oil price    0.000 (0.000)     
Stability     0.000 (0.000)    
Solar_radhoriz      0.058 (0.037)  
Constant -0.103 (0.097)  -0.249 (0.196)  -0.189 (0.135)  -0.281 (0.191)  
Year FE Yes   No  Yes   Yes    
N 125   125    123   125   
Groups 13   13    13   13   
F-/Wald-test  0.0 (Wald, p-value) 0.0 (Wald, p-value) 0.0 (Wald, p-value) 0.0 (Wald, p-value)
Various tests 0.25 (AR2, p-value) 0.30 (AR2, p-value) 0.26 (AR2, p-value) 0.25 (AR2, p-value)
Hansen test 1.0   1.0   1.0   1.0    
# instruments 173   156   171   173    
Endogenous variable: CDM, GEF, ODA, policies 
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Alternative 
DV 
CO2 reduction via RE 
per capita 
 
Share of RE electricity 
production 
 
CO2 reduction via RE 
per GDP (country-
specific grid factors) 
CO2 reduction via RE 
per GDP (difference 
to last year) 
SOLAR Blundell-Bond 
GMM system model, 
robust standard errors   
Blundell-Bond 
GMM system model, 
robust standard errors   
Blundell-Bond 
GMM system model, 
robust standard errors   
Blundell-Bond 
GMM system model, 
robust standard errors   
 Coeff SE  Coeff SE  Coeff SE  Coeff SE  
Lagged DV 0.622 (0.094) *** 0.802 (0.054) *** 0.872 (0.043) ***    
CDM         
GEF_L1-9 0.000 (0.000) *** -0.001 (0.001)  -0.000 (0.000)  -0.000 (0.000)  
Knowledge 0.415 (0.067)  -2.182 (2.142)  -0.497 (0.461)  -0.187 (0.215)  
Policies 0.005 (0.003)  0.049 (0.058)  0.010 (0.011)  -0.001 (0.005)  
Oil imports 0.023 (0.007) *** 0.357 (0.217)  0.078 (0.049)  0.031 (0.017) * 
GDP per capita 0.000 (0.001)  0.000 (0.000)  -0.001 (0.002)  -0.000 (0.001)  
Nat. resources 0.026 (0.009) *** 0.333 (0.218)  0.072 (0.048)  0.027 (0.016) * 
ODA 0.002 (0.002)  -0.106 (0.093)  -0.024 (0.019)  -0.017 (0.007) ** 
Constant -0.117 (0.044) *** -1.540 (1.048) -0.352 (0.247)  -0.194 (0.142)
Year FE Yes   Yes Yes Yes   
N 125   123 125 125   
Groups 13   13 13 13   
F-/Wald-test  0.0 (Wald, p-value) 0.0 (Wald, p-value) 0.0 (Wald, p-value) 0.0 (Wald, p-value)
Various stat. 0.06 (AR2, p-value) 0.22 (AR2, p-value) 0.24 (AR2, p-value) 0.27 (AR2, p-value)
Hansen test  1.00 (p-value) 1.00 (p-value) 1.00 (p-value) 1.00 (p-value)
# instruments 172   170 173 101 
Note: In case of CO2 reduction via RE per capita, CDM, GEF and ODA are standardized per capita and not per USD of GDP. Not displayed: 
Endogenous variables in BB: CDM, GEF, ODA, policies 
 
Influence of number of policies in first lag & inclusion of post2012 CER value in CDM variable 
 
SOLAR Blundell-Bond 
GMM system model, 
robust standard errors   
Blundell-Bond 
GMM system model, 
robust standard errors   
Blundell-Bond 
GMM system model, 
robust standard errors   
Blundell-Bond 
GMM system model, 
robust standard errors   
 Coeff SE  Coeff SE  Coeff SE  Coeff SE  
Lagged DV 0.833 (0.054) *** 0.828 (0.045) *** 0.849 (0.044) *** 0.849 (0.042) *** 
CDMtil2012         
CDMtil2020         
GEF_L1-9 -0.000 (0.000)  -0.000 (0.000)  0.000 (0.000)  -0.000 (0.000)  
Knowledge -0.080 (0.209)  -0.184 (0.293)  -0.173 (0.274)  -0.190 (0.276)  
Policies      0.004 (0.007)  
L.Policy 0.013 (0.012)   0.018 (0.014)     
L.REPolicy -0.006 (0.007)       
L.Policy_FIT    -0.027 (0.019)      
L.Policy_I&S    0.061 (0.038)     
Oil imports 0.052 (0.034)  0.051 (0.032)  0.045 (0.029)  0.044 (0.028)  
GDP per capita 0.001 (0.002)  0.000 (0.001)  -0.001 (0.001)  -0.001 (0.001)  
Nat. resources 0.043 (0.029)  0.073 (0.046)  0.049 (0.033)  0.041 (0.028)  
ODA -0.015 (0.013)  -0.013 (0.011)  -0.012 (0.011)  0.000 (0.011)  
Constant -0.187 (0.13)  -0.373 (0.245)  -0.247 (0.170)  -0.194 (0.142)  
Year FE Yes   Yes Yes Yes  
N 125   125 125 125  
Groups 13   13 13 13  
Wald-test  0.0 (Wald, p-value) 0.0 (Wald, p-value) 0.0 (Wald, p-value) 0.0 (Wald, p-value)
Various stat. 0.25 (AR2, p-value) 0.25 (AR2, p-value) 0.25 (AR2, p-value) 0.25 (AR2, p-value)
Hansen test  0.00 (p-value) 0.00 (p-value) 1.0 (p-value) 1.00 (p-value)
# instruments 186   170 170 173  
Note: Not displayed: Endogenous variables in BB: CDM, GEF, ODA, policies; all policy variables entail the number of policies in the lag; TEN 
= tenders, RPS = Renewable portfolio standards, I&S=Incentives& Subsidies, FIT=Feed-in tariffs 
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10.2.7 Wind power: alternative specifications and sensitivity analyzes 
 
WIND Selection model 
Logit with 
clustered SE 
Blundell-Bond (BB), 
One step, robust SE , 
w/o control 
Fixed effects,  
robust SE 
Blundell-Bond (BB) 
GMM system model, 
One step, robust SE 
 dy/dx SE  Coeff SE  Coeff SE  Coeff SE  
GEF_L1-3 -0.000 (0.000) ** 0.003 (0.000) *** 0.003 (0.001) ** 0.003 (0.000) *** 
GEF_L4-6 0.000 (0.000)  -0.001 (0.001) ** 0.002 (0.001) *** 0.002 (0.001) *** 
GEF_L7-9 predicts success. perfect. -0.003 (0.001) *** 0.001 (0.001) ** 0.001 (0.001)  
Year FE Yes   Yes   Yes  Yes   
N 1964   242   240  240   
Groups 122   25   25   25   
F-/Wald-test  0.0 (Wald, p-value) 0.0 (Wald, p-value) - (F, p-value) 0.0 (Wald, p-value) 
Various stats 0.16 (Pseudo-R2) 0.22 (AR2, p-value) 0.92 (R2) 0.96 (AR2, p-value)
Hansen test    1.00     0.00   
# instruments    244     310   
Not displayed: Control variables +lagged DV for Random effects and BB; endog. variables in BB: CDM, GEF, ODA, policies 
 
 
 
WIND Blundell-Bond 
GMM system model, 
One step, robust SE; 
CDM Lag1 
Blundell-Bond 
GMM system model, 
One step, robust SE; 
CDM Lag1-2 
Blundell-Bond 
GMM system model, 
One step, robust SE; 
GEF Lags 1-6 
Blundell-Bond 
GMM system model, 
One step, robust SE; 
GEF Lags 1-2 
 Coeff SE  Coeff SE  Coeff SE  Coeff SE  
CDM 0.001 (0.002)  0.001 (0.002)  0.000 (0.001)  0.000 (0.002)  
GEF 0.002 (0.000) *** 0.002 (0.000) *** 0.003 (0.000) *** 0.001 (0.000) *** 
Year FE Yes   Yes   Yes  Yes   
N 240   237    240   237   
Groups 25   25    25   25   
F-/Wald-test  0.0 (Wald, p-value) 0.0 (Wald, p-value) 0.0 (Wald, p-value) 0.0 (Wald, p-value) 
Various tests 0.28 (AR2, p-value) 0.28 (AR2, p-value) 0.28 (AR2, p-value) 0.28 (AR2, p-value) 
Hansen test 0.00   1.00   1.00   1.00   
# instruments 292   289   292   286   
Not displayed: Lagged DV + control variables; Endogenous variables: CDM, GEF, ODA, policies 
 
 
 
WIND Fixed effects,  
bias corrected,   
bootstrap SE 
OLS with clustered 
SE 
 
Random effects,  
robust standard errors  
Arellano Bond GMM 
difference model  
 
 Coeff SE  Coeff SE  Coeff SE  Coeff SE  
Lagged DV 1.013 (0.049) *** 1.021 (0.076) *** 1.021 (0.076)*** 0.915 (0.143) *** 
CDM  -0.001 (0.001)  0.000 (0.001)  0.000 (0.001)  0.001 (0.002)  
GEF_L1-9 0.005 (0.001) *** 0.002 (0.001) * 0.002 (0.001)* 0.002 (0.001) *** 
Knowledge 0.667 (2.269)  -0.259 (0.726)  -0.259 (0.726)  -1.145 (0.973)  
Policies -0.004 (0.063)  0.049 (0.036)  0.049 (0.036)  0.026 (0.037)  
Oil imports 0.814 (0.306)  0.010 (0.022)  0.010 (0.022)  0.114 (0.122)  
GDP per capita -0.020 (0.104)  -0.003 (0.006)  -0.003 (0.006)  -0.014 (0.031)  
Nat. resources    -0.005 (0.022)  -0.005 (0.022)    
ODA -0.074 (0.060)  0.035 (0.064)  0.035 (0.064)  0.075 (0.025)  
Constant    0.018 (0.097)  0.436 (0.255)    
Year FE Yes   Yes   Yes  Yes   
N 244   240    240   237   
Groups 26       25   25   
F-/Wald-test  - (Wald, p-value) (F-test, p-value) - (Wald, p-value) 0.0 (Wald, p-value) 
Various stats - (R2) 0.94 (R2) 0.94 (R2) 0.25 (AR2, p-value) 
Hansen test          1.0   
# instruments        170   
Dependent variable: tonnes of CO2 reduced with biomass power generation, per million USD of GDP (2007 USD), assuming 500 tCO2 reduced 
per GWh of renewable power production; for bias-corrected FE estimator, the xtlsdvc Stata command was used, and the BB estimator was 
chosen to initialize the bias correction, all independent variables assumed to be exogenous in all models.  
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WIND Blundell-Bond 
GMM system model, 
robust standard errors   
Blundell-Bond 
GMM system model, 
robust standard errors 
Blundell-Bond 
GMM system model, 
robust standard errors   
Blundell-Bond 
GMM system model, 
robust standard errors 
 Coeff SE  Coeff SE  Coeff SE  Coeff SE   
Lagged DV 0.972 (0.080) *** 0.971 (0.079) *** 0.978 (0.075) *** 0.970 (0.086) ***  
CDM 0.001 (0.002)  0.001 (0.019)  0.000 (0.001)  0.001 (0.002)   
GEF_L1-9 0.002 (0.000) *** 0.002 (0.000) *** 0.003 (0.000) *** 0.002 (0.001) ** 
Knowledge -0.251 (0.737)  -0.347 (0.734)  -0.103 (0.659)
Policies 0.044 (0.028)  0.039 (0.025) 0.023 (0.026)  0.044 (0.028)
Oil imports 0.023 (0.028)  0.022 (0.028) -0.007 (0.036)  0.025 (0.031)
GDP per capita -0.004 (0.007)  -0.004 (0.007)  -0.005 (0.007)
Nat. resources -0.003 (0.027)  -0.007 (0.029) -0.012 (0.029)  -0.020 (0.035)
ODA -0.005 (0.071)  -0.009 (0.074) -0.024 (0.068)  0.855 (0.725)
Kyoto Protocol    -0.014 (0.024)    
Electricity use     -7.914 (20.59)    
Financial mark.     0.203 (0.077) **   
Develop. loans      -99.391   (59.71) * 
Constant 0.526 (0.268)  0.602   (0.295) ** 0.456  (0.270) * 0.576   (0.309) * 
Year FE Yes   Yes  Yes   Yes    
N 240   240    240   204    
Groups 25   25    25   25    
F-/Wald-test  0.0 (Wald, p-value) 0.0 (Wald, p-value) 0.0 (Wald, p-value) 0.0 (Wald, p-value)
Various tests 0.28 (AR2, p-value) 0.28 (AR2, p-value) 0.28 (AR2, p-value) 0.28 (AR2, p-value)
Hansen test 1.0   1.0   1.0   1.0    
# instruments 292   293   292   251    
Endogenous variable: CDM, GEF, ODA, development bank loans, policies  
 
 
WIND Blundell-Bond 
GMM system model, 
robust standard errors   
Blundell-Bond 
GMM system model, 
robust standard errors 
Blundell-Bond 
GMM system model, 
robust standard errors  
Blundell-Bond 
GMM system model, 
robust standard errors 
 Coeff SE  Coeff SE  Coeff SE  Coeff SE   
Lagged DV 0.970 (0.080) *** 0.975 (0.084) *** 0.961 (0.077) *** 0.973 (0.081) ***  
CDM 0.001 (0.002)  0.001 (0.002)  0.001 (0.002)  0.001 (0.002)   
GEF_L1-9 0.003 (0.000) *** 0.003 (0.000) *** 0.003 (0.000) *** 0.002 (0.000) *** 
Knowledge    -0.252 (0.676) -0.684 (0.703)  -0.244 (0.742)  
Policies 0.048 (0.029)  0.068 (0.031) ** 0.061 (0.029) ** 0.043 (0.028)  
Oil imports 0.019 (0.028)  0.024 (0.036) 0.022 (0.032)  0.022 (0.027)  
GDP per capita -0.003 (0.007)  -0.004 (0.007) -0.003 (0.006)  -0.005 (0.007)  
Nat. resources -0.005 (0.028)  -0.006 (0.027) -0.045 (0.033)  -0.007 (0.072)  
ODA -0.005 (0.072)  -0.049 (0.068) -0.002 (0.077)    
3rd Education -0.001 (0.002)      
Oil price    0.003 (0.001) **    
Stability     -0.000 (0.000) **   
%Wind>6m/s      -0.000 (0.003)  
Constant 0.540 (0.276) * -0.020  (0.115) 0.745   (0.209) *** 0.397  (0.248) ** 
Year 
dummies Yes 
  
No
 
Yes
  
Yes 
   
N 240   240    236   240    
Groups 25   25    25   25    
F-/Wald-test  0.0 (Wald, p-value) 0.0 (Wald, p-value) 0.0 (Wald, p-value) 0.0 (Wald, p-value) 
Various tests 0.28 (AR2, p-value) 0.28 (AR2, p-value) 0.27 (AR2, p-value) 0.28 (AR2, p-value) 
Hansen test 1.0   1.0   1.0   1.0    
# instruments 292   275   289   293    
Endogenous variable: CDM, GEF, ODA, policies 
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Alternative 
DV 
CO2 reduction via RE 
per capita 
 
Share of RE electricity 
production 
 
CO2 reduction via RE 
per GDP (country-
specific grid factors) 
CO2 reduction via RE 
per GDP (difference 
to last year) 
WIND Blundell-Bond 
GMM system model, 
robust standard errors   
Blundell-Bond 
GMM system model, 
robust standard errors   
Blundell-Bond 
GMM system model, 
robust standard errors   
Blundell-Bond 
GMM system model, 
robust standard errors   
 Coeff SE  Coeff SE  Coeff SE  Coeff SE  
Lagged DV 0.925 (0.017) *** 0.896 (0.035) *** 1.129 (0.025) ***   
CDM -0.001 (0.001)  0.001 (0.006)  -0.002 (0.003)  0.000 (0.001)  
GEF_L1-9 0.003 (0.000) *** 0.021 (0.002) *** 0.000 (0.000)  0.002 (0.000) *** 
Knowledge 2.559 (4.065)  -3.090 (2.888)  0.293 (0.533)  -0.479 (0.733)  
Policies 0.101 (0.143)  0.032 (0.143)  0.086 (0.046) * 0.026 (0.020)  
Oil imports 0.113 (0.081)  0.238 (0.146)  0.018 (0.026)  0.020 (0.029)  
GDP per capita -0.005 (0.024)  0.000 (0.000) ** -0.008 (0.005)  -0.003 (0.007)  
Nat. resources 0.088 (0.121)  -0.009 (0.123)  0.017 (0.022)  -0.001 (0.028)  
ODA 0.284 (0.236)  0.505 (0.389)  -0.070 (0.06)  -0.021 (0.057)  
Constant 2.271 (1.274) * 1.423 (0.861) * 0.180 (0.164)  0.517 (0.263) * 
Year FE Yes   Yes Yes Yes  
N 240   236 240 240  
Groups 25   25 25 25  
F-/Wald-test  0.0 (Wald, p-value) 0.0 (Wald, p-value) 0.0 (Wald, p-value) 0.0 (Wald, p-value)
Various stat. 0.27 (AR2, p-value) 0.33 (AR2, p-value) 0.36 (AR2, p-value) 0. 30 (AR2, p-value)
Hansen test  1.00 (p-value) 1.00 (p-value) 1.00 (p-value) 0.00 (p-value)
# instruments 292   288 293 210  
Note: In case of CO2 reduction via RE per capita, CDM, GEF and ODA are standardized per capita and not per USD of GDP.  
 
 
Influence of number of policies in first lag & inclusion of post2012 CER value in CDM variable 
 
WIND Blundell-Bond 
GMM system model, 
robust standard errors   
Blundell-Bond 
GMM system model, 
robust standard errors   
Blundell-Bond 
GMM system model, 
robust standard errors   
Blundell-Bond 
GMM system model, 
robust standard errors   
 Coeff SE SE Coeff SE  Coeff SE     
Lagged DV 0.975 (0.065) *** 0.978 (0.092) *** 0.968 (0.072) *** 0.970 (0.078) *** 
CDMtil12 -0.000 (0.001)  0.000 (0.001)  0.000 (0.001)    
CDMtil20      0.001 (0.002)  
GEF_L1-9 0.002 (0.000) *** 0.002 (0.000) *** 0.002 (0.000) *** 0.003 (0.000) *** 
Knowledge 0.010 (0.780)  -0.616 (0.726)  -0.010 (0.705)  -0.227 (0.733)  
Policies      0.041 (0.028)  
L.Policy 0.140 (0.084) *  0.165 (0.091) *   
L.REPolicy 0.030 (0.022)      
L.Policy_RPS    -0.043 (0.133)     
L.Policy_TEN    0.400 (0.109) ***    
L.Policy_FIT    -0.127 (0.124)     
L.Policy_I&S    -0.059 (0.071)     
Oil imports 0.016 (0.030) *** 0.004 (0.027)  0.022 (0.031)  0.021 (0.029)  
GDP per capita -0.010 (0.009)  0.001 (0.006)  -0.005 (0.007)  -0.004 (0.007)  
Nat. resources 0.010 (0.028) ** -0.009 (0.030)  0.000 (0.029)  -0.007 (0.027)  
ODA 0.023 (0.057) * 0.020 (0.072)  0.025 (0.059)  0.000 (0.074)  
Constant 0.231 (0.327)  0.536 (0.313) * 0.379 (0.306)  0.517 (0.263) * 
Year FE Yes   Yes Yes Yes  
N 240   240 240 240  
Groups 25   25 25 25  
Wald-test  0.0 (Wald, p-value) 0.0 (Wald, p-value) 0.0 (Wald, p-value) 0.0 (Wald, p-value)
Various stat. 0.29 (AR2, p-value) 0.27 (AR2, p-value) 0.28 (AR2, p-value) 0.28 (AR2, p-value)
Hansen test  1.00 (p-value) 1.00 (p-value) 1.0 (p-value) 1.00 (p-value)
# instruments 310   288 288 292  
Note: Post-2012-CER price of 3 USD per CER assumed, which is roughly the average post-2012 CER price as reported by GTZ (2010) for the 
period 2005-2008. Not displayed: Endogenous variables in BB: CDM, GEF, ODA, policies; all policy variables entail the number of policies in 
the lag; TEN = tenders, RPS = Renewable portfolio standards, I&S=Incentives& Subsidies, FIT=Feed-in tariffs 
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10.2.8 Effectiveness when assuming technology lifetimes according to LDV coefficients in BB model 
 
  
 
 
 
  
  
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
0.12
Official
claim
BB,
w/o
controls
FE,
with
controls
BB,
with
controls
Official
claim
BB,
w/o
controls
FE,
with
controls
BB,
with
controls
CDM
BIO
CDM
BIO
CDM
BIO
CDM
BIO
GEF
BIO
GEF
BIO
GEF
BIO
GEF
BIO
Biomass power
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
Official
claim
BB,
w/o
controls
RE,
with
controls
BB,
with
controls
Official
claim
BB,
w/o
controls
RE,
with
controls
BB,
with
controls
CDM
GEO
CDM
GEO
CDM
GEO
CDM
GEO
GEF
GEO
GEF
GEO
GEF
GEO
GEF
GEO
Geothermal power
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
Official
claim
BB,
w/o
controls
RE,
with
controls
BB,
with
controls
Official
claim
BB,
w/o
controls
RE,
with
controls
BB,
with
controls
CDM
HYD
CDM
HYD
CDM
HYD
CDM
HYD
GEF
HYD
GEF
HYD
GEF
HYD
GEF
HYD
Hydro    power
0
0.01
0.02
Official
claim
BB,
w/o
controls
FE,
with
controls
BB,
with
controls
Official
claim
BB,
w/o
controls
FE,
with
controls
BB,
with
controls
CDM
SOL
CDM
SOL
CDM
SOL
CDM
SOL
GEF
SOL
GEF
SOL
GEF
SOL
GEF
SOL
Solar power
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
0.12
Official
claim
BB,
w/o
controls
FE,
with
controls
BB,
with
controls
Official
claim
BB,
w/o
controls
FE,
with
controls
BB,
with
controls
CDM
WIN
CDM
WIN
CDM
WIN
CDM
WIN
GEF
WIN
GEF
WIN
GEF
WIN
GEF
WIN
Wind power Notes:
In case of OLS, fixed effects (FE), random effects (RE) and 
Blundell Bond estimates, the bars show the mean values, while 
the whiskers indicate the 90% confidence interval. In case where 
the lower whisker of the 90%-confidence interval is outside the 
graph, no significant effect has been found. Values are based on  
500 tonnes of CO2 reduced per GWh of renewable electricity 
production, and technology lifetimes calculated according to 
the coefficients of the lagged dependent variable in the BB 
model with control variables (biomass =2.7 years lifetime, 
geothermal = 8.6, hydro = 21.7, solar = 11.5 and wind =13.7). 
 
To make comparison with coefficients possible, the CDM official 
claim bar shows the  effectiveness per USD of funding, whixh is 
estimated using the same carbon price as in the models -  10 USD 
per tCO2). 
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10.3 Annex to Chapter 6 (Drivers of renewable energy policies) 
 
10.3.1 Coding to assign one regional / trade bloc to each country (used for tradebloc variable) 
 
ASEAN Brunei Darussalam  
ASEAN Cambodia 
ASEAN Indonesia 
ASEAN Lao PDR 
ASEAN Malaysia 
ASEAN Myanmar 
ASEAN Philippines 
ASEAN Singapore 
ASEAN Sri Lanka Bloc 
ASEAN Thailand 
ASEAN Vietnam 
AU Angola 
AU Benin 
AU Botswana 
AU Burkina Faso 
AU Burundi 
AU Cameroon 
AU Cape Verde 
AU Central African Rep. 
AU Chad 
AU Congo 
AU Côte d'Ivoire 
AU Dem. Rep.of Congo 
AU Equatorial Guinea 
AU Eritrea 
AU Ethiopia 
AU Gabon 
AU Gambia 
AU Ghana 
AU Guinea 
AU Guinea-Bissau 
AU Kenya 
AU Lesotho 
AU Liberia 
AU Madagascar 
AU Malawi 
AU Mali 
AU Mauritius 
AU Mozambique 
AU Namibia 
AU Niger 
AU Nigeria 
AU Rwanda 
AU Sao Tome & Princip 
AU Senegal 
AU Seychelles 
AU Sierra Leone 
AU South Africa 
AU Swaziland 
AU Tanzania 
AU Togo 
AU Uganda 
AU Zambia 
AU Zimbabwe 
CARICOM Bahamas 
CARICOM Barbados 
CARICOM Belize 
CARICOM Dominica 
CARICOM Grenada 
CARICOM Guyana 
CARICOM Haiti  
CARICOM Jamaica 
CARICOM St. Kitts-Nevis 
CARICOM St. Lucia 
CARICOM St.Vincent & Gren. 
CARICOM Suriname 
CARICOM Trinidad and Tobago 
CEFTA Albania 
CEFTA Bosnia-Herzegovina 
CEFTA Bulgaria 
CEFTA Croatia 
CEFTA Macedonia 
CEFTA Romania 
CIS Armenia 
CIS Azerbaijan 
CIS Belarus 
CIS Georgia 
CIS Kazakhstan 
CIS Kyrgyzstan 
CIS Moldova 
CIS Russia 
CIS Tajikistan 
CIS Turkmenistan 
CIS Ukraine 
CIS Uzbekistan 
ChiKorMon China 
ChiKorMon Korea, Republic of 
ChiKorMon Mongolia 
ChiKorMon Taiwan 
EU Cyprus  
EU Czech Republic 
EU Estonia 
EU Hungary 
EU Latvia 
EU Lithuania 
EU Poland 
EU Slovak Republic 
EU Slovenia 
LOAS Algeria 
LOAS Bahrain 
LOAS Comoros 
LOAS Djibouti 
LOAS Egypt 
LOAS Iraq 
LOAS Jordan 
LOAS Kuwait 
LOAS Lebanon 
LOAS Libya 
LOAS Mauritania 
LOAS Morocco 
LOAS Oman 
LOAS Qatar 
LOAS Saudi Arabia 
LOAS Somalia 
LOAS Sudan 
LOAS Syria 
LOAS Tunisia 
LOAS United Arab Emirates 
LOAS Yemen 
NAFTA Mexico 
SAARC Bangladesh 
SAARC Bhutan 
SAARC India 
SAARC Maldives 
SAARC Nepal 
SAARC Pakistan 
SICA Costa Rica 
SICA El Salvador 
SICA Guatemala 
SICA Honduras 
SICA Nicaragua 
SICA Panama 
SPC Cook Islands 
SPC Fiji 
SPC Kiribati 
SPC Marshall Islands 
SPC Micronesia, Fed. Stat. 
SPC Nauru 
SPC Niue 
SPC Palau 
SPC Papua 
SPC Samoa 
SPC Solomon Islands 
SPC Timor-Leste 
SPC Tonga 
SPC Tuvalu 
SPC Vanuatu 
UNASUR Argentina 
UNASUR Bolivia 
UNASUR Brazil 
UNASUR Chile 
UNASUR Colombia 
UNASUR Ecuador 
UNASUR Paraguay 
UNASUR Peru 
UNASUR Uruguay 
UNASUR Venezuela 
- Cuba 
- Dominican Republic 
- Iran 
- Israel 
- Turkey 
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10.3.2 Full models in comparison with concise models (targets and tariffs) 
 
 
RE Targets 
(concise) 
RE Targets
(full) 
Feed-in-tariffs 
(concise) 
Feed-in-tariffs  
(full) 
 dy/dx SE  dy/dx SE dy/dx SE dy/dx SE  
Domestic energy+ -0.002 (0.001)  -0.002 (0.001) -0.003 (0.001) ** -0.003 (0.001) **
GDP per capita 0.009 (0.004) ** 0.007 (0.004) 0.009 (0.004) ** 0.008 (0.004) *
GDP growth 0.055 (0.046)  0.054 (0.049) 0.006 (0.058) 0.001 (0.056)  
Population+  0.008 (0.003) *** 0.008 (0.002) *** 0.005 (0.002) ** 0.004 (0.002)  
Education   0.006 (0.014) 0.004 (0.015)  
Hydro resources 0.002 (0.002)  0.003 (0.002) ** 0.004 (0.002) * 0.004 (0.002) *
Wind resources 0.000 (0.000)  0.000 (0.000) * 0.000 (0.004) 0.000 (0.000)  
Solar resources 0.005 (0.004)  0.006 (0.003) -0.005 (0.004) -0.004 (0.004)  
Geothermal res. 0.000 (0.000)  0.000 (0.000) -0.000 (0.000) -0.000 (0.000)  
Biomass res. 0.001 (0.002)  0.001 (0.003) 0.004 (0.002) * 0.003 (0.002) *
Democracy 0.001 (0.000) * 0.001 (0.000) 0.001 (0.001) * 0.001 (0.001)  
Pollution (SO2)   0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000)  
Civil society org.   -0.001 (0.002) 0.001 (0.003)  
Veto players -0.002 (0.001)  -0.002 (0.001) -0.001 (0.002) -0.001 (0.002)  
EU member 0.027 (0.014) ** 0.027 (0.016) ** 0.001 (0.012) 0.000 (0.012)  
CEFTA 0.016 (0.009) * 0.014 (0.009) * 0.007 (0.009) 0.005 (0.008)  
Common language   -0.010 (0.009) -0.013 (0.013)  
Neighbours 0.012 (0.009)  0.014 (0.010) -0.012 (0.011) -0.013 (0.010)  
Tradebloc   0.001 (0.018) 0.005 (0.013)  
Colony 0.084 (0.039) ** 0.790 (0.020) 0.050 (0.026) * 0.045 (0.026) *
CDM projects 0.003 (0.004)  0.003 (0.004) * -0.004 (0.004) -0.004 (0.004)  
GEF funding 0.004 (0.004)  0.004 (0.005) 0.007 (0.005) 0.007 (0.005)  
Development aid 0.007 (0.006)  0.008 (0.005) 0.009 (0.006) 0.009 (0.006) **
Year FE Yes   Yes Yes Yes  
N 1119   1119 935 935  
Years 12   12 10 10  
log likelihood -140.0   -139.0 -112.1 -111.2  
AIC 339.9   347.9 280.2 288.4  
BIC 490.5   523.7 415.8 448.1  
Pseudo-R2 0.28   0.28 0.25 0.26  
dy/dx: Marginal effects at mean values of all other independent variables 
SE: standard error 
Significance levels: * = p-value <0.1, ** = p-value <0.05, *** = p-value <0.01  
+ For these variables the 2009 values have been extrapolated. 
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10.3.3 Full models in comparison with concise models (incentives and framework policies) 
 
 
RE Targets 
(concise) 
RE Targets
(full) 
Feed-in-tariffs 
(concise) 
Feed-in-tariffs  
(full) 
 dy/dx SE  dy/dx SE dy/dx SE dy/dx SE  
Domestic energy+ -0.002 (0.001)  -0.002 (0.001) -0.004 (0.004) -0.003 (0.003)  
GDP per capita 0.009 (0.004) ** 0.007 (0.004) * 0.011 (0.008) 0.011 (0.010)  
GDP growth 0.055 (0.046)  0.054 (0.046) -0.211 (0.152) -0.204 (0.141)  
Population+  0.008 (0.003) *** 0.008 (0.003) *** 0.018 (0.005) *** 0.014 (0.005) ***
Education   0.006 (0.013) 0.036 (0.040)  
Hydro resources 0.002 (0.002)  0.003 (0.002) -0.005 (0.004) -0.005 (0.005)  
Wind resources 0.000 (0.000)  0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000)  
Solar resources 0.005 (0.004)  0.006 (0.004) -0.012 (0.010) -0.009 (0.011)  
Geothermal res. 0.000 (0.000)  0.000 (0.000) -0.000 (0.001) 0.000 (0.001)  
Biomass res. 0.001 (0.002)  0.001 (0.002) 0.000 (0.007) 0.001 (0.007)  
Democracy 0.001 (0.000) * 0.001 (0.001) * 0.002 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001)  
Pollution (SO2)   0.000 (0.000) -0.001 (0.002)  
Civil society org.   -0.001 (0.003) 0.008 (0.007)  
Veto players -0.002 (0.001)  -0.002 (0.001) -0.001 (0.004) -0.001 (0.004)  
EU member 0.027 (0.014) ** 0.027 (0.014) * -0.025 (0.049) -0.004 (0.048)  
CEFTA 0.016 (0.009) * 0.014 (0.009) 0.030 (0.028) 0.044 (0.026) *
Common language   -0.010 (0.012) -0.026 (0.028)  
Neighbours 0.012 (0.009)  0.014 (0.009) 0.021 (0.023) 0.020 (0.024)  
Tradebloc   0.001 (0.013) -0.011 (0.049)  
Colony 0.084 (0.039) ** 0.79 (0.039) ** 0.073 (0.040) * 0.075 (0.038) **
CDM projects 0.003 (0.004)  0.003 (0.004) 0.025 (0.018) 0.018 (0.017)  
GEF funding 0.004 (0.004)  0.004 (0.004) 0.034 (0.018) * 0.028 (0.017)  
Development aid 0.007 (0.006)  0.008 (0.006) 0.009 (0.015) 0.005 (0.014)  
Year FE Yes   Yes Yes Yes  
N 938   938 861 861  
Years 10   10 12 12  
log likelihood -110.5   -109.6 -185.9 -184.0  
AIC 277.0   285.2 431.9 438.0  
BIC 412.6   445.1 574.6 604.5  
Pseudo-R2 0.29   0.30 0.17 0.17  
dy/dx: Marginal effects at mean values of all other independent variables 
SE: standard error 
Significance levels: * = p-value <0.1, ** = p-value <0.05, *** = p-value <0.01  
 + For these variables the 2009 values have been extrapolated. 
 
   
 
10.3.4 Relative importance of domestic and international variables 
 
 RE Targets           
(concise model) 
Feed-in-tariffs   
  (concise model) 
Financial incentives 
(concise model) 
Framework policies 
(concise model) 
 Domestic 
variables 
Internatio-
nal variab. 
Domestic 
variables 
Internatio-
nal variab. 
Domestic 
variables 
Internatio-
nal variab. 
Domestic 
variables 
Internatio-
nal variab. 
N 1119 1119 935 935 938 938 861 861
Pseudo R2 0.23 0.13 0.19 0.14 0.23 0.17 0.14 0.12 
log likelihood -147.97 -166.36 -121.16 -128.26 -119.65 -129.90 -191.75 -196.82 
AIC 341.94 370.71 284.31 290.53 281.29 293.79 429.50 431.63 
BIC 457.40 466.09 385.96 372.82 383.01 376.13 538.94 522.04
	
  
 
10.3.5 Correlation table 
 
Target adoption 1.00        
Tariff adoption 0.14 1.00       
Incentive adopt. 0.01 0.20 1.00      
Framework adopt. 0.35 0.08 0.16 1.00     
Domestic energy -0.01 -0.03 0.00 -0.05 1.00     
GDP per capita 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.04 0.31 1.00     
GDP (growth) 0.02 0.06 0.05 0.01 0.09 0.05 1.00     
Population 0.13 0.04 0.12 0.11 0.08 -0.25 -0.02 1.00     
Education 0.11 0.12 0.11 0.10 0.11 0.77 0.07 -0.12 1.00     
Hydro resources -0.04 0.02 0.04 0.02 -0.03 -0.41 0.07 0.19 -0.31 1.00     
Wind resources 0.03 0.02 0.00 -0.02 0.00 0.14 0.02 -0.13 0.28 -0.26 1.00     
Solar resources -0.08 -0.15 -0.11 -0.10 -0.01 -0.29 -0.25 0.02 -0.50 -0.12 0.13 1.00     
Geothermal res. 0.02 0.03 0.11 0.05 0.08 0.09 -0.03 0.33 0.12 0.19 -0.02 -0.17 1.00     
Biomass resources -0.02 0.03 0.02 -0.02 0.01 -0.01 0.07 -0.27 -0.06 0.16 -0.14 -0.29 0.07 1.00    
Democracy 0.07 0.11 0.10 0.08 -0.28 0.03 -0.04 0.05 0.19 0.32 -0.10 -0.23 0.17 0.07 1.00    
Pollution (SO2) 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.02 0.01 0.34 -0.05 -0.15 0.28 -0.40 0.09 0.01 -0.02 -0.11 -0.09 1.00    
Civil society org. 0.04 0.03 0.06 0.08 -0.28 -0.49 -0.01 0.50 -0.32 0.50 -0.25 0.01 0.19 -0.05 0.42 -0.26 1.00    
Veto players 0.12 0.07 0.08 0.08 -0.11 0.02 -0.06 0.21 0.12 0.18 -0.09 -0.18 0.12 0.08 0.60 -0.06 0.33 1.00    
EU member 0.17 0.09 0.15 0.06 -0.01 0.12 0.03 -0.09 0.13 -0.08 -0.05 -0.21 -0.03 0.19 0.10 0.01 -0.06 0.09 1.00    
CEFTA 0.06 0.10 0.07 0.06 0.00 0.21 0.04 -0.07 0.24 -0.01 -0.06 -0.40 -0.08 0.01 0.23 0.06 -0.05 0.17 -0.02 1.00    
Language 0.08 0.02 0.05 0.07 0.09 0.17 0.09 -0.07 0.16 0.02 0.07 -0.07 0.08 0.04 -0.02 0.02 -0.10 -0.06 0.00 0.13 1.00    
Neighbours 0.11 0.10 0.15 0.11 -0.14 0.12 0.12 -0.03 0.24 0.08 -0.01 -0.30 0.02 0.08 0.19 -0.11 0.11 0.05 0.20 0.19 0.45 1.00    
Tradebloc 0.16 0.15 0.14 0.12 -0.05 0.18 0.13 -0.03 0.31 0.13 -0.02 -0.33 0.07 0.13 0.24 -0.02 0.07 0.10 0.20 0.17 0.53 0.61 1.00    
Colony 0.02 0.10 0.01 0.05 -0.13 -0.16 0.06 -0.15 -0.03 -0.15 0.05 -0.04 -0.21 0.00 -0.23 0.00 -0.06 -0.14 0.12 -0.17 0.25 0.17 0.24 1.00    
CDM projects 0.13 0.04 0.13 0.13 -0.06 0.09 -0.02 0.04 0.12 0.14 0.00 -0.03 0.11 -0.02 0.13 -0.01 0.13 0.05 -0.02 -0.05 0.23 0.25 0.40 -0.02 1.00   
GEF funding 0.08 0.10 0.10 0.15 -0.04 0.00 0.03 0.16 0.11 0.10 -0.02 -0.09 0.12 -0.02 0.03 -0.06 0.13 0.05 -0.03 -0.02 0.19 0.15 0.30 0.11 0.23 1.00  
Development aid 0.05 0.10 0.11 0.09 -0.05 -0.20 0.10 0.31 -0.04 0.32 -0.10 -0.10 0.15 0.06 0.23 -0.17 0.42 0.13 0.03 0.08 0.13 0.21 0.25 -0.06 0.15 0.17 
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10.3.6 Coefficients when including diffusion variables separately in models 
 
 RE Targets              
(concise model) 
RE Targets      
(full model) 
Feed-in-tariffs            
(concise model) 
Feed-in-tariffs  
(full model) 
 dy/dx  SE dy/dx SE dy/dx SE dy/dx  SE
Language 0.020  (0.016) 0.003 (0.008) -0.023 (0.019) -0.013  (0.015)
Neighbours 0.019  (0.014) 0.009 (0.009) -0.018 (0.013) -0.016  (0.011)
Tradebloc -0.016  (0.031) -0.000 (0.016) 0.012 (0.018) 0.034  (0.014)
Colony -0.022  (0.032) -0.002 (0.018) 0.064 ** (0.031) 0.053 ** (0.028)
Colonizer45a 0.017 * (0.009) 0.012 ** (0.006) -0.018 (0.013) -0.014  (0.010)
 
 Financial incentives 
(concise model) 
Financial incentives    
(full model) 
Framework policies 
(concise model) 
Framework policies   
(full model) 
 dy/dx  SE dy/dx SE dy/dx  SE
Language -0.022  (0.022) -0.014 (0.016) -0.010 (0.030) -0.011  (0.027)
Neighbours 0.021  (0.015) 0.018 * (0.011) 0.017  (0.024) 0.007  (0.022) 
Tradebloc 0.018  (0.024) 0.009  (0.016) 0.029  (0.049) 0.005  (0.048) 
Colony 0.093  (0.059) 0.095 ** (0.043) 0.069 * (0.041) 0.064 * (0.037) 
Colonizer45a -0.002  (0.008) 0.002 (0.006) b b   
   a Dummy whether adoption by post-1945 colonizers; b data on adoption of framework policies by colonizer not available 
 
 
10.3.7 Coefficients of further variables and robustness check for GEF/CDM coefficients (d. = dummies) 
 
 RE Targets             
(concise model) 
Feed-in-tariffs          
(concise model 
Financial incentives 
(concise model 
Framework policies 
(concise model) 
 dy/dx SE dy/dx SE dy/dx SE dy/dx  SE
Fuirther control variables (Environmental preferences, groups and energy dependence, international diffusion 
Green MPs, d.  -0.006 (0.010) -0.002 (0.012) 0.001 (0.007) 0.063 * (0.035)
Green Party, d. -0.002 (0.004) -0.001 (0.005) 0.004 (0.004) -0.016  (0.015)
Protected areaa -0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) -0.000 (0.000) 0.000  (0.000)
GDPp.c.2  -0.001 (0.003) -0.000 (0.003) 0.003 (0.002) -0.006  (0.005)
ENGOsa -0.006 (0.004) 0.001 (0.001) -0.002 (0.002) -0.002  (0.004)
Greenpeace  -0.010 (0.007) 0.001 (0.006) -0.001 (0.004) -0.023  (0.022)
Diesel pricea 0.004 (0.007) 0.016 * (0.009) 0.012 (0.008) -0.011  (0.021)
Oil priceb 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) -0.000 (0.000) 0.000  (0.001)
Electricity use -0.003 (0.002) -0.000 (0.002) -0.001 (0.001) -0.004  (0.004)
GDPxEl-use -0.017  (0.019) -0.004  (0.028) 0.028 * (0.017) -0.061  (0.057)
FCCC ratif. (y.) 0.002 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) -0.001 (0.001) 0.002  (0.003)
Kyoto ratif. (y.) 0.000 (0.000) -0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000  (0.000)
US colony (p45) 0.025 (0.015) 0.007 (0.012) 0.015 (0.011) 0.029  (0.052)
Robustness check for GEF and CDM specifications   
GEF (d.) -0.006 (0.009) 0.002 (0.007) -0.001 (0.008) 0.030  (0.021)
L1.GEF (d.) 0.010 (0.007) 0.010 (0.007) 0.006 (0.006) 0.040  (0.025)
L2.GEF (d.) -0.004 (0.009) -0.002 (0.008) 0.003 (0.006) 0.039  (0.027)
L3.GEF (d.) 0.011 (0.008) 0.006 (0.008) -0.002 (0.008) -0.016  (0.037)
L4.GEF (d.) 0.005 (0.010) Predicts failure perf. 0.008 (0.008) 0.010  (0.038)
L5.GEF (d.) Predicts failure perf. 0.010 (0.008) -0.012 (0.011) -0.026  (0.047)
L6.GEF (d.) 0.017 * (0.009) 0.017 * (0.010) 0.005 (0.009) Predicts failure perf
CDM (d.) 0.017 ** (0.008) 0.003 (0.007) -0.002 (0.006) 0.028  (0.025)
L1.CDM (d.) 0.007 (0.007) -0.003 (0.007) 0.006 (0.007) 0.067 ** (0.030)
L2.CDM (d.) 0.019 ** (0.009) -0.015 (0.012) -0.003 (0.007) 0.032  (0.040)
L3.CDM (d.) 0.012 (0.011) -0.007 (0.012) 0.011 (0.010) Predicts failure perf
a Reduces sample size, and data only for 2010 (is assumed to be the same in other years; b Here, year dummies are excluded but year (to proxy 
linear trend) is included; d = dummies, ENGO = environm. NGO, MP = member of parliament; p45 = post 1945; ratif. = ratified; y. = years
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10.4 Annex to Chapter 7 (Mobilizing private finance) 
 
10.4.1 Skewness and kurtosis of dependent variables  
 
PD=Project document, EV= evaluations 
* = p-value <0.1, ** = p-value <0.5, *** = p-value <0.01  
 
 
 
10.4.2 Pearson’s product moment correlation coefficient for GEF covariates 
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cost-effectiveness (PD) 1.00  
Ln cost-effectiveness (PD) 0.65 1.00 
cost-effectiveness (EV) 0.43 0.41 1.00
Ln cost-effectiveness (EV) 0.47 0.61 0.56 1.00
Private investments 0.09 0.20 0.18 0.35 1.00
Public investments -0.16 -0.13 -0.03 0.29 0.09 1.00
International grants -0.11 -0.09 -0.17 -0.04 0.02 0.20 1.00
National grants 0.07 0.01 0.00 0.17 -0.07 0.10 -0.11 1.00
World Bank -0.13 0.03 -0.02 0.24 0.13 0.46 -0.01 -0.18 1.00 
Size of the economy 0.27 0.35 0.63 0.43 0.30 -0.05 -0.20 0.03 0.11 1.00 
Size of project 0.08 0.11 0.36 0.35 0.26 0.17 -0.15 -0.08 0.35 0.57 1.00 
Date of approval -0.10 -0.15 0.07 0.13 0.07 0.10 0.13 0.20 0.09 -0.03 0.06 1.00
 
  
GEF/ 
CDM 
Variable N Mean Standard 
Deviation
Skew-
ness
Skewness 
(p value) 
Kurto-
sis 
Kurtosis 
(p value) 
GEF Cost-effectiveness (PD) 101 1.00 2.42 4.75  0.00*** 30.82  0.00*** 
 Ln cost-effectiveness (PD) 89 -1.50 1.96 -0.03  0.90 2.49  0.31 
 Cost-effectiveness (EV) 43 1.17 2.92 4.28  0.00*** 22.20  0.00*** 
 Ln cost-effectiveness (EV) 40 -1.80 2.55 -0.53  0.14 2.74  0.99 
CDM Cost-effectiveness (PD) 218 0.47 0.78 3.39  0.00*** 16.63  0.00*** 
 Ln cost-effectiveness (PD) 218 -1.63 1.64 -1.15  0.00*** 5.15  0.00*** 
 Cost-effectiveness (EV) 68 0.32 0.76 5.99  0.00*** 42.68  0.00*** 
 Ln cost-effectiveness (EV) 68 -1.80 2.55 -0.97  0.00*** 4.40  0.00*** 
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10.4.3 Pearson’s product moment correlation coefficient for CDM covariates 
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cost-effectiveness (PD) 1.00  
Ln cost-effectiveness (PD) 0.65 1.00  
cost-effectiveness (EV) 0.94 0.44 1.00
Ln cost-effectiveness (EV) 0.59 0.94 0.53 1.00
Private  investments 0.20 0.20 -0.06 0.08 1.00  
Public investments 0.08 0.10 -0.01 0.13 -0.20 1.00  
Privately owned 0.10 0.17 -0.03 0.17 0.45 -0.45 1.00  
Size of the economy 0.01 0.14 -0.06 0.20 -0.11 0.19 -0.38 1.00   
Size of project 0.37 0.22 0.90 0.31 -0.10 0.07 -0.16 0.11 1.00 
Date of approval -0.12 -0.17 -0.31 -0.34 -0.06 -0.21 0.17 -0.08 -0.16 1.00 
 
 
 
10.4.4 Correlation between investment intensity and cost-effectiveness of evaluated projects  
 
GEF 
 
Pearson’s pair-wise 
correlation coefficient   
Spearman’s rank-ordered pair-wise 
correlation coefficient 
Cost-effectiveness (logarithm) Cost-effectiveness (logarithm) 
Private investments 0.35** 0.42*** 
N=40; * = p-value <0.1, ** = p-value <0.05, *** = p-value <0.01  
 
 
 
CDM 
 
Pearson’s pair-wise  
correlation coefficient   
Spearman’s rank-ordered pair-wise 
correlation coefficient 
Cost-effectiveness (logarithm) Cost-effectiveness (logarithm) 
Private investments 0.08 0.12 
N=68; * = p-value <0.1, ** = p-value <0.05, *** = p-value <0.01  
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